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A bstract
Mid-nineteenth century Americans' treatment of their urban environment was
governed by a pervasive culture of change. Change in buildings and land uses was
thought both inevitable and good. This study examines Boston as a case study of
reactions to and ultimate abandonment of this culture of change.
Starting in the 1860s, Americans responded with increasing dismay to the pace of
environmental change. Some associated it with unwelcome social changes. A growing
ideology of home and family increased sensitivity to neighborhood change. The
beginnings of city planning theory questioned the economic waste of frequent changes
in buildings and land use. The parks movement suggested an alternative, government
action to make at least some parts of the urban environment permanent.
Private deed restrictions addressed change in the domestic environment. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's 1863 Parker v. Nightingale decision made
restrictions available as a legal tool for long-term enforcement of land use controls.
Developers responded by marketing the permanence of new neighborhoods. By the
early twentieth century both law and restrictions themselves emphasized flexibility in
order to achieve continuing control rather than permanence.
The historic preservation movement addressed change in certain pieces of the existing
environment. Early preservationists concentrated on structures such as the Old South
Church and the Old State House which they saw as monuments of historic events.
Efforts to protect historic public spaces such as Boston Common helped shift the
movement's concerns from the historical to the visual. By the end of the century, a
continuing series of ad hoc preservation campaigns emphasized landmarks valued for
their aesthetic contribution to the urban landscape, such as the Bulfinch State House
and Park Street Church. Preservationists paid attention to ever larger swaths of urban
landscape until they were restoring whole neighborhoods, beginning with Beacon Hill.
When the preservation movement was institutionalized by the 1910 foundation of the
Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities, it retreated from these broad
environmental concerns to instead take an archaeological approach to old buildings as
individual artifacts.
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The shortcomings of private efforts to protect neighborhoods and landmarks led to
the use of government powers to supplement deed restrictions and preservation efforts.
Bostonians used first eminent domain and then the police power to set building lines
and height limits in Boston's Back Bay and Beacon Hill districts, setting national
precedents that culminated in comprehensive zoning. These government actions
focused less on environmental permanence than on control of continuing development.
While zoning was enacted with an explicitly preservationist rationale, by the time it was
in practice the control it offered could be used to speed as well as to retard the pace of
change.
By the end of the 1920s these reforms fundamentally altered the city-building
process. Certain features of the environment were thought of as permanent and in
practice were mainly made exempt from change. Development of the rest of the city
took place within a framework of public policies controlling environmental change.
thesis supervisor: Robert M. Fogelson
Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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Introduction
Any Boston man who had come of age in time for the Civil War, looking around
himself at the turn of the century, would have seen a city almost completely altered
since his youth. Not a single original building stood in whole swaths of the city;
indeed, much of the ground beneath the city had not existed. As great as these physical
changes were, he would find even greater changes in the ways Bostonians went about
building and inhabiting their city.
His parents, no matter how wealthy and no matter where they lived, almost certainly
moved to a new neighborhood; if not, they watched their old one change so much that,
in effect, a new neighborhood came to them. He, on the other hand, could have raised
his children in, and still live in the same neighborhood, essentially unchanged except
for the satisfying growth of its trees. If like most mobile Americans he did move, it
could be with the satisfaction of knowing that he did so by choice, and not because the
changing city had forced him to. If he had the money, he had his pick of
neighborhoods in any of which he might remain for the rest of his days without
worrying about encroachments from businesses or tenements.
When such encroachments had appeared on his boyhood street, his parents, no matter
what their feelings about it, probably reacted by trying to cash in on the changing land
uses as profitably as they could, in order once again to secure a suitable home. The
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cycle from fashionable new residential area to slum or commercial use could take as
little as ten or fifteen years.1
If such unwelcome changes intruded onto his own street, he would probably react
differently, and a different response was usually available: he and his neighbors could
sue to enforce deed restrictions prohibiting non-residential uses or multi-family
occupancy. While real estate wisdom had once held that such restrictions diminished
land value, he was more likely to consider them essential to it.
When he worked or shopped downtown, he would be aware of the tremendous
changes there. His generation had watched approvingly as row after row of eighteenth-
century houses were pulled down to make way for mercantile 'palaces,' which they
cheerfully expected to see replaced in their time by still more wonderful buildings. Yet
many of the landmarks pointed out in his childhood - the Old South Church, Old State
House, Kings Chapel and its burial ground - were still there for him to pass every day.
As a young man he would reasonably have expected every one of these to disappear
during his lifetime. Now as he approached his old age he would be equally confident
that they would all remain for his grandchildren to show to their own grandchildren.
Similarly, he would have expected to see the townhouses of Beacon Hill and then the
Back Bay fall before the expansion of elevator apartments and office buildings, and if
he were a man of ordinary sensibilities he would applaud the city's successful growth
and give thanks for its increasing tax base. Yet now the city, responding to a great
popular outcry, if not from him then from his wife and daughters, was spending rather
than collecting, in order to prohibit these tall buildings and save the old neighborhoods
where they were rising. If our Bostonian lived to a ripe old age, he would have seen
these trends continue to their culmination in comprehensive zoning, a degree of public
control unthinkable when he was young, and for the equally unthinkable end of
preventing, rather than encouraging, change in the city.
1 Homer Hoyt, One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago: The Relationship of the Growth of
Chicago to the Rise of Its Land Values, 1830-1933 (Chicago, 1933), 189-192; Walter Firey, Land Use
in Central Boston (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), 61-68.
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The questions
Today Americans take for granted the shared value of continuity in the built
environment. Neighborhood stability and historic preservation are universally approved
as principles, and in practice become controversial only when they conflict with one
another or with other interests.
In the mid-nineteenth century things were profoundly different. The whole culture of
planning and building was based on continual change. Real estate investors anticipated
ever-denser use, and residential property was valued and developed with an eye to its
eventual conversion for commercial purposes. Subdivisions were often re-platted
during the development process to allow denser building. Neighborhood deterioration,
if unwelcome, was accepted as inevitable.
Old buildings were regarded with distaste. They were 'firetraps,' 'eyesores,' often
converted to unintended uses with unsightly results. Historically significant buildings
were not exempt from this perception; while Bostonians took great pride in them, their
appreciation was not aesthetic. In North America as in Europe, such buildings might be
saved as 'ancient monuments,' but they were symbols to be adorned rather than
artifacts to be preserved, and in retrospect their treatment often has been called
vandalism.
Around the end of the nineteenth century, all these things changed:
Increasingly complex infrastructure, more elaborate and expensive building types,
and the considerable social and economic costs of continual reconstruction and
relocation lent increasing attractiveness to what planner Charles H. Cheney later called
"building for permanency." 2 If the city could begin to take a permanent shape, then
2Charles H. Cheney, 'Building for Permanency: The Esthetic Considerations in a Master or City Plan,'
in Planning Problems of Town, City, and Region: Papers and Discussions at the Twentieth National
Conference on City Planning (Philadelphia, 1928), 32. See discussion in Marc A. Weiss, The Rise of
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durable infrastructure such as streets, lots, utilities and transit lines could be configured
for particular land uses rather than for generalized speculative potential. The late
nineteenth century produced Romantic suburbs notable not just for their quality as
residential designs, but for the very idea that a subdivision could be designed to remain
residential, not merely ill-equipped for but actively designed to resist conversion to
other uses. Deed restrictions imposed legally what subdivisions attempted spatially -
establishing a permanent form and use for the urban fabric. Real estate thinking, the
main normative theory of urban form during this period, underwent a subtle but
fundamental shift from a speculative outlook to one focused on stability of investment
and permanence of value. Beginning in the 1890s, land use and building height
regulations - the predecessors of modern zoning - imposed on existing areas the same
kinds of restrictions being put into deeds in new subdivisions. For the first time,
American cities explicitly sought to avert change in their patterns of land use and built
form. The impulse received its clearest expression in the preservation movement, which
began, as an urban phenomenon, in this period.
Other examples of the search for permanence can be drawn from fields further
removed from urban planning. In architecture, the Colonial Revival style emerged in
the 1880s, reinforcing preservationism and at the same time creating the potential for a
permanently established community architectural identity. The same period saw the first
movement to forever set aside wilderness areas as national and state parks, and the
beginning of efforts to preserve archaeological remains of pre-Columbian settlement.3
'Perpetual care' cemeteries aimed to secure an earthly durability corresponding to
spiritual eternity. 4
Attitudes about environmental stability, and approaches to achieving it, changed so
thoroughly and along so many parallel lines that the changes appear in retrospect as a
single phenomenon. Some of these changes have received attention from historians;
the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land Planning (New York,
1987), 61.
3Norman T. Newton, Design on the Land: The Development of Landscape Architecture (Cambridge,
Mass., 1971), 517-527.
4James J. Farrell, Inventing the American Way of Death, 1830-1920 (Philadelphia, 1980), 137.
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some have received little. Even when they have been studied, they have seldom been
studied in relationship to one another. The attempt to secure environmental permanence
was not a single coordinated 'movement,' because its participants did not identify it as
one. Nonetheless, people in diverse fields were saying the same things; often they were
the same people, responding to threats the connections between which they might be
only dimly aware of.
How did attitudes toward environmental continuity change at the end of the nineteenth
century? Why did permanence become a goal for people dealing with so many different
parts of the built environment? How did they try to achieve it? What kind of
groundwork did their efforts lay for twentieth century planning, preservation, and
perception of American cities?
The inur
This study examines the culture of city-building, a branch of material culture. It is a
history of what people thought, but only insofar as it affected what people did.
Lots of people were involved in making cities, and so this study examines culture not
in any elite sense, but rather culture as the working suppositions of a wide range of
different kinds of people: real estate speculators; legislators and ward politicians;
lawyers, surveyors, civil engineers, architects, and their emerging professional kin,
landscape architects and city planners; and, in general, the well-to-do third of the
population who made up these other groups' customers, clients, and activist
constituencies.
The inquiry inevitably focuses on the upper and substantial middle classes. Part of its
subject is perception, and these are the classes who left written records of their
perceptions. The rest of its subject is the processes of decision making about urban
change, and the upper and upper middle classes controlled those processes (in other
words, they left the built record as well as the written record). Finally, sociologists
often claim that cultural changes begin at the upper strata of society and diffuse through
the rest. I believe that is the case here, but there is little in the historical record to answer
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the question. Studies of residential mobility indicate that only the upper classes were
likely to stay in one place long enough even to know about the pace of environmental
change. Working-class and lower middle-class people presumably had more immediate
and tangible worries than the pace of change in their surroundings; on the other hand
there is no prima facie reason to suppose they found environmental change any less
disruptive than did their upper-class contemporaries. Labor unions as well as
millionaires protested encroachments on Boston Common.
Whether or not classes actually agreed, not much of this story is about class conflict.
In a few of the issues I explore, the upper or middle classes clearly perceived and acted
against threats from lower classes. More often, all but the elite were implicitly excluded
by issues involving ancestral mansions, Revolutionary forebears, or expensive
neighborhoods. Most of the episodes pitted different elites against one another -
wealthy householders against commercial developers, or factions within the
congregations of upper-class churches. Even if the working classes were equally
interested in neighborhood stability, their disputes were less likely to end up in the
courts or before the legislature. Disputes of the upper classes, on the other hand, forged
attitudes and legal tools later used by the rest of society.
While my focus on upper classes is inherent, my focus on the city is deliberate. This
is a study about the shaping of the urban environment, at the urban scale. The
movement for national and state parks was related (especially as it was led by many of
the same members of the urban elite), but beyond my scope, as its setting was not
urban. Emergence of the Colonial Revival style for new buildings is also connected, as
is re-use and museum curatorship of historic building pieces, but all these are smaller
than the scale of the city. Within my scope is preservation of whole existing Colonial
buildings, especially public buildings which served as landmarks around which
perception of the whole city might take shape.
This study is organized around three important strands of the pursuit of permanence:
deed restrictions, historic preservation, and public development regulations.
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Deed restrictions, by which subdividers imposed long-term land use and design
controls, addressed the stability of prospective environments, pieces of the city in the
process of production. They are important because they contradicted and challenged the
speculative heart of thinking about change in the urban environment. Previous studies
of deed restrictions have emphasized their design and social intentions and
consequences. I will emphasize instead the very idea of control and permanence and the
radical departure this represented from prior real estate experience.
Historic preservation addressed the stability of extant environments. It emerged in
two generations from being an extreme form of antiquarianism, seemingly out of place
in the New World, to first, an accepted approach for extraordinary features of the
environment, and, by the end of the period, an institutionalized public policy and in
some cases a way of thinking about whole urban environments. Popular conflict
between change and permanence often appeared as historically informed opposition to
change in public spaces and landscapes, although these are not traditionally defined as
the mainstream of historic preservation.
Public regulation of urban growth and change expanded the private tools of
restrictions and preservation. It shows a late nineteenth century shift from viewing
government as an agency for promoting environmental change, to seeing government
as the only entity able to control change and secure environmental stability. While the
origins of this public control lie in sanitation, safety, and regulating private use of
public space, by the early twentieth century some public powers had evolved
specifically for controlling visible change in the environment. The first of these was
building height restrictions, and then building setbacks and use districts; these were all
brought together finally as comprehensive zoning.
Boston was in the forefront of all these changes. It was the source of critical caselaw
establishing deed restrictions as a tool for private planning. It was one of the earliest
centers of urban preservationism. Its building height restrictions, the first in the
country, provided one of the most important national precedents for zoning. Reactions
to change were stronger, earlier, and more successful in Boston than elsewhere. The
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reasons for this were many, and they point to Boston as not an anomaly but a
prototype.
Interest in permanence soon took hold in other cities across the country, including
cities strongly identified with change. Chicago enacted building height restrictions only
a year after Boston did, and they were later adopted or urged with preservationist
rationales in Baltimore and on Fifth Avenue in New York.5 Land developers across the
country adopted deed restrictions as an essential part of their craft, and historic
preservation similarly became a nationwide movement with adherents in such unlikely
places as Chicago and the west coast. By the early 1880s, westerners were already
working to save some of their heritage of Spanish colonial settlement, and by the end of
the decade their interest had expanded to include the remnants of Anglo-American
arrival only forty years before. 6
While Bostonians often invoked their Revolutionary past as a heritage distinguishing
their city from others, and an established elite did its best to reinforce the city's image
as an intellectual center, it was first of all a big commercial and industrial city, and it
was growing fast. Boston was fully a part of the prevailing nineteenth century culture
of change.
5Garrett Power, 'High Society: The Building Height Limitation on Baltimore's Mt. Vernon Place,'
Maryland Historical Magazine 79 (1984): 197-219; Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York,
1969).
6Charles B. Hosmer, Jr., Presence of the Past: A History of the Preservation Movement in the United
States Before Williamsburg (New York, 1965), 124-126.
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CHAPTER ONE:
The culture of change
Let us welcome whatever change may come.
- Nathaniel Hawthorne, 18631
"Changzeful times"2
At 7:24 PM, on Saturday, November 9, 1872, the Boston fire department logged a
report from alarm box 52 at Summer and Kingston Streets in downtown Boston. An
epidemic had idled most horses in the city, so a team of men pulled a single pumping
engine to the scene. When they got there, they found that the fire had already spread up
an elevator shaft and completely consumed the four-story building. They discovered to
their horror that water mains laid when this was a residential area carried only enough
water to reach two or three stories, and as more engines arrived and connected their
hoses the pressure dropped lower. The fire easily jumped the narrow streets, aided by
fashionable new Mansard roofs which jutted their wooden cornices toward one another
out of reach of the firefighters' streams. The combination of dangerous buildings and
inadequate protection had recently led London and Liverpool insurance underwriters to
conclude that downtown Boston was a disaster waiting to happen.3 It was happening.
1Nathaniel Hawthorne, Our Old Home: A Series of English Sketches (Columbus, 1970), 5:60.
2Chandler Robbins, Two sermons, delivered before the Second Church and Society, Sunday, March 10,
1844, on the occasion of taking down their ancient place of worship (Boston, 1844), 41.
3Boston Globe, August 9, 1873: 8.
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During the night Chief Engineer John S. Damrell ordered his men to begin
dynamiting buildings to clear firebreaks, but their untrained efforts often spread the
flames. The fire stopped at the walls of the Old South Church only through some
combination of divine intervention and the heroic efforts of firefighters. By the time the
Great Fire was brought under control on Monday, fourteen people had died and 65
acres of the heart of the city were smoking rubble and surreal heat-sculpted granite.4
fig. 1.1. Boston after the Fire, 1872. The spire of the Old South Church, far right,
marks one edge of the burnt district. At far left, the burnt-out shell of Trinity Church
breaks the horizon like a sooty castle.
In spite of the fire's immense destruction, and the magnificence of the buildings it
consumed,5 the city was strangely free of mourning for them. Bostonians hardly knew
the place. The 'burnt district' had already changed out of all recognition when it became
a downtown business area. If the public felt any sentimental attachments here, they
were to the residences and gardens which had only recently been displaced. The fire
spared Old South Church, "almost the only building of historic significance within the
burnt district..." 6 Yet the Old South, like burned-out Trinity Church, had already
4Christine Meisner Rosen, The limits of power: Great fires and the process of city growth in America
(New York, 1986), 177-79.
5Boston Globe, November 21, 1872: 4.
6Editorial: 'Historical aspect of the fire,' Boston Globe, November 15, 1872: 4.
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decided to move elsewhere; they were lost in plans if not yet in fact. Perhaps the fire
was not traumatic because the city had sustained its trauma here piecemeal as the area
was transformed. The burnt district was already scar tissue. The fire was only a more
dramatic instance of what Bostonians were doing for themselves.
For most Bostonians the area's recent reconstruction operated in another way to
preclude nostalgia. Memories of building it were so fresh, and the result was
considered so successful, that it seemed no real problem to do it again. In this widely-
held view, rebuilding Boston was an opportunity. Crooked and narrow old streets
could be made wide and straight, and buildings more fire-resistant; in the end the Great
Fire would leave Boston bigger and better.
To support this view Boston had only to look to Chicago, which had suffered a
vastly more damaging fire just a year earlier. Despite fears (or in some quarters hopes)
that the disaster would set Chicago back permanently, by the time Boston burned
Chicago's ambitious reconstruction had already made it "beautified, stronger, more
successful than ever."7 The fire only enhanced Chicago's legend.
Chicago was the prodigy of nineteenth century urbanization, but cities throughout the
western world grew at prodigious rates, especially in North America. Many, founded
in or just before the century, would grow to hundreds of thousands. As Homer Hoyt
wrote in 1933, with a mixture of awe and pride:
The growth of Chicago in the nineteenth century has been paralleled by that of no
other great city of a million population or over in either ancient or modern times ....
It compressed within a single century the population growth of Paris for twenty
centuries. From 1840 to 1890, the rapidity of its development outstripped that of
every other city in the world. An insignificant town in 1840, ... by 1890 it was the
second city in point of numbers in the United States. In 1930 only London, New
York and Berlin - all much older - contained more people. 8
The growth of established seaport cities like Boston and Philadelphia was less
impressive only by comparison. In fact before Chicago took its place as the emblem of
7Editorial: 'The Bright Side,' Boston Globe, November 15, 1872: 4.
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American urban growth, its symbol was Boston's own industrial satellite of Lowell,
the nation's fourteenth largest city in 1840,9 'the American Manchester,' where
nineteen years earlier stood only a few farms.
Bostonians were no less aggressive in developing their own city and its suburbs. By
any objective standard - population, wealth, building - the city grew fast. When the
Town of Boston became a municipality in 1822, its real estate was assessed at $23
million. By the decade after the Civil War, the city added that much to its valuation each
year.10 Up to 1880, Boston's population grew by a third to a half each decade. While
this percentage growth eventually slowed, Boston on the average added almost 10,000
inhabitants each year in the 50 years after 1860. Only New York, Chicago,
Philadelphia, Cleveland, and St. Louis equalled this absolute increase.
These new residents had to live somewhere. Boston in 1840 was a city of 93,000
crammed into substantially the same square-mile peninsula as the colonial town of two
hundred years earlier. This circumstance had already resulted in complete abandonment
of detached houses, even for the rich, and extreme overcrowding for the poor. Those
who were in between increasingly left for the suburbs - the working classes walking
across bridges to Charlestown, Cambridgeport, or South Boston, the middle classes
settling the nation's first commuter suburbs along railroads leading out of the city.
Boston had no room for more people, yet it continued to grow. Even though its
suburbs consistently grew faster than the city, Boston added, on average, its entire
1840 population each decade from 1860 to 1920.
In order to accomplish this growth, Bostonians completely remade their whole
environment, over and over, working "such a transformation as no other great city of
the world has ever undergone at the hands of man," as a contemporary historian
8Hoyt, One Hundred Years of Land Values, 279.
9Lowell was also the third largest city in New England. Seventh Census of the United States: 1850
(1853), table XXXIV.
10Charles S. Damrell, A Half Century of Boston's Building (Boston, 1895), 356, 358. For the years
1871-74 (the first for which building statistics are available), the increase came about two-thirds
through appreciation and one-third through new construction; see John F. Fitzgerald, Annual Address of
... Mayor of Boston, to the City Council (City doc. 1, 1907), app. 9.
20
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described it.11 They shovelled hills into bays to more than double the peninsula's area.
They turned to housing innovations, such as buildings intentionally designed as
tenements, and the American premiere of 'French flats,' or apartments. Boston also
annexed adjacent suburbs, though with less success than other American big cities.
Whether annexed or not, the once-rural landscapes near the city soon sprouted densely-
built houses and streets as far as the eye could see.
While these new areas spread, Boston was also reworking the old city plan at its
center. Mayor Alexander H. Rice, in his 1856 annual review of the city's finances,
reminded citizens that
Boston is subjected to one item of expense which is almost unknown in cities of
modem origin ... the numerous narrow and crooked streets which well enough
answered the convenience of a provincial town, are found to be totally inadequate to
the wants of a great city, daily becoming more and more crowded with business
and population.12
So Boston widened and cut through new arteries. The pace increased when the
legislature in 1868 finally granted the city the right to recover some of the costs from
property-owners who benefitted. 13 "... [I]t seems inevitable," said Mayor Rice, "that
these improvements must continue, until a considerable portion of our original territory
has been rebuilt." 14
What was life like in such a changing environment? Mid-nineteenth century city
dwellers' lives were so unsettled as to make this question unimportant for many of
them. Peter R. Knights' research on residential persistence and mobility in Boston
before the Civil War reaches the startling conclusion that "one-half of Boston's
population would disappear and be replaced every one or two years." 15 Those who
remained moved around within the city, and the rate at which they moved was
11Edward Stanwood, 'Topography and Landmarks of the Last Hundred Years,' in Justin Winsor, ed.,
The Memorial History of Boston, including Suffolk County, Massachusetts. 1630-1880 (Boston,
1881), 3:25.
12Alexander H. Rice, Inaugural Address of ... Mayor of the City of Boston, to the City Council (City
doc. 1, 1856), 12.
13Rosen, The limits of power, 185.
14Rice, InauguralAddress (1856), 13.
15Peter R. Knights, The Plain People of Boston, 1830-1860: A Study in City Growth (New York,
1971), 59.
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
increasing. If Knights' samples are representative, then Boston's 1860 population of
178,000 included fewer than 4,000 household heads who had lived in the city in
1830.16 Since this stable minority consisted disproportionately of the well-to-do, it was
mainly these classes who had the chance to see environmental change affecting their
own lives. We can begin to understand those effects by looking at changes in elite
neighborhoods.
Before the end of the eighteenth century, the city had no real elite sections. Merchants
and the wealthy lived in many parts of colonial Boston, especially the center of town,
the pleasant high grounds overlooking it, and the North End, which was if anyplace the
preferred neighborhood. When the North End's royalists left with evacuating British
troops, the area began a slow decline in fortunes, eventually to become an immigrant
tenement district. The center of the city, around State Street, also lost its residential
attractiveness with the growth of business after the war. Movement from these two
areas, together with growth of the city's upper classes, made fashionable
neighborhoods expand in every other direction. In 1795 the Mount Vernon Proprietors
began developing Beacon Hill from a ragged wasteland into a homogeneous upper-
class district. South of State Street, pleasant houses and gardens grew up in the old
'South End' of Summer, Franklin, and Pearl Streets and Fort Hill, and after 1810 this
district spread westward to Tremont Street and Park Street, facing Beacon Hill across
the Common. Increasing segregation of land uses yielded a growing turf for the well-
to-do, but even where it was shrinking, as in the North End, the process was
reassuringly gradual.
As the peninsula filled in to urban densities, elite residential areas maintained stable
locations, but changed in form, as when Patrick T. Jackson in the early 1830s levelled
almost-rural Pemberton Hill and its mansions to create Pemberton Square and its fine
rowhouses. 17
1611.4% of 1860 sample members "present in Boston at start of' 1830, multiplied by 33,633
households in 1860 (Knights, Plain People, Tables IV-6, IV-5, 57, 56).
17Walter Muir Whitehill, Boston: A Topographical History (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 106-111.
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By the next decade, however, intensifying competition for space had less benign
effects on these neighborhoods. "The alterations here surpass all you can conceive,"
wrote Charles Bulfinch to his son in 1843.18 The business district expanded south into
Franklin and Pearl Streets; from the other direction waterfront warehouses encroached
on Fort Hill. Residents sold out to speculators, and this time neighborhood change was
not gradual. While Fort Hill's new owners waited to build business blocks, they
carried their investments by packing houses from cellar to attic with the Irish who were
arriving at and working on the docks below.
The Fort Hill and Pearl Street aristocracy moved to Tremont Street, Temple Place,
and Bedford Street, expanding the old South End below Summer Street. They found
themselves almost immediately in the path of the newly-emerging retail district, which
by 1847 had an outpost on Washington Street as far south as Summer Street.19 A
horsecar line which opened on Washington Street in 1856 gave additional impetus to
this retail invasion, but it also provided a residential alternative.
The streetcars ran to the new South End, a comparatively vast area of land being filled
along the neck which connected Boston to the mainland. The city had been trying for
decades to lure suburban-minded middle-class residents here, and starting in 1856 it
succeeded. The South End, according to historian Walter Firey, was "the distinctly
preferred residential district of the city"20 during the 1860s, while business blocks
quickly replaced Summer and Tremont Street houses. Upper-class preferences soon
switched to the new Back Bay (see fig. 1.2.), and by 1873 the South End was already
recognized as a declining area being converted to roominghouses. Of all the changing
neighborhoods, the South End's rise and fall was the most traumatic. Not only was its
fashionable life-span the shortest yet, but unlike Fort Hill and the Summer Street
district, its departing residents generally sold not at a handsome gain but at a loss.
18June 12, 1843 letter to his son, in Bulfinch, Ellen Susan, ed., The Life and Letters of Charles
Bulfinch, Architect (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1896), 301.
19Firey, Land Use in Central Boston, 59.
20Firey, Land Use in Central Boston, 61.
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So long as fashionable neighborhoods moved around within the limits of the city's
original peninsula, they were never out of easy walking distance of the shared
environment of public spaces and buildings, particularly churches, which anchored the
changes in people's individual environments. By the 1840s neighborhood changes
were tearing these anchors loose. Churches began moving, pulled by wholesale
migration of their congregations and pushed by the altered character of their old
locations. Of the thirteen churches which in 1845 served the old Summer Street district
east of Washington Street, deacon Frederick D. Allen of the Old South Church reported
in 1872 that one had closed its doors and eleven had moved elsewhere. Only the Old
South remained, and its leaders, said Allen, "have long regarded the ultimate removal
of our place of worship as inevitable." 21
One of the departures on Allens' list was the Second Church. When Chandler
Robbins succeeded Ralph Waldo Emerson to its pulpit in 1833, the congregation
occupied the oldest church structure in the city, on Hanover Street in the North End.22
Before Robbins retired in 1874, the church would make its home in five different
buildings, not counting temporary accomodations.
Even before Robbins' ministry, the Second Church's members had begun agitating to
move from the North End. The hundred-year-old building was increasingly difficult to
maintain, and its location increasingly unattractive to the congregation. During
Emerson's tenure their dissatisfaction was already sufficiently public that the Roman
Catholic Diocese in 1832 expressed interest in buying the building, an offer which was
itself a significant indicator of neighborhood change. By 1840 the majority of the
congregation, including its most well-to-do members, had moved away from the
neighborhood, and they bought a site on Beacon Hill where they proposed to build a
new church. Robbins sought a compromise to keep the congregation intact, but he too
was convinced that the church would have to move. The North End faction still
21Frederick D. Allen, discussing the area bounded by Washington, State, and Essex Streets, and the
harbor; Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, Old South Society, petitioners, vs. Uriel Crocker et als. Report
of evidence taken at the hearing ... before Mr. Justice Colt (Boston, 1876), 56. See also 'Old
Landmarks Removed,' Christian Register, 5 Aug. 1871, quoted in Samuel Kirkland Lothrop, A
Discourse preached in the Church in Brattle Square, on the last Sunday of its use for public worship,
July 30, 1871. ... and an account of laying the corner-stone of the new church (Boston, 1871), 42.
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resisted, and hoped that the church had "put at rest this long agitated question" when it
voted in 1843 to demolish and rebuild on the same site.23 During the year of
construction, the congregation worshipped in the Old South Church, and the South End
majority could not have failed to appreciate its convenience as compared with Hanover
Street. The new building saddled the church with debt, while members continued to
drift away, and in 1849, by necessity rather than by choice, the congregation sold it and
left their historic neighborhood. Wealthy parishioners had offered to save the building,
Robbins afterward claimed, but he felt the church would fail if it remained in the
changing North End. Instead it was set adrift. For a while Robbins preached to his
flock in the Masonic Temple, until the congregation bought a small chapel at almost the
same spot on Beacon Hill to which they had refused to move ten years earlier. In
1854, they absorbed another congregation in order to take over its church south of
Summer Street on pleasant, tree-lined Bedford Street, just the sort of home the Second
Church had been looking for. But even as Robbins moved his flock into their new
quarters, businesses were moving in around them. In only eighteen years, the
congregation dispersed even more thoroughly than they had done from the North End,
and once more its members decided to move on. This time, they packed up to bring
with them the pulpit, pews, stained glass, and the very stones of their building. When
they did so - early in 1872 - they were not yet sure where they would go. They bought
a lot in the South End, but this time sensed impending neighborhood change even
before they moved in. They rebuilt instead at Copley Square, in the Back Bay.24
2 2Robbins, Two Sermons ... March 10, 1844, 3.
23Chandler Robbins, Sermon, delivered before the proprietors of the Second Church, Wednesday,
September 17, 1845, at the dedication of their new house of worship (Boston, 1845), quoting from the
October 19, 1843 vote of the congregation; Chandler Robbins, History of the Second Church, or Old
North, in Boston, to which is added, a history of the New Brick Church (Boston, 1852), 146-48, 159.
24George H. Eager, comp., Historical sketch of the Second Church in Boston (Boston, 1894), 35-36;
Chandler Robbins, History of the Second Church, 155-57. Even this church, though dedicated in 1874
to stand for "years, even through centuries, to come" (Chandler Robbins, A Sermon preached at the
dedication of the Second Church, Boylston Street, November 4th, 1874 [Boston, 1875],4), only lasted
until 1912, when the Second Church, again finding its fashionable residential location overtaken by
business, once again moved, this time to a more-or-less suburban location at the Brookline border,
where they remain. The building was once again dismantled, this time to be re-used elsewhere in the
city by a different congregation. (John Nicholls Booth, The Story of the Second Church in Boston [The
Original Old North] including the Old North Church Mystery [Boston, 19591,44-47).
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The Second Church's move was part of a stampede to the Back Bay. Federal Street
(thereafter Arlington Street) Church in 1859 bought one of the first lots filled (fig.
1.2.), helping to establish the area's aristocratic character, and three more churches
followed in the 1860s. In 1871 and 1872, Brattle Square and Old South Churches laid
cornerstones in the Back Bay, and Trinity Church, which had hesitated momentarily
about venturing out "upon the new land," acquired a site there.25 These were three of
Boston's most prestigious congregations, and their decisions to move to the Back Bay,
coming in quick succession, must have deflated in the South End any lingering hopes
of social preeminence.
The move to the Back Bay was a tide of ostentatious fashion. The Old South
Church's building committee betrayed this impulse when it requested contractors'
estimates for a new building "in every respect equal in finish" to the First Church, the
Back Bay's most recently completed arrival.26
The very idea of 'fashion' in objects as durable as buildings and urban districts
underscores the era's increasing assumptions of mutability. During the eighteenth
century, the simple Georgian style served as enough of an architectural constant that
Charles Bulfinch, enlarging Faneuil Hall in 1805, could copy its 1747 exterior details
without any sense of anachronism.27 The great majority of structures were designed in
an architectural vernacular which evolved slowly enough that new buildings looked not
too different from the old buildings they replaced, so the city remained familiar even as
its components changed. By the middle of the nineteenth century, this continuity had
broken down with the advent of widespread self-conscious architecture, as a
bewildering succession of styles clothed buildings which previously would not have
pretended to any style at all, and even humble cottages became subjects for pattern
books promoting the latest architectural fashions. As each new building sought to
25Trinity considered one site at the foot of Beacon Hill, instead; Trinity Church. Report of Committee.
January 12, 1871 (Boston, 1871), 3. See also [Bishop] William Lawrence, Address...delivered in
Trinity Church, Boston ... the ftieth anniversary of its consecration (Boston, 1927), 8.
2601d South Society, Report of Committee to consider building on Boylston Street (Boston, June 24,
1870), 6.
27Whitehill, Topographical History, 42.
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differentiate itself from its surroundings, environmental change, no matter what its
objective rate, became subjectively more noticeable.
fig. 1.2. The Back Bay, c. 1870, viewed over the Common and the Public Garden
from the State House dome. At left is the 1861 Arlington Street (formerly Federal
Street) Church; At right the beginning of Commonwealth Avenue. The vast expanse of
the as-yet unfilled Back Bay extends behind them.
Change g
A month before the 1872 fire, the Globe cheerfully described just how noticeable
change had become:
Bostonians who have been absent from their native city for a few years, return to
express astonishment as they regard the rapid growth of the city .... Extended
avenues, squares, and elegant blocks of buildings are springing up every
twelvemonth, and the town is increasing in its number of inhabitants with
unprecedented rapidity .... Old landmarks and localities have almost completely
disappeared, and about one-half of Boston to-day is built upon made ground,
reclaimed from the tide waters. The Back Bay - scene of past skatings, and
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boatings, and smeltings, and snipe shootings, has vanished, giving place to palatial
residences, elegant parks, superb avenues, and scores of stone churches whose
architectural beauty cannot be excelled.28
Like the Globe's editor, most nineteenth century Americans sensed the acceleration
of change, and by and large they agreed it was good. Their approval exhibited two
strains of thought. The Globe's comments belonged to the first one, optimistic and
imbued with rationality, which viewed change as improvement, emphasizing material
progress, gradual and continual. The older strain thought of change as renewal,
emphasizing less the good to come than the corruption of what was old, and thus the
necessity of starting anew. No sharp line divided these two views; they reinforced one
another, as Nathaniel Hawthorne showed a few years earlier in recounting an
American's reflections on a perfectly preserved English village:
his delight at finding something permanent begins to yield to his Western love of
change, .... Better than this is the lot of our restless countrymen, whose modern
instinct bids them tend always towards 'fresh woods and pastures new.' Rather
than the monotony of sluggish ages, loitering on a village-green, toiling in
hereditary fields, listening to the parson's drone lengthening through centuries in
the gray Norman church, let us welcome whatever change may come - change of
place, social customs, political institutions, modes of worship - trusting that, if all
present things shall vanish, they will but make room for better systems, and for a
higher type of man to clothe his life in them, and fling them off in turn.29
The older strain of thought, viewing change as renewal, was a remnant of American
revolutionary ideology. Bostonians evoked even earlier roots in the Puritan founders'
search for a new beginning. The view is akin to the Millennial tradition which
anticipated the ultimate end of a corrupt world and the beginning of a good one.
Americans in each generation saw theirs as the time which marked this divide. In the
enlightenment's secularized version renewal was cyclical: each generation had not only
the right but the responsibility to make its world anew. Thomas Jefferson stated the
principle most starkly: "the dead have no rights."30
28Boston Globe, October 8, 1872: 4.
29Hawthorne, Our Old Home, 5:59-60.
30Jefferson to Samuel Kerscheval, July 12, 1816, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Albert Ellery
Bergh (Washington, D.C., 1903) 15:42-43; David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country
(Cambridge, England, 1985), 108.
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While both Puritan and Republican thought dealt mainly with institutions and society,
they were easily translated into principles for the environment. Puritans rejected the
notion of hallowed ground and thus, in theory, the stabilizing influence of consecrated
houses of worship. As for Americans of the early nineteenth century, while their
architecture sought to validate the Republic through timeless Greek Revival buildings in
durable granite, Hawthorne suggested in House of Seven Gables that state-houses
ought to crumble every twenty years as a hint to re-examine the institutions within
them. Legal theorists of the early Republic argued along similar lines that the law,
instead of following ancient precedent, should expire to be rewritten every nineteen
years.31
American land law during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century evolved along
lines generally following this principle, if not so dramatic. Legislatures and courts
consistently ignored expectations of continuity, favoring instead productive use and
change. Past generations' legal edifices, like their physical ones, would be torn down
and built over to suit the living. For example, American states systematically abandoned
the English common-law doctrine of 'ancient lights,' the right to prevent a new
structure from blocking an existing window. It was incompatible with "the rapidly
growing cities in this country," explained a legal commentator in 1832.32 Similarly,
nuisance doctrine was progressively relaxed to avoid fettering the growth of industries
and railroads. Even ownership itself became subject to changing circumstances,
through the doctrine of adverse possession, under which a person openly using
another's land as if it were his own would, after a period of years, gain title to it. While
this doctrine originated in English common law, nineteenth-century Americans made it
easier to invoke. Adverse possession made sense to them because it rewarded action
and reflected their impatience with often absentee or hereditary paper ownership. 33
The most direct legal interference by past generations brought the most severe
reactions: while bequests often explicitly expressed their donors' wishes, courts were
31Jefferson to Kercheval, Writings, 15:42; Daniel Boorstin, The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson
(Boston, 1960), 208-10; Lowenthal, Foreign Country, 108.
32James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 2d ed. (1832), quoted in Lawrence M. Friedman, A
History of American Law, 2d ed. (New York, 1985), 413.
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reluctant to let the dead bind the living. "A perpetual entail of real estate for special
uses, in a town destined to grow and expand, was likely in the end to become a public
nuisance," complained one clergyman who, through such an entail, had to live in his
predecessors' eighteenth-century parsonage on what by 1851 had become a noisy
downtown street.34 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed with him and
overturned the restriction four years later.35 Courts routinely read such stipulations not
as specific requirements but as general intentions subject to reinterpretation in light of
changing circumstances. A more radical view rejected the legitimacy of even general
intentions of the dead. In this view, for example, churches should be taxed so that they
would continue in existence only if they remained vital institutions commanding
continuing support; if they existed solely through endowment by earlier generations,
their endowment should be returned to the use of the living.
While this older strain of thought favored change because it viewed lack of change as
stagnation or ossification, the newer strain simply believed change was generally for
the better. Unlike the older thinking which looked for renewal mainly in society and
institutions, the improvement strain concerned itself primarily with progress in the
material world. Even people who were more interested in social or spiritual progess
could not help but be impressed at the nineteenth century's tangible accomplishments.
Rev. Chandler Robbins of the Second Church, for example, turned his eyes downward
from heaven to earth as the congregation in 1844 prepared to leave its 123-year-old
building:
what progress has society made since the corner-stone of this edifice was laid! ...
And we and our children, if we are but faithful to the mighty trust of the most
glorious present which the world has yet seen, may turn our faces forward with a
still more hopeful gaze, and expect, that ere the new temple which we are about to
33Friedman, History of American Law, 413-14.
34Samuel Kirkland Lothrop, A History of the Church in Brattle Street, Boston (Boston, 1851), 112.
35Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Moses Grant & others, 69 Mass. 142 (1855). The case
was decided not on the facts of change in the neighborhood, but on the 'rule against perpetuities,' the
general principle of not allowing permanent legal instruments beyond the reach of modification by the
living.
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rear shall crumble with age, or be exchanged for a more spacious and beautiful
house, ... its worshipers [shall] rejoice in a yet more perfect manifestation of the
kingdom of Heaven on earth.36
A nation which was then building the Brooklyn Bridge and entertaining projects to
harness Niagara thought its own powers as sublime as Nature's, and its material
progress potentially limitless. Indeed, the most insidious check on progress was
inability to imagine the future's still greater improvements. As Rev. Dr. Jacob H.
Manning prayed at the dedication of the new Old South in 1875, "Spare it only so long
as it shall serve Thy loving purpose ....When its noble walls must crumble, teach thy
people to bow in the faith of something better to come ..."37
Faith in material progress was easy in the nineteenth century. In every department of
domestic and urban technology, radical improvements became almost the norm.
Candles gave way to oil lamps and gaslight and then to the miraculous electric light.
Omnibuses appeared and then gave way to horsecars and electric streetcars and rapid
transit. Water systems, and the sewage and drainage systems they enabled and
required, rearranged both houses and streets. In the process many technological dead
ends - pneumatic transit, for example, or the many waste disposal methods which
competed with flush toilets - were explored and then abandoned, making the march of
improvement all the more bewildering. "They invent everything all over again about
every five years," explained Arthur Townsend in Henry James's 1881 Washington
Square, "and it's a great thing to keep up with the new things." 38
Even apart from technological change, the country's increasing wealth brought
evident improvements in its standard of living, at least for the classes then visible to
polite society. "In ten years," predicted one Gothamite in 1855, "the finest buildings
now in New York will be far surpassed by the growing taste and wealth of builders."39
Prosperity in turn spurred technological innovation, and the advent of mass marketing
brought these innovations to more people faster than ever before.
36Robbins, Two Sermons ... March 10, 1844, 48.
37Hamilton Andrews Hill, History of the Old South Church, 1669-1884 (Boston, 1890), 548.
38Henry James, Washington Square (London, 1949), 37.
39New York Tribune, May 3, 1855, quoted in Edward K. Spann, The New Metropolis: New York
City, 1840-1857, (New York, 1981), 101.
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A special intersection of technology, prosperity, and marketing gave rise to the
suburbanization which contemporaries found perhaps the most striking evidence of
material progress. Railroads and then horsecars made vast new tracts available for
urban housing, while growing middle classes had the resources to take advantage of
them. Detached houses with sunlight on four sides and their own gardens, no matter
how tiny, validated material progress through the moral and spiritual accomplishment
of better homes for families. Businesses' invasion of downtown residential areas was
by this thinking a positive force, since it pushed even the timid or nostalgic out to
suburban Arcadia. Nor was the migration solely to the benefit of these former
urbanites. Their arrival improved the suburbs themselves, as at the Roxbury Highlands
outside Boston, once a "a rough, ragged tract of wilderness," according to an observer
in 1872, "but now covered with elegant dwellings, embowered in trees and flowers,
presenting, at every turn, density of population and charming residences."40
Both strains of thought agreed, each by its own logic, that old things were bad and
new things good. The first assumed the point in its premise that renewal was needed.
"Whatever is old is corrupt," said Emerson, "and the past turns to snakes." 41 In the
progress strain, the superiority of the new followed more benignly from faith in
improvement. Henry James's Arthur Townsend expressed this faith in reflecting on his
new home:
"It doesn't matter, ... it's only for three or four years. At the end of three or four
years, we'll move. That's the way to live in New York - to move every three or
four years. Then you always get the last thing. It's because the city's growing so
quick - you've got to keep up with it .... when we get tired of one street we'll go
higher."42
Historian Sam Bass Warner explains the implications of streetcar suburbs'
"omnipresent newness":
40Boston Globe, August 26, 1872: 4.
4 1Ralph Waldo Emerson, 'Works and Days' (1870), quoted in Lowenthal, Foreign Country, 105.
42James, Washington Square, 37.
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Whether a man lived in a lower middle class quarter of cheap triple-deckers, or on a
fashionable street of expensive singles, the latest styles, the freshly painted houses,
the neat streets, the well-kept lawns, and the new schools and parks gave him a
sense of confidence in the success of his society and a satisfaction at his
participation in it.43
The new suburban environment, with its emphasis on landscape and nature, was an
implicit rejection of the old neighborhoods of the city, built up to the street with houses
in past generations' styles.
If historic buildings were important or worthwhile, it was in spite of their age, not
because of it. Historical significance resided in sites rather than structures; tearing down
the oldest church in Boston made sense to the Second Church congregation in 1844
because it allowed them to build anew at their traditional location. Some of Boston's
historically-minded citizens in 1826 proposed demolishing the Old State House because
its site would be an appropriate location for a statue honoring George Washington. It
was without any reluctance that they recommended "the removal of such an
encumbrance":
If no statue of Washington had been procured, the committee thought that the City
could do no act more worthy of its reputation ... than to raze the present edifice,
and to erect a column, or obelisk, as a memorial of the important use, to which that
spot had been devoted, and by which it had been consacrated [sic]..."44
Over the next half century this philosophy retained its force. Franklin Haven,
president of the Merchants' Bank, in 1881 led another attempt to get rid of the Old State
House, where "a shaft or other monument" could "best commemorate the spot and
cherish its patriotic associations." 45 The same argument was applied also to other
historic structures. The Old South was "a hideous structure, offensive to taste,"
testified Addison Davis in 1877, and "a handsome building could be erected there,
43Sam Bass Warner, Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1962), 156.
44Records of the Board of Trustees of the Washington Monument Association [July 19, 1826], MS,
Bostonian Society Library.
45Boston City Council, Joint Standing Committee on Public Buildings, The Old State House. Report
of a hearing ...on the petitionsfor and against the removal of the Old State House (City doc. 71B,
1881), 4; editorial, Boston Globe, May 31, 1872: 4.
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upon the front of which might be placed an attractive model of the old church, which
would answer every purpose of the present structure as a monument."46
Old buildings without such historic associations were subject to even clearer negative
feelings. They were eyesores and firetraps, and any project which eliminated them was
to be encouraged. The anonymously ancient structures of Italian hill towns inspired
revulsion in Americans, according to Hawthorne, and "gazing at them, we recognize
how undesirable it is to build the tabernacle of our brief lifetime out of permanent
materials" 47. A decade before Boston's conflagration, they led him to reflect that
All towns should be made capable of purification by fire, or of decay within each
half-century. Otherwise, they become the hereditary haunts of vermin and
noisomeness, besides standing apart from the possibility of such improvements as
are constantly introduced into the rest of man's contrivances and
accommodations. 48
Americans had an interest in deciding that a continually changing environment was
good, because they believed it was their natural condition.
Change is inevitable
Change is the order of Divine Providence; nothing is permanent or enduring upon
earth...
- Rev. S. K. Lothrop (Brattle Square Church), 187149
everything must yield to the immediate wants and will of the living. The command
of present USE is in our day incontrovertible and supreme. Its sceptre sways
46Massachusetts General Court, Committee on Federal Relations, Hearing ... March 4, 1878 (Boston,
1878), 36.
47Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Marble Faun (Columbus, 1968), 4:301.
48Hawthorne, Marble Faun, 4:301-02.
4 9 Lothrop, A Discourse ... July 30, 1871, 27.
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everywhere. The marks of its empire are all around us. It takes down, and builds
up, and knows no veneration. The sacred and the beautiful are continually bowing
before it. It has often pointed ominously at this old edifice. It has touched it now,
and to-morrow it falls.
- Rev. Chandler Robbins (Second Church), 184450
Pervasive faith in progress led to a certain resignation on the part of anyone who
doubted any of its benefits (and such people did exist, as we will see in the next
chapter). Change was inevitable, Americans thought, so even if change was not good,
there was no point in resisting it. This was, of course, a self-fulfilling prophesy:
historic structures would come down if no one would take measures to save them;
threatened neighborhoods would deteriorate if their residents' instinctive first response
to undesirable change was to move rather than to resist.
Belief in the inevitability of change did not lead merely to passive resignation;
nineteenth century city people actively anticipated, planned for, and depended on
change. All planning - financial and personal as well as topographical - incorporated the
expectation of rapid and continual change. According to historian Edward K. Spann,
New Yorkers before the Civil War thought "nothing was permanent and nothing more
valuable than the money needed to take advantage of changing times." 51 Financial
practice, even in Boston where family trusts might hold their property for generations,
emphasized liquidity of assets: short-term leases and short-term balloon mortgages.
For all but the most established tenants and borrowers, these practices implied an
instability of tenancy which became painfully evident with each financial crisis. At other
times it loomed as a possibility which would have seemed more disturbing except that
so many people moved so often anyway.
Making change part of the calculus of all decisions about the urban environment
helped bring about that change. In anticipation of redevelopment, New Yorkers built
their city as "an irregular collection of temporary buildings," as one English visitor
50Robbins, Two Sermons ... March 10, 1844, 4.
51Spann, New Metropolis, 102.
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described it, "not meant to endure for any length of time."52 Naturally such buildings
deteriorated quicky, and their owners replaced them frequently. "Build better, build
something immortal?" asks Spann. "Why, when a new and, one hoped, better world
would soon appear in some new and better uptown?"53
The assumption of change encouraged change also by buffering people - some
people, the ones making decisions - from the effects of change, and thus forestalling
their resistance to it. New Yorkers with a choice settled the central spine of Manhattan
island because they assumed its waterfronts would eventually become tenement and
warehouse districts, and so they were neither affected by nor much interested in the
neighborhood succession which in fact took place there.54 Bostonians, like residents of
other American cities, increasingly buffered themselves from urban change by leaving
the city altogether, for outlying towns which they believed would remain more stable.
The pervasiveness of the assumption of change can be seen in its infiltration even of
subjects traditionally assumed permanent. The most dramatic example was the treatment
of graveyards. "It is often said by poor people," said Mrs. Harriet H. Robinson, from
the Boston suburb of Malden, "that the time will come when they will own six feet of
earth, and occupy it until the last trump sounds." 55 Mrs. Robinson spoke in 1884 as
the Boston Common Council considered selling for a building site part of the South
Burying Ground, where her father was buried.
In spite of the popular expectation of permanence which she expressed, actual usage
in most urban graveyards was in every way the opposite. From the South Burial
Ground alone, the City in previous years had given up sections for a piano factory
addition, an alley to service neighboring residential development, a street, a hotel, and
even a music hall. Not only did abutting landowners treat the burial ground as available
52Fanny Kemble, Journal of a Residence in America (1835), quoted in Lowenthal, Foreign Country,
126.
53Spann, New Metropolis, 116.
54Spann, New Metropolis, 106-108.
55Boston City Council, Special Committee on the South Burying-Ground, Report (City doc. 153,
1884), 36.
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space for their own continuing expansion, but the city itself did not consider it a
permanent use of the land: it was a place for putting bodies, not for keeping them.
Tombs were built there not to mark permanent resting places, but to allow removal of
bodies without the inconvenience of digging them up. As for the 3,000 or so bodies
buried in the ordinary manner in the ground, the city had no apparent intention of
maintaining their graves indefinitely. Shortly after active burials ceased, the city closed
the graveyard's gates and stopped taking care of it. Nor were these attitudes directed
only toward the paupers' graves of the South Burial Ground. The aristocratic Granary
and King's Chapel burial grounds downtown received better landscape care, but they
too held 'speculative tombs' owned by undertakers who regularly removed bodies from
them in order to free up space for new interments. 56 The Board of Health in 1877
pointed out that the combined value of the land occupied by these two graveyards was
over a million dollars, and stated approvingly that "Sooner or later ... the remains of
those buried in these cemeteries will be removed, and the ground used for other
purposes." 57 Trinity Church, having sold tombs in a basement crypt, later insisted that
the sales were revokable in order to re-use the property as a business block. 58
Relatives of the dead tacitly acquiesced in this treatment of burial as a potentially
temporary land use. They reserved and frequently exercised the right to move the
remains of their relatives, usually to some place like Mount Auburn Cemetery in
Cambridge. As the prototype for the Rural Cemetery movement, Mount Auburn was
meant to locate the departed far enough outside the city that they could indeed rest in
peace forever. But the ancestors brought there by their nineteenth century descendants
might well have expected the same from their original resting places, and even within
rural cemeteries, families moved their loved ones' remains from place to place.59 At the
hearing where Mrs. Robinson objected to disturbing the South Burying Ground, she
was far outnumbered by speakers who raised no objections to respectfully executed
relocation of bodies, and in some cases welcomed it for the potential to improve their
56See Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1885, Acts ch. 278, § 1: "Boards of Health of cities and towns
may prohibit the use by undertakers, for the purpose of speculation, of tombs as places of deposit for
bodies committed to them for burial ..."
57Boston Board of Health, Fifth Annual Report (City doc. 67, 1877), 19.
58Trinity Church, Report ... January 12, 1871, 2.
59James J. Farrell, Inventing the American Way of Death, 125.
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loved ones' posthumous neighborhoods. In a revealing paradox, the City Registrar
testified that the graveyard was ripe for discontinuation, giving as his evidence the fact
that he had ceased receiving requests for the removal of bodies from it.
Churches, like graveyards, were popularly considered permanent. Catholics
expressed these expectations formally through the ceremony of consecration, after
which "the church is set apart from all secular uses. It cannot be soia, and can only be
destroyed by the hand of God."60 Because they took these promises seriously,
Catholics did not consecrate any of their churches in Boston until 1875, recognizing the
difficulties in honoring such a commitment there. While seventeenth-century Puritans
rejected consecration as a worldly distraction, in practice their descendents shared
Catholics' belief that places of worship should be permanent, even in the absense of
any formal ritual affirming it. Chandler Robbins expressed these popular expectations
when he said of the old Second Church that "a hundred and thirty years of occupancy
by a Christian church make it a consecrated spot."61 As with graveyards, actual practice
revealed these expectations to be confused, and subservient to the demands of a
changing city.
While Robbins' rhetoric paid homage to continuity and tradition, these often took
insubstantial or token form: the congregation's name, for example, or its communion
vessels, which "have survived the burning of one house of worship, and the demolition
of three. They have accompanied this church in all its vicissitudes and wanderings." 62
Robbins in 1874 applied the image of this silverware like a salve on the sore spot of yet
another move to yet another building: "How immediately they transfer to it the hallowed
associations which our hearts have twined about them in other temples! How they
impart to it at once the air of home!63
Even this contrived and tenuous continuity allowed Robbins and his followers a high
tolerance for environmental instability, which they did not merely passively accept, but
actively initiated. In the 1840s, both halves of the congregation sought radical change.
60Boston Globe, August 16, 1875: 1.
61Robbins, Sermon ... September 17, 1845, 15.
62Robbins, Sermon ... November 4th, 1874, 23.
63Robbins, Sermon ... November 4th, 1874, 22.
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The ostensibly conservative North End faction did not seek to preserve the oldest
church in the city, nor even to construct a new building replicating or reminiscent of it;
like their South End counterparts they wanted a new building of new design. A
generation later, packing and numbering like an archaeological treasure the stones of a
28-year-old church built for another congregation smacked of desperation for continuity
(relics from the old Hanover Street meetinghouse, by contrast, had been scattered
among other churches). But the congregation began its move before fixing on a
destination, and they did not follow through with the fetishistic process of bringing
their Bedford Street building with them; instead they re-used the carefully renumbered
stones in a building improved so far as to make them unrecognizable. Another minister
moving his flock to the Back Bay at the same time articulated the principle which
underlay all this apparent confusion: "As we cannot annul, we should cheerfully submit
to that law of change which is a necessary condition of our being on earth."64
While change itself might be a law, the direction of change was by no means certain.
Bostonians did not know where their city was going, as they demonstrated during a
decade of arguing about where to put a new courthouse which was first proposed in the
early 1870s. One writer urged the city to build "such a Court House as will suffice for
the next twenty years," since "twenty years from now we may require a house in
another part of the city." 65 Another suggested letting the courts take over the Beacon
Hill State House, so that a new one could be built on the Back Bay.66
The Back Bay complicated any understanding of the city's future growth. Downtown
had been expanding to the south, but the new land opened a westward direction which
had not existed before. Would the business district, like residences and institutions,
change its course? If it did turn toward the Back Bay, would it engulf intervening
6Samuel Kirkland Lothrop, A Sermon Preached at the Dedication of the Church of Brattle Square
Society, on the corner of Clarendon Street and Commonwealth Avenue, Dec. 22, 1873 (Boston,
1874), 3.
65
'H.H.A.' letter, Boston Globe, January 31, 1874: 3.
66Boston Evening Transcript, May 14, 1878: 4.
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Beacon Hill, as some people expected?67 All American cities faced similar
uncertainties, none more than Chicago, where the Fire in 1871 suddenly turned all the
contingencies of evolving urban form into a single immediate question. "Some do not
[re]build," reported the Globe's Chicago correspondent,
because they do not know what to build. There is great uncertainty as to where
business centres are to be, as to which streets will be plebian and which aristocratic.
The sweeping fire abolished all distinctions, ... and men are waiting until causes
over which they have little control have decided whether they are to put up shanties
or palaces.68
Projecting the answers to such questions was the stock-in-trade of real estate
speculators. Real estate thinking was important not merely because it produced most of
the built environment, but because it also provided the contemporary terms for
understanding that environment. Before the emergence of the city planning movement
at the turn of the century, the implicit rules of real estate were the main available body
of theory for explaining urban growth and form.
Real estate development was a more fragmented process in the nineteenth century
than it is today. Rather than a single developer producing a finished piece of the
environment by taking it from raw land through occupancy, each step of this process
was undertaken separately, mostly by small-scale operators. The first actors in the
process were the land developers, who made a minimum of tangible improvements, but
simply packaged land for speculation by recording a 'plat' and staking lots. They often
marketed aggressively; larger subdividers hired trains for free weekend excursions to
their sites, where clambakes and brass bands were calculated to heighten auction fever.
Their product was popular. Most people could flatter themselves that they understood
it, and real estate looked like a safe investment at a time when banks sometimes were
not. Even the working class could afford the cheapest lots when they were offered on
67At a legislative hearing on the Old South Church, Avery Plumer "spoke of the rapid growth of the
city, and the retirement of dwellings before the march of business. Within twenty years he prophesied
that all Beacon Hill east of Charles street would be used for mercantile purposes, and that the entire
peninsula would in time be swept of dwelling-houses and devoted to business purposes" (Boston
Globe, January 28, 1874: 2).
68Boston Globe, March 28, 1872: 2.
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easy credit, and wealthier investors could gamble on land near the center which might
or might not become part of downtown. Everyone could be a speculator.69
The word 'speculation' had in the nineteenth century, as it does now, many shades of
meaning. In a matter-of-fact sense it means gaining unearned increment from change.
James E. Vance, using this definition, emphasizes the importance of anticipating and
understanding change in order to profit by it. Richard Sennett on the other hand
describes nineteenth century speculation as almost pure gambling. People anticipated
change in the sense of expecting it to happen, but when and how was a matter of
chance, largely beyond comprehension. Genteel opinion in general, and the Boston
elite in particular, was appalled by 'speculation,' but their definition focused not on
gain but on gamble. A latent Puritanism rebelled at truly unearned profit; investors
properly earned their gain by understanding their investments, by correctly predicting
change.70
Investors were aided in their understanding by the pervasive anticipation of change
which probably made for easier insights into the directions of urban growth. Our late-
twentieth-century sensibilities can be disturbed when we look at a nineteenth-century
city street map and realize that much of it shows paper streets which existed on the .
ground as nothing more than surveyors' stakes, if that. Such a map does not, in our
view, correctly represent reality. But its contemporary users were less likely to be
bothered by this distinction. Their view of reality was compounded of what was
becoming as well as what had already come about. A view which is today found mainly
among those involved in real estate development was then the rule for average citizens,
each of whom was at least potentially a speculative lot investor.
The all-encompassing awareness of potential land use change extended to the
domestic environment. Just as homeowners today seldom entirely lose sight of their
69Michael J. Doucet, 'Urban Land Development in Nineteenth-Century North America: Themes in the
Literature,' Journal of Urban History 8 (1982): 299-342; Hoyt, One Hundred Years of Land Values,
388-391.
70James E. Vance, This Scene of Man: The Role and Structure of the City in the Geography of
Western Civilization (New York, 1977), 34. Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man: On the Social
Psychology of Capitalism (New York, 1974), 139-140. Paul Goodman, 'Ethics and Enterprise: The
Values of the Boston Elite, 1800-1860,' American Quarterly 18 (Fall, 1966): 437-451.
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property as accumulated equity - a consideration which ordinarily leads them to value
neighborhood stability - so their counterparts in the mid nineteenth century were ever
conscious of it as a speculation, always aware of its potential for conversion, perhaps at
some distant future date, to something other than a house. Thus even those developers
marketing a suburban residential environment, an escape from the city, often felt they
had to promise an investment in what would later become a city.71
This attitude is explained by a sobering corollary of the axiom of inevitable change.
When good neighborhoods changed they generally changed for the worse, and
neighborhood decline was accepted as a rule of real estate. Nineteenth century
Americans viewed their homes as speculative investments in part by necessity, a
defensive adaptation to the changing city. Since they would eventually be forced to
vacate their homes, they wanted to do so on favorable terms.
The spatial expression of this philosophy was the city of gridded streets of standard
lots. "Since the growth of cities leads normally to the ultimate conversion of residence
land into business land," explained real estate writer Richard Hurd, "a uniform system
of platting suitable for business purposes throughout the entire city is generally
preferable." 72 No lot, no locality made any commitment as to its intended use; all were
designed to accommodate the most intense uses they might later be called on to serve.
In the ideal urban fabric every street was wide and straight enough to become a main
business thoroughfare. The grandfather of the speculative grid was the 1811 plan for
Manhattan, where "some two thousand blocks were provided," as Frederick Law
Olmsted later explained,
each theoretically 200 feet wide, no more, no less; and ever since, if a building site
is wanted, whether with a view to a church or a blast furnace, an opera house or a
71Spann, New Metropolis, 200: "Uniformly, the developers sold a residential environment, yet many
could not resist adding the promise that their lands would rapidly increase in value and so were desirable
investments. This was particularly so of some of the inner suburbs which were touted paradoxically not
simply as refuges from the city but as incipient cities themselves. The developers of Laural [sic] Hill
boasted both of the beautiful location of their village and of its omnibus, ferry, and railroad services
which, combined with 'its river advantages,' guaranteed that it 'must become a large manufacturing and
commercial place'; essentially the same promise was used to promote land sales at East New York and
other places. Buy a home -buy a profitable investment..." See also Boston Globe, February 3, 1878:
2.
72Richard M. Hurd, Principles of City Land Values (1903; reprint, New York, 1924), 52.
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toy shop, there is, of intention, no better a place in one of these blocks than in
another.73
In Boston as in many eastern cities the grid was not such a transcendant Cartesian
reality imposed by public authority, but a hypothetical norm interpreted by each
developer within his own domain, so that the map of the city showed not one grid but a
crazy quilt of little grids.
What developers could interpret they also could and did reinterpret, by replatting
streets and lots. The practice of resubdivision grew naturally out of the uncertainties of
real estate development. Of all residential land, fashionable upper-class building lots
drew the highest prices, so subdividers with even the slimmest hopes of attracting such
buyers laid out their plats for this market. Only a few of them could succeed.74 But did
the others really fail? When they re-drew their plats as more modest lots a fraction of
their original size - often by cutting additional streets through - the cachet of the
imaginary upper-class neighborhood could be used in subsequent marketing.75 The
potential for re-subdivision was thus a valuable tool in any land developer's kit. Plats
might be re-subdivided while they were still raw land, or they might be re-drawn
around those lots which already had been sold and perhaps built upon.
Resubdivision was also carried out at a smaller scale by individual lot-owners. In the
literature of housing reform this process is familiar as the way back courts and rear
tenements were created out of already small yards. But the practice was also common at
the other end of the social scale, as the owners of great houses sold off their gardens as
building lots, often remaining in the mansion and therefore taking an interest in the
quality of the new development 76 In at least some cases the potential for individual re-
73Frederick Law Olmsted and J. James R. Croes, 'Preliminary Report of the Landscape Architect and
the Civil and Topographical Engineer, upon the Laying Out of the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth
Wards ...' (1876), in Albert Fein, ed., Landscape Into Cityscape: Frederick Law Olmsted's Plans for a
Greater New York City (Ithaca, N.Y., 1967), 352.
74Spann, New Metropolis, 106. For a contemporary expression, see Spann, New Metropolis, 456
(note 33): "Samuel Halliday, something of an expert on housing, said in 1859 that 'the class of houses
in a neighborhood has much more to do in fixing the price of building lots that the geographical
position of the lots.'
75Real Estate Register and Rental Guide (Providence), March 30, 1892: 6.
76Advertisement, Boston Globe, March 10, 1874: 5: "Seashore residence at Cohasset .... The land will
cut up to good advantage for building lots." This was presented as one option to pay for an estate
which was otherwise marketed not for speculation but for occupation by the purchaser.
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subdivision was anticipated in the original design of plats, as in the suburbs of another
New England city where subdividers laid out large 100 by 100 foot lots, "for houses or
dividing to sell again":
Our object is to WHOLESALE land rather than to retail, [said their advertisement,]
giving the buyer the opportunity to sell a considerable portion at advanced prices,
thereby securing his own home site at a practically nominal figure.77
While re-subdivision of individual lots changed neighborhoods more gradually than
wholesale re-platting, in the aggregate it was potentially even more disruptive because it
was less orderly and predictable. 78 For homeowners, however, it was always in the
lexicon of possibilities, a last resort to pull the full speculative value out of their
property, if they felt forced to move.
In nineteenth-century Boston there was an intimate relationship between rapid growth
and change which made th physical environment unstable, and a culture which
approved and even celebrated such change. But people naturally enough did not like
being forced from their homes. In spite of a prevailing ideology which taught that
change was both inevitable and productive, for the greater good and for themselves as
individuals, they expressed much the same feelings of regret, fear, and anger which we
would expect under similar circumstances today. During the 1870s and '80s,
Bostonians began to decide that these were not merely self-indulgent sentiments to be
set aside, but valid objections to the culture of change.
77Real Estate Register and Rental Guide (Providence) May 18, 1892: 2.
78Spann quotes an.advertisement for Fordham, New York, in 1852: "The object of the above
restrictions ... is to endeavor to secure a good neighborhood, and prevent nuisances and little village
lots from being laid out" (New Metropolis, 199).
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CHAPTER Two:
Problems with change
Progress is a terrible thing.
- William James1
Unfamiliar society
Change was the norm in nineteenth-century America in other realms aside from the
urban environment, and much of the change was not pleasant. A modem urban
industrial society was emerging from an agrarian country, and it was a disturbing
process. These larger social forces helped create the preconditions for a shift in the way
Americans viewed environmental change.
From the 1840s onward Boston's in-migration from the New England countryside
began to be overwhelmed by waves of migration from across the Atlantic, first from
Ireland and then from southern and eastern Europe. Bostonians who were happy to see
their city grow by assimilating the sons and daughters of Maine farmers were
ambivalent about assimilating the children of Ireland. An anti-Irish and anti-Catholic
mob in 1834 burned the Ursuline convent in Charlestown, an early and virulent
1Quoted in Spann, New Metropolis, 158.
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manifestation of ante-bellum xenophobia.2 By the last third of the nineteenth century
nativism had subsided from a political movement into a pervasive and uncomfortable
consciousness that much of the urban population was not 'wholesome American stock'
but something else, poor or transient or especially foreign, a population whose ways
were at best strange, and a population which was growing at an alarming rate. One
byproduct of this growth was the beginnings of ethnically-based machines of political
power and patronage which seemed to make a mockery of America's republican
principles, and encouraged a growing nostalgia for apparently simpler times.
At the other end of the social scale, old urban aristocracies such as Boston's
Brahmins were being displaced from the apex of wealth by a numbingly rich kind of
newcomer. Brahmin wealth, mostly inherited, was tied to position within a local
community and to an ethic of responsibility to that community. The new larger fortunes
of industrial America were embodied in impersonal and placeless corporations, or held
by the flamboyant robber barons who could buy and sell businesses at this new scale.
Boston remained one of the nation's centers of capital, but its conservative bankers and
trustees frowned on excess and took a dim view of their new financial more-than-peers
elsewhere. Bostonians ranging from the old-money elite to the native-born working
classes thus saw new and unwelcome social extremes emerging both above and below
them. "Two enemies, unknown before, have risen like spirits of darkness on our social
and political horizon," wrote Boston historian Francis Parkman in 1878, "an ignorant
proletariat and a half-taught plutocracy." 3
A growing incidence of civil unrest seemed to come hand in hand with this stark class
differentiation. Mob violence became steadily more common in American cities in the
middle years of the nineteenth century, and then erupted at an unprecedented scale
during the Civil War. When the Union imposed a military draft in July, 1863, rioting
Irish immigrants lynched blacks in New York and plunged the city into virtual anarchy;
by the time the army re-established control several days later rioters and troops together
2Oscar Handlin, Boston's Immigrants: A Study in Acculturation (Cambridge, 1941; New York, 1975),
187-89.
3Francis Parkman, 'The Failure of Universal Suffrage,' North American Review, July-August 1878: 4,
quoted in Robert M. Fogelson, America's Armories: Architecture, Society, and Public Order
(Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 24.
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had killed more than a hundred people. In Boston's North End a mob attacked an
armory which the militia defended by firing a cannon into the crowd, killing several
people.4 While these riots could not compare in ferocity with the battles of the Civil
War itself, to most Boston residents they were more disturbing. They brought the
war's chaos home to otherwise secure northern territory, and undermined whatever
ideas of common purpose people used to impose sense on the great national self-
destruction.
After the war this sense of looming conflict did not abate, but arose increasingly from
labor strife. In 1877, at the depth of the worst depression the nation had yet
experienced, railroads cut wages, triggering a strike which turned violent when the
companies tried to keep trains running with non-union labor backed by police and the
militia. Federal troops killed scores of people to take control of cities from Baltimore to
Chicago. In comparatively placid Boston, Harvard President Charles W. Eliot began
drilling riflemen at the college. The violence in 1877, wrote an historian a generation
later, "seemed to threaten the chief strongholds of society and came like a thunderbolt
out of a clear sky, startling us rudely. For we had hugged the delusion that such social
uprisings belonged to Europe and had no reason of being in a free republic."5
It now seemed possible that American cities could be engulfed in European-style class
warfare. Commentators drew parallels between the 1877 disturbances and the Paris
commune of six years earlier. The experience of pitched battles in the streets on this
side of the Atlantic energized previously sluggish efforts to build fortress-like armories
for the militia in American cities; in Boston the First Corps of Cadets began a
fundraising campaign in 1878. "The skies may be clear today," they said of the city's
restless classes, "... but no man knows when the storm may burst." 6 Americans
regularly invoked the metaphor of a volcano under the city; hidden social forces of
untold power waited to erupt into unimaginable destruction. 7 The whole fabric of
4Paul S. Boyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920 (Cambridge, Mass. 1978), 69;
Fogelson, America's Armories, 168-69.
5James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States from Hayes to McKinley, 1877-1896 (New York,
1919), 46; the quoted passage was written in 1909. Fogelson, America's Armories, 27-28.
6Fogelson, America's Armories, 56.
7Fogelson, America's Armories, 24-25.
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society threatened to fall apart; it was no longer clear that there were any limits to the
potential disruption.
A watershed in the history of American cities was the 1873 decision by the town of
Brookline to decline annexation to Boston. Annexation advocates held out promises of
limitless pure water, street lighting, and other material improvements; for Brookline
residents who identified themselves with the city's prosperity they painted a vision of a
greater Boston growing to become the second city of the nation. But Brookline's
comfortable suburbanites, by the resounding vote of 706 to 299, were not impressed
with these incantations of the culture of change. 8 They liked what they had. "It is better
to keep the town pure," said one Brookline resident, "than to mix with the city affairs
and attempt to purify them."9 Brookline became a new prototype in American
metropolitan development: the independent commuter suburb, functionally a part of the
city but socially and politically separate, taking its sustenance from the urban economy
but insulating itself as much as possible from the urban population and problems. Other
towns around Boston and other cities quickly saw Brookline's point, and backed away
from the rim of the urban vortex. 10
The metropolis grew bigger even if the municipal boundaries did not, and it also grew
fundamentally different. Rapid changes in the physical environment expressed far-
reaching changes in social structure. The revolution in urban transportation wrought by
railroads and streetcars, says historian David Schuyler, "literally turned the city inside
out," reversing the structure of the walking city by "enabling the rich to move to homes
in the suburbs, while the poor huddled in increasingly congested downtown areas." 11
Boston, said one resident in 1873, had become "[t]wo cities - the city of warehouses
8Boston Globe, October 8, 1873. Boston voters, by contrast, approved annexing Brookline by a higher
margin than they gave to any other town.
9Thomas Parsons, Boston Globe, October 1, 1873: 5.
10Boston remained with the smallest area of any major American city; Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass
Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York, 1985), Tables 8-1 and 8-2, 139-40.
11David Schuyler, The New Urban Landscape: The Redefinition of City Form in Nineteenth-Century
America (Baltimore, 1986), 150.
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and the city of dwellings." 12 Within the city of dwellings, spatial differentiation was
carried further as increasingly fine distinctions of class and ethnicity were expressed in
residential location. This increasing neighborhood segregation, Edward K. Spann notes
of New York City, "was both imprecise and unstable; the expansion of commerce and
the growth in the number of poor people was too rapid for either to be contained within
an established zone." 13 Because the intimately mixed social classes and land uses of the
old walking city were no longer acceptable, almost any land use change appeared
threatening. The consequences of neighborhood change became potentially more
drastic; no longer would neighborhoods merely become denser, they would change in
type, and a person who once belonged there would no longer belong. People reacted to
neighborhood change with a heightened sensitivity. In John P. Marquand's novel The
Late George Apley, Apley's father sees opposite the family's South End mansion a
man wearing no dress coat. "The next day," recalls Apley, "he sold his house for what
he had paid for it and we moved to Beacon Street [in the Back Bay]. Father had sensed
the approach of change; a man in his shirt sleeves had told him that the days of the
South End were numbered." 14
When people became uneasy about the directions and pace of social change, then the
city's physical change no longer seemed reassuring. Suddenly change in general
seemed perhaps negative rather than positive. This was not a reasoned conclusion but a
cultural gestalt-switch, a shift in perception, like the silhouette of a vase which
suddenly reveals itself as the space between two human profiles. People reinterpreted
what they knew of the world, seeing it in a new light. The rapidly-changing face of the
city could still be seen as a sign of material progress, but it could just as easily be seen
as a symptom of the disturbing social changes it housed. It was the aggregate of these
individual shifts in perception which was ultimately important; the particular times and
catalytic events which changed individual minds varied. "The party of Memory for the
first time began to outvote the party of Hope," says David Lowenthal of the 1880s and
12Turner Sargent, in Boston Globe, May 6, 1873: 8.
13Spann, New Metropolis, 109.
14John P. Marquand, The Late George Apley (1936, New York, 1964), 19.
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'90s.15 The culture of change was a matter of faith, and once questioned, that faith
quickly evaporated.
As individual Americans lost their faith in change, they grew more keenly aware of its
disadvantages - problems they already knew about, but had dismissed either as
sentimentalism unbefitting a practical nation, or else as regrettable but inevitable side-
effects of a necessary and healthy progress. As faith in change slipped away,
awareness of these drawbacks remained and assumed a life of its own as a criticism of
the culture of change. People began to acknowledge the disorientation that resulted
from rapid change. They sought refuge from change in their own lives. Finally they
began to formulate new theories of urban growth and form based not on change but on
permanence.
Disappearing landmarks and the unfamiliar city
People regretted the loss of familiar scenes and landmarks, but their sadness often
took them by surprise, because the culture of change had taught them to reject such
sentimentality. The Second Church congregation felt unexpectedly bereft at the
demolition of its old home in 1844. "We knew not how dear were its old walls, till they
began to disappear," confessed Reverend Chandler Robbins. "We never realized how
strong and tender were the associations that bound it to our hearts, till we saw it
dismantled, desolate, and ruinous, whilst the work of its destruction was going on." 16
15Lowenthal, Foreign Country, 122.
16Chandler Robbins, Address delivered at the laying of the corner-stone of the Second Church ... May
30,1844 (Boston, 1844), 3; "I believe," he continued, "that few buildings have ever been taken down
in this city, whose demolition has excited such general interest, whose loss has been so universally
felt."
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Perhaps the first recorded preservation controversy in America was the unsuccessful
opposition to demolishing Boston's 'Old Brick' First Church meeting-house in 1808,
as the congregation moved from State Street to then-bucolic Chauncy Place.17 Sixty
years later the expanding business district had overtaken that spot too. Reverend Rufus
Ellis, in his 1868 farewell sermon at Chauncy Place, was less circumspect about his
regrets than others in his position had been a decade or so earlier. "For myself," he
said,
as the time for our departure has drawn nearer and nearer, I am less and less willing
to go. I was sorry when I found that our stay must be shortened by only so much
as a week. I am thankful that it is no part of my duty to disturb the headstone of the
old building, as it was to aid in placing the corner-stone of the new. I am sorry that
I ever assented when they called the church gloomy .... I shall try not to be near
when the first axe falls upon the old timbers. ... the glory has not been lifted from
this house, and our hearts are in the old places. 18
"I sincerely hope that more abiding things are in store for the congregation;" said Ellis,
"such changes are not good for us." 19
The lost landmark which raised the most serious questions about the culture of
change was Brattle Street Church, razed in the early 1870s. The peculiar power of its
loss came from the relationship between two parts of its story. First, it was seen as
perhaps the most historically significant structure to go since the Old Brick
meetinghouse in 1808, and much of the community mourned it. Second, the
subsequent fate of its congregation suggested new and disturbing lessons about the loss
of the building, and about change in general.
17
"After the demolition of the old brick," complained one of these preservationists, "there is scarcely a
vestige of antiquity left in the town" (Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 29). See also William Hayden
appendix in Rufus Ellis, The Last Sermon preached in First Church, Chauncy Street, May 10, 1868
(Boston, 1868), 22-24.
18Ellis, Last Sermon ... May 10, 1868, 13-15. Similarly, Phillips Brooks had worked to get rid of old
Trinity Church on Summer Street in order to have his friend H. H. Richardson build a magnificent new
one on the Back Bay, but two days after the old one burned in the Great Fire, he wrote to a friend, "I did
not know how much I liked the gloomy old thing, till I saw her windows bursting, and the flames
running along the old high pews. I feel it was better for the Church to go so than to be torn down
stone by stone" (Lawrence, Address...delivered in Trinity Church, 9).
19Ellis, Last Sermon ... May 10, 1868, 6.
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Brattle Square was one of the great Brahmin churches, built in 1772-73 largely at the
instigation of Governor and parishioner John Hancock; its proprietors included both
Presidents Adams, as well as governors and chief justices of the Commonwealth, and
some of its wealthiest merchants. The building, designed by Thomas Dawes, was
among the earliest of Boston's churches that later generations would find architecturally
respectable. The church's social and aesthetic prominence were further reinforced by
ready-made historical interest when British troops took over the new building for a
barracks and endeared themselves to nineteenth-century antiquarians by chiseling
Hancock's name off the cornerstone. A patriot cannonball said to have struck the
church was installed in the exterior wall in 1825, cementing the building's
Revolutionary associations in the public mind.20
Twenty years later Brattle Square, just off State Street, was at the very center of the
business district, a too-worldly destination for churchgoers' Sunday tastes. The
congregation considered and rejected moving in the 1840s, and discussed the question
again and again during the next two decades. In the 1850s the church's lawyers, asking
the Supreme Judicial Court to modify an eighteenth-century will by which the society
held its nearby parsonage, argued that the area had changed so thoroughly since then
that it was no longer reasonable to expect the minister to live there. The court agreed.
Reverend Samuel K. Lothrop's farewell sermon conveys the sense that the
neighborhood finally forced them, almost physically, to leave.21
Lothrop and his flock looked upon their relocation with foreboding because of the
beloved structure they would be leaving. Of the many migrating churches, this move
was the least hopeful yet. In his farewell to the old building, Lothrop mouthed
mechanically the usual formulas about the importance of the church as an institution
rather than as a tangible structure.
Are our religious feelings and associations so much more local and confined than
those of every other part of our nature, that we cannot meet the changes that require
20Lothrop, A Discourse ... July 30, 1871, 49. Frederic C. Detwiller, 'Thomas Dawes' Church in
Brattle Square,' Old-Time New England 69 (1979): 1-17. Lothrop, History, 107-08.
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us to transfer them to new scenes? Is our worship ... so dependent upon the
influence of outward and accustomed surroundings ...?22
He went on to deny this rhetorical premise, but the passion in his sermon reinforced
what many of his parishioners must have felt: that Brattle Square Church really was a
particular building in a particular place, and not a transportable institution.
The congregation forced itself to sacrifice its church because, faced with the altered
neighborhood around it, the culture of change told them this was the appropriate
response. Even though they would understandably feel regrets about the move, said
Lothrop, to give in to their "attachment and reverence for this spot and this house"
would be a self-indulgent "gratification of our personal feelings."23 When nostalgia
became an impediment to change, it was in this view a "morbid" impulse.24
The prospect of losing Brattle Square Church brought the greatest public outcry yet,
from Boston's "citizens generally, who feel that they have, as it were, some right of
property in this old landmark of the past."25 These protests, however, were not yet
channelled into any effective avenues of opposition. Old Brattle Square Church held its
last service July 30, 1871. Elite churches were usually empty in the summer, as their
congregations fled to the country and the shore, but this service was packed. The
society sold the building, which then stood for many months as a forlorn shell. That
fall they laid the cornerstone for their new building, designed by H. H. Richardson, on
Commonwealth Avenue in the Back Bay.
The new building's dedication on December 22, 1873, took place a few weeks after
that year's financial panic, which together with the fire reduced the congregation's
2 1Lothrop, A Discourse ... July 30, 1871. See also account in Boston Globe, July 18, 1877: 2.
Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Moses Grant et al., 69 Mass. 142 (1855). The
parsonage, on Court Street, was given by Lydia Hancock, John Hancock's aunt.
2 2 Lothrop, A Discourse ... July 30, 1871, 30. Similarly, Lothrop, Sermon at the Dedication ... Dec.
22, 1873: "Bricks and mortar are not alive. It is the living organization that gives power to the
memories and associations that gather around them, and these memories and associations go where the
living organization goes."
2 3 Lothrop, A Discourse ... July 30, 1871, 28.
2 4 Lothrop, Sermon at the Dedication ... Dec. 22, 1873, 3, 25.
25Lothrop, A Discourse ... July 30, 1871, 29-30.
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ability to subscribe the hefty pew sales needed to pay for it, even as budget overruns
made them all the more imperative. The church opened under a mortgage, a common
practice which ordinarily seemed prudent enough, when at Lothrop's dedication
sermon all could hear yet another disaster. The new church had appalling acoustics. 26
Now Bostonians saw revealed a dark side to churches' hopeful Back Bay migration.
If their leaders sincerely saw them as durable institutions carrying on continuing
existences on new sites, the church-going public at large was willing to treat them in the
same spirit of change and renewal as they had already shown for their neighborhoods.
The Back Bay's oversupply of churches in a small area was convenient for a sort of
religious comparison shopping; shades of doctrinal distinction proved less compelling
than convenience and fashion. As each new church opened, it was thronged for a
season with the curious. The new Brattle Square Church and its tower were a success
as an architectural presence on Commonwealth Avenue, but its elderly minister and
difficult acoustics made it fare badly once people ventured inside. Within a year, it was
searching for a new pastor so that Lothrop could retire; with both financial and
ministerial uncertainty, even those parishioners who were inclined to stay hesitated to
make a financial commitment.
By 1875, Brattle Square Church was in crisis; in the deepening national depression, it
was unable to raise money for its overdue mortgage. The congregation openly
discussed selling its new building. The $95,000 debt was easily within the reach of the
society's wealthy members, but they had already given, and wanted to see more general
support before they would give more. That support was not forthcoming. When the
proprietors announced a meeting to consider ways of avoiding a sale, so few
parishioners came that the meeting had to be re-scheduled. Lothrop, in failing health,
took a leave of absence, and the church closed in the summer of 1875. The society
disbanded and tried unsuccessfully to close its books by selling the building.
So the Brattle Square Church, after much talk about the necessity of moving to avoid
a slow death in its old location, moved and instead died quickly. What killed it? Not
26Samuel K. Lothrop, Letters of Rev. S. K. Lothrop to the Proprietors of Brattle Street Church
(Boston, 1876), 7-9.
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bad acoustics, nor debt. Both could be remedied, but the parishioners lacked the will,
and instead fled in shame and embarrassment. There were two possible interpretations.
One, in keeping with the culture of change, was that they had waited too long. In this
view the congregation killed itself in the 1850s and 1860s, when they clung morbidly
to the past. If the congregation had dwindled slowly in its old church, so that it could
not be rebuilt in the new, this explanation would be compelling. But the congregation
left for the Back Bay more-or-less intact, ample in both numbers and wealth, and fell
away only after it arrived.
The other explanation is the one that Lothrop and his contemporaries were so eager to
discount: that Brattle Square Church really was an irreplaceable building; that the
parishioners' shame and embarrassment was not over their architect's acoustical
miscalculation, but at the act of desecration they had allowed themselves to commit in
selling the old church to be torn down for stores. This explanation led to dark
conclusions, for it did not follow that the congregation could have continued its life
permanently in its old meetinghouse. If it could not live apart from its Brattle Square
building, and if the square itself was so inhospitable as to be lethal to the congregation,
then Boston's growth had strangled this church dead, and other institutions' faith in
progress was perhaps misplaced. Moving away was no guaranteed solution to the
problems of change in their localities; they would at least have to ask whether they
could be solved in place.
Brattle Square Church raised one further question which was at the heart of any ideas
of permanence for architectural landmarks: was it the union of institution and structure
which was consecrated, or the structure itself? Had the congregation committed its act
of desecration when it moved from its Brattle Square Church, or when it allowed the
building to be demolished? The idea of preserving landmarks independently of
institutions seemed grotesque to Lothrop, who asked, "...would we leave these
churches stranded and useless on their old spots, to be monuments then not simply of
change, but of decay and death?" 27 His contemporaries were ill-equipped to ask these
27 Lothrop, Sermon at the Dedication ... Dec. 22, 1873, 4.
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questions, let alone answer them, but in a few years they would have to do both for the
Old South Church.
How were people to respond to the sadness they felt at these changes in the city
around them? Those who had begun to lose their faith in change were able to treat such
emotions as more than anomalies. The destruction of culturally significant buildings or
sites could reverberate with the same jarring notes as the increasing disharmony of
society at large. The destruction of visually prominent buildings could be disorienting,
and this disorientation was itself yet another stimulus helping to re-form attitudes
toward change.
One existing conceptual framework for questioning change was the nineteenth
century Romantic tradition in the arts, but only in the second half of the century did
Americans connect that tradition with the actual process of shaping the urban
environment. By the 1840s, some Americans expressed an awareness of the dark side
of progress, a growing sympathy with the wilderness that was being vanquished as
settlement spread across the continent and across the new suburbs. But these were
literary qualms; they had no place in the practical culture of city-building. Since they
were framed as a conflict between civilization and nature, they made few distinctions
within the city and so had little to say about any changes there other than its overall
growth.
These qualms about lost nature were often expressed in the vicinity of cities, as they
extended into and destroyed or transformed the countryside. The Hudson River school
of landscape painting made people particularly sensitive to change in that region above
New York City; painter Thomas Cole complained that "they are cutting down all the
trees in the beautiful valley on which I have looked so often with a loving eye."28 New
York native Henry P. Tappan, chancellor of the University of Michigan, returned to the
city in 1855 and bemoaned its expansion over an island once "remarkable for its natural
28T. Cole letter to Luman Reed, Mar. 26, 1835, quoted in David Schuyler, 'The Sanctified Landscape:
Scenic Values and Historic Preservation in the Mid-Hudson Valley, 1820-1850,' (American Studies
Program, Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa. Photocopy, 1989), 14.
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beauty." Just across the rivers, "[t]he heights of Brooklyn, the shores of Hoboken,
might have been preserved for enchanting public grounds. They, too, are lost
forever." 29 After Boston annexed the town of Roxbury, one resident described its
transformation:
Parker's Hill with its gray ledges, seamed by the frost of ages, but painted with the
soft and parti-colored lichens, and decorated with ferns and nodding grasses, has
yielded to the ravages of the drill and sledge hammer, to the pick and shovel ....
The dog-tooth violets, the cowslips, the columbines, the anemones, the gentians
have fled... and blank, unadorned highways have taken their places, fringed no
longer with beauty of any kind, but presenting rows and blocks of very inferior
houses ...30
With the growth of cities, their residents found increasing occasion to rue disruption
not only of their sylvan settings but of streetscapes within the city itself, as familiar and
pleasing scenes were lost. "New York is notoriously the largest and least loved of any
of our great cities," said Harper's Monthly in 1856. "Why should it be loved as a city?
It is never the same city for a dozen years together. A man born in New York forty
years ago finds nothing, absolutely nothing, of the New York he knew." 31
The cumulative effect of losing landmarks and whole swaths of the city was more
than sadness; it was actual cognitive disorientation, the uncomfortable sensation of a
reality not in accordance with internalized mental maps. When the environment changed
so thoroughly that people could no longer tell where they were - literally, in the case of
returning residents, but figuratively true for many others - then change in the
environment alone could be enough to bring into question the idea of change as
improvement.
The shift from vernacular to self-conscious architecture reinforced the disorienting
effects of environmental change. Vernacular replacement of ordinary buildings by
similar structures had hidden the pace of change; but the rapid succession of exotic
29Henry Philip Tappan, The Growth of Cities: A Discourse delivered before the New York
Geographical Society, on the evening of March 15th, 1855, quoted in Spann, New Metropolis, 115.
30 [Robert Morris Copeland] editorial, Boston Daily Advertiser, October 16, 1873, quoted in Cynthia
Zaitzevsky, Frederick Law Olmsted and the Boston Park System (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 18.
31Quoted in Spann, New Metropolis, 158.
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styles and frenzied eclecticism exaggerated it.32 So long as change seemed good, this
was encouraging. But as soon as change was potentially disturbing, then the urban
environment was among the most disturbing phenomena around. Surviving old
buildings, even ordinary ones, took on a reassuring aspect, not merely for the
sentimental associations particular to each of them, but also for their general suggestion
of continuity.
But as Americans looked around themselves they found little such reassurance. An
awareness of the pervasive newness of their environment, its complete lack of remnants
from antiquity, gave them a cultural inferiority complex. Bostonian Charles Eliot
Norton, upon arriving in England in 1868, found that the patina of age gave scenes in
that country "a deeper familiarity than the very things that have lain before our eyes
since we were born."33 Years later, as Professor of Art History at Harvard, Norton
reflected on this in an article entitled 'The Lack of Old Homes in America.' He worried
about the culture that was evolving in a nation of temporary abodes, "barren ... of
historic objects that appeal to the imagination and arouse the poetic associations that
give depth and charm to life."34 Thanks to the culture of change, he said, "Boston is in
its aspect as new as Chicago," 35 and neither could offer anything to measure up to
Norton's Old World standards.
The national centennial clebrations in 1876 reinforced a growing awareness of
American history which helped residents of the eastern states recognize and value what
continuity did exist in their environment. In the Boston area this awareness was
especially immediate, as people marked a succession of centennials of particular battles,
parading through Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill's Charlestown and feeling
the evocative power of surviving places which had witnessed momentous events. The
321n the 1880s, distress at the possibility of losing the Bulfinch State House was compounded by the
prospect that it would be replaced by "some architectural phantasy of the newest new school."
Worcester Spy, quoted in Malcolm Sillars, The State House, a comprehensive project of enlargement
(Boston, 1888), 32. See chapter 5.
33Norton to James Russell Lowell, August 30, 1868, in Sara Norton and M. A. DeWolfe Howe, eds.,
Letters of Charles Eliot Norton (Boston, 1913), 1:306.
34Charles Eliot Norton, 'The Lack of Old Homes in America,' Scribner's Magazine 5 (1889): 638.
35Norton, 'Lack of Old Homes,' 639.
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specifically architectural awareness promoted by exhibits at the Philadelphia Centennial
Exhibition legitimized affection for remaining old buildings and helped spawn the
Colonial Revival school of architecture.
As the Colonial Revival style grew in popularity, the loss of old buildings became all
the more disturbing. Now they were not merely survivals with perhaps some
sentimental value, but prototypes, their worth multiplied by all the offspring they might
spawn in the future. For the first time since Americans became architecturally self-
conscious, they could imagine the possibility of a permanent community architectural
identity. "When we have an opportunity of designing a building to be erected on some
ancient site," wrote one correspondent to American Architect and Building News,
why not recognize the fact that the germ of a vernacular style was planted here 200
years ago, and, instead of ruthlessly rooting it out and substituting a neo-Grec or
Jacobean mansion, take the tender sapling from its withered trunk, and replant it in
its parent soil ... ?36
In matters of taste, at least, old could be good.
One reason people were prepared to believe that old was good was the growing
conviction that, in at least one important component of cities, change was indeed bad.
That component was the private domestic environment, each family's home.
The threatened domestic environment
It is strange how contentedly men can go on year after year, living like Arabs a tent
life, paying exhorbitant rents, with no care or concern for a permanent home.
American Builder, 186937
36H. Hudson Holly, an architectural pattern book publisher, quoted in Jean A. Follett, 'Colonial
Revival Origins,' in Providence Preservation Society, The Colonial Revival in Rhode Island (1890-
1940) (Providence, 1989), 2.
37American Builder, September, 1869, quoted in Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 50.
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Americans first acknowledged an exception from change in the urban environment in
their vision of the ideal home, and notwithstanding the material progress on which the
ideal relied, it eventually became an important challenge to the whole culture of change.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, residential development in and around
American cities was being shaped by what Gwendolyn Wright has called 'the cult of
domesticity.' 38 The main axiom of this domestic ideology was separation of the
workplace from the home. Houses were to be located in exclusively residential districts
from which men would leave each day for workplaces such as offices, warehouses,
and factories; the household was no longer to be a unit of economic production.
Women and children therefore would be separated from work. "The family," says
Kenneth Jackson, "became isolated and feminized, and this 'women's sphere' came to
be regarded as superior to the nondomestic institutions of the world." 39 The cult of
domesticity taught that, in Jackson's words, "the home ought to be perfect and could be
made so."40 It needed to be perfect because the home and the nuclear family within it
became more important as the basic building block of society, taking over moral,
spiritual, and educational roles once filled by other community institutions. After the
Civil War, says Wright, Americans set aside the quest for national salvation to seek
instead "redemption for one's own family."41 Home life was considered the seat of all
virtue; the stability of civilization rested upon the stability of the hearth.42
38The emergence of this set of ideas of home has been traced in a number of recent histories of housing
and suburban development: Gwendolyn Wright, Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in
America (Cambridge, Mass., 1981); Gwendolyn Wright, Moralism and the Model Home: Domestic
Architecture and Cultural Conflict in Chicago, 1873-1913 (Chicago, 1980); David Handlin, The
American Home: Architecture and Society, 1815-1915 (Boston, 1979); Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass
Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York, 1985); John Stilgoe, Borderland:
Origins of the American Suburb, 1820-1939 (New Haven, 1988); Robert Fishman, Bourgeois
Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York, 1987).
39Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 48.
40Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 49.
4 1Wright, Building the Dream, 96.
42
"The American Home" was the "Safeguard of American Liberties," according to the title of a
painting commissioned in 1893 by the founder of the United States League of Building and Loan
Societies; Wright, Building the Dream, 101.
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The house symbolized the family and its place in the world. "[T]he good family and
their suburban home became almost interchangeable concepts,"43 says Wright. "The
suburban home, how it was furnished, and the family life the housewife oversaw,
contributed to the definition of 'middle class,' at least as much as did the husband's
income."44 Houses were set on their own grounds, separated from neighbors at the
sides and rear and set back especially from the street, surrounded by an ornamental
space not meant to be productive like fields or kitchen gardens, nor utilitarian like urban
courts or 'yards' in the old meaning of the word. The new suburban yard re-created as
a private retreat the nature that was being lost from the public landscape. It allowed the
idealized domestic environment to extend outside the walls of the house, and served,
says Jackson, as "a kind of verdant moat separating the household from the threats and
temptations of the city."45
Every part of this ideology isolated the home and family from cities and the change
that went on there. The idealized domestic environment put a boundary around the
realm where change was normal or acceptable. Segregating home from work separated
it not only from industrial nuisances, but also from all the powerful economic engines
of urban change. The domestic environment was instead a stable, permanent alternative
to the city's tumult, "waiting like a refuge," says John Stilgoe, "in the storm of the late
nineteenth-century urban frenzy." This was true in theory whether the family owned a
gracious suburban villa which met the demanding requirements of the ideal, or
struggled to afford a simple cottage of its own. Families that were unable to buy into
the physical expressions of the suburban ideal nonetheless tried to adapt rituals of the
cult of domesticity to the less hospitable setting of urban housing. The lowest classes in
their tenements experienced little stability in the physical environment, as the real estate
market continued treating their homes as a transitional phase on the way to some more
43Wright, Building the Dream, 107; Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 52.
44Wright, Building the Dream, 99.
45Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 58. Frederick Law Olmsted in 1868 referred to fenced yards as "private
outside apartments"; quoted in Schuyler, New Urban Landscape, 162.
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profitable land use, but settlement house workers tried to socialize them to the domestic
ideals of stability.46
American families did not necessarily become in practice any more settled or less
migratory. Kenneth Jackson describes this paradox of a highly mobile population
pursuing an ideal of rootedness, which was resolved, he says, by treating each
particular house as "the temporary representation of the ideal permanent house":
Although a family might buy the structure planning to inhabit it for only a few
years, the Cape Cod, Colonial Revival, and other traditional historical stylings
politely ignored their transience and provided an architectural symbolism that spoke
of stability and permanence.47
The drive to express domestic permanence explains why the Colonial Revival and its
kin, such as Mission Revival in California, received more widespread popular
acceptance than anything American architects have done before or since. In the best
suburban developments this reassuring imagery extended as well to large-scale design
which neslted the individual houses in an apparently timeless pastoral landscape.
These refuges and signs of permanence served as an increasingly important
underpinning to the culture of change, a reassuring private stability which allowed
people to face with equanimity the continual changes in their public environment.
Within the city, the Back Bay development served this same purpose, allowing upper-
class Bostonians, fortified in a precinct they believed secure, to accept invasion of their
old neighborhoods by business or by lower classes.
The problem was that the forces of environmental change did not respect the
boundaries put around them. Even the favored classes watched their private refuges
overtaken. One universal threat was the very streetcars that allowed mass realization of
the suburban ideal. Where neighborhoods grew on vacant land around a trolley line,
homebuyers wanted to locate at least a block or so from the tracks; when a streetcar
company sought a line in an existing street of owner-occupied dwellings, such as
Boston's Columbus Avenue or Marlborough Street, it could count on a vigorous
46Stilgoe, Borderland, 178.
47Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 51.
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opposition. It was not that streetcars were like elevated trains a significant nuisance in
themselves, but they were harbingers of further change, announcing the impending
arrival of apartment houses and businesses, the evaporation of neighborhood
character.48
Homeowners' insecurity was magnified by the idealization of the domestic
environment, which made them sensitive to nuance and thus vulnerable to a broader
variety of potential changes. "The very qualities that made the home so meaningful,"
says Gwendolyn Wright, "also made it precarious." 49 A middle-class ideal which
imitated country seats of the wealthy could never entirely measure up on an eighth of an
acre, and so the suburban home relied on its neighbors' houses and lawns for much of
the identity it sought to project. Real estate expert Richard Hurd, at the turn of the
century, asserted that in residential areas "the erection of almost any building other than
a residence constitutes a nuisance."so
Sensitivity to change was further reinforced by a continuing belief in the inevitability
of neighborhood decline, a deeply ingrained and tenacious idea still driving residential
planning and the housing market well into the twentieth century, long after evidence
was available to support a more optimistic view of the potential for environmental
permanence. The infamous 'redlining' maps which steered residential mortgage lending
starting in the 1930s ostensibly showed the phases of neighborhood deterioration,
based, says Jackson, on the assumptions that "change was inevitable" and "the natural
tendency of any area was to decline." 51 Neighborhood stability, in this view, was only
a respite from the inevitable, and was therefore all the more important to maintain.
48Andrew J. King, Law and Land Use in Chicago: A Prehistory of Modern Zoning (New York, 1986),
chapter 6; Boston Globe, October 21, 1875: 2; James Means, 'Shall We Save Marlborough Street? or
Shall It be Sacrificed for the Benefit of Land Speculators?' circular letter, May 6, 1890, in Codman
family MS collection (30.668), Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities, Boston;
Eleanora W. Schoenebaum, 'Emerging Neighborhoods: The Development of Brooklyn's Fringe Areas,
1850-1930' (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1976), 192-197; Hurd, City Land Values, 118.
49Wright, Building the Dream, 108.
50Hurd, City Land Values, 117.
51Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 198.
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One of the periods in a neighborhood's life when it was most vulnerable to change
was the early stages of its development, while uncertainty remained as to what would
fill its vacant lots, or even whether they might be re-subdivided, since far more land
was put on the market for high-quality residences than could ever be absorbed by the
market. Subdivision lots were most often taken up and built upon during economic
booms, and lay dormant during busts; more-or-less complete development of a tract
could take several cycles during which building patterns there could shift
dramatically.52 Buyers preferred, where possible, to avoid this uncertainty.
Homeowners' insecurity translated into a powerful economic force. Marketing
emphasized 'established' neighborhoods, the character of which was already safely
settled.
Developers of elite subdivisions, and later their middle-class imitators, took on an
increasing share of infrastructure provision, installing utilities, paving roads, and
planting trees and more elaborate landscaping, in order to reduce uncertainty about the
neighborhood's ultimate character. This concern eventually drew land developers into
the separate and unfamiliar field of housebuilding. In the early nineteenth century,
subdividers often initially sold lots under conditions requiring prompt construction, so
that early buyers' houses would help establish the value of the rest of the tract. By the
1890s developers sometimes built the first few houses themselves in order to control
this critical determinant of neighborhood character.53 In the middle of the twentieth
century this trend would culminate in vertical integration of the housing industry, so
that a single developer commonly took responsibility for subdividing and improving a
piece of raw land, building all the houses on it, and selling them to the public.54 Before
this integration, sensitivity to neighborhood change ensured that homeowners and
prospective buyers would remain skittish as long as any undeveloped lots remained
nearby.
52Spann, New Metropolis, 106; Doucet, 'Urban Land Development,' 329.
53E.g., Chevy Chase, Maryland (1893), Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 124; Roland Park, Maryland
(1894), where these houses were sold at a loss, Harry G. Schalck, 'Planning Roland Park, 1891-1910,'
Maryland Historical Magazine 67 (1972): 423.
54Joseph Laronge, 'The Subdivider of Today and Tomorrow,' Journal of Land & Public Utility
Economics 18 (1942): 427; Weiss, Community Builders, 30-31, 40-48.
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A steadily growing portion of the real estate market was non-speculative, purchases
by prospective residents who set the value of residential land not by its potential for but
its protection from change.55 This new definition of value made the real estate industry
ever more interested in the conceptual boundaries that exempted areas from the prospect
of change. No place within reach of a metropolis was truly immune from change; like
every historic structure, every valued neighborhood was potentially threatened. When
intangible qualities of neighborhoods became a large part of their financial value, then
their decline became not only a potential domestic trauma for their residents, but also a
significant economic waste for society as a whole.
Waste. missed opportunities. and the need for planning
The waste resulting from premature neighborhood obsolescence was "[o]ne of the
most appalling losses in the economic life of the United States to-day," developer J. C.
Nichols told the Eighth National Conference on City Planning in 1916.56 People first
began counting the costs of change in the late nineteenth century, not through abstract
concepts such as obsolescence, but in the actual physical destruction of buildings long
before their useful life was over. "We have been building up only to tear down a few
years later," said Hugh O'Brien, Boston's mayor from 1885 to 1888.57 As increasing
environmental change forced people to recognize the economic waste in this process,
55Laronge, 'Subdivider of Today and Tomorrow,' 427; Weiss, Community Builders, 61-62.
56J. C. Nichols, 'Financial Effect of Good Planning in Land Subdivision,' Proceedings of the Eighth
National Conference on City Planning, Cleveland, June 5-7, 1916 (New York, 1916): 93; Weiss,
Community Builders, 64-67. See also quantification of the economic effects of neighborhood change in
Lawson Purdy, 'Remarks at the Closing Dinner,' Proceedings of the Ninth National Conference on
City Planning, Kansas City, Mo., May 7-9, 1917 (New York, 1917), 293-94.
57He made the remarks in 1877, as alderman; Boston City Council, Public Parks in the City of
Boston. A Compilation of Papers, Reports, and Arguments, Relating to the Subject (City doc. 125,
1880), 93.
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some of them began to ask whether there might be better ways of making cities so thay
they would not need to be unmade so quickly.
Dislocation from environmental change showed up in numerous parts of the urban
economy. Business districts shifted location, and residential neighborhoods fell from
fashion, buffeting the finances of individual families, and preventing the economic
stabilization that could occur through a system of long-term mortgage financing.58
Infrastructure was provided haphazardly and then, like downtown Boston's hydrants
during the fire, proved inadequate to its altered tasks. Cities paved streets only to have
one new utility after another rip them up.
Boston provided one of the most direct examples of these costs in its continual
struggle to cut traffic arteries through its tangled web of narrow seventeenth-century
streets. "During the past twenty-five years," said Mayor Hugh O'Brien in 1885, "we
have expended millions of dollars for widening and extending streets that could have
been saved if some systematic plan had been adopted. ... [A] vast amount of property
in buildings has been destroyed by change of street lines and grades."59 Street
widening caused not only public costs but private disruptions as well; investments had
to be made in uncertainty and sometimes amidst the remnants of buildings which, while
in theory 'made whole' by municipal compensation, in practice were both a wasted
asset in themselves and a drag on investment around them. The Common Council
Street Committee complained in 1860 that widening North Street in the North End had
failed to improve business along its length because "new fronts have been placed [on]
mere shells of buildings, and even chimneys form a portion of the front wall,
disfiguring the appearance of the street."6
58Nichols, 'Financial Effect of Good Planning,' 95.
59Hugh O'Brien, Inaugural Address of ... Mayor of Boston (City doc. 1, 1885), 33. Richard M. Hurd
in 1903 cited Boston as the main American example of this form of "sheer waste"; Hurd, City Land
Values, 41.
6Boston Common Council, Committee on Streets, Report ... on the Widening of North Street (City
doc. 72, 1860), 4; see also Boston Evening Transcript, January 27, 1915: 3.
Boston and other American cities long sought 'excess condemnation' powers that would allow them to
take these remnants (see editorial, Boston Herald, January 29, 1903: 6; Boston Society of Architects'
campaign for excess condemnation amendment), in order, they thought, to realize a profit on private
improvements planned in a rational whole with the newly-widened streets. When Massachusetts cities
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When American cities were smaller and simpler, such dislocations might have seemed
an acceptable price for their vitality. But by the end of the nineteenth century some of
them were growing to rank among the world's largest; surely urban fabric at this new
scale could not be disposable. If resistance to change was a goal in residential
neighborhoods, in much of the rest of the urban environment it was an unwelcome fact.
Historian Josef Konvitz speaks of cities' permanence as a problem beginning at the end
of the nineteenth century, in that increasingly durable public works - transit lines,
subterranean utilities, even paved streets themselves - no longer afforded flexibility in
urban form.61 Elaborate new building types such as railroad stations, hotels,
department stores and elevator office blocks represented large investments which
needed to be amortized over long periods, and unlike small older houses and
warehouses were not adaptable to unanticipated uses. The city planning movement
arose in part as a response to this problem: if important parts of the environment were
in fact permanent, then they ought to be planned as permanent.
Planning for the future in this way required a new concept of progress. On Henry
Tappan's return to New York in 1855, he pointed out a fundamental criticism of the
culture of change, a flaw in the notion of progress as Americans had applied it in their
cities. The world's great cities, he said, progressed cumulatively, as each generation
built upon the best of those who had come before. The city should be "continually
becoming dearer to us as it becomes more beautiful and contains more objects to render
it worthy of our love." But New York grew by frenetically tearing down and
rebuilding, indiscriminately destroying the best along with the worst. "[I1f she goes on
increasing and flourishing," asked Tappan, "must not all the works of the present and
prosperous generation sink into insignificance, and leave not a trace behind ...?"62
finally received this power by constitutional amendment in 1911, they discovered that this profit was a
chimera (Boston Evening Transcript, January 27, 1915: 3). Even when consciously planned to
maximize public and private gain together, these infrastructure changes were a net drag on the common
wealth.
61Josef W. Konvitz, The Urban Millenium: The City-Building Process from the Early Middle Ages to
the Present (Carbondale, Ill., 1985), ch. 5.
62Quoted in Spann, New Metropolis, 115-16.
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Americans had to figure out how to turn Tappan's criticism into a prescription, how to
plan the best which would be kept as a foundation for what was to follow.
Bostonians drew these same philosophical lessons from their street widenings,
because they were so clearly avoidable had previous city-builders exercised foresight.
The problem was not limited to the old streets of the original peninsula; it was if
anything more serious in the suburban wards of Dorchester and Roxbury, annexed in
1867, where many miles of new development relied on what only recently had been
country lanes and farm roads.63 At an 1870 meeting of the American Social Science
Association, in Boston, Frederick Law Olmsted pointed out that
It is practically certain that the Boston of today is the mere nucleus of the Boston
that is to be. It is practically certain that it is to extend over many miles of country
now thoroughly rural in character, in parts of which farmers are now laying out
roads with a view to shortening the teaming distance between their wood-lots and a
railway station, being governed in their courses by old property lines, which were
first run simply with reference to the equitable division of heritages, and in other
parts of which, perhaps, some wild speculators are having streets staked off from
plans which they have formed with a rule and pencil in a broker's office, with a
view chiefly to the impressions they would make when seen by other speculators
on a lithographed map.M
Such haphazard growth was setting the stage for a repetition of the same inefficiency
and congestion the city experienced at its center, and the same expense and disruption
in correcting them - which, said Olmsted, could never be accomplished as completely
as if the streets were laid out well in the first place. Up to this point, Olmsted was
saying nothing more than had Mayor O'Brien and the host of other people who
grappled with the practical problems left by American cities' undirected expansion.
Most of these people saw the answer as a coordinated extension of an urban grid over
the countryside, as New York had done at the beginning of the century and many other
cities were doing since, providing a neutral armature for whatever urban growth might
bring.
63Boston City Council, Committee on Laying Out and Widening Streets, Final Report (City doc.
116,1870), 24-25.
"Frederick Law Olmsted, 'Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,' (1870), in S. B. Sutton, ed.,
Civilizing American Cities: A Selection of Frederick Law Olmsted's Writings on City Landscapes
(Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 68.
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Olmsted soon questioned not only unplanned growth, but also this solution
customarily prescribed for it. As the nation's most prominent landscape architect and
prophet of the parks movement, a pulpit he had gained as winner of the 1858 design
competition for New York's Central Park, Olmsted took on the even greater challenge
of becoming the country's leading critic of the culture of change in the urban
environment.
Olmsted formulated his most profound argument for environmental permanence by
looking beyond the costs of actually changing land uses to count also the opportunity
costs of trying to accommodate change by providing for every land use on every site.
Grids might in theory be infinitely adaptable, but their one-size-fits-all urban fabric was
in practice inappropriate for most of the uses to which it was actually put. A year after
Olmsted's Boston speech, he made this argument in a plan for Staten Island, then a
semi-rural suburb of New York. Most of the island would never be used for
commercial or industrial purposes, he said, and designing it for these uses would only
make it less suitable for its inhabitants.65
A few years later Olmsted had honed these arguments further. In 1876, with engineer
J. James R. Croes as his assistant, he reported a plan for parts of Westchester County
which were about to be annexed to New York City as The Bronx. The Parks
Commission, charged with laying out the new territory, spent several years wrestling
with the difficulties of extending the Manhattan street grid, or something like it, over
the rugged topography north of the city. Olmsted and Croes questioned the wisdom of
this approach. While most people involved in developing the city considered the grid a
great success, they said, "its inflexibility" increasingly brought problems:
If a proposed cathedral, military depot, great manufacturing enterprise, home of
religious seclusion or seat of learning needs a space of ground more than sixty-six
yards in extent from north to south, the system forbids that it shall be built in
New York ....
The rigid uniformity of the system of 1807 requires that no building lot shall be
more than 100 feet in depth, none less. The clerk or mechanic and his young
family, wishing to live modestly in a house by themselves, without servants, is
65Frederick Law Olmsted, et al., 'Report to the Staten Island Improvement Commission of a
Preliminary Scheme of Improvements' (1871), in Fein, ed., Landscape into Cityscape, 173-205.
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provided for in this respect no otherwise than the wealthy merchant, who, with a
large family and numerous servants, wishes to display works of art, to form a large
library, and to enjoy the company of many guests.66
The clerk or mechanic and his young family, as a result, could never hope to live in
their own home in New York; the idealized domestic environment was denied to most
of the city's population by the grid itself, the very instrument which was supposed to
provide the ultimate adaptability in land uses.
"[A]n attempt to make all parts of a great city equally convenient for all uses,"
concluded Olmsted and Croes, will also make them "equally inconvenient."67 They
explained their alternative through the then especially powerful metaphor of the home:
If a house to be used for many different purposes must have many rooms and
passages of various dimensions and variously lighted and furnished, not less must
... a metropolis be specially adapted at different points to different ends.68
If specific districts of the city could be built with a view to specific land uses, they
could be laid out more appropriately for their intended uses, enhancing their functioning
while at the same time saving money which would have been spent pointlessly adapting
them for uses they would never accommodate. Topography, said Olmsted and Croes,
ensured that Riverdale in the Bronx would become a commercial district "only by some
forced and costly process," so why not lay it out in winding roads rather than straight
blocks which not only cost more to construct but marred the landscape's residential
attractiveness?69
Such an approach required two innovations in real estate thinking. The first was "a
certain effort of forecast as to what the city is to be in the future." 70 Olmsted had
already shown on Staten Island and in The Bronx that he was not reluctant to make
6601msted and Croes, 'Preliminary Report,' 352-54.
6701msted and Croes, 'Preliminary Report,' 356.
6801msted and Croes, 'Preliminary Report,' 352. Landscape architect H. W. S. Cleveland earlier
invoked the same metaphor when he termed the provision of uniform blocks for differing uses "as
absurd as would be the assertion that the convenience and comfort of every family would be best served
by living in a square house, with square rooms, of a uniform size" (quoted in Jackson, Crabgrass
Frontier, 75).
6901msted and Croes, 'Preliminary Report,' 361.
7001msted and Croes, 'Preliminary Report,' 357.
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such an effort; major topographic determinants could be discerned, and their workings
were not mysterious. Such forecasting was after all the real estate speculator's stock in
trade, but Olmsted stepped on the speculator's prerogatives by suggesting that
projecting future land use was a matter not only of private but of public interest.
The second innovation was to establish "permanent occupation" 71 by intended land
uses. Unlike Manhattan's grid, the curving streets which Olmsted proposed for
Riverdale's suburban villas would never be good for anything else. This challenged the
culture of change at its heart, the belief in literal limitlessness of possibilities, as
Olmsted acknowledged:
It may be questioned whether, even in a locality as yet so remote from dense
building and so rugged in its topography, the demand for land for various other
purposes will not, in time, crowd out all rural and picturesque elements, and
whether, for this reason, it would be prudent to lay it out with exclusive reference
to suburban uses?72
This was a delicate question. Olmsted pointed to London, still the largest city in the
world and growing in increments greater than New York's, where similar picturesque
suburbs were absorbed whole rather than converted as the metropolis overtook them.
He pointed also to the considerable flexibility within such a district for incremental
changes and different building types which could be accommodated without altering its
permanent character. Despite these arguments, New York followed few of Olmsted's
recommendations, although Riverdale grew to be just such a district as he proposed. 73
In 1881 Olmsted moved his office to Brookline, and continued addressing issues of
environmental permanence in his plans for the Boston park system and in other work
around the country.
Olmsted explored his philosophy of the permanently differentiated city through
another medium, planning for private development of suburbs. He defined "true
suburbs" as places "in which urban and rural advantages are agreeably combined with
71Olmsted and Croes, 'Preliminary Report,' 362.
72Olmsted and Croes, 'Preliminary Report,' 364.
73Olmsted and Croes, 'Preliminary Report,' 362-63; Seymour J. Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed's New
York (New York, 1965), 116-17; Schuyler, New Urban Landscape, 177-78.
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... prospect of long continuance."74 Olmsted's subdivision designs, like his proposal
for Riverdale, used curvilinear layouts that were intentionally unsuited to any use other
than individual residences, and which would resist conversion to other uses (fig. 2.1.).
The first of his suburban designs to be constructed was Riverside, Illinois, begun in
1869. In an earlier unrealized project for Berkeley, California, Olmsted felt himself
excused from the culture of change by the nature of his client, the brand-new College
[now University] of California, which was presumably less interested in profit than in
creating suitable surroundings for its campus. Olmsted therefore presented as one of the
strengths of his plan its street layout which "would be inconvenient to follow for any
purpose of business beyond the mere supplying of the wants of the neighborhood
itself."75 At his Fisher Hill subdivision in Brookline, where construction began in
1884, the same logic clearly governs its curvilinear street pattern, which avoids any
convenient connection between Boylston and Beacon Streets.76
CENERAL PLAN -
BROOKLINE HILL
fig. 2.1. Frederick Law Olmsted's design for Fisher Hill, Brookline. The subdivision
was meant to be unsuitable for conversion from residential use.
7401msted, Vaux & Co., 'Preliminary Report upon the Proposed Suburban Village at Riverside, near
Chicago,' (1868) in Sutton, ed., Civilizing American Cities, 292.
75Frederick Law Olmsted, 'Report upon a Projected Improvement of the Estate of the College of
California, at Berkeley, near Oakland,' (1866) in Sutton, ed., Civilizing American Cities, 288.
76Zaitzevsky, Olmsted and the Boston Park System, 115-117.
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Practical concerns were bringing real estate thought into line with such reformers'
ideas. Olmsted's elaborately landscaped subdivision designs were examples of the
larger trend in which land developers took on ever-larger up-front costs. These costs
included not only their provision of increasingly elaborate roads, utilities, and
landscaping, but also money they spent assembling and carrying large tracts of land
which could only be brought onto the market over long periods. Stability of investment
thus became important not only for the buyers but even more so for the developers of
elite property, who had to be confident that their heavy initial investment would be
returned in enhanced value over the years or even decades which might be required to
complete sales. The people who created such communities as Chevy Chase, outside
Washington, D.C., says Kenneth Jackson, were "[m]ore interested in quality than in
rapid growth." 77 The financial strains of maintaining quality through lean times in
Riverside, Roland Park, and the Country Club district of Kansas City made their
respective developers keenly interested in protecting that quality against any threats of
change. 78
Similar worries plagued developers and investors in downtowns, where even more
money was at stake. There the desire for stability arose not in order to finish selling off
a project, but from the need for even greater time to recoup initial investment. As New
York attorney William Seton Gordon explained in 1891, "while most changes are
attended by an increase in the value of land, all have a tendency to lessen the value of
buildings by disturbing the harmony assumed to exist at the first between buildings and
neighborhood." 79 For the tremendous investments being made in downtown buildings,
this made accurate understanding of future land shifts increasingly important. Around
the turn of the century the real estate industry sought a scientific understanding of urban
change through increasingly systematic and quantitative appraisal methods. Whether by
77Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 124.
78Weiss, Community Builders, 48-52; Nichols, 'Financial Effect of Good Planning,' 92. On the heavy
costs of improvement at Riverside, see Olmsted, 'Report to the Staten Island Improvement
Commission,' 196. On the difficulty of carrying the land assembled for Roland Park, see Schalck,
'Planning Roland Park,' 422. The developers of Riverside defaulted during the Panic of 1873, and the
Roland Park Company struggled through the Depression of the 1890s.
79William Seton Gordon, 'Building Restrictions - Right to Enforce,' Albany Law Journal 43 (1891):
349.
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science or by art, investors hoped to defeat the disruptive power of change by correctly
forecasting it.80
By the 1870s and 1880s, theorists, city-building practitioners, and much of the public
had found fundamental problems with the culture of change. People were displeased by
the pace of alterations around them and were no longer reluctant to say so. Families
increasingly sought homes in neighborhoods which would be refuges from the
changing city. Developers and real estate operators grew concerned about the stability
of their investments. A new group of professionals who would become known as city
planners began arguing that the metropolis could be healthy only if its form were
shaped deliberately and permanently.
80Hurd, City Land Values, preface, summary, and ch. 8.
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CHAPTER THREE:
Available responses to change
If change in the urban environment was really a problem, rather than a healthy fact of
life; if at least some parts of cities ought to be permanent, then what could Americans
do about it? An examination of their attitudes toward and avenues for action around the
end of the Civil War may be organized in three categories:
People first sought private solutions, practising the cult of domesticity and attempting
to keep themselves and their families out of the path of change. They chose homes not
for their speculative potential, but as anti-speculations, places they thought would retain
their character, often suburban retreats. As they learned that no place was in itself
exempt from change, they tried controlling the use of land by private agreements,
through a branch of property law which came to be known as deed restrictions. If
people wanted permanence in their surroundings, and were able and willing to pay for
it, could they have it?
Deed restrictions sought to extend a degree of lasting control over private sections of
the environment, but even more troubling were public landmarks, most of which were
already under various sorts of communal control - churches, burial grounds, public
buildings and public spaces. The visibility of change was magnified by the use of these
places as symbols of community stability. Could community control of such sites
ensure the physical permanence demanded by this symbolism?
Finally, while the community controlled landmarks, if at all, only through ad hoc or
quasi-public institutions, the ongoing transformation of urban governments into
modem municipalities opened opportunities for more systematic and universal public
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controls. Could the government's traditional role in promoting change be reversed,
using public powers instead to bring stability and permanence to the urban
environment?
Deed restrictions
Perhaps it was inevitable in nineteenth-century America, with its reverence both for
individual rights and for private property, that environmental permanence should
receive its first systematic attention as a question of property rights. A man's home was
his castle, and if its property-line ramparts included grounds around it, then from at
least one small part of the city he need fear no disturbing change. But if he sold off
parts of that garden for others to build on - a common occurrence as American towns
grew to urban densities - did he have to completely relinquish control over its future
use? Could he not bind successive owners to refrain from at least those disruptions he
could define ahead of time? Lawyers searched through the baggage of legal tradition for
tools which could be adapted to these new tasks.
Restrictions in deeds, specifying permissible uses of land or forms of buildings, were
available as a legal tool throughout the nineteenth century. They appeared in Boston at
least as early as 1703, and before 1810 they were used on Beacon Hill to specify front
yard setbacks, maximum and minimum building heights, and contruction "of brick or
stone" only. 1 Those writing such restrictions found available many time-honored
prototypes. In legal theory, they can be grouped into two categories: easements and
covenants. Easements alter the way a particular piece of property is defined; covenants
modify the bargain by which it is conveyed.
An easement establishes a relationship between two or more pieces of property.
Party-wall easements, for example, set rules by which owners of abutting rowhouses
1Allen Chamberlain, Beacon Hill, its ancient pastures and early mansions, (Boston, 1925), 181, 89;
Atkins v. Boardman, 37 Mass. 291 (1838); Jeffries v. Jeffries, 117 Mass. 184 (1874).
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
share their common walls. Rights of way allow access from one property across
another, usually along a particular route and sometimes for particular purposes only.
An easement 'runs with the land' - it fixes a relationship not between individuals, but
between pieces of land, no matter who later comes to own them. Ordinarily the
relationship is permanent.
The problem with easements was that they were not, in theory, adaptable to the new
uses which Americans had in mind. These generally involved limiting, for the benefit
of one landowner, what another one could do with his property - a category known as
'negative' easements. But English precedent, the ancestor of American jurisprudence,
limited negative easements to a clearly defined set including access, party walls and
lateral support of the soil, light and air or 'ancient lights' (the right to prevent a
neighbor from blocking one's window), and riparian rights. Conservative English
courts refused to enforce restrictions "of a novel kind ... devised and attached to
property, at the fancy or caprice of any owner" which would then run with it "into all
hands however remote." 2 They were nervous about the very permanence which made
easements attractive. Even with these limitations, easements seemed an appropriate
model for some land development purposes. A subdivision laying out a street with ten-
foot building setbacks on each side bore a strong family resemblance to a right of way
mated with easements of light and air.
Unlike easements, covenants were infinitely flexible, limited only by the imagination
of the people writing them. A covenant, according to a contemporary definition, was an
agreement, a branch of the law of contracts, the object of which could be anything not
specifically illegal or in violation of public policy.3 Massachusetts deeds in the first half
of the nineteenth century included, for example, covenants to build rowhouses with
facades "uniform, one with the others,"4 to build only "dwelling-houses ... or
2Keppel v. Bailey, Myl. & K. 517, 534 (1834), quoted in King, Law and Land Use in Chicago, 10.
3John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of
America (Philadelphia, 1858), 1:345.
4Codman v. Bradley, 201 Mass. 361 (1909). The deed, in Boston, dated from 1811.
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buildings for religious or literary purposes,"5 and to put "a roof of slate or of some
other equally incombustible material" on any building more than twelve feet high.6
Related to covenants are conditions, a special form of agreement which if violated
causes a property to revert to its original owner. Conditions are normally used where
the new owner will need time to complete his part of the bargain. Donations of land to
religious congregations often included conditions requiring that a church be built by a
specified time.7 Subdividers sometimes sold lots on condition that buyers erect houses
within a certain period;8 the implicit bargain was that the buyer would not later
speculatively resell the vacant lot and thereby compete with the developer, but rather
would contribute to the subdivider's efforts to establish the neighborhood.
The problem with covenants was how and by whom they could be enforced,
questions which in turn affected how long they remained effective. There was no
question that a covenant, unless limited in time, remained binding indefinitely between
the original parties who signed the deed. The trouble began when properties changed
hands. A covenant was of little use if the people bound by it could evade its burden by
selling to others, but English precedent frowned on the assignment of contracts. This
difficulty had been overcome by the invention of 'real covenants,' that is, covenants the
subjects of which 'touched,' or inherently concerned, a piece of land, and therefore like
easements would 'attach' and run with it. An early and common example was the fence
covenant, dividing responsibility for maintaining a shared boundary fence,
responsibility which attached to the land so that "he who has the one is subject to the
other."9 Because title deeds in America were publicly recorded, purchasers of land
were presumed aware of any covenants concerning it, and by taking it they presumably
assented to these agreements made by their predecessors.
5Hubbell v. Warren, 90 Mass. 173 (1864), at 173-74; covenant, in Charlestown, from some time
before 1846.
6Lowell Institute for Savings v. City of Lowell, 153 Mass. 530 (1891), at 530-31; deed in Lowell
from 1839.
7Canal Bridge v. Methodist Religious Society, 54 Mass. 335 (1847); Cambridge deed from 1823.
8Estabrook v. Smith, 72 Mass. 572 (1856); 1852 Worcester deed; Hopkins v. Smith, 162 Mass. 444
(1894); 1867 Oak Bluffs subdivision.
9Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 1:346.
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Conditions followed their own separate logic. The burden of a condition - the risk of
forfeiture - necessarily ran with the land, but its benefit (the 'right of reverter') could
not, because as far as any single parcel of land was concerned the original owner had
parted with his title, and existed only as a person rather than a landowner. Reversionary
rights vested in him personally and descended to his heirs, rather than attaching to any
other piece of land which he might happen to have owned. The example of conditions,
together with the presumption that covenants related individuals rather than pieces of
property, meant that courts had great latitude in deciding who could enforce covenants,
and whether they continued to run or expired with the sale of property or death of their
original beneficiaries. 10
Even where covenants attached to land, the question of who could enforce them
presented still further intricacies. By analogy with the idea that only the parties to a
contract could enforce it, real covenants bound only people between whom there was
'privity of estate' - some direct transfer of property, or a chain of such transfers. But
applying this rule technically to covenants in a subdivision produced strange results. A
chain of transfers linked all the lot owners with the subdivider, but not with each other.
Each of them was a 'stranger' to the transactions by which the subdivider imposed
restrictions on every other lot. The subdivider, however, left the scene; when he sold
the last lot he no longer stood in a continuing property relationship with any of them,
and if he remained the personal beneficiary of the covenants, he was the one person
without any direct interest in enforcing them. As covenants expanded from special
cases into ordinary real estate practice, privity of estate became a riddle with which
English and American courts wrestled from time to time. Covenants would not be a
workable tool for private planning until they solved it.
One final and unpredictable difficulty with covenants was the requirement that they be
in accordance with public policy. One such policy was the 'rule against perpetuities.'
The 1858 edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionary defined a 'perpetuity' as "[any
limitation tending to take the subject of it out of commerce" longer than the lifetime of
some specified person plus twenty-one years. The rule traditionally applied to title, that
1osee, e.g., Badger v. Boardman, 82 Mass. 559 (1860); Skinner v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180 (1881), in
which the court holds that the restrictions cannot be enforced even by the late grantor's heirs.
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is, to restrictions on selling property, or conditions which made ownership uncertain
for unacceptably long periods. But trial lawyers regularly argued that permanent
restrictions on the use or arrangement of buildings were perpetuities, and the concept
led many courts to look askance at any covenant which was not limited in duration. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1829 accepted "partial and temporary
restrictions" on land, "at least for a limited number of years,"1' while a less
sympathetic Illinois Supreme Court later pronounced that "it is contrary to the well
recognized business policy of this country to tie up real estate...." 12 Opinions like these
did little to encourage faith in covenants as a long-term means of land use control, and
they enhanced the attraction of easement theory, with its presumption of permanence.
The evolution of these legal tools (which will be described further in chapter 4) was
crucial to efforts at securing environmental permanence, but their importance was
indirect. Legal evolution followed rather than led real estate practice, and practice was
surprisingly independent of the legal doctrines which theoretically underlay it, at least
until courts in the late nineteenth century began taking an active interest in restrictions.
Deeds seldom staked out theoretical positions, for example by designating their
restrictions as easements or as covenants. Non-lawyers, and even some lawyers,
blissfully ignorant of the subtleties of then-current jurisprudence, simply wrote in plain
English what they meant to accomplish, in the innocent faith that courts would enforce
it. Other more subtle lawyers drafted restrictions which they hoped would satisfy every
school of thought. Either way, it was up to the courts to decide on the theoretical
underpinnings for enforcing them, if it came to that.
The overwhelming majority of deed restrictions never made it into a courtroom. If a
restriction was signed and then followed, or if it was violated without anyone suing,
then its doctrinal correctness was irrelevant. The plain English of the restrictions
succeeded or failed on its own, their evolution following a logic which came not from
the theories of law but from the exigencies of real estate development. The equity courts
in which deed restriction doctrine was hammered out were guided by the principle of
11Gray v. Blanchard, 25 Mass. 283 (1829), at 289-90.
12145 Ill. 336 (1893), quoted in King, Law and Land Use in Chicago, 44.
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reasonableness, and therefore strongly influenced by prevailing practice and the
expectations which had arisen from it.
In practice, deed restrictions at mid-century were used less to withdraw land from the
potential for change than to control the process of its development for a limited time.
Deed restrictions could be used to secure two distinct goals: uniformity and stability.
Uniformity was addressed through the specificity and stringency of the restrictions'
substance; stability through their duration, enforcement, and potential for revision. In
the early nineteenth century both goals were new ones and eventually both were widely
pursued, but developers' most immediate aim was uniformity. 13
The residential subdivisions that first used systematic deed restrictions, such as
Mount Vernon Street (1801) and Louisburg Square (1826) on Beacon Hill, or
Gramercy Park (1831) in New York, were designed as ensembles and used restrictions
to ensure that the actions of independent builders would contribute to an overall
composition. 14 The idea of such an ensemble - or at least its realization - was new on
this continent, and conflicted with the ordinary practice of uncoordinated individual
construction. Deed restrictions resolved this conflict in a way more acceptable to
Americans than the leasehold tenure of England or the strict public controls of France,
from which places these design precedents came.
Uniformity was no threat to the culture of change. By creating a predictable product,
restrictions rationalized the land conversion process, made it more efficient and
profitable, and perhaps incidentally increased its rate.
13For example, deeds at Monument Square, Charlestown, in 1846 include conditions "to the end that
there may be an uniformity in the buildings to be erected fronting the said Monument Square, and for
determining the character and style thereof ...," specifying that they were to be "not less than three nor
more than four stories high, ... built of brick or stone ..." (Hubbell v. Warren, 90 Mass. 173, at 173,
174).
14Chamberlain, Beacon Hill, 89, 188; Stephen Garmey, Gramercy Park: An Illustrated History of a
New York Neighborhood (New York, 1984), 31.
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Most deed restrictions written before the 1860s specified no duration or expiration,
and therefore appear on the surface to be permanent restrictions. This appearance is
misleading. An examination of mid-nineteenth century practice suggests that most of
them were conceived as applying only to the first generation of building on each lot.15
Conditions in deeds from the city of Boston in 1857 on the South End's Rutland Street,
for example, referred to "the building which may be erected." 16
This interpretation is reinforced by internal evidence in the restrictions themselves.
First, many named existing buildings as prototypes to be copied - a common formula
for construction contracts, naturally implying a one-time applicability, but unreliable
over a long period during which the prototype might disappear or be altered. Five deeds
on Common (now Tremont) Street in 1811 contained the condition
that all the said houses to be erected on said house lots shall be erected on a right
line, so that no one of the said five houses shall project before another, and also that
all said houses ... shall be as to the number of stories and the height of them in
conformity with the new block of houses to the Northward thereof on Common
street, unless all the proprietors of the said five house lots should unanimously
agree on some other plan, in which their several houses shall be uniform, one with
the others. 17
When such restrictions were applied to single lots their intention could be even clearer,
as in an 1863 deed requiring that "the front on Arlington Street shall correspond with
my house adjoining according to the plan of G. J. F. Bryant herewith to be
recorded." 18
15American Unitarian Association v. Minot, 185 Mass. 589 (1904), was decided on this point. Some
restrictions were indeed meant to be permanent: the Mt. Vernon Street indenture (1820), formalizing an
1801 setback agreement as a permanent restriction (Chamberlain, Beacon Hill, 89); Pemberton Square
restrictions (1835) which include modification provisions making clear the intention that they be
permanent. These were unusual; more often those drafting deeds simply did not address the question of
duration, leading at least to the conclusion that it was not important to them.
16Sanborn v. Rice, 129 Mass. 387 (1880), at 388.
17Codman v. Bradley, 201 Mass. 361, at 365. Chief Justice Knowlton in that case suggests that when
the parties recorded a release of this condition in 1857, they did not consider it as applying only to the
initial buildings, but he goes on to say that the applicability of the condition at that time was
"doubtful," (at 367) and its release more in the nature of removing a cloud on the title.
18Welch v. Austin, 187 Mass. 257 (1905). Similarly, an 1844 building contract for a house on
Ashburton Street, executed a month after the deed, appears to have been anticipated in the restrictions
(Baptist Social Union v. Boston University, 183 Mass. 202 (1903) at 204).
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Second, restrictions' juxtaposition with other requirements, most especially that a
building be erected by a certain time, implied applicability to that structure alone. 19
Finally, covenants were commonly put in the form of conditions - violation of which
would forfeit the estate - making it appear unlikely that they were expected to apply
beyond a limited amount of time, even if that duration was not specified. Common
sense boggled at the uncertainty that conditions could create in real estate titles over a
long period of time, and courts were thus very reluctant to let them run indefinitely.
The conclusion that deed covenants were meant to apply to a single generation of
construction is reinforced by analogy with the land lease covenants which regulated
building in London. By their nature, these covenants applied to the first structure built
on each lot, because tenants would negotiate new leases before rebuilding. Americans
probably modelled their deed covenants more-or-less directly on the London system;
Bostonians' "mimicry" of English institutions in general, writes social historian Ronald
Story, was "omnipresent" 20 in the mid-nineteenth century, and Boston together with
much of the world still looked more to London than to Paris as the pinnacle of urbane
development. On Rutland Street, for example, the city followed London practice almost
word for word, substituting 'deed' for 'lease.' An initial agreement with a builder
specified the size, siting, and materials of houses he would build on 13 adjacent lots,
with each to be conveyed by a separate deed as it was finished. 21 The covenants in each
deed simply recited the terms of the initial agreement and then affirmed that "the
building at present erected upon the said lot is constructed in conformity with the above
conditions..."22 Intentions about leasehold covenants' duration and enforcement were
clear in the context of a well-defined landlord-tenant relationship, but became
ambiguous when the same terms were inserted into freehold deeds. Americans had not
yet thought through all these ambiguities.
19e.g., 1867 Cottage City conditions requiring that a house be erected "within one year" (Hopkins v.
Smith, 162 Mass. 444).
20Ronald Story, Harvard & the Boston Upper Class: The Forging of an Aristocracy (Middletown,
Conn., 1980), 166.
21Sanborn v. Rice, 129 Mass. 387, at 388.395.
22Sanborn v. Rice, 129 Mass. 387, at 389.
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The assumption that restrictions ordinarily applied only to the first generation of
building, leads to a paradox which makes subdividers' intentions harder to fathom in
retrospect: a deed restriction without duration - nominally permanent - was as time
passed less likely to be enforced than one with a stated expiration. A long finite term
made clear that the restriction meant to regulate more than a single act of building, and
offered little room for reinterpretation at the hands of unpredictable courts.23 But finite
terms also fit within the culture of change - the assumption of inevitable change. One
generation wanting permanence could effectively secure it by a term restriction of
sufficient duration; if change was inevitable, it seemed only fair that the next generation
should have the opportunity to start from scratch.
Whatever their authors' intentions, restrictions' duration in practice was determined in
part by who could enforce them, and for how long. Related to the idea of covenants
applying only to the first generation of building was the assumption that they were
enforceable only by the land's original seller. Conditions definitely worked this way.
Restrictions in general were seen not as a mutual relationship among lots in a
subdivision, but as a contract between two parties, like the deed itself.24 This
assumption can be inferred most clearly from the practice of issuing releases from deed
restrictions. Before 1863, any releases were invariably issued by the subdivider or his
heirs to the purchaser, neighbors within the plat had nothing to do with it.
Restrictions used in this way did not withdraw land from potential change indefinitely
to protect purchasers, but only long enough to protect the developer as he sold off the
lots in a subdivision. Unscrupulous or cynical subdividers might unload their last lots
quickly, or even at an advanced price, by leaving them unrestricted.25
23see, e.g., Gray v. Blanchard, 25 Mass. 283.
24Linzee v. Mixer, 101 Mass. 512 (1869) - the Back Bay; Sharp v. Ropes, 110 Mass. 381 (1872) - a
small-time, unsophisticated subdivider exercising personal control.
25Hano v. Bigelow, 155 Mass. 341 (1892), in which the last lot in a subdivision was sold unrestricted
in 1869. Subdividers sold lots for triple-deckers as restrictions' expiration approached: in 1894 (Roak v.
Davis, 194 Mass. 481 [1907] at 483); in.1899 (Ivarson v. Mulvey, 179 Mass. 141 [1901]).
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Marketing and description of subdivisions indicated a certain ambivalence about the
purpose of deed restrictions. Lot purchasers were clearly meant to think of the
restrictions as a benefit to themselves, and not just to the subdividers. But if
subdividers alone could enforce restrictions - or omit or even rescind them - then the
protection afforded depended on the developer's good faith. Even where a developer's
intentions were sincere, the passage of years rendered remote the likelihood of locating
him or his heirs, and prevailing upon them to bring a lawsuit to enforce restrictions in a
neighborhood in which they no longer had any material interest.26 There is no
indication that most home owners expected their deed restrictions to provide any such
long-term legal protection. What long-term benefit they received was not from the
restrictions themselves, but from the character of the neighborhood as initially
established under the restrictions.
A different kind of long-term relationship existed when land was subdivided by a unit
of government. From the 1840s to the 1860s, the city of Boston sold thousands of lots
of filled land along the neck in the new South End, most or all of them subject to deed
restrictions. The municipality would be around indefinitely, and unlike private
subdividers it would presumably be responsive to neighborhood concerns and
interested in long-range land uses.
By the end of the 1850s, Bostonians were beginning to look at deed restrictions with
environmental permanence in mind. They put them to work for this end as the city
began its expansion onto the Back Bay in 1857, an extraordinarily ambitious project
which would take decades to complete. It was administered by a three-member state
commission. From the beginning, lots were subject to dimensional restrictions
specifying front yard setbacks, minimum building heights of three stories, and
maximum cellar depth to avoid drainage and foundation problems on the filled land.27
While South End deeds limited the area to residential uses for twenty years, the Back
26Codman v. Bradley, 201 Mass. 361: the heirs of the beneficiaries of an 1811 condition were able to
be located in 1857 only because they still owned property nearby.
27in Allen v. Mass. Bonding and Insurance Co., 248 Mass. 378 (1924).
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Bay use restrictions were perpetual.28 They offered an environment of long-term
stability, evidently learning from and certainly competing successfully with the South
End. The existence of the Back Bay commission promised an effective means of
enforcement, so that buyers really viewed the restrictions as offering durable
protection.
Americans were interested in securing environmental permanence through deed
restrictions, and the Back Bay's unique combination of large-scale urban design, public
ownership, and a specially-created long-term institutional structure provided an
unparalleled context for using restrictions. In ordinary development, however,
American caselaw as yet gave little encouragement that restrictions could control change
over any long period.
The place of old landmarks
In the public environment, people found the disappearance of old landmarks
disturbing because they believed, despite the culture of change, that at least some of
them were supposed to be permanent. Ideas about the permanence of landmarks were
deeply embedded in attitudes about social and institutional stability, and even having to
explicitly think about the durability of churches, graveyards, or public buildings called
into question that stability. A growing antiquarian sensibility allowed people to
appreciate buildings and scenes of great age even while applauding the progress which
was relegating them to memory. These ideas could remain so contradictory and
confused only because there was seldom any call to sort them out by translating them to
action. Starting around the time of the Civil War, however, the combination of
increasingly pervasive change in cities together with an increasing awareness of history
28Sanborn v. Rice, 129 Mass. 387; form of deed in Massachusetts, Commission on the Back Bay,
Catalogue of 50 Lots of Land on the Back Bay ... to be sold by public auction, on Wednesday, Oct. 24,
1860 (Boston, 1860), 6.
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forced Americans to recognize these contradictions and to consider, at first tentatively
and unsuccessfully, what to do with old but valued pieces of the urban environment.
Nineteenth-century Americans' earliest historical awareness had to do with people
and events, which they associated only sometimes with places and seldom with actual
remaining structures. Thus in 1826 Bostonians could propose demolishing their Old
State House to erect a statue commemorating the events which had occurred in it.
History in the environment meant not antiquities surviving from earlier periods, but
monuments erected by the present generation.29 Perhaps the most conspicuous in the
nation and one of the most admired was the Bunker Hill monument in Charlestown, a
221-foot granite obelisk built between 1825 and 1843. Not until the end of the century
did citizens begin to express regret that the monument's construction had effaced the
Revolutionary battle's last remaining actual traces.30
As for the permanence of monuments and monumental buildings themselves,
Bostonians' thoughts throughout most of the nineteenth century were innocently simple
and strangely contradictory. While they expected the city to change, they had high
hopes for the durability of their institutions, and structures that symbolized these
institutions should therefore endure. Samuel Adams, laying the cornerstone of the
Massachusetts state house in 1795, hoped that it might "remain permanent as the
everlasting mountains."31 At the Second Baptist Church dedication in 1811, Reverend
Thomas Baldwin said, "[w]e placed no inscriptions under [the cornerstone]; our hopes
were, that the building would stand, till the Arch-Angel's trumpet shall demolish the
universe." 32 The owner of a Trinity Church tomb in 1871 recalled of the bodies which
29Edward Everett speech for Bunker Hill monument, to be erected by "the people of Massachusetts of
this generation," in Lowenthal, Foreign Country, 322.
30Kay, Lost Boston (Boston, 1980), 129-33.
3 1Quoted in Alfred Seelye Roe, The Old Representatives' Hall, 1798-1895. An Address delivered before
the Massachusetts House of Representatives, January 2, 1895 ... (Boston, 1895), 42. Similarly, the
New York City Council in 1803 said its new city hall "is intended to endure for ages"; quoted in
Hendrik Hartog, Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the City of New York in
American Law, 1730-1870 (Chapel Hill, 1983), 95.
32Thoras Baldwin, A Discourse delivered Jan. 1, 1811, at the Opening of the New Meeting-House
belonging to the Second Baptist Church ... (Boston, 1811), 33.
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lay under the building that "when they were interred there, it was supposed they would
not be removed until the general resurrection."33 While the durability of institutions
was loosely expected to ensure the permanence of the buildings they occupied, it did
not necessarily follow that protecting the buildings was a particularly high priority.
When churches discovered conflicts between their roles as custodians of souls and as
custodians of buildings, as when their congregations moved away from them, it
seemed obvious that buildings would have to suffer.
Governments, like churches, were custodians of public landmarks. Revolutionary
rhetoric aside, the permanence of monumental government buildings seemed assured
by permanence of use. But like churches, government functions could move, and
unlike most churches they could do so without directly consulting their constituenies.
Even on the same site, permanence of use did not necessarily yield permanence of
structure; by the 1860s the legislature was considering replacing the 'everlasting' state
house. Finally, the government might make a bad custodian, as for example when city
workers sometime in the mid-nineteenth century rearranged headstones in the Granary
and King's Chapel burial grounds. Whether their purpose was symmetry of appearance
or ease of maintenance, the effect was that, in Oliver Wendell Holmes' words, "nothing
short of the Day of Judgement will tell whose dust lies beneath any of these records,
meant by affection to mark one small spot as sacred to some cherished memory."34
Boston had a long tradition of fixing permanently certain prominent features of the
urban environment. The original city charter in 1822 specifically prohibited selling the
Common or Faneuil Hall.35 These two places gave Boston's citizens prototypes for
thinking about environmental permanence. When the city applied street numbers to
Tremont Street and its graveyards in 1850, the Common was exempted from the
33Massachusetts General Court, House of Representatives, Objections in behalf of several proprietors
of pews and tombs to a bill to authorize Trinity Church, in Boston, to sell land ... (Boston, 1871), 6.
34Quoted in Firey, Land Use in Central Boston, 167-68.
35article 25: "The city council also shall have the care and superintendence of the public buildings, and
the care, custody, and management of all the property of the city, with power to lease or sell the same,
except the common and Faneuil Hall ..."
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system.36 Even as Bostonians were busy withdrawing things from prospective
permanence, they were drawing the line somewhere. But enumeration of these two
properties served to devalue all the others that were not included in the list. This
exclusion was nearly fatal to the Old State House, which the city treated as a source of
income, renting its rooms to businesses which disfigured its walls with advertising
signs in what one modern preservationist has called "adaptive abuse." 37 Its appearance
(see fig. 5.3.) was both an embarassment and a puzzle: was it an historic shrine, or a
run-down commercial building?
Even for the Common and Faneuil Hall, the policy of permanence was incoherent.
They were fixed landmarks in that they would not be alienated and presumably would
not be destroyed, but neither of them was particularly well cared for. Until well into the
nineteenth century, the Common was used as a true common for pasturing livestock,
and remained in the scruffy condition which might be expected of an economic asset of
such doubtful utility in its newly urban context. Afterwards, one of its main functions
was as a dumping ground for snow cleared from the streets, with all the unsavory
things cleared with it. Faneuil Hall had been built as a combination marketplace and
meeting hall, and the municipal government treated it, too, as an economic asset,
managed as an income-producing part of the marketplace complex - a utilitarian brand
of preservation in which Bostonians later took great pride:
Here orators
In ages past
Have mounted their attack
Undaunted by proximity
Of sausage on the rack. 38
This ambivalent treatment was in a way deliberate. There was simply no category for
preserved things - preservation was not in itself an assigned function, so the existence
of the Common and Faneuil Hall depended on maintaining their existing uses. Many
36George Adams, pub., The Directory of the City of Boston, 1850-51 (Boston, 1850), 67-68.
37Sara B. Chase, 'A Brief Survey of the Architectural History of the Old State House, Boston,
Massachusetts,' Old-Time New England 58 (1978): 43.
38Francis Hatch in Boston Globe, February 1, 1958, quoted in Whitehall, Topographic History, 44.
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controversies about the Common, as we will see in chapter 5, grew out of the fact that
it was not clear exactly what its use was.
Bostonians' ambivalence about the permanence of public buildings became especially
evident as they left old ones to move their institutional occupants onto the new Back
Bay. This district was conceived from the beginning as a civic showpiece, a special
case. Many of the people steering institutions there felt they were heading for safety, a
place which would be immune from the rapid changes which had driven them from
other localities. Even as church proprietors embraced the culture of change to explain
and excuse their abandonment of beloved downtown structures, they erected
extraordinarily elaborate and expensive buildings which were clearly not intended to be
transitory. They, like the upper-class families who were their members, patrons, and
neighbors, sought permanence. Reverend Phillips Brooks concluded his dedication
prayer for the new Trinity church, "And so make this church the Church of the Trinity
forever,"39 and the structure was more than adequate to the task. Even more than the
ideal family home, public buildings like H. H. Richardson's Brattle Square and Trinity
churches were meant, in historian Alan Gowan's words, "to stand for and from
eternity."40 American cities could have prospective permanence, even if they could not
have the visible retrospective permanence of the Old World.
Americans' unsatisfied yearning for environmental antiquity led to appreciation,
exploration, and eventually protection of native American antiquities, most notably the
spectacular pueblo settlements of the southwest and the enigmatic mounds of the
midwest. Charles Eliot Norton and other Bostonians led in this movement by
organizing the Archaeological Institute of America in 1879.41 While these indigenous
ruins helped satisfy a longing for ancient traces on this continent, from the everyday
urban environment of American cities, they seemed just as foreign as European castles.
In Europe, with its greater number and age of old buildings, a preservation movement
had been growing from the beginning of the nineteenth century, and as the second half
of the century began, a preservationist debate was raging there. English and French
39Quoted in Lawrence, Address...delivered in Trinity Church, 25.
40Alan Gowans, Images of American Living (Philadelphia, 1964), 352;.
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architect 'restored' a tremendous number of surviving historic buildings. But restorers
such as Sir Gilbert Scott and Eugene Viollet-le-Duc were not shy about improving on
history. Scott's alterations of medieval cathedrals involved such thorough
reconstruction that they became essentially works not of preservation but of nineteenth-
century revival architecture. Viollet-le-Duc advocated restoration to a hypothetical
"condition of completeness which could never have existed at any given time."42 These
men thought of historic structures as monuments rather than artifacts, valuing them
mainly as symbols rather than as objects surviving from the hands of original makers.
Their restoration efforts were guided more by stylistic theories and beliefs about the
period of highest significance in each building's history than by actual evidence from
the surviving fabric.
On the other side of the debate was English art critic and social theorist John Ruskin,
who valued old buildings for age itself. "I think a building cannot be considered as in
its prime until four or five centuries have passed over it,"43 he wrote in The Seven
Lamps of Architecture, published in 1849. Restoration, therefore, was "a Lie":
You may make a model of a building as you may of a corpse, and your model may
have the shell of the old walls within it as your cast might have the skeleton, with
what advantage I neither see nor care; but the old building is destroyed.44
Ruskin saw buildings mainly as artifacts. He valued them for their genuineness, and
thus found them irreplaceable even in the smallest part. Their symbolic significance was
secondary, and in any case symbolism too was cumulative, so that the idea of restoring
to an earlier period of greater significance was a contradition in terms. Because the
unarrested process of aging would eventually destroy buildings, Ruskin's views did
not allow for literal permanence, but he aspired to a durable architecture which would
undergo decay only at the scale of geologic time. 45 For existing antiquities, Ruskin had
4 1Ronald F. Lee, The Antiquities Act of 1906 (Washington, 1970), 4.
42Quoted in Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 23.
43John Ruskin, The Seven Lamps of Architecture (1849; New York, 1971), 183.
44Ruskin, Seven Lamps, 185.
45A building should be "more lasting ... than ... the natural objects of the world around it"; Ruskin,
Seven Lamps, 177. See also 172.
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simple advice. "Take care of your monuments," he wrote, "and you will not need to
restore them."46
William Morris, a disciple of Ruskin, was moved by Scott's restorations to found in
1877 the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings. The society, which Morris
nicknamed the 'Anti-scrape' movement, aimed "to put Protection in place of
Restoration." 47 Fifty years "of knowledge and attention" to Britain's old buildings, he
said, "have done more for their destruction than all the foregoing centuries of
revolution, violence and contempt."48 What exactly did Morris aim to protect?
"Anything which can be looked upon as artistic, picturesque, historical, antique or
substantial: any work, in short, over which educated, artistic people would think it
worth while to argue at all." 49 Or as one contemporary critic said of the group's
radically inclusive goals, it wanted "to preserve what is left of the past in the most
indiscriminate way; whether good or bad, old or new, preserve it all."so
Were Americans aware of these European debates? "All over the country," writes
Gwendolyn Wright, "people of every class, from the mechanic to the dowager, had
become familiar with the aesthetic and social theories of John Ruskin." 51 His ideas
informed building for permanence in the newly-made city, such as the monumental
buildings of the Back Bay. But Americans only slowly came to see Ruskin's
prescriptions for existing antiquities as having anything to do with their own
environment. European ideas formed an intellectual background, but only a distant one,
as Americans recognized their own historic landmarks and worked out for themselves
what to do with them.52
46Ruskin, Seven Lamps, 186.
47Quoted in Martin S. Briggs, Goths and Vandals. A study of the destruction, neglect and preservation
of historical buildings in England (London, 1952), 210.
48Quoted in Briggs, Goths and Vandals, 208.
49Quoted in Briggs, Goths and Vandals, 210.
50Robert Kerr, 'English Architecture Thirty Years Hence' (1884), quoted in Lowenthal, Foreign
Country, 396.
51Wright, Moralism and the Model Home, 12.
52Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 25.
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Before the Civil War, Americans began to develop their own sense of local antiquity.
Publishers offered more urban guidebooks as cities grew larger and as the railroad
system's extension made it easier for strangers to visit them; most of these books
included antiquarian details among their topographic descriptions. In 1851 two different
Boston guides appeared specifically describing the city's old landmarks: Nathaniel
Dearborn's Reminiscences of Boston, and J. Smith Homans' Sketches of Boston, Past
and Present. Donald J. Olsen finds in London during the same years a similar growth
in popular antiquarianism which showed "a widespread eagerness to see behind the
commonplace present to a romantic past."53
Bostonians' antiquarian awareness included the homes of heroes, such as John
Hancock's house on Beacon Hill, and the sites of their heroic events such as the battle
of Bunker Hill, but also encompassed landmarks valued solely for their hoary
antiquity. The places with heroic associations - almost all dating from the Revolutionary
era - fit within the European tradition of seeing ancient structures as monuments, but
the second category fit instead within the Ruskinian tradition of viewing old buildings
as artifacts. One such landmark in Boston was the 'Old Feather Store,' a medieval-
looking seventeenth-century house next to Faneuil Hall. At least six different views of
the building were published between 1825 and 1850 (fig. 3.1.), and another four
appeared during the 1850s; it was "quaint,"54 a curiosity. The Old Feather Store was
demolished in 1860 to widen North Street; its imminent demolition prompted early
efforts at photographic documentation, but no serious attempt at preservation. 55
Antiquarians' customary response to the passing of landmarks was regret rather than
resistance.
5301sen, Donald J., The City as a Work of Art: London, Paris, Vienna (New Haven, 1986), 306.
54Ballou's Pictorial 8 (May 26, 1855): 332, quoted in Abbott Lowell Cummings, 'The Old Feather
Store in Boston,' Old-Time New England 48 n. 4 (Apr.-June, 1958): 86. See pp. 99-102 for his
'Check-list of known contemporary views of the Old Feather Store.'
55Cummings quotes the Daily Evening Traveller of July 10, 1860, as saying that "the front wall of
the building will be carefully taken down, in as good condition as possible, and will be removed to
East Cambridge, where it will probably be set up in some place where it can be preserved"; he reports
that "Nothing further is said about any such project, however" ('The Old Feather Store,' 87).
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fig. 3.1. 'View of the Old Building at the Corner of Ann St.,' an 1835 print of the
Old Feather Store. A glimpse of modem Quincy Market in the background provides a
contrast with the new and reminds us that we are in a rapidly growing city.
Preservation, in James Marston Fitch's definition - "curatorial management of the
built world"56 - did not exist in American cities, and the absense of this concept no
doubt unfavorably colored people's impression of old buildings. Old buildings were
kept, and like the Old State House adaptively re-used often enough, but the reason was
almost always economy. This motive is of course not unimportant in preservation
today. But then, the absense of experience with restoration meant that adaptations were
often mean, and the idea of a lavish restoration was inconceivable. When substantial
amounts of money were put into an old building it was in order to make it look new. To
the extent that Americans were aware of European restoration, they did not find the
concept applicable at home where there were no 'ancient monuments,' though when
56J ames Marston Fitch, Historic Preservation: Curatorial Management of the Built World (New York,
1982).
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
restorations were first attempted, it was to buildings such as the Old State House which
first came to mind as American equivalents.
The embryonic preservation movement in America before the Civil War focused
exclusively on places with historic associations. In 1847, residents of Deerfield in
western Massachusetts organized to save the "Old Indian House" with its hatchet-
scarred door recalling a 1704 attack on the settlement. They failed to preserve anything
but the door itself.57 In 1850 New York State bought the Hasbrouck House in
Newburgh, Washington's headquarters during the final years of the Revolution, and
opened, according to Charles Hosmer, the "first historic house museum in the United
States."58 In 1856 the State of Tennessee purchased The Hermitage, Andrew Jackson's
estate outside Nashville. Near Boston, the Essex Institute in Salem began before the
Civil War to take an interest in preserving buildings.59
By far the most important antebellum preservation effort was the nationwide
campaign to buy George Washington's home, Mount Vernon. By the 1850s,
Americans treated it as a national shrine, and they were puzzled and offended that
Washington's descendants, who still owned it, were not receptive to their pilgrimages.
Southerner Ann Pamela Cunningham in 1853 began campaigning to save it from
becoming "the seat of manufacturers and manufactories,"0 or as was more likely, a
resort hotel. She organized the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association for the purchase and
"perpetual guardianship" 61 of Mount Vernon. In 1856, as she expanded her
organization nationwide, she was joined by former Massachusetts Senator Edward
Everett, who had been instrumental in the erection of the Bunker Hill monument.
Everett was motivated this time by a combination of reverence for Washington and a
perception that the Mount Vernon campaign could serve as a vehicle for the cause of
national unity. By 1859 this early women's organization had succeeded in raising the
57J. M. Arms Sheldon, 'The "Old Indian House" at Deerfield, Mass., and the Effort Made in 1847 to
Save It from Destruction,' Old-Time New England 12, n. 3 (Jan., 1922): 98-108.
58Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 36.
59Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 37-38.
6'To the Ladies of the South,' Charlestown Mercury December 2, 1853, quoted in Hosmer, Presence
of the Past, 44.
61Quoted in Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 49.
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enormous sum of $200,000 and buying the property, although caring for it through the
Civil War and the years that followed would prove an equally difficult task.62
All of these places had in common associations with heroic figures or historic events.
There was little discussion of their architecture nor of whether or how they would be
restored. Of their visual role in the environment around them there was almost no
consideration. Their primary role was to act as cultural symbols. In this they competed
with the explicit sculptural and architectural monuments with which American cities
were increasingly graced.
All the structures preserved before the Civil War stood in rural areas or small towns.
There was little organized preservationism within cities. The greatest exception was
Independence Hall in Philadelphia, bought by the city in 1816 to save it from
destruction by the state, but like the Old State House in Boston, its status remained in
doubt for decades to come. 63 For the most part, urban antiquarians had little thought
that they could or should actually influence the physical evolution of the city. Historic
structures just happened to remain, and it would have seemed strange and impractical to
try to save them.
Bostonians first seriously questioned this, and gave the country a taste of the practical
and philosophical difficulties of urban preservation, in an unsuccessful effort before
and during the Civil War to save John Hancock's house. Before Hancock's death in
1793, he was said to have expressed the intention of bequeathing his house to the
commonwealth, but he died before making arrangements to do so.64 The estate instead
passed to his young nephew, also named John Hancock, and it was the death of this
nephew in 1859 which precipitated the house's crisis. "I hope," he wrote in his will,
"the estate may not be sold, but retained in the family," and he directed that it "not be
sold till four years after my decease," 65 perhaps hoping the delay would force his heirs
to some durable arrangement for keeping it. Instead, they immediately offered it to the
62Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 41-62; Boston Globe, June 17, 1875: 1.
63Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 30.
64"The minutes for his will to this effect were under his pillow when he died." Boston City Council,
Report of Committee on the Preservation of the Hancock House (City doc. 56, 1863), 9.
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commonwealth for $100,000. Governor Banks recommended the purchase as an
official home for the state's governors. 66
The legislature approved buying the Hancock house, but with evident ambivalence. It
required unanimous action by a committee of eight state officials, who were also to
report "a recommendation as to the uses to be made of said estate in the future," with
the stipulation that "it shall never be used as a residence for the governor." 67 The
purchase was not consummated, and in 1863, immediately after the four years had
passed, two men bought the land beneath the house for $125,000.
Charles L. Hancock, the estate's administrator, offered the structure itself, together
with its valuable furnishings and portraits, as a gift to the city, to be removed from the
site.68 The city council appointed a committee headed by Thomas C. Amory "to
consider the propriety of some effort on the part of the City Government for the
preservation of the Hancock House," 69 which formulated plans to save the house by
moving it elsewhere. The least expensive move would be across the street onto the
Common, although Amory's committee noted that "there are prejudices, perhaps well
grounded, against erections of any description on the Common." 70 If located on the
Common or Public Garden, the house might be used as a caretaker's residence;
elsewhere it could become "an historical cabinet."71 Individuals quickly pledged
$6,000, and were expected to provide double that, toward the estimated $17,000 cost
of moving the building, but the effort faltered when the Council learned that its estimate
was low.72 Demolition began in June for two modern mansions to replace the single
historic one.
65Charles L. Hancock petition, March 18, 1863, Massachusetts State Archives, legislative documents,
Resolves 1863, ch. 45.
66Boston City Council, Preservation of the Hancock House, 8.
67Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1859, Acts ch. 175.
68Charles L. Hancock to Thomas C. Amory, May 23, 1863, in Boston City Council, Preservation of
the Hancock House, 6.
69Boston City Council, Preservation of the Hancock House, 5.
70Boston City Council, Preservation of the Hancock House, 11.
71Boston City Council, Preservation of the Hancock House, 11-12.
72Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 39.
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It is a question of some perplexity to decide how far it is wise or proper for the city
government or for individuals to interfere to prevent the act of modern vandalism which
demands the destruction of this precious relic; for that it is destroyed, in effect, if re-
moved, we conceive admits of no question. Will it, or will it not, be a mitigation of the
public disgrace to establish the house itself elsewhere as a perpetual monument of the
proceeding.
Without wishing in the least degree to discourage the public spirit and the patriotism
of those gentlemen in the City Council who are seeking at this moment to do the beat thing they can for the prersevation
of the house, we still think it right that one preliminary appeal should be made to the present owners. They are gentlemen
of wealth, they have made an honest purchase, and of course may plead that they have a right to do what they will with
their own. It is with fall recognition of their rights in this respect, and withal in the utmost kindness to them, that we
would admonish them how dearly is purchased any good thing which costs the sacrifice of public associations so dear and so
noble as those that cluster around the Hancoek Ho4se.
These purchasers must at any rate be prepared to hear, during the whole of their
Uves and that of their remotest posterity, so ong as any of them may lire In the elegant modern palaces
whi shal supplant the ancient strueture, the frequent expression of public doieealent. Argument may
show them blameless, but sentimeat will ever eondemn the proceeding in which theirs will be perhaps the
mAst I Pcet. but nevertheless the mest permanent part. Il not onen that an opportunity is given to sem
of wealth to oe a tile to puhie gratitude by an act of simple self.denalaL Muth an opportumity falls to the
gt ofthe pehasers ofthi estate.
fig. 3.2. A large handbill printed in red ink as the last gasp of the effort to save the
Hancock house.
As a last resort, Bostonians appealed to the new owners themselves. "It is not often,"
said a large handbill printed for the effort, "that an opportunity is given to men of
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wealth to earn a title to public gratitude by an act of simple self-denial." In a veiled
threat the posters pointed out that although "they have made an honest purchase, and of
course may plead that they have a right to do what they will with their own," they
"must at any rate be prepared to hear, during the whole of their lives ... the frequent
expression of public discontent. Argument may show them blameless, but sentiment
will ever condemn the proceeding" of demolishing John Hancock's house.73 This was
an appeal to the old notion of wealth bringing with it responsibility to the community. It
did not work.
Public sentiment regarded prominent families almost as institutions, and relied on
them like other institutions to maintain their landmarks and historic shrines. In this view
the crisis of the Hancock house ought to have been solved sixty years before it
happened, for according to the Brahmin code of ethics Hancock's heirs should have
honored his intentions and given his home to the Commonwealth. That they did not
was thus no failure of the system but a failure of character in individuals. An appeal to a
new set of individuals made sense to Bostonians, more sense than the attempts at public
action.
The Hancock house episode was a transitional event in the history of American
preservation. Amory's committee argued for preserving the house because "we have so
few ancient or historical edifices"; 74 but once Bostonians began looking they found
they had quite a few. The Hancock house offered a taste of preservation battles to
come. These would naturally arise only in response to threatened changes, and given
the tacit assumption that institutional and social stability ensured stability of landmarks,
each preservation controversy would be complicated by the implication that some
institution, like the Hancock family, had failed in its role. The affair also established
some general precedents. Both the state and the city recognized that preservation could
be a legitimate aim of public policy and a legitimate object of substantial public
expenditure. Private individuals, too, assumed financial responsibility for preservation,
bringing the Mount Vernon precedent to the urban environment. Finally, translating
730. H. Burnham, publisher, 'Bostonians! Save the Old John Hancock Mansion' (June 6, 1863),
SPNEA library, Boston.
74 Boston City Council, Preservation of the Hancock House, 10.
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public policy and individual responsibility into effective action posed not only practical
difficulties but also the conceptual problems of assigning a satisfactory use to a building
which had left the utilitarian realm to become instead "an historical monument."75
Although the Hancock house effort failed, it failed catalytically. Bostonians had gone
beyond regretting the loss of urban landmarks to try saving one. In later years they
would find energy both in the realization of how close they came to succeeding, and in
the realization of how great was their loss.
Government powers. the urban environment. and parks
The ambivalence people felt about government involvement in preservation reflected
the novelty not just of public action to save old buildings, but of public intervention of
any sort in private development decisions.
Governments at all levels did get involved in shaping new urban form, but their
actions were conceived as public preparation for essentially private processes.
Municipalities graded and paved roadways, provided or encouraged private
corporations to provide other infrastructure systems, located parks, markets, and a host
of other public facilities, and often subsidized private enterprises such as railroads
which they hoped would give them a competitive advantage in attracting further
growth. States and even the federal government influenced urban form through
transportation company charters and grants, bridge and harbor improvements, and
other large-scale public construction. While these powers if coordinated had
tremendous potential for consciously shaping the city, Americans not only failed to
realize this potential, but saw little point in it. "[A]ll urban growth was good," says
Sam Bass Warner, "and therefore needed no special attention." 76 The fabric of the city
75Boston City Council, Preservation of the Hancock House, 11.
76Sam Bass Warner, The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth (Philadelphia,
1968), 53.
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emerged instead from what Warner calls the tradition of "privatism."77 As historian
Hendrik Hartog says of New York's grid, "The formal design of the city was public;
but that design remained only a context for private decision making." 78
Encouraging private development was a new nineteenth-century role for
governments, which according to Hartog in previous centuries confined themselves to
conservatively protecting property rights. But by the beginning of the nineteenth
century, policy and legal doctrine both favored "the use of public action to nurture
growth, even at the cost of destroying property rights." 79 Government in America
existed not for conserving static accumulations of wealth, but for increasing aggregate
wealth by promoting growth.
Boston's tradition of municipal generation of new urban form was among the
strongest of any mid-nineteenth century American city. Boston's constricted peninsular
site made it essential to find some means of making new land at a large scale, and the
city's administration had been comparatively effective by American standards, so was
therefore believed capable of large-scale enterprises.
Topographical tinkering in the half-century after independence was carried out mainly
by private enterprises operating under public charter. The Mount Vernon Proprietors in
1795 began grading Beacon Hill and filling the Charles Street flats; during the next
thirty years the Front Street Corporation filled what is now Harrison Avenue, and the
Mill Pond Corporation turned the former mill-pond between the West and North Ends
into a new district since called the 'Bulfinch triangle.' The Boston and Roxbury Mill
Corporation attempted the largest remolding of topography by criss-crossing the Back
Bay with tidal dams to power mills. Both the Bulfinch triangle and the Back Bay mill-
dams took more time and met with less success than expected, demonstrating the limits
of private organization for large-scale generation of urban form.80
77Warner, Private City, 3.
78Hartog, Public Property and Private Power, 175.
79Hartog, Public Property and Private Power, 77; see also 203.
80Whitehill, Topographical History, 77-80, 88-94.
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Meanwhile, in 1825 the newly-incorporated municipal government, under mayor
Josiah Quincy, began its own ambitious piece of form generation, transforming an
obsolete arm of the harbor and several blocks of ramshackle old buildings at the core of
the city into a new market complex of unprecedented scale. This "granite megabuilding"
rose in a mere sixteen months, a triumph of design, administration, and construction,
and a prototype which suggested that in Boston at least, the physical expansion of the
city could safely be entrusted to government action.81
In the decades after Boston's success at 'Quincy Market,' the city government
continued in the role of large-scale developer, steadily transforming the tidal flats along
the neck into dry land marked out into streets and blocks to be covered with new
houses and warehouses. These decades of practical experience formed the background
for public development of the Back Bay. As of the late 1860s, before the South End
began its decline, Boston's public development efforts thus far seemed unalloyed
successes, inspiring a confidence which permitted the Back Bay's great ambitiousness
both in design complexity and in topographical scale.
Even as development of the South End and Back Bay expanded the government's
role in city-building, it emphasized the extent to which that process was ordinarily a
private one. Comprehensive public control of development in these districts was
possible only because the city and state owned the land, acting in effect as private
developers rather than using specifically governmental powers. Like a private
developer, they shaped urban form initially through land subdivision, and like a private
developer they exerted control over construction and occupancy through deed
restrictions. Most of those restrictions, as we have seen, aimed not so much for
permanence as for uniformity and speedy development; public assets were disposed of
in the interest of steering urban growth and increasing its pace. But neither subdivision
nor deed restrictions provided any mechanism for public control where development
took place on privately-owned tracts. Control of development was squarely on the
private side of the boundary between public and private, and during this period
81Kay, Lost Boston, 131; Whitehill, Topographical History, 96.
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governments achieved public control not by moving that boundary but by stepping over
it, to act in a private capacity.
The use and disposal of public property was one of various generic powers of
government, each of which defined another boundary between public and private, and
implied other government roles in promoting environmental change - or, potentially, in
securing environmental permanence. In addition to the government as a property
holder, four other sovereign powers were important to urban development. First, the
'police power,' by which states regulate individual behavior, would evolve into the
basis for most public control over land use and development, but in the 1860s the
police power was still in its formative stages and indeed had not yet been named.
Second and more important during this period was eminent domain, by which the
government could take private property for public use. Third, taxation, while
conceptually a mere instrument for enabling other government functions, in fact could
have its own effects on urban growth. Finally, public expenditures built much of the
infrastructure that enabled rapid rapid growth, but also maintained public buildings and
spaces, and might have saved the Hancock house.
Each of these government powers was used in the 1860s as a way of promoting
urban growth. If public action was desirable to counteract the effects of that growth - a
big 'if' - it would do so with list of tools. As people began to question the culture of
change, they sought new ways of using these powers in the pursuit of environmental
permanence.
To the limited extent that governments regulated private development, they did so
through the police power, part of the unspecified powers of sovereignty reserved to the
states in the federal constitution. In its broadest sense, the police power is the state's
right to control the activities of individuals in the common interest; it has been
traditionally formulated as the power to regulate for public health, safety, morals, and
welfare. This seemingly unbounded power was initially conceived as a conservative
protection of private rights from behavior which might disturb their enjoyment. In
terms of property law, all property is held subject to the requirement that it not be used
to annoy or harm any other's property. The police power allows the state to intervene in
defining these interests. It could and did become a medium for activist expansion of
government powers, but still had to be balanced against private rights. Courts in the
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nineteenth century were inclined to give the benefit of the doubt to private property
rather than public regulation. Where they made exceptions, it was in the interest of
promoting growth.
The most readily accepted regulations were those which had to do with public safety.
London after the fire of 1666 enacted fire codes which amounted almost to architectural
specifications, and North American towns from the earliest settlement regulated
buildings to control the danger of fire. Controlling construction in the interest of safety
grew to include not only fire but structural codes, which became increasingly important
as technology began changing more quickly, and building required engineering
calculations more complex than the rules-of-thumb which had sufficed for vernacular
construction.
The police power also encompassed the notion of 'public nuisances,' activities which
could be controlled because they inherently impinged on the rights of other property-
owners. Municipalities long regulated the operation and location of slaughterhouses,
piggeries, and stables, and in the nineteenth century added to the list various noxious
industrial processes.82 A newer branch of the police power was housing laws,
regulation of the environment growing out of a new empirical understanding of
sanitation and public health, starting for Massachusetts with the Tenement House Act of
1868.83 The term 'police power' itself dates from this period of expanding
regulation.84 Each of these applications of the doctrine helped avoid the worst problems
of the increasingly complex processes of urban development, making them more
efficient and thus ultimately fostering growth. However, once the government's control
82
"Unwholesome trades, slaughter houses, operations offensive to the senses, the deposit of
gunpowder, the application of steam power to propel cars, the building with combustible materials, and
the burial of the dead, may all be interdicted by law, in the midst of the dense masses of population, on
the general and rational principle, that every person ought so to use his property as not to injure his
neighbors; and that private interests must be made subservient to the general interests of the
community." Kent, Commentaries (1832), quoted in Christopher Tiedemann, A Treatise on the
Limitations of the Police Power in the United States (St. Louis, 1886), 426, n. 1.
83Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1868, Acts ch. 281; Christine Cousineau, 'Tenement Reform in
Boston, 1870-1920: Philanthropy, Regulation, and Government Assisted Housing,' in Proceedings,
Third National Conference on American Planning History, Cincinnati, 1989 (Hilliard, Ohio, 1990),
600.
4Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights (Chicago, 1904), preface,
v.
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over private development was established, it could be applied to curb change as easily
as to encourage it.
Massachusetts led in the police power's evolution because compared to the rest of the
country, its courts viewed the doctrine expansively, taking the position that the
legislature was the proper judge of the need for regulation, and its actions were
therefore to be presumed valid.85 The police power's boundary between public and
private was the limitation that it must avoid confiscating private property. One test of
the validity of police power exercises was that they should affect equally all whose
circumstances were equal; they modified the definition of all property rather than taking
some of it. Where the common good imposed a burden which fell unequally on
different property-owners, the solution was to compensate them under a different
branch of government powers, eminent domain.
Eminent domain is the power by which units of government -or corporations to
which they delegated the right - can take private property for public purposes, in return
paying its owner a fair price for it. The purposes pursued ordinarily included public
works, and private construction of railroads and other infrastructure. Eminent domain
made it impossible for individual 'hold-outs' to prevent large-scale environmental
change. Like the police power, eminent domain did not inherently favor change; the
definition of 'public purposes' continually expanded and might conceivably include
taking property to preserve it rather than to change it. With the notion of taking not
land, but merely easements over the use of land, eminent domain could even become a
tool of public control over private development.
Taxation might affect both the pace and the shape of urban growth. 'Single-tax'
followers of Henry George hoped to encourage urban development by taxing only land
and not the improvements on it; while the intent of their reform was social and
economic, it was part of the culture of change. Methods of raising money for public
improvements had more specific effects on urban form. The ability to assess the
beneficiaries of improvements made possible a long-term program of reconstruction in
the center of Boston, rendering the street pattern there less fixed. Tax abatements for
85King, Law and Land Use in Chicago, 124-27.
105
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
churches and other quasi-public institutions assisted maintenance of landmarks, and
potentially offered some public influence over their fate.86
Public expenditure was the first government power widely applied to attaining
environmental permanence, as urban parks in the mid-nineteenth century became one of
the country's foremost new public works. Even though the landscape of a place like
New York's Central Park was a wholly artificial creation, it was nonetheless about
permanence rather than change. "The object of a park." said landscape architect H. W.
S. Cleveland in 1855, "is to secure to the dwellers in cities the opportunity of enjoying
the contemplation of such objects of natural beauty as the growth of the city must
otherwise destroy." 87 Real estate lawyer and future city councilman Uriel H. Crocker
in 1869 first proposed a metropolitan park system for Boston, which would not merely
create parks within the city's boundaries, but preserve remaining scenery in "her
beautiful suburbs .... We should endeavor to secure the lovely spots for the benefit and
enjoyment of the people before they are built upon, and their natural beauty
destroyed."88
0
fig. 3.3. Boston metropolitan park system proposed by Uriel H. Crocker, 1869. It
aims to secure permanently a variety of existing rural landscapes in Boston's suburbs.
86J[osiah] P[hillips] Quincy, 'The Moral of It,' The Nation 15 (Dec. 12, 1872); Josiah Phillips
Quincy, Tax-Exemption No Excuse for Spoliation. Considerations in opposition to the petition, now
before the Massachusetts legislature, to permit the sale of the Old South Church (Boston, 1874).
87Schuyler, New Urban Landscape, 67.
881n City Council debate, April 1, 1875, quoted in Boston City Council. Public Parks, 34. Olmsted's
1870 Boston talk, in which he outlined the metaphor of the city as a house of many rooms, was
arranged in aid of legislation for such a park plan; Zaitzevsky, Olmsted and the Boston Park System,
37.
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Once parklands were secured, "considerations of stability and endurance" governed
how they should be treated, said Frederick Law Olmsted to the American Social
Science Association at its 1880 meeting in Saratoga, New York.89 Whether their
landscapes were preserved or created, they were supposed to impart a sense of
timelessness which would be a therapeutic relief from the changing cities around them.
Olmsted's concluding remarks were an exhortation to "make the park steadily gainful of
that quality of beauty which comes only with age."90 Six years later, writing
specifically about Boston's Franklin Park, he cited "the element of lastingness" as a
central principle of park design, saying that "as a rule, the older the wood, and the less
of newness and rawness there is to be seen in all the elements of a park, the better it
serves its purpose. This rule holds for centuries - without limit."91
The connection between parks and preservation was expressed outside the urban
environment as Olmsted, Charles Eliot Norton, and others worked to protect the
Yosemite Valley, Niagara Falls, and other natural wonders through creation of state and
national parks. Years later the connection was also made explicit in Massachusetts by
the 1891 incorporation of the Trustees of Public Reservations, a private, tax-exempt
organization for saving "beautiful and historic places."92 The Trustees of Reservations
began with a letter in Garden and Forest by Charles Eliot, Olmsted's former apprentice
and later a partner in the firm, advocating preservation of the Waverly Oaks, a stand of
ancient trees in Belmont and Waltham outside Boston. Eliot proposed a private
association to hold "surviving fragments of the primitive wilderness of New England
... as the Public Library holds books and the Art Museum pictures - for the use and
enjoyment of the public."93 Two decades of unsuccessful attempts to establish a
metropolitan park system led impatient Bostonians to this private solution, thus even the
89Frederick Law Olmsted, The Justifying Value of a Public Park (Boston, 1881), 4.
9001msted, Justifying Value, 20.
91Frederick Law Olmsted, 'Notes on the Plan of Franklin Park and Related Matters,' (1886), in
Sutton, ed., Civilizing American Cities, 256-257.
92Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1891, Acts ch. 352.
93Charles Eliot, letter to editor, Garden and Forest (Mar. 5, 1890), quoted in Zaitzevsky, Olmsted and
the Boston Park System, 118.
107
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
parks movement, with the enormous expenditures it entailed, involved a boundary
between public and private.
Eliot added 'historic' places to the group's purview while he was organizing it,
although the list of historic places that he had in mind includes only natural sites,
making it clear that the organization's focus was landscapes rather than preservation of
architectural landmarks. The Trustees of Reservations served as a model for the
Trustees of Scenic and Historic Places and Objects in the State of New York,94 and for
the British National Trust, both founded in 1895. In Massachusetts, Eliot immediately
directed the Trustees back to their origins by using them as an institutional instigator for
creation of Boston's Metropolitan Park Commission, to save pieces of the landscape
which were beyond the means of a private organization.95
The parks movement was one of the earliest organized responses to environmental
change, and it was the first to use government powers in pursuit of environmental
permanence. While parks were important both in themselves as permanent features of
cities, and also as criticisms of the culture of change, they were inherently an exception
to the norms of urban fabric and its development. That development remained
thoroughly on the private side of the boundaries of public powers, and for their own
individual answers to the problems of change Americans turned first to private
methods, seeking permanence in their homes and neighborhoods through residential
deed restrictions.
94Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 94-100. It was renamed the American Scenic and Historic Preservation
Society in 1901.
95Zaitzevsky, Olmsted and the Boston Park System, 121-23.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
'Neighborhood restricted'
Urban Americans after the Civil War increasingly sought to buffer themselves and
their families from environmental change by moving, if they could, to homes in
suburbs that looked permanent and that they hoped would in fact resist alteration. While
Olmsted and others explored physically arranging the residential subdivision for
permanence, they sought to reinforce their designs by imposing deed restrictions which
would accomplish the same thing legally - determining once and for all the future shape
and character of neighborhoods.
Land developers, including the Back Bay commissioners, were beginning to impose
restrictions that clearly aimed at long-term resistance to environmental change, rather
than merely control of the initial development process. But the difficulties in enforcing
them made them essentially unworkable for this new purpose, as demonstrated by the
numerous restrictions imposed long ago and since lying dormant. Was there some way
to make deed restrictions enforceable not through the uncertain agencies of subdividers
or their heirs, but instead by the affected residents of a neighborhood? The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts provided an answer in the 1860s, a story which began
forty years earlier in a garden off of Washington Street.
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Equitable Easements
When Dr. Lemuel Hayward died in 1821 after a long career as one of Boston's
leading surgeons, he left nine warehouses on Long Wharf, stores and houses around
the city, and two hundred acres of farmland elsewhere in Massachusetts, all to be
shared by eight members of his family. The most valuable single property was Dr.
Hayward's mansion and the acre of garden behind it on Washington (then called
Newbury) Street, between Bedford and Essex Streets. The house with its grounds was
worth several times the share of any single heir, and so the family decided to subdivide
the garden as building lots.1 The solution was obvious enough; fashionable new streets
and row houses had been sprouting for years all around them in the growing South
End.
In the spring of 1823 the estate's executors hired a surveyor who laid out the garden
as 19 houselots along a 36-foot-wide dead-end 'Avenue,' which soon came to be called
'Hayward Place.' By agreement among the heirs, each lot was conveyed subject to the
condition "that no other building shall be erected or built on the lot except one of brick
or stone, not less than three stories in height, and for a dwelling-house only."2 The lots
sold quickly and the street was built up with what a resident later described as "large
and elegant dwellings, ... all of brick or stone," either occupied by their owners or
"rented ... to tenants at a high rent."3 Several of the heirs, including Dr. Hayward's
son George, settled on the little street.4
Time passed and Boston grew. Next door to the former Hayward garden, 'Rowe's
Pasture' was built up, as was every other scrap of open land nearby. George Hayward
became a prosperous surgeon in his own right and moved to Beacon Hill; his father's
1
'Warrant and Partition of Hayward Estate,' Suffolk County Land Records, Deed Book 277: 269-81.
2Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. 341 (1863), at 342.
3Testimony [of Samuel Parker?] in Equity Records, S. J. C., April- Oct. 1863, 412, in Supreme
Judicial Court Archives, Boston.
4One of the heirs settled on the farm in East Sudbury, one took the mansion house itself, and two -
still minors when the doctor died - were living a few years later on what had been his garden.
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mansion was demolished and replaced with a commercial building. By the early 1860s,
forty years after Hayward Place was laid out, Washington Street held a busy horsecar
line and was strictly commercial, its converted old houses mostly replaced by big new
mercantile structures which had spread onto side streets as far south as Bedford Street,
the first big cross street north of Hayward. In the midst of all this Hayward Place itself
was still a quiet middle-class neighborhood, many of its houses occupied by their
owners. By comparison with Peter Knights' samples of Boston's population, their
lives were stable. Ellinor Hayward, widow of one of the original heirs, still lived at
number 13, and across the street at number 3 lived Samuel Parker, a retired customs
inspector who had bought his house new in 1823.
Early in 1862, change turned the corner onto Hayward Place. The house next door to
Parker's belonged to a Walpole resident, James Nightingale, who rented it that year to a
Frederick Loeber. Loeber lived nearby and owned a restaurant at the center of town on
Congress Square; he had first opened it three years earlier on Washington Street,
directly opposite Hayward Place.5 Shortly after Loeber rented number 2 Hayward
Place, Parker heard workmen busy there. According to his later testimony "it seemed,
from the apparent preparation, that the changes might be more than what is usual in
regard to dwelling-houses ordinarily," so he inquired and "to his great surprise and
sorrow, he was informed by the workmen that ... Loeber was going to convert the
house ... into a restaurant, or eating-saloon." 6
Parker's neighbors were as unhappy about the change as he was, and once the
restaurant opened accused Loeber of
having large numbers of people in and about said premises, at all hours of the day
and night, eating and drinking, and indulging in all kinds of merriment and loud
and boisterous conversation, debate, and controversy, in the usual manner of
allowing such establishments to be conducted in the large cities, and where the
police have little or no power to repress or control the conduct of the class of
persons collecting about restaurants, saloons, eating-houses, and other similar
places of refreshment; and, in this way, ... Loeber, as the natural and almost
necessary consequence of applying the premises, ... to the use aforesaid, has
5401 Washington Street (Boston City Directory, 1859).
6Equity Records, S. J. C., April- Oct. 1863, 411-412.
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rendered the locality about Hayward Place almost wholly unfit for quiet and
comfortable residences ...7
Their testimony underlines the close relationship between dissatisfaction with
environmental change and a more pervasive unease about social changes accompanying
urbanization. The sense of losing control over society led to new demands being put on
spatial segregation of land uses as a means of ordering social relations. In the
eighteenth century Dr. Hayward built his mansion undeterred by the White Horse
tavern across the street, but now to the residents of his former garden, Loeber's
restaurant symbolized the unravelling of civilized life.
Parker and his neighbors summoned Loeber's landlord Nightingale, who was
sympathetic but found himself in a dilemma. His lease recited the same provisions as
the deed, but Loeber "insisted ... that he has good, general, and lawful right to apply
the premises ... to any use he may choose, as long as he resides therein ..."8
As of 1862 the law offered two clear ways for this dispute to come to court. First,
Nightingale could bring action against Loeber for violating his lease. Second, the
Hayward heirs could sue Nightingale for violating conditions in the deed. If they won,
Nightingale would lose the house, and they would have to deal with Loeber
themselves. But it was Parker and his neighbors who wanted relief, and as neither of
these courses of action was available to them, their lawyers sued under a third untested
doctrine; thus this ordinary tale of nineteenth-century neighborhood life elevated itself
to lasting significance. The deed, they said, contained not 'conditions' but 'restrictions'
on the tenure of the land, constituting "the organic law of that block of houses,"9 and
enforceable by any neighbor who held property from the same subdivision. If neither
Nightingale nor the Hayward heirs would bring suit, then such a doctrine was
necessary to let Parker himself bring it.
The Supreme Judicial Court had in effect invited just such a suit in Associate Justice
George T. Bigelow's 1860 Whitney v. Union Railway opinion. The Whitney decision
involved restrictions written in 1851 which specifically stated that they would be
7Equity Records, S. J. C., April- Oct. 1863, 415.
8Equity Records, S. J. C., April- Oct. 1863, 414.
9Parker v. Nightingale, defendants' brief, 4, Social Law Library, Boston.
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enforceable by any proprietor within the tract. Bigelow endorsed this principle, but it
had no direct bearing on the case as Whitney herself was the original subdivider.10
Parker was in a very different position: his deed contained no such statement of his
right to enforce the restriction, yet unlike Whitney he had no other grounds upon which
to sue. Bigelow's discussion of co-proprietors' rights was essentially gratuitous,
because the case did not turn on the question. It established no binding precedent, but
extended an invitation for some other plaintiff to come forward and test the principle.
Parker was to be that test, and his whole case turned on whether he had standing to
bring the suit at all. Bigelow had indicated his receptiveness to the arguments which
formed the crux of Parker's case; and by 1862 Bigelow had become Chief Justice.
The Supreme Judicial Court in 1863 ordered a permanent injunction against Loeber's
restaurant. The case set an important precedent in three different ways, which were
recognized with various degrees of explicitness in Bigelow's decision. First,
restrictions could be enforced by any property owner within a subdivision; second,
their duration could be permanent, and third, the word 'condition' in an old deed could
be interpreted not as a condition but as a restriction.
Parker's standing to bring the suit at all, said Bigelow, was "the most important and
difficult question raised":
In strictness, perhaps, the right or interest created by the restrictions ... did not pass
out of the original grantors, and now remains vested in them or their heirs. But if
so, they hold it as a dry trust, in which they have no beneficial use or enjoyment ...
and [those] now holding the estates ... are proper parties to enforce the
restriction."11
10Whitney v. Union Railway, 77 Mass. 359 (1860), at 362.
11Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. 341, at 346, 348. He continues: "...circumstances may exist which
might warrant a refusal to grant equitable relief....If, for instance, it was shown that one or two owners
of estates were insisting on the observance of restrictions and limitations contrary to the interests and
wishes of a large number of proprietors...by which great pecuniary loss would be inflicted on them, or
a great public improvement be prevented, a court of equity might well hesitate to use its powers to
enforce a specific performance or restrain a breach of the restriction" (at 349).
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Thus, as Lawrence Friedman puts it in A History of American Law, Bigelow "vaulted
over" 12 privity of estate, making enforcement of deed restrictions practicable over long
periods of time.
Second, the court specifically addressed the restrictions' duration; the words "shall
be" in the deed, said Bigelow, created "a permanent regulation."13 This too had been
discussed in Whitney v. Union Railroad, where Bigelow explained that restrictions
without time limits did not violate the rule against perpetuities because they could be
released at any time by their beneficiaries. 14 But the Whitney case was at best a weak
precedent for this principle, since the restrictions were only six years old when she
sued. By enforcing the Hayward Place restrictions after forty years, Bigelow squelched
any idea that public policy, at least as Massachusetts courts defined it, would prevent
people from fixing elements of the built environment for as long as they liked.
Third, in addition to vaulting over privity, Bigelow stepped around the definition of a
condition. Conditions not only created awkward uncertainties as to title, but they did
nothing to solve the practical problems they addressed. If an offending building caused
forfeiture of an estate, the result was new ownership with same offending building.
The original grantor's heirs who could enforce conditions could also release them, a
strange and inadequate arrangement in which land use decisions were made by people
with no continuing interest in the neighborhood. Bigelow simply assumed without
comment that the Hayward deed covenants were restrictions, affecting the use of land
but not its ownership. Subdividers even before Parker v. Nightingale had begun
addressing this probem by imposing "conditions" which "shall not work a
forfeiture."15 After Parker, courts began explicitly reinterpreting conditions as
restrictions in order to enforce them over long periods of time. 16
12Friedman, History of American Law, 421.
13Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. 341, at 347.
14Whitney v. Union Railway, 77 Mass. 359, at 366.
15Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585 (1890), at 587, quoting 1835 deeds on Pemberton Square. The
Pemberton Square restrictions are remarkable for having fully anticipated equitable easement doctrine.
Not only did they spell out enforcement provisions, but they reserved these rights both for the
subdivider and for "the owner of any lot interested in such breach." See also Tobey v. Moore, 130
Mass. 448 (1881), which quotes 1850 deeds in Cambridge that include "restrictions and conditions"
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Bigelow's decision had more lasting effect on the legal landscape than on the
landscape of Boston. Commerce continued spreading around Parker and his neighbors.
The First Church, whose Chauncy Place building was within the same city block as
Hayward Place, decided in 1865 to find a new location because tall commercial
structures around it had darkened its interior. Parker died, and several of his co-
plaintiffs moved away.
Not only did change continue, but so also did acceptance of change. Justice Bigelow
had used the case to advance his own judicial agenda, but for the residents of Hayward
Place his proclamation that the restriction was "a permanent regulation" was apparently
too strong medicine; they simply wanted Loeber's restaurant out. In 1869, just five
years after the state's high court bestowed permanence upon them, Hayward Place's
owners - including some of the original plaintiffs - petitioned the city of Boston to
extend the street through so that it could become a business thoroughfare (fig. 4.1.).
The following year they signed mutual releases of their restrictions,
it being deemed for the best interests of all concerned, that said condition and
restriction should be waived, so that ... Hayward Place, and the houses thereon,
violation of which "shall not subject the said grantees or their heirs or assigns to a forfeiture of their
estate in said land ..." (at 449).
16The leading case on the subject before Parker v. Nightingale had been Gray v. Blanchard, 25 Mass.
283 (1829), in which the Supreme Judicial Court enforced a 30-year condition by forfeiture of an estate
after 25 years had elapsed, saying "We cannot help the folly of parties who consent to take estates upon
onerous conditions, by converting conditions into covenants" (at 287). In 1847, the court voided a 24-
year-old condition rather than enforce it by forfeiture; Canal Bridge v. Methodist Religious Society, 54
Mass. 335.
After Parker, the court in 1874 explicitly reinterpreted an 1807 "condition" as a restriction in order to
enforce it in Jeifries v. Jeffries, 184 Mass. 184. The following year in Episcopal City Mission v.
Appleton, 117 Mass. 326, it declared an 1847 condition to be a restriction, but refused to enforce it. By
1879, in Keening v. Ayling, 126 Mass. 404, it had blurred this boundary enough to refer to conditions
as "conditions or restrictions." See also Skinner v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180 (1881), an 1859 deed;
Cassidy v. Mason, 171 Mass. 507 (1898), an 1847 subdivision.
The question received a final airing in 1900 in Clapp v. Wilder, 176 Mass. 332, in which a 4 to 3
majority declared that a condition imposed in 1867 was really a condition, in order to decide that it was
too late to enforce it. In the dissenting opinion, Associate Justice Marcus Morton 3d explained what
had become the settled practice: "conditions are construed as restrictions ... not because the courts have
any special fondness for or leaning towards building schemes or plans of general improvment, but
because it would be inequitable and unjust as against the owners of adjoining and neighboring estates to
construe them otherwise, and to permit a party taking an estate with notice of a valid agreement
respecting its mode of use and occupation towards such estates to avoid it" (at 344).
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fig. 4.1. Hayward Place, plan accompanying second petition for street extension,
1871.
may be used for business purposes, we the undersigned, owners ... waive all of
said conditions and restrictions, ... so that each several owner may use his or their
respective estates entirely independent of any other owner ...17
Only one owner had begun taking advantage of his releases, when the Great Fire
swept away all the new mercantile buildings to within a block of Hayward Place, and
the flood of commercial refugees seeking new quarters swamped whatever remained of
the little neighborhood.
Parker v. Nightingale launched in America the branch of property law variously
known as deed restrictions or covenants, or equitable restrictions, equitable servitudes,
or equitable easements. These different names imply different explanations for what
these legal tools were, and in turn raised different questions about how courts should
treat them. How effective they would be over time depended on how courts answered
these questions. While the real estate industry and the public knew them as restrictions,
the lawyers' term 'equitable easements' best embodies both what was new and what
17Suffolk County Land Records, Deed book 1034: 181.
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was powerful about them. They were 'equitable' because judges ruling on them would
act technically as courts of equity rather than courts of law, and could therefore order
that violations be abated, rather than leaving the violations in place and merely awarding
damages. They were 'easements' because they were relations between property rather
than between people, and legal action would therefore be initiated not by subdividers,
but by neighbors, who most cared about violations.
Equitable easements took a while to filter into practice, partly because courts took
some time to work out the details of the new doctrine. On the Back Bay, a
neighborhood whose deed restrictions probably produced more litigation than any other
in the nation, residents wanted the protection promised by this tool and were too
impatient to wait for the courts. In 1866 they secured an act from the legislature which
accomplished the same result by empowering them to sue the Back Bay commissioners
to enforce their restrictions; three years later the Supreme Judicial Court declared that
owners in the Back Bay already had a right to enforce their restrictions, under the
Parker v. Nightingale doctrine, even before passage of the act.18
In the emergence of new legal doctrines like that of equitable easements, the
conservative momentum of the law is maintained by judges' extreme reluctance to
explicitly reverse precedent, relying instead on finding or inventing rules to
'distinguish' cases from earlier decisions that they do not care to follow. In Parker v.
Nightingale, Bigelow thus did not change the definition of deed restrictions, but
discovered a new category which supposedly had existed all along: restrictions imposed
for the mutual benefit of a group of owners, and therefore enforceable by any of
them. 19 By what rule would courts - and property owners - distinguish when a set of
restrictions belonged to this new category? The Parker decision stressed the common
"scheme or joint enterprise" 20 to which the restrictions gave expression. It was
common reliance on a single agreed plan which related the Hayward Place proprietors
18Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1866, Acts ch. 264; Linzee v. Mixer, 101 Mass. 512.
19Fifty years later another case challenged the legal fiction that such restrictions had always existed.
Lawyers for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology claimed that provisions in its 1861 deed from
the Commonwealth could not have been meant as equitable easements because they did not exist until
two years later when the Parker decision created them. The court observed that it was "not impressed"
by this argument. MJ.T. v. Boston Society of Natural History, 218 Mass. 189 (1914), at 196.
20Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. 341, at 347.
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to one another, so that they did not need to be contractually related in the customary
way. The 'general plan,' as it was called in subsequent decisions which further
elaborated the concept, was a reification of binding shared assumptions about a
neighborhood's enduring form and character.
Courts were initially cautious in recognizing the existence of such plans. The kind of
arbitrary control developers had often exercised while selling off a subdivision was not
enough to make restrictions enforceable afterward by the purchasers. 21 In the ten years
after Parker, the court recognized plans conferring mutual enforceability only in the
Back Bay and Beacon Hill.22 But as popular expectations grew that restrictions would
be enforced, courts found such plans easier to discover. The restrictions imposed in
any residential subdivision developed in a reasonably orderly and coherent manner
were held to create equitable easements.23 As the body of caselaw matured into a
predictable set of rules, land developers could be sure to follow these rules in their
deeds.24 By 1895, the "natural" assumption, according to the Supreme Judicial Court,
was that any restrictions were intended as part of a general plan;25 the burden of proof
had shifted in favor of creating and enforcing equitable easements.
An ultimate token of judicial acceptance of equitable easements, given their
commercial context of American urban real estate development, was the determination
that they were worth money. Justice Bigelow had suggested this possibility in the
Parker decision where he discussed the economic aspects of restrictions and noted that
purchasers might pay a premium for land because of them.26 In 1890 the court moved
beyond theoretical discussion to recognize the expectations of permanence under
21Sharp v. Ropes, 110 Mass. 381.
22Linzee v. Mixer, 101 Mass. 512 (1869): Back Bay; Jeffries v. Jeifries, 117 Mass. 184 (1874):
Beacon Hill.
23Sanborn v. Rice, 129 Mass. 387 (1880): South End; Tobey v. Moore, 130 Mass. 448 (1881): Dana
Estate, Cambridge; Hano v. Bigelow, 155 Mass. 341 (1892): Roseland Street, Cambridge, held to have
a general plan despite several lots left unrestricted.
24See, e.g., an 1886 deed by a private developer in the Back Bay, which recited that its restrictions
were imposed in "furtherance of a general scheme for the improvement of the granted property and that
the same were imposed to benefit the parcels conveyed," not merely to benefit the subdivider. Evans v.
Foss, 194 Mass. 513 (1907), at 514-15.
25Locke v. Hale, 165 Mass. 20 (1895), at 23, referring to an 1871 deed.
26Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. 341, at 348.
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restrictions as a compensable taking under eminent domain, in the case of Ladd v.
Boston. In 1886 the city took for its new courthouse site one side of Pemberton
Square, on the east slope of Beacon Hill. When the square had been developed in
1835, it was "mutually agreed, in the strongest and most unmistakeable terms,"
according to the deeds, that certain areas "shall remain forever open," including the
front ten feet of the lots taken for the courthouse.27 The city blocked Nathaniel W.
Ladd's view of the square by building to the front line of the lots, but claimed that
equitable easements, unlike ordinary easements, were not property interests for which
Ladd had any right to compensation. Wrong, wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., in the court's opinion. "If the plaintiff has an easement, the city must pay for it."28
In some other jurisdictions, an economic framework governed interpretation of deed
restrictions from the beginning, but that worked against securing permanence in the
environment. The economic interpretation was less in keeping with a theory of
restrictions as easements, which were ordinarily enforced through injunctions for
specific performance, than as covenants, which implied remedy as with other broken
contracts through the assessment of damages. But environmental permanence was a
cultural goal rather than an economic one. Compensation "would be an unsuitable
remedy" for an encroachment beyond the building line on Commonwealth Avenue,
decided the Massachusetts high court in 1891. "The injury is not one easily measurable
by money."29 By most contemporary economic thinking, restrictions distorted the land
market and ultimately reduced the value of land, even if individuals might perversely
prefer them for sentimental reasons. A judicial approach which looked to economic
theory, therefore, often not only left restrictions unenforced, but also awarded no
damages.
The confusion between easement and covenant doctrines was not resolved. In a
recent study of deed restrictions in Illinois, Andrew J. King notes that "the courts often
picked their theories to suit their purposes. ... [D]ecisions based on a judge's
preference for the social and economic implications of different kinds of land use
27Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585.
28Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, at 588.
29Attorney General v. Algonquin Club, 153 Mass. 447 (1891), at 454.
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received an acceptable intellectual gloss."30 The ambivalence remained precisely
because of the flexibility it allowed judges to provide theoretical support for decisions
based on practical or sentimental considerations. And Massachusetts judges'
preference, where they recognized stable neighborhoods, was most often to perpetuate
them.
Massachusetts courts quickly removed any explicit legal props from the culture of
change. While early nineteenth-century caselaw favored "temporary restrictions ... for a
limited number of years,"31 the Whitney and Parker decisions in the 1860s accepted
permanent restrictions. A building line in Cambridge brought the question of
permanence squarely before the court in 1881. "[T]hough unlimited in point of time,"
wrote Chief Justice Horace Gray in what was afterward cited as the definitive national
precedent on the question, "it is a valid restriction."32
Judges' preference for permanence expressed itself in another way: though there was
no theory to justify it, they were less inclined to enforce short-term restrictions than
long. For example, an 1894 subdivision in the Jamaica Plain section of Boston
included restrictions of only eight years duration, one of which limited construction to
one- or two-family dwellings. The subdivider was still selling lots after five years had
passed, and one of these latecomers built a 'triple-decker' three-family tenement.
Though the court found it "very clear" that the building violated the restrictions, it
awarded monetary damages rather than ordering compliance, "considering the short
time the restrictions were to run."33
Justice John W. Hammond in 1911 summed up the judicial attitude toward
restrictions in Massachusetts in a case concerning the new Back Bay, intended in his
words as "a fine residential district ... not only for the present but also for the future": 34
30King, Law and Land Use in Chicago, 19.
31Gray v. Blanchard, 25 Mass. 283.
32Tobey v. Moore, 130 Mass. 448, at 450; Corpus Juris 18:386.
331varson v. Mulvey, 179 Mass. 141, at 142-143. See also Scollard v. Normile, 181 Mass. 412
(1902), in which the restrictions' short time to run (six years left of fifteen) contributed to a decision
not to enforce them.
34Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Bancroft, 209 Mass. 217 (1911), at 221.
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If, in these days of noise and bulging, intrusive activities, one who has been in
confusion all day desires to have a home where, awake or asleep, he can pass his
hours in quiet and repose, there is no reason of public policy why, if he can get it,
he should not have it.35
Selling permanence
While lawyers and judges worked out what legal tools would be available for the
private control of neighborhood change, thousands of large and small subdividers were
at work exploring the market to figure out how to use these tools. Imposition of some
form of land use and building line restrictions became common even in unpretentious
subdivisions. "So common have agreements of this nature become," wrote a New York
attorney in 1891, "that there is scarcely a title in those districts in our large cities which
have been called into requisition for building purposes during the past thirty years in
which they are not to be met with."36 By the turn of the century they were prevalent
enough in Boston that advertisements stated when they were offering "unrestricted
land." 37 Restrictions spread nationwide even to places where neither courts nor custom
had favored them previously.38 Everywhere their use became more self-conscious;
developers began to use restrictions aggressively as a marketing tool.
Early restrictions regulated buildings' construction and position on the land;
restrictions on permissible uses gradually became common and eventually became the
most important use of the tool. Regulation of siting and dimensions fit the early idea of
applying restrictions to a single generation of building, though they could also be useful
over the years to keep alterations and reconstruction in conformity with their
35Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Bancroft, 209 Mass. 217, at 223.
36Gordon, 'Building Restrictions,' 349.
37Boston Herald, 1 Nov. 1902: 13.
38
"The whole subject of restrictions is still in its infancy. Outside England, Massachusetts, and New
York, the cases are few ..." Charles I. Giddings, 'Restrictions Upon the Use of Land,' Harvard Law
Review 5 (1892): 284. Restrictions were common in Illinois throughout the late nineteenth century,
even though courts refused to enforce them there until 1902; King, Law and Land Use in Chicago, 52.
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surroundings. Regulation of use inherently applied over a period of time, whether finite
or permanent. The first generation of use restrictions focused on the activities to be
excluded, accepting the nineteenth-century pattern of mixed land uses but seeking a
benign mix. A particularly elaborate version imposed in Cambridge in 1850 forbade
owners to build structures
which shall be used for the trade or calling of a butcher, currier, tanner, varnish-
maker, ink-maker, tallow-chandler, soap-boiler, brewer, distiller, sugar-baker,
dyer, tinman, working brazier, founder, smith, or brickmaker, or for any nauseous
or offensive trade whatsoever; nor occupy such lots for these or any other purposes
which shall tend to disturb the quiet or comfort of the neighborhood... 39
Soon mixed use itself began to seem a problem, and restrictions focused not on what
would be prohibited but what would be allowed, at first simply by limiting land to
residential use. Developers soon found that there was a market for unmixing uses even
further by unmixing social classes. They restricted subdivisions to ensure a certain
class of occupancy by limiting them to single-family houses, by setting a minimum
construction cost for them, and in many parts of the country by limiting the race,
religion, or ethnicity of their owners or occupants."4 Almost as important as class were
the visible signs of class, and provisions for design and landscaping, together with
prohibitions of such activities as outdoor drying of clothes, made restrictions grow ever
more elaborate.
39Tobey v. Moore, 130 Mass. 448, at 449.
4Clement E. Vose, Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant
Cases (Berkeley, 1959), 8-11. Racially restrictive covenants were most common in midwestern and
border states, and in California where they were directed against Asians (Helen Monchow, The Use of
Deed Restrictions in Subdivision Development [Chicago, 1928], table III, 47-50). Patricia Burgess
Stach, in a study of deed restrictions in Columbus, Ohio, found two subdivisions which "prohibited
ownership or occupancy by 'foreign undesirables,' and a third singled out foreigners of the 'Dago
class.'"; 'Real Estate Development and Urban Form: Roadblocks in the Path to Residential
Exclusivity,' Business History Review 63 (Summer 1989): 356-383, 375. Sam Bass Warner, in his
study of Boston between 1870 and 1900, found "no evidence, however, of the use of covenants against
any racial, religious, or national group." Streetcar Suburbs, 122. They could be found in California at
least as early as the 1890s, but they came into most widespread use between 1917, when the U.S.
Supreme Court declared racial zoning unconstitutional in Buchanan v. Warley (245 U.S. 60) and 1948,
when the court did likewise with racial covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer (334 U.S. 1). The use of deed
covenants to enforce racial segregation was thus a relatively late use of a legal tool which had already
developed to deal with issues of uniformity and permanence of environmental design.
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In spite of this growing complexity, the 'restricted neighborhood' came to be treated
as something of a commodity, a standardized product which could be traded without
requiring further information. Real estate advertisements used the word "restricted" to
telegraph an image of exclusivity and stability, while rarely bothering to elaborate on
the substance - or duration - of the restrictions.4 1 Specifics were more common in
advertisements for moderate rather than high-prestige developments, addressing market
resistance among people who might fear their intentions would be restricted against. A
subdivision on Devon Street in Dorchester was advertised in 1897 as offering "small,
choice building lots ... restricted to one or two family houses"; 42 the important message
was that duplexes were not prohibited. For elite projects, on the other hand, advertising
copywriters could devote themselves to rhapsodic descriptions of picturesque settings
and use a phrase such as "carefully restricted" to say all they needed.43 The Norton
Estate in Cambridge near Harvard was designed in 1887 by Charles Eliot, an Olmsted
apprentice and son of Harvard College president Charles William Eliot, and incided
restrictions elaborate for the time. They permitted single-family dwellings only, to cost
at least $4500 above the foundations, specifying large setbacks not only for front yards
but also at the sides and rear of lots, and regulating the heights of fences.
Advertisements for the lots expressed all this as a "carefully protected
neighborhood."44
4 1Alexander S. Taylor discussed the substance of typical restrictions in 'Districting Through Private
Effort,' 'Districting Through Private Effort,' Proceedings of the Eighth National Conference on City
Planning, Cleveland, June 5-7, 1916 (New York, 1916), 180-82. See advertisements in Boston
Evening Transcript, April 18, 1896: 11, (Babcock Hill, Brookline); October 2, 1897: 23, (Wellington
Hill); May 3, 1924: VI/3, (Winchester, "in one of the finest restricted residential streets"). My favorite
is an ad for lots in Chestnut Hill: "Fine location. Restrictions." Boston Evening Transcript, May 3,
1924: VI/2.
42Boston Evening Transcript, September 18, 1897: 23. See also auction advertisement for Hunnewell
Hill Land Co., in Newton, "single houses to cost not less than $4000 to build, and two-family houses
to cost not less than $6000 to build - all to have a twenty foot setback from line of street." Boston
Sunday Herald, June 28, 1903: 23.
43Boston Evening Transcript, April 18, 1896: 5 (Battery Heights, Cushing Hill, Hull). See also
Boston Evening Transcript, April 3, 1915: IV/13: 'fully restricted' (Brookline); Boston Evening
Transcript, April 3, 1915: IV/12: 'properly restricted' (Allindale Homesteads, Dedham).
"Boston Evening Transcript, January 16, 18%: 5; Antoinette F. Downing, Elisabeth MacDougall,
Eleanor Pearson, Survey of Architectural History in Cambridge, Report Two: Mid-Cambridge
(Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 30. The restrictions ran for only twenty years.
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"In some localities," found Helen C. Monchow in a 1929 study of deed restriction
practice, "subdividers literally sell the restrictions themselves."45 "Absolute
protection," offered one ad for Boston suburban property.46 Many subdivisions
distributed pamphlet explanations of their restrictions, written partly as aids to their
administration and partly as marketing tools.
Subdividers found that buyers responded not only to the substance of restrictions, but
to their duration. "The making or unmaking of value in a community," said longtime
Cleveland developer Alexander S. Taylor in 1916, "lies in proper restriction of land,
and the more rigid and fixed they are, the safer and surer is the land owner's
investment."47 Monchow concluded that "the more highly developed the subdivision,
the longer the terms of the restrictions."48
This emphasis on duration appeared in marketing. "The restrictions are such as will
always keep them strictly first-class estates," assured one Boston real estate ad in
1896.49 "A great opportunity to build in a permanent residential restricted
neighborhood," said another almost thirty years later.50 Outside Cleveland, the Van
Sweringen brothers developed Shaker Heights in the 'teens and 'twenties with
restrictions running to the year 2026, more than a century. "[N]o matter what changes
time may bring around it," said one of their advertisements, "no matter what waves of
commercialism may beat upon its borders, Shaker Village is secure, its homes and
gardens are in peaceful surroundings, serene and protected for all time."51 Another of
their brochures began with the question, "What is Shaker Heights Village?" and
answered, "A permanent, strictly restricted, exclusively residential municipality,
carefully planned and being developed for the benefit of those desiring to purchase
homes with the certain knowledge that no undesirable elements of any kind shall ever
45Monchow, Deed Restrictions, 71.
46Boston Evening Transcript, April 3, 1915: II/5.
47Taylor, 'Districting Through Private Effort,' 178.
48Monchow, Deed Restrictions, 57.
49Advertisement: 'Jamaica Plain,' Boston Evening Transcript, April 28, 1896: 11,.
50Advertisement: 'Parkway Land,' Boston Evening Transcript, May 3, 1924: VI/4,.
51Quoted in Eugene Rachlis and John E. Marqusee, The Land Lords (New York, 1963), 72.
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be allowed to intrude."52 Such ostentatiously long duration - and a perpetual restriction,
if less ostentatious, was longer still - made no sense in terms of rational planning or
economics, but developers looked beyond beyond economic rationales to the market.
They were selling something more than economic accordance between building and
location; they were selling permanence.
Permanence was most satisfying if it extended backward as well as forward in time.
The best developers combined an assured future provided by restrictions with a visible
past which offered a patina of environmental continuity to brand-new neighborhoods.
J. C. Nichols, developer of Kansas City's Country Club District, explained that good
subdividers practised "preservation ... of the interest and charm, the historic feeling,
the peculiar individuality of property."53 Near Boston, this combination of preservation
with prospective permanence was "The Vision" in a brochure for the new deed-
restricted community of Westover:
Here is a compact area of nearly a thousand acres of virgin territory of striking
natural beauty, which has been preserved for a notable undertaking - the planning
and building of a complete village of small estates, where every home shall have a
perfect setting and a protected privacy, in harmonious and artistic surroundings,
which shall grow more beautiful through succeeding generations.54
Other developers chose to provide this appearance of continuity not with any actual
historic features of their sites, but through design controls requiring traditional styles of
architecture.
By the turn of the century, as restrictions became more common, buyers (especially
in expensive subdivisions) became more sophisticated in looking for restrictions that
not only sounded good, but would work well in practice. Developers continually
refined their deeds in response to experience. The result was increasingly specific and
enforceable restrictions.
52Green-Cadwallader-Long, Questions and Answers Regarding Shaker Heights Village (Cleveland,
n.d.)
53Nichols, 'Financial Effect of Good Planning,' 94.
54
'Westover: A New England Village of the Twentieth Century' (N.p., n.d.), 5. Italics original.
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This happened in part through standardization. The Olmsted firm offered its clients a
printed form of restrictions, which local lawyers could adapt to their own
jurisdictions. 55 The restriction brochures which developers distributed as a marketing
tool served also as prototypes from which others could copy, and helped spread details
of practice beyond local communities of real estate operators.56
Enforceability was aided by more careful legal draftsmanship. Language became
increasingly specific, so that restrictions with the same substantive intentions were
expressed in ever more elaborate terms. The first Back Bay deeds allowed "steps,
windows, porticos, and other usual projections" beyond the building line, but after six
years of practice the commissioners drafted a new form of deed that specified detailed
dimensions for these projections. 57 Elaborate language appeared for defining single-
family use.58 These simple measures recognized that restrictions might in fact be
invoked after a long period of time, when the original parties' intentions would
otherwise be difficult to ascertain.
55John C. Olmsted to W. M. Elliott, President, Licton Mineral Springs Co., Seattle, August 2, 1907,
8, box B232, Olmsted Associates papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
56Roland Park's first restrictions were modelled on those of Llewellyn Park, New Jersey, and Tuxedo
Park, New York; Schalck, 'Planning Roland Park,' 427-28.
57Linzee v. Mixer, 101 Mass. 512, at 514,.522-23. The new deeds provided that "steps, windows,
porticos and other usual projections appurtenant to said front wall are to be allowed in this reserved
space of twenty feet, subject to the following limitations, namely, first, that no projection of any kind
(other than door-steps and balustrades connected therewith, and also cornices at the roof of the building)
will be allowed to extend more than five feet from said front wall into said space; and second, that no
projection in the nature of a bay-window, circular front or octagon front, with the foundation wall
sustaining the same, (such foundation wall being a projection of front wall,) will be allowed, unless
any horizontal section of such projection would fall within the external lines of a trapezoid, whose base
upon the rear line of the aforesaid space does not exceed seven-tenths of the whole front of the building,
nor exceed eighteen feet in any case, and whose side lines make an angle of forty-five degrees with the
base."
"The commissioners always considered that this was a fair construction of the restrictions and
limitations of the former deed," said one of them, Franklin Haven, "and, on October 26, 1865, voted
accordingly." (at 523).
58Monchow, Deed Restrictions, 32-33. The reason for this was cases like Stone v. Pillsbury, 167
Mass. 332 (1897), in which the Supreme Judicial Court allowed an alcoholism hospital in an 1887
Roxbury subdivision restricted to single-family construction. "Single dwelling-house," said the court,
was a technical real estate term which did not bind the owners because they were not real estate
professionals.
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One of the most important of intentions was who could enforce restrictions. At first,
enforcement clauses aimed at ensuring that the restrictions would be interpreted as
equitable easements, not mere personal agreements with the subdivider. Later J. C.
Nichols expanded the scope of deed restrictions to something akin to public zoning, by
writing into his deeds enforceability even by people outside his subdivisions, in return
for reciprocal rights in surrounding developments.59
Real long-term enforceability could best be accomplished through self-perpetuating
groups to administer restrictions. Such groups had existed since the early nineteenth
century to care for the common spaces of urban subdivisions such as Louisburg Square
on Beacon Hill, Gramercy Park in New York, and the private streets of St. Louis.
After the turn of the century, large-scale developers set up community organizations
whlich were also charged with approving construction and alterations within the
development. In its fully-articulated form this method involved a homeowners'
association to levy fees, see to maintenance and services, and enforce restrictions, and a
separate architectural board of review or 'art jury' - sometimes composed of paid
professionals - to determine the propriety of proposed improvements.60 As an
enforcement agency the homeowners' association was a hybrid, combining the
institutional identity of a developer with the permanence and community self-interest of
neighbors. "The theory," wrote Nichols, "is that these directors have a vital interest in
the continuance of the established character of the development, they are elected by vote
of their neighbors and thus represent the lotowners and afford a sound medium for
perpetuating the ideals and standards of the development." 61 In such developments
deed covenants also took on the new role of subjecting owners to the private
59J. C. Nichols, 'Developer's View of Deed Restrictions,' 133.
60Monchow, Deed Restrictions, 65-7 1; Elvon Musick, 'Legal Authority for Architectural Control,'
Planning Problems of Town, City and Region: Papers and Discussions at the Nineteenth National
Conference on City Planning (Philadelphia, 1927), 269-83. One reason for increased use of this
mechanism was a failure of minimum-cost provisions in long-term restrictions because "with the
cyclical economic changes and improvements in home building, costs varied from time to time, thus
tending to defeat the purpose of the restriction as it related to the figure originally proposed" (Laronge,
'Subdivider of Today and Tomorrow,' 428).
61Nichols, 'Developer's View of Deed Restrictions,' 138.
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assessments that ensured resources for enforcement and reinforced the institutional
permanence of these private quasi-governments. 62
Too much permanence?
The evolution of deed restrictions was not, however, a triumphant march toward
ever-greater permanence. A list of actual deed restrictions arranged by the date they
were imposed, for example, does not appear to show any trend toward longer specified
durations.63 This is inconclusive, however, for several reasons. First, restrictions were
applied to an increasing percentage of new subdivisions, so that comparisons from one
period to another can end up comparing different classes of development. Second,
courts in many jurisdictions outside Massachusetts refused to honor permanent
covenants, and developers everywhere responded by switching to finite durations
rather than perpetual ones. Other kinds of evidence point to a growing embrace of long-
term if not permanent environmental stability: first, the increasing use of restrictions,
and second, the increasing care taken to ensure that these restrictions remained
unambiguously enforcible after many years.
What is clear in this evolution is that a steadily growing amount of attention was paid
to issues of duration and permanence, and that this attention was directed toward
62E.g., Roland Park Co., Deed and Agreement ... Guilford (Baltimore, 1913), 13-14, covers care of
comon areas and provision of services, and also "For expenses incident to the examination and approval
of plans as herein provided, and to the enforcement of the restrictions, conditions, covenants,
easements, charges and agreements herein contained. (14). Nichols, 'Developer's View of Deed
Restrictions,' 139; Charles S. Ascher, 'Reflections on the Art of Administering Deed Restrictions,'
Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics 8 (1932): 376-77.
63Monchow attempted such an arrangement and concluded there was no discernible trend (Deed
Restrictions, 56-57). See chart in H. V. Hubbell, 'Land Subdivision Restrictions,' Landscape
Architecture, October, 1925: 53-54, which shows all restrictions drawn up by the Olmsted firms to
1925, and see Table V in Monchow, Deed Restrictions, 59-60. 1 am indebted to Patricia Burgess Stach
for access to her raw data on restrictions in Columbus, Ohio, which further reinforce these conclusions.
No systematic sampling of Boston restrictions has been attempted for this study, and this discussion is
based instead on examination of restrictions described in Supreme Judicial Court decisions and other
sources.
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devising practical mechanisms for controlling environmental change. When participants
in this process looked around at what they had accomplished, however, many had
second thoughts about the practicality of environmental permanence.
How could property owners tell which restrictions were permanent? Parker v.
Nightingale appeared to breathe eternal life into many old restrictions, most of which
were probably never intended to be perpetual. Their duration like their other terms was
to be divined by consulting the intentions of their authors, but these people were no
longer available to clear up the question, and courts had a way of consulting their own
idiosyncratic preferences instead. On these unpredictable results could depend most of
the value of a piece of property. For example, three lots on Beacon Hill's Mount
Vernon Street had been conveyed between 1806 and 1808 with the provision that
stables then standing on them should "never" be raised above their height of thirteen
feet. Did the word 'never' create a permanent restriction limiting any future buildings
on this land to the same height? It took two separate suits before the Supreme Judicial
Court in 1874 and 1875 to establish that buildings there would indeed be limited to a
single story forever.M
Once restrictions were in force, how could they be ended? First, by their own internal
mechanisms, the simplest of which was a finite duration, or as later became more
common, a specified expiration date. Restrictions unlimited in duration might specify
some predetermined procedure for modifying or abrogating them, such as a majority
vote of lot owners. Few early deeds contained any of these internal mechanisms.
Second, restrictions could be voluntarily terminated by uniting the restricted and
benefitted properties in a new legal instrument, as the Hayward Place owners had done.
If this was accomplished by assembling all the affected lots back into a single
ownership, the restrictions were said to be extinguished; if it was accomplished by an
agreement among several different owners, the restrictions - or any subset of them -
were said to be released. It was the existence of these mechanisms, external to the
provisions of the deed itself and available at any time, that kept permanent restrictions
from violating the rule against perpetuities. Finally, where differences among owners
prevented either reassembly or release, restrictions could still be terminated by the
64Jeffries v. Jeffries, 117 Mass. 184, at 184-185.
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action of a court. If the restriction was properly drawn, and ran with the land - if, in
other words, it was in force to begin with - a court might set it aside for one of two
reasons. Either a failure to enforce the restrictions, or a change in the neighborhood on
which they operated, could in the judgement of a court render their enforcement
inequitable.65
Permanent restrictions without internal provisions for modification were durable
indeed; they could be altered only by a court or by unanimous action among all the
owners in a subdivision. For one large hotel proposed in 1896 in the new Back Bay,
the Boston Globe gave special credit to the legal team which assembled the land and
secured the releases necessary to build it. "This work ... was in itself tremendous." 66
At the same time that real estate dealers were learning to sell permanence, the
increasing patchwork of permanent conditions and restrictions led to a growing unease
among the real estate conveyancers and lawyers who dealt with them professionally. In
1886 a group of them petitioned the legislature to reform this system of land regulation;
no real estate brokers joined in the petition, which complained that
many real estate titles especially in Boston and vicinity are incumbered with
burdensome and vexatious conditions and restrictions, in some cases exposing
valuable estates to the risk of forfeiture, on grounds comparatively insignificant;
that those incumbrances frequently prevent the improvement of such real estate and
subject the persons holding such estates to great trouble, annoyance and expense
and that no adequate legal remedies exist for these evils. 67
The petitioners asked for "laws to limit and regulate the power of imposing such
conditions and restrictions upon real estate and to define the remedies & rights of all
persons interested in such conditions and restrictions ...."
The specific complaints make it clear that these professional drafters and examiners of
deeds were mainly concerned about conditions, with their potentially drastic
65see Monchow, Deed Restrictions, 24, for a version of this list organized somewhat differently.
66Boston Globe, February 2, 1896: 16.
67Eighteen signatures appear on the petition; of the seventeen legible names nine are listed in the 1886
Boston City Directory as lawyers, two as conveyancers, and one as both. Petition, presented by Mr.
Bailey of Everett, February 3, 1886, Massachusetts State Archives, legislative documents, Acts 1887,
ch. 418.
130
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
consequences for land titles, but they also included restrictions in their petition, and
these people if anyone understood the distinction. The legislator who presented the
petition also presented a bill that focused on conditions; after a specified deadline most
of them would be treated as restrictions, and they could henceforth be created only by
strictly defined language. A final section of the bill dealt with restrictions and their
duration:
No restriction on the mode of use of real estate, ... shall be hereafter created to be in
force for more than twenty years from the date of the deed ... unless the time during
which such restrictions shall be in force is expressly set forth ...68
The judiciary committee recommended against the bill, but the legislature kept it alive
by referring it to the next year's session. The committee in 1887 revived only the
section limiting the duration of restrictions and increased the default term to thirty years;
the legislature enacted it. From then on, new restrictions with expiration dates could run
as long as anyone liked, but if they were "unlimited as to time," they would "be
construed" as limited to thirty years.69 In Massachusetts, restrictions on land use could
no longer be permanent.
It was not clear in practice exactly what was to be limited to thirty years. Did 'use of
real estate' refer only to, for example, a limitation to single-family dwellings, or was it
to be understood in a broader sense as including location of buildings, their height - in
effect the whole substantive content of restrictions? Developers already distinguished
between dimensional and use restrictions and commonly set different durations for
them. The city of Boston in all its South End deeds had limited buildings to residential
use for twenty years, and also imposed dimensional and construction requirements
which were not limited in duration. "After the twenty years had passed the scheme must
have been intended to have regard to some possible occupation," wrote Justice William
681886 House bill 406.
69Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1887, Acts ch. 418. The complete text of the act was:
"When the title or use of real estate is affected by conditions or restrictions unlimited as to time, such
conditions or restrictions shall be construed as being limited to the term of thirty years from the date of
the deed or other instrument or the date of the probating of the will creating such conditions or
restrictions, except only in cases of gifts or devises for public, charitable, or religious purposes. This
act shall not apply to existing conditions or restrictions or to such as may be contained in a deed, gift
or grant of the Commonwealth, nor shall it operate in any case to defeat restrictions for a term of years
certain."
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C. Loring in 1910. He speculated that the dimensional requirements themselves might
have been intended to control uses, in effect limiting them to ones compatible with a
residential neighborhood. "[W]hatever may have been the scheme which was to exist
after the twenty year period as to the use to be made of the buildings had expired, I do
not see why that scheme cannot be maintained."70 A restriction on the height of houses
written after the 1887 act was deemed perpetual in an 1897 decision, supporting the
idea that the limit on duration applied only to restrictions on use.71
The act caused another kind of confusion by speciflying a default term which was
misunderstood as a maximum by some people, apparently including Associate Justice
Marcus P. Knowlton of the Supreme Judicial Court. "It is not for the interest of the
community," wrote Knowlton in a 1903 decision,
nor is it the policy of the Commonwealth, that, as conditions greatly change in our
large cities, restrictions put upon land in reference to the quiet of residential streets
should continue, when the neighborhood is entirely given up to business, unless
they are so expressed as plainly to be binding. ... Such restrictions created since the
enactment of the St. 1887, c. 418, ... cannot remain in force longer than thirty
years.72
The rules would not be determined definitively until some time after 1917, when
restrictions imposed after the 1887 act had been around for thirty years or more. Given
these confusions, subdividers might have felt discouraged from writing restrictions for
very long terms. Nevertheless, some did impose then for finite terms considerably
longer than thirty years, and they were ultimately upheld.73 Others continued writing
70Stewart v. Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28 (1910), at 32. Justice Loring favored environmental
permanence in other forms, as well. He had worked to save the Bulfinch State House, and shortly after
this decision he would join the new Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities as a life
member (see chapter 5).
See also the South End deed in Hamlen v. Werner, 144 Mass. 396, a decision handed down by the
Supreme Judicial Court on March 7, 1887, during the month the Committee on Judiciary was
considering the bill to limit restriction terms.
7 1Brown v. O'Brien, 168 Mass. 484 (1897). The decision does not mention Acts 1887, ch. 418, and
was based on other grounds.
72Baptist Social Union v. Boston University, 183 Mass. 202, at 205.
73Jenney v. Hynes, 282 Mass. 182 (1933), which enforced a thirty-seven year old use restriction
imposed in the new Back Bay in 1896, terminating in 1950.
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perpetual restrictions on use, which though unenforceable offered their customers the
illusion of permanence. 74
Since the 1887 act allowed finite terms no matter how long, it permitted virtual
permanence, and the real target of its prohibition was unintentional permanence. No
longer would property owners and courts have to wonder whether a subdivider's
omission of an expiration date was a product of deliberation or of sloppiness. The act
applied only to new restrictions, however, and thus did not address the early-nineteenth
century deeds which most often presented these problems. Two years later the
legislature produced a companion act which dealt with conditions and restrictions
already on the books. It simply allowed any person interested in deed covenants more
than thirty years old to bring action in the Supreme Judicial Court "for the purpose of
determining the validity or defining the nature and extent of such possible condition, or
other incumbrance." 75 Wary of unconstitutional interference with private contracts, the
legislators offered the court none of the substantive guidelines rejected in the 1886 bill.
It was a purely procedural reform which would reduce the contentiousness and waste
of private land use regulation by resolving doubts about restrictions before rather than
after they were violated. The court would continue to act as it had, in theory interpreting
the intentions of the original parties to the agreements, and in practice routinely
changing 'conditions' to restrictions.
The legislature, in creating a procedure for interpreting dubious language in old
deeds, implicitly acknowledged changing standards of permanence, in effect admitting
that the Hayward deeds, and others like them, did not necessarily mean what Justice
Bigelow had said they meant. Eventually the act would also help resolve ambiguities in
the intentions of its contemporaries, as a mechanism for bringing post-1887 deeds into
court to see whether they fell within the prohibition of perpetual restrictions. Perhaps
most important, it would provide a non-adversarial way of determining where
restrictions' intentions had been fatally undermined by neighborhood change.
74E.g., the 1900 'Montvale' subdivision in Worcester, limited to one- or two-family hous er";
Allen v. Barrett, 213 Mass. 36 (1912).
75Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1889, Acts ch. 442, §1.
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The emergence of the judicial doctrine of 'neighborhood change' demonstrates that
the intentions which fundamentally determined environmental permanence were not
those of the generation which wrote restrictions into a deed, but those of the generation
which enforced or failed to enforce them. Courts inevitably had a great deal of
discretion in enforcement, affording a flexibility which could defeat environmental
permanence and yet was necessary for truly achieving it. For deed restrictions really to
ensure permanence, they had to be taken literally when they said 'no' and literally when
they said 'forever,' yet their interpretation had to be supple enough to meet new
problems as they arose. Judges were most likely to enforce restrictions when someone
was violating clear neighborhood character, and were less likely to enforce them when
a neighborhood was changing. In other words, of the two fundamental purposes of
deed restrictions, they would use their flexibility in enforcement more for uniformity
than for stability.
The leading case on neighborhood change, for Massachusetts and for the nation, was
Jackson v. Stevenson, decided in 1892. In an 1853 residential subdivision at Boston's
Park Square, the city imposed restrictions which, among other things, defined rear
yards which were not to be covered by buildings. Nearly forty years later, as the area
was being absorbed into the expanding downtown, one owner sought to enforce the
restriction to keep another from expanding his store. "It is evident that the purpose of
the restrictions as a whole was to make the locality a suitable one for residences;" said
the court,
and that, owing to the general growth of the city, and the present use of the whole
neighborhood for business, this purpose can no longer be acocmplished. If all the
restrictions imposed in the deeds should be rigidly enforced, it would not restore to
the locality its residential character, but would merely lessen the value of every lot
for business purposes. It would be oppressive and inequitable to give effect to the
restrictions; and since the changed condition of the locality has resulted from other
causes than their breach, to enforce them in this instance could have no other effect
than to harass and injure the defendant, without effecting the purpose for which the
restrictions were originally made. 76
This passage from Jackson v. Stevenson established a two-part test that courts could
apply to determine whether restrictions should be enforced despite changes in a
76Jackson v. Stevenson. 156 Mass. 496 (1892), at 502.
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neighborhood. First, had the change been caused by violations of the restriction?
Second, would enforcing the restriction restore the district to its intended character - or
in the court's words, would it accomplish "the purpose for which the restrictions were
originally made"? Park Square failed both tests, so the court declined to enforce the
restriction there and instead called for an assessment of the plaintiff's monetary
damages, if any.
Changing neighborhoods gave practical importance to the theoretical question
whether restrictions were easements to be enforced by injunction or contracts to be
enforced by award of monetary damages. Massachusetts early favored the easement
theory which eventually dominated through much of the United States, and treated
damages as a lesser remedy to be used only when, as in Jackson v. Stevenson,
enforcement was inappropriate. In other jurisdictions, however, contract theory
dominated at first. The problem, as King points out in his study of restrictions in
Illinois, was that "[a] change in neighborhood usually indicated that business or multi-
family use now predominated. Normally land values would rise, and the plaintiff could
show no recoverable monetary loss."77 Strictly economic theories of land use, which
did not take into account neighborhood character independent of its financial value,
could not account for complaints about neighborhood change and could do little to
answer them.
A string of decisions refined the neighborhood change doctrine put forth in Jackson
v. Stevenson, defining the extent of changes, both geographical and substantive, that
would render restrictions invalid, but the mere existence of the doctrine was a blow to
the pursuit of permanence. In practical terms the discretion exercised by courts made
deed restrictions seem unreliable as a long-term tool for controlling land use and built
form. "We all know what these private restrictions, as a rule, are worth," said city
planning expert Lawrence Veiller in 1916. "'There ain't no such animal"' as a long-
term restriction, he said,
because we all know that 25, 50, or 75 years after the development has been made,
conditions change and the courts step in, and the man who placed the restrictions
77King, Law and Land Use in Chicago, 50.
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being dead, the courts as a rule say, 'We will not maintain these restrictions any
longer.'78
But many developers continued selling permanence, and in order to do so in this
more skeptical judicial environment they had to modify their products. One response to
the insistence on finite terms was to write term restrictions which included procedures
for their own renewal by some specified majority of owners, easing the otherwise
almost insurmountable obstacle of achieving unanimity among them. In a further
innovation, developers offered de facto permanence by making the restrictions self-
renewing, shifting the burden of action from those who would like to continue them to
those who wanted to change them. By 1929, said Helen Monchow, this was the most
common form of restriction.79 J. C. Nichols claimed to have used it first in the Country
Club district of Kansas City:
The restrictions automatically extend themselves unless the owners of a majority of
the front feet execute and record a change or abandonment of the restrictions five
years before the respective expiration dates. ... In the Country Club District the
presumption in favor of the established character of the development for home
purposes has prevailed and, if its character is to be changed, the affirmative vote of
those wishing the change is required. ... With the greater protection to property
through such automatic extension of restrictions, ... the original restriction period
need not be so long. Perhaps 25- to 30-year periods are long enough to give
reasonable assurance and yet short enough to permit readjustment of restrictions to
changing modes of life.80
'Changing modes of life' challenged environmental permanence at least as much as
did changing neighborhoods. Norms as well as neighborhoods evolved over time and
could leave restrictions behind. The deeper intent of restrictions - maintaining a certain
neighborhood character - often could not be reduced to permanent objective rules, and
attempts to do so could skew a neighborhood's development in unwelcome ways.
Restrictions had to be interpreted flexibly to follow their intent rather than their letter
when tastes changed, as in the growing suburban prediliction for the picturesque and
consequent chafing of the uniform setback lines enshrined in many deed restrictions, or
78Lawrence Veiller, 'Districting by Municipal Regulation,' Proceedings of the Eighth National
Conference on City Planning, Cleveland, June 5-7, 1916 (New York, 1916), 149.
79Monchow, Deed Restrictions, 61.
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when there arose whole unanticipated categories of land use, such as garages. "If we
had made a restriction a few years ago against garages or outbuildings, we would be up
against it to-day," said J. C. Nichols in 1916. "It may be that in ten or fifteen years we
might want housing for aeroplanes."81 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
grappled with garages in a suit filed in 1907 in the new Back Bay, where restrictions
written in 1890 prohibited stables but allowed other "usual outbuildings." Well, said
the court after four years, a garage is not a stable, but then again it certainly was not in
1890 a usual outbuilding, either.82 To property owners who needed to know whether
they could build garages, such deliberation was alarmingly academic and time-
consuming.
By inserting internal provisions for modifying restrictions, developers acknowledged
their potential obsolescence, and aimed for longevity through flexibility. These
provisions put the power of amendment into the hands of owners in an attempt to keep
it out of the hands of courts. One aim of this flexibility was to create a judicial
presumption of validity whenever restrictions had not been altered. The restrictions in
Palos Verdes, outside Los Angeles, included a complex system of different
requirements for approving modifications, depending on the area they would affect and
on whether the provision was deemed 'basic.' 83
Where deed restrictions reserved some discretionary decision-making powers, the
process of administering the restrictions could offer even more flexibility than the
process of amending them. Community design committees were a built-in mechanism
for dealing both with unanticipated change in circumstances, and with evolving
neighborhood standards. Monchow in 1929 found that requiring review of all building
plans, rather than mere conformity to pre-set objective standards, was "comparatively
80Nichols, 'Developer's View of Deed Restrictions,' 135. Nichols had earlier discussed his self-
renewing restrictions at the Eighth National Conference on City Planning in 1916; Nichols, 'Financial
Effect of Good Planning,' discussion, 109.
81Nichols, 'Financial Effect of Good Planning,' discussion, 109.
82Riverbank Improvement Company v. Bancroft, 209 Mass. 217.
83Musick, 'Legal Authority for Architectural Control,' 278.
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new and ... its use is increasing." 84 Attorney Charles S. Ascher in 1932 wrote
'Reflections on the Art of Administering Deed Restrictions,' defining his art as "the free
rendering of the black and white of legal documents in the pastel shades of human
conduct and desire."8s Whatever mechanism intermediated between legal documents
and human desire, it was to "perform the vital function of making the plan serve the
people for whom it was intended but who could not be consulted in its preparation,
instead of making the residents slaves to the preconceived plan."s6
This growing appreciation for flexibility was a second phase in the reaction against
the culture of change. Now people sought not permanence in the environment, but
control over it. They explored the tool they had invented to prevent change and
discovered that it was even more powerful when used to shape change. Instead of
exerting control only once by defining a permanently fixed state, control could be
exercised over and over.
When this new philosophy was applied by developers, they sometimes retained more
control for themselves than they allowed to their customers. This was a partial return to
the original system that preceded equitable easements. For example, Frederick Law
Olmsted, Jr., advised Baltimore's Roland Park Company to plat "sketchily and only as
needed" for the sake of flexibility, and the company's deeds retained the right to modify
restrictions on land it still held.87 Subdivision marketing would allow this to work only
when, as in Roland Park, the integrity of the developer was above question and the
flexibility was clearly being used only for adjusting designs within their original
84Monchow, Deed Restrictions, 35; see also Nichols, 'Developer's View of Deed Restrictions,' 137.
For an example in Springfield and Longmeadow, Massachusetts, see Parsons v. Duryea, 261 Mass.
314 (1927). As of 1868, by contrast, Frederick Law Olmsted thought "We cannot judiciously attempt
to control the form of the houses which men shall build" in Riverside; "we can only, at most, take care
that if they build very ugly and inappropriate houses, they shall not be allowed to force them
disagreeably upon our attention," through setback and landscaping requirements. Olmsted, 'Proposed
Suburban Village at Riverside,' 301-02.
85Ascher, 'Art of Administering Deed Restrictions,' 375.
86Ascher, 'Art of Administering Deed Restrictions,' 376.
8701msted to Bouton, December 1, 1900, quoted in Schalck, 'Planning Roland Park,' 425; Roland
Park Co., Deed and Agreement ... Guilford, 9-10. Similarly, 1920 Merrymount Co. deeds cited in
Abbott v. Stegman, 263 Mass. 585 (1928).
138
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
intentions. Monchow found such provisions common, usually tempered by definite
limits on the developer's prerogatives, or requirements for consent, to avoid producing
"a feeling of insecurity" on the part of residents, the very feeling that restrictions existed
to alleviate.8s
An even stronger retention of control was provision for enforcement by the developer
but not by neighbors. By the 1890s, the Riverbank Improvement Company in its
Beacon Street subdivisions included restrictions limiting owners' enforcement rights to
their own block, while the company could enforce them throughout the district. A more
extreme version appeared a few years later in Newton Center, written by a subdivision
syndicate which included one judge from the Superior Court and one from the Supreme
Judicial Court. The latter tribunal later wrote with glee of these part-time developers that
"[a]ll had a wholesome fear of equitable restrictions, and a desire to profit by them."89
These legal savants broke all the rules for creating equitable easements, varying both
the substance and the duration of their restrictions from one lot to the next. Clearly this
was deliberate, said the court; they "intended to retain a power in themselves to change
their system of development; and, while restricting the several lots as they were
granted, they intended to avoid granting power to the purchasers to prevent the
imposition of different restrictions."9
The most important effect of deed restrictions was to challenge real estate orthodoxy,
undermining the culture of change. Neighborhoods could indeed remain stable, and
speculation on continual land use conversion was not the only way to make money in
real estate. "Through the use of private deed restrictions," says real estate historian
Marc Weiss, "residential subdividers had already market-tested the value of land-use
regulations and found them to be most desirable." 91 The presence of unrestricted land,
and the emergence of threats unanticipated by existing restrictions, eventually led
homeowners and the real estate industry both to embrace the idea of public regulations
88Monchow, Deed Restrictions, 54. See also Nichols, 'Developer's View of Deed Restrictions,' 136.
89Beekman v. Schirmer, 239 Mass. 265 (1921), at 266.
90Beekman v. Schirmer, 239 Mass. 265, at 270.
9 1Marc A. Weiss, 'Urban Land Developers and the Origins of Zoning Laws: The Case of Berkeley,'
Berkeley Planning Journal 3 (1986): 8. J. C. Nichols in 1929 claimed that "the effectiveness of the
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that would act like restrictions while overcoming their limitations, as we shall see in
chapter 6.
Boston was a leader among the places that developed deed restrictions as a legal tool
in the late nineteenth century so that new residential districts would no longer be at the
mercy of the culture of change. By the early decades of the twentieth century, most
urban development in the United States took place under this system of private land use
planning which aimed to secure, if not permanence, at least a degree of stability in the
newly-made urban environment.
What of the existing urban environment, already built and thus beyond the reach of
deed restrictions? How could Bostonians save the parts they valued of the city they
already had?
use of deed restrictions by the subdividers of the country really gave birth to the idea of zoning"
('Developer's View of Deed Restrictions,' 142).
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CHAPTER FIVE:
Preservation
Why does Boston differ from Chicago? Why do we differ here from Cincinnati?
.... If in addition to the loss of the house where Benjamin Franklin was born, the
old Hancock residence, and the Brattle Street Church, you shall add the Old State
House, which has already been desecrated and half its sanctity destroyed, the Old
South, and Faneuil Hall, then what have you, Bostonians, left in any sense
different from any city that has sprung up within the last twenty years?
Rev. William H. H. Murray, at the Old South Church, 18761
These monumental buildings are Boston's ancestral jewels, held in trust by us, to
be handed down to our posterity.
Rev. James Freeman Clarke, 18722
Historic monuments
In the years after the Hancock house fell in 1863, Bostonians experienced further
losses of prominent old buildings, mostly as churches took their places in the migration
to the Back Bay. Brattle Square Church acquired its new site in 1867; Trinity Church in
1870 began preparing to move, although the congregation still held services in its old
downtown building until the Great Fire consumed it in November of 1872. Both these
moves aroused opposition, but both went ahead anyway. "[F]or the last few years
nearly all of the older churches have been on a stampede after their worshippers," said
the Christian Register in 1871. "[S]oon the Old South will be the only reminder, in the
1Quoted in Everett Watson, History of the Old South Meetinghouse in Boston (Boston, 1877), 96.
2Boston Globe, December 9, 1872: 1.
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heart of the city, of the church edifices of a former generation." 3 The greatest American
preservation effort of the nineteenth century, and the one which brought preservation to
the cities, began when the Old South Church congregation decided that it too would
follow its worshippers to the Back Bay.
The Old South dated from 1729, a large brick barn of a building whose plainness
made it architecturally fit the old puritan term 'meeting-house' better than 'church.' 4 It
had been the largest assembly space in provincial Boston and the town used it for
public meetings that would not fit in Faneuil Hall; from this fact its historical
significance flowed more or less automatically. It was said to be the second richest
church in the United States, after Trinity in New York. The Old South combined a
prominent congregation and a venerable structure, as did for example Brattle Square
Church, but also had a unique Revolutionary role as the site of famous orations and
gatherings such as the one which launched the Boston Tea Party. 5 It was this
combination of great age, social prominence, and historical importance, but especially
the last, which made the Old South meeting-house seem a special case, its preservation
worthy of extraordinary measures.
The effort to preserve the Old South went through three phases of successively
widening scope. First, a faction within the church sought to block its decision to move.
Then, opponents bomn wthin and outside the church challenged its right to make such a
move, in effect trying to force the congregation to take responsibility for preserving the
building. Finally, preservationists campaigned to save the building independently of the
congregation.
The Old South's organization was typical of protestant churches of the period. About
350 individuals were listed as members of the church.6 Anyone could attend Sunday
services and, member or not, had to pay 'pew rent.' The only exceptions were the 45
or so pew proprietors, who made up the voting membership of the Old South Society,
3Christian Register, August 5, 1871, quoted in Lothrop, A Discourse ... July 30, 1871, 42.
4See Detwiller, 'Thomas Dawes's Church in Brattle Square': fig. 7, 8-9.
5Boston Globe, December 4, 1872: 4; G. G. Wolkins, Freedom and the Old South Meeting-house, Old
South leaflets, no. 202 (Boston, 1945), 17.
6List of Pastors, Officers, and Members (1870).
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the corporation which for civil purposes was the church. These proprietors had each
paid a substantial fee for their right, and paid a quarterly 'pew tax' as well; they were
the more well-to-do among the congregation. The pew proprietors selected a 'standing
committee' to actively manage the society's affairs. The standing committee was
powerful indeed, for it not only took care of the society's million dollars or so of
assets, but also controlled admission to pew proprietorship. These officers, said a
contemporary observer, "are chosen mostly from a class of men who can afford to live
on the Back Bay," and in the early 1870s ten of eleven did, while for the congregation
as a whole less than a quarter lived there.7
The experience of one particular hour in 1865 convinced many in the society that it
was time to leave the old meeting-house. A national synod of Congregationalists met in
the Old South that year, but traffic noise from Washington Street drowned out the
proceedings. After the very first speaker, the participants resolved to remove to a
quieter location, deeply embarrassing their hosts.8 The following year a committee of
the church's proprietors described its neighborhood:
Business presses on all sides; and the air around this locality is corrupted by
cooking and eating houses, and other establishments about us. Washington Street
has become so crowded and unpleasant that it is hardly a suitable place for females
to walk in the evening.9
In 1869 the congregation bought a lot at Copley Square in the Back Bay. The pew
proprietors by 14 to 6 approved this purchase of land "sufficient for a house of
worship," yet they almost unanimously affirmed that the action "does not contemplate
the sale or removal of the Old South Meeting-house."1 0 How could these two votes be
7Richard Henry Dana, Jr., The Old South. Argument ... before the Committee on Parishes and
Religious Societies, November 27, 1872 (1872), 3. Dana quotes an earlier pastor of the society as
saying "he wished the funds were in the sea, for they kept people in the church whose chief object was
to administer them" (2).
8Hill, History, 521.
9April 30, 1866 report by Charles Stoddard, Loring Lothrop, Avery Plumer, and the church's two
pastors, quoted in Hill, History, 524. They were speaking of the congregation's Spring Lane chapel, on
another side of the same block; the congregation voted to give up the chapel and rent one on Beacon
Hill instead.
100ct. 19, 1869 meeting, 'Extracts from the Records of the Old South Church,' 2, in Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, Old South Society v. Crocker; Attorney General v. Old South Society
(Boston, 1874-1896), various papers bound as 1 v. [Boston Public Library].
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reconciled? Taken together, they were a compromise which meant different things to
different people. For the majority, it seemed to be a matter of timing. A new church
would be built on the lot, and the fate of the old meeting-house would be decided then.
From the beginning, the society's building committee made provisions for a complete
replacement of the old structure on the Back Bay, even though they constructed only a
chapel at first.11 The minority, said one of its members, viewed the purchase merely as
"a precautionary measure." 12 Several alternatives seemed possible. The Back Bay
chapel might be operated as a sort of satellite facility for the congregation, like the
Beacon Hill chapel it replaced, or a Sunday School the church ran in the West End.13
The size and prominence of the Copley Square property argued against such a policy,
and pointed toward the more radical alternative of partitioning the society, one half to
remain in the original meeting-house and the other to worship on the Back Bay. The
minority were fortified in their interpretations by the church's charter, which prohibited
selling or leasing the meeting house property, in accordance with the 1669 gift by
which the society acquired it.14 They questioned the religious efficacy as well as the
fairness of catering to the richest quarter rather than the bulk of the congregation and the
large transient downtown population, which the location and financial resources of the
Old South made it uniquely able to serve.
Several of the preservationist minority were already at odds with the rest of the
proprietors from an earlier controversy, and perhaps for that reason were quicker to
organize an internal opposition. Publisher Uriel Crocker, together with his son Uriel H.
Crocker, who would later propose Boston's metropolitan park system, had questioned
the church's financial management, and in 1857 the younger Crocker was deposed as
an officer of the society. 15 He spent much of the next fourteen years before the
Supreme Judicial Court arguing against the Old South. The first suit, heard between
1859 and 1866, charged that the society had systematically diverted money from its
110ld South Society, Report of Committee, June 24, 1870, 2.
12Jacob Dresser, quoted in Boston Globe, November 27 1872: 4.
13Hill, History, 507-08.
14See 'Brief for the Attorney General,' 11, in Supreme Judicial Court, Old South Society v. Crocker;
Attorney General v. Old South Society.
15Joseph Ballard, Reasons for the Appointment of a Committee, to Investigate the Prudential Affairs
of the Old South Church in Boston (Boston, 1859), 22.
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poor-relief funds to general support of the wealthy congregation. Crocker won,
although the court did not find the amounts involved as large as he claimed. 16 During
this period he evidently found it uncomfortable to worship at the Old South, and joined
the West Church, apparently considering the move temporary. After he won the
decision against Old South's management, the society in 1870 took the unprecedented
step of expelling him and confiscating his valuable pew rights.17 The episode is
significant both for its acrimony and for the fact that, like the issue of preserving the old
meetinghouse, the earlier complaint involved a perceived failure of the society in its
duty to the community.
Despite the charter's prohibition of selling the old meeting-house, the Old South
standing committee informally entertained offers for the property. The Boston Board of
Trade in 1869 asked to buy the land for a proposed Union Merchants' Exchange, and
even released a rendering for the building at that site. In April, 1872, the society voted
to ask the legislature for authority to dispose of the property, but they were too late for
action in that year's session. 18
That November, the Great Fire destroyed the city around the Old South, and firemen
worked hard to keep the flames from the meetinghouse itself. Many of the church's
proprietors, wrote Bostonian Charles Francis Adams in The Nation, "by no means
regard this as a matter for felicitation," 19 as they saw the smoking ruins of nearby
Trinity Church end any opposition to that congregation's relocation. They found
another way to take advantage of the fire. The city commandeered the Old South to
quarter troops guarding the burnt district, and several burnt-out businesses sought to
use the meeting-house as temporary accommodations when it became available. Almost
as soon as the fire was out, the standing committee announced that the post office
wanted the Old South as emergency quarters; this use was perhaps the most essential
they could have proposed and the one best calculated to win legislative approval. Their
16Attorney General v. Old South Society in Boston, 95 Mass. 474 (1866).
17Crocker v. Old South Society in Boston, 106 Mass. 489 (1871). This time the church won.
18Hill, History, 527-529.
19[Charles Francis Adams], 'The Fate of an Historic Edifice,' The Nation 15 (November 28, 1872):
346.
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petition to the legislature was not limited to post office use, however, nor to leasing the
building; they asked for the removal of all restrictions on disposal of the property.20
A hundred of the church's members and nineteen of its proprietors - only twenty-one
had voted for the post office lease - asked the legislature to deny the request, as did
other opponents from all around New England.21 These remonstrants were represented
by Richard Henry Dana, Jr., former U.S. Attorney for Boston, whose testimony set
many of the arguments which would remain constant throughout the rest of the
controversy. Even though the campaign had now entered its public phase, it was still
framed largely as a question of interests within the religious society itself. The
question, said one legislator, was simply whether "the Lord could not afford to own a
respectable corner lot."22
But the campaign also considered the meeting-house as an historical monument, and
the institution of the Old South Society as a custodian in the larger public interest.
"Here are some twoscore persons," wrote Charles Francis Adams of the pew-
proprietors,
who, by mere accident, find themselves the trustees of an edifice of first-class
historical interest. Instead of jealously guarding and preserving it, they are wholly
unable to see anything but the inconvenience to themselves and their families of
attending religious services in it once a week.23
The standing committee vehemently objected to this view of their responsibility.
There was "no sense in having such a sentimental veneration for bricks and mortar,"
testified Deacon Charles Stoddard, "for even if the British did do something or other in
the church, that was nothing to do with the work of Christ."24 Stoddard said that he
had fought the placing of an historical tablet on the wall, and Reverend Jacob M.
20Hill, History, 528; Dana, Argument, 3.
21Dana, Argument, 2-3.
22Boston Globe, December 3, 1872: 4.
23[Adams], 'Fate of an Historic Edifice,' 347.
24Boston Globe, 23 Nov. 1872: 4.
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Manning, who before the relocation project arose had fostered historical appreciation of
the building, told his congregation that it now threatened to "bring us into bondage."25
The Old South's defenders made almost no mention of the building as an architectural
or visual landmark. They almost ostentatously disdained its appearance; as the Globe
reported:
No enthusiasm for the preservation of the old structure could ever throw a glamour
of beauty about the severely plain, rectangular building, its curious spire, or the
odd-looking weather vane which surmounted it. Only historic associations could
make the structure so interesting to the people of New England and of the nation. 26
"They say the Old South is Ugly!" said reformer and orator Wendell Phillips. "I should
be ashamed to know whether it is ugly or handsome. Does a man love his mother
because she is handsome?" 27 If the sight of the church was ever mentioned as a reason
for saving it, it was as a daily reminder of higher values within the mundane
atmosphere of Boston's business district.
At the same proprietors' meeting which approved the post office lease, the society
also voted to offer the meetinghouse for sale to the Massachusetts Historical Society,
for its market value to be determined by appraisal. The historical society's executive
committee answered that it could not possibly afford the building, although it would be
happy to act as a custodian if someone were to contribute the purchase price. Individual
members of the majority offered 25 to 30 thousand dollars toward the cost, feeling a
personal responsibility that they did not feel the church as an institution shared.28 But
neither the historical society nor anyone else attempted to raise the additional hundreds
of thousands of dollars which would be necessary to meet the terms of this offer.
The legislature approved not the complete release the society sought, but only the
actual two-year lease to the U.S. government for the post office.29 The Old South
moved services to its Copley Square chapel in spring of 1873, voting that "for all
25Sermon, May 2, 1869, quoted in Hill, History, 525.
26Boston Globe, June 24, 1876: 1.
27Massachusetts General Court, Committee on Federal Relations, Hearing, 31.
28
'Extracts from the Records,' 6, in Supreme Judicial Court, Old South Society v. Crocker; Attorney
General v. Old South Society, Hill, History, 530-3 1.
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purposes it shall be the meeting-house of the Old South Church."30 Over the objections
of its preservationist pew-holders, the society began constructing a $450,000 church
there.31 Then, in 1874, when the post office lease was half over and the new church
was rising in the Back Bay, the society renewed its application for a complete release to
dispose of the building. The legislature finally sidestepped the contentious issue by
passing jurisdiction to the Supreme Judicial Court. 32
The court in the summer of 1875 heard arguments on the society's right to sell the
meetinghouse. A preliminary decision in October of that year seemed to favor the
building's preservation; the court held that a majority vote of the proprietors was not
alone sufficient for the its sale and destruction, but that the society also had to
demonstrate that the minority's interests were not unreasonably compromised by the
action.33 Once again the issue would be treated as a religious matter internal to the Old
South Society. The Society dedicated its new church in December of 1875.34 The
following spring, the court heard the second half of the case. The justices, noting that
the law did not permit them to take into account "regrets ... at the probable removal of a
building surrounded by so many patriotic and historical associations," on May 8, 1876,
granted the Old South Society permission to dispose of its meetinghouse. 35
As soon as the decree was finalized, the society advertised for sale:
All the materials above the level of the sidewalks ... The spire is covered with
copper, and there is a lot of lead on roof and belfry, and the roof is covered with
imported old Welch slate. 60 days will be allowed for the removal.
Terms cash.36
29Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1872, Special session, Acts ch. 368.
30Hill, History, 531.
310ld South v. Crocker, 119 Mass. 1 (1875), at 7.
32Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1874, Acts ch. 120.
3301d South v. Crocker, 119 Mass. 1.
34Hill, History, 547.
350ld South Society v. Crocker. This decision was not published in the Massachusetts Reports, but
appears in Transactions of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts 3 (1896): 264-67; quote on 267.
36Wolkins, Freedom and the Old South, 24-25.
148
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
1716-A Br
149
TH&E OSD SoUTH TumpHTh.
AMERICAN 
-
-- PEOPLE -
Itieh Ridi.e School. A. Worshipped in for a Century. and Handled 1876-The "Preservation" Proposed.or what
Down to Us for Preservatlon. Will be if the fsorts upon Public Spirited
Citizens are Not Successful.
fig. 5.1. 'The Old South Church.' Political cartoon, Boston Globe, June 24, 1876.
On Thursday, June 8, 1876, auctioneer Samuel Hatch, who had earlier presided over
disposal of the Hancock house, announced in the Old South that "This ancient structure
has done its work. Time is no respector of persons or of buildings,"37 and opened
bidding which reached only $1350. On Saturday, the purchaser began dismantling the
steeple of the meetinghouse as salvage.38
The following day, the third and most extraordinary phase of the Old South
preservation effort began as George W. Simmons & Son, proprietors of Boston's 'Oak
Hall' clothing store, secured a seven day delay in the demolition. Simmons hung from
the steeple a banner reading:
THE ELEVENTH HOUR!
MEN AND WOMEN OF MASSACHUSETTS!
Does Boston desire the humiliation which is to-day a part of her history since she
had allowed this memorial to be sold under the hammer?
SHALL THE OLD SOUTH BE SAVED?
37Boston Globe, June 9, 1876: 2.
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We have bought the right to hold this building uninjured for seven days, and will be
conditionally responsible for raising the last $100,000 to complete its purchase.
G. W. Simmons & Son, Oak Hall, Boston. 39
At noon on Wednesday, June 14, Bostonians crammed the building for a mass
meeting at which Wendell Phillips, according to one of his listeners, "spoke as if
pleading for the life of one condemned unjustly."40 The issue was no longer one of
religion, but of secular historical significance. Phillips invoked the national centennial
and challenged the idea of monuments which had prevailed among Bostonians for
generations.
The saving of this landmark is the best monument you can erect to the men of the
Revolution. You spend $40,000 here, and $20,000 there, to put up a statue of
some old hero .... But what is a statue of Cicero compared to standing where your
voice echoes from pillar and wall that actually heard his Phillippics? ... Shall we
tear in pieces the roof that actually trembled to the words which made us a nation?41
The meeting appointed a committee, chaired by Governor Alexander Rice, to appeal
for funds and negotiate the building's preservation. They obtained a month's extension
on the structure's stay of execution, and asked the Old South's standing committee for
a lease on the underlying land and an agreement to sell it for a value to be fixed by
appraisal, as in the offer to the historical society. The church's officers waited to
respond on the day before demolition was to resume. They withdrew the offer to the
historical society; the price of the land was $420,000, to be paid in cash in two months.
They expressed skepticism that the preservation committee would raise it, and required
that the committee agree in writing "that if at the expiration of the time above fixed ...
you are unable to purchase the property on the terms proposed, you will not ask us for
any further extension of time." 42 They pointed out that they had generously refrained
from asking any rent for the building in the interim. "[T]he society," wrote The
Commonwealth, "does not mean that two edifices bearing the name of 'Old South'
38Boston Globe, June 10, 1876: 4.
39Burdett, History, 89.
40Burdett, History, 90. Directors of the Old South Work, The Old South Meeting House, Old South
leaflets no. 183, 15, quotes Burdett as "one who was present."
4101d South Meeting House, Old South leaflets no. 183, 7.
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fig. 5.2. The Old South meeting-house during fundraising efforts, 1876.
42Quoted in Boston Globe, July 14, 1876: 4.
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shall stand at the same time in the city of Boston - one to be a continual reminder of the
unpatriotic course of the controllers of the other!"43 Clearly it was unwilling to become
the de facto funder of the building's preservation by holding it off the market
indefinitely.
Despite the roster of male speakers and committee members, it was the women of
Boston who did most of the work toward saving the Old South.44 The fundraising,
which totalled $60,000 in its first month, was largely carried out by women
canvassers. While the preservation committee wrangled with the church society over
the land, twenty women on July 19 spent $3,500 to buy the structure itself from the
salvage contractor. They engaged architects to prepare plans for moving and
reconstructing the building, if necessary. They proposed to acquire as its new site a
vacant lot opposite the new Old South Church at Copley Square, "in which case,"
wrote the Globe, "rumor states that an injunction restraining the erection of the ancient
edifice will be applied for by the Old South Society."45
Purchase of the structure energized the preservation effort, but the sum of money
required was enormous. Preservationists appealed to the city for financial assistance,
but the society's short deadline fell before the City Council would reconvene in the
fall.4 6
Once again, the Old South was rescued by a woman. The building's purchase, and
the contingency planning for moving it, had been organized by Mary Hemenway,
whose husband, Augustus Hemenway, perhaps the richest man in New England, had
died just a month before leaving an estate valued at fifteen million dollars.47 She had
long been active as an educational reformer and philanthropist; in later years she would
43Quoted in Boston Globe, July 8, 1876: 4.
44Already at the first mass meeting on June 14, journalist Curtis Guild spoke "highly commending the
part women took in such movements," according to Burdett (History, 97), in apparent reference to the
preservation of Mount Vernon.
45Boston Globe, July 19, 1876: 2; Boston Globe, July 20, 1876: 5. This rumor, said the chairman of
the standing committee, was "a lie"; Boston Globe, July 27, 1876: 5.
46Boston Globe, July 15, 1876: 8.
47Boston Globe, June 19, 1876: 2; Boston Globe, July 13, 1876: 4.
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fund archaeological exploration of the American west.48 Shortly before the standing
committee's immovable deadline, she anonymously offered $100,000 to the
preservation effort. Together with a $225,000 mortgage previously arranged with the
New England Mutual Life Insurance Company, and a reduction in the price to
$400,000, the Old South was saved, at least for awhile.49
A trustee for the preservation committee took title to the property on October 11,
1876. The Old South Society, which had not been so concerned about the building's
future when it was sold for salvage, was considerably more concerned now that it
appeared that it could continue to stand. The sale was subject to the condition
that said building shall not at any time during the period of thirty years ... be used
for any business or commerical purpose, and shall be used during said period for
historical and memorial purposes only, and that it shall not at any time during said
period be used for any purpose whatever on Sunday, ... and in case of breach of
the foregoing conditions or any of them, said building shall be forfeited to said Old
South Society in Boston, and said Old South Society in Boston reserves the right to
enter for breach of condition and enforce said forfeiture, and take down and remove
said building, 50
The church, its attorneys later explained, had no objection to selling the building to the
Massachusetts Historical Society without such draconian conditions, but "It was a very
different question whether it should pass into the control of men who, by reason of
successive defeats in the Courts or other reasons, had become unfriendly to the
interests of the Society."51
The preservation committee asked the 1877 legislature to incorporate and exempt
from taxes an 'Old South Association' as a permanent custodian for the building. The
incorporation bill delegated eminent domain powers to the association, specifically to
remove the odious condition in its deed. Some legislators opposed this provision, both
on the grounds that it was a high-handed breach of contract and that historic
preservation was not a public purpose for which eminent domain could legitimately be
48Dictionary of American Biography, 518-519.
49Boston Globe, October 14, 1876: 2.
50Quoted in Hill, History, 544.
5101d South Society, To the Legislature of Massachusetts. Answer to the Reply of Petitioners to the
Remonstrance of the Old South Society [1877], 3.
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used. The bill passed by 176 to 30 after John D. Long, past speaker of the
Massachusetts House and one of the charter directors of the association, explained to
the legislature that, far from being a contract freely entered, the society's terms were
nothing short of ransom. "As they have not done equity," he said, "they have no right
to expect equity." Long urged his former colleagues to pass the bill in order to end a
"miserable squabble" which had now occupied the city for years.52
The campaign to save the Old South was not at an end, however, because the
building was still encumbered by a $225,000 mortgage. The preservation committee in
1877 sought, along with eminent domain and tax exemption, a state appropriation of
$25,000, but 241 petitioners, many of them business firms, opposed the expenditure
because of the need for "strict economy" in that depression year. As far as can be
discerned, not a single woman signed this remonstrance, although at least one of the
petitioners was the father and two were husbands of women on the preservation
committee.53 The legislature dropped the approriation from the bill before it passed.
The following year, the Old South Association came back to ask $50,000, and both
supporters and opponents gave more energy to the question. During the two years of
deepest depression Americans had yet experienced, more than 50,000 people from
around the nation had contributed over $230,000 to the preservation effort.m A
succession of fairs, balls, and other fundraising events for the Old South were raising
diminishing amounts of money while hurting the rest of Boston's charities. "We ask
this aid," said lawyer George 0. Shattuck for the association, "because we need it."55
Opponents cited not only the state's fiscal condition, but also the danger of setting a
52Boston Globe, April 26, 1877: 2; April 27, 1877: 2; Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1877, Acts
ch. 222. After winning this battle, the Old South Association did not actually use the building on
Sundays. "Should anything be attempted at any time in the future under the sanctions of this law,"
warned Hamilton Andrews Hill in the congregation's official history in 1890, "it will, of course, be
competent to the Old South Society to take measures to test the question of its constitutionality" (Hill,
History, 546).
530ne of the business firms was New England Mutual Life Insurance Company, which held the
mortgage on the property. Another signatory was Avery Plumer, a member of the Old South church
standing committee. Mrs. Henry Warren Paine and Mrs. Arthur T. Lyman, both of whose husbands
signed the petition, were on the Preservation Committee; Mrs. Lyman's father was John Amory
Lowell, another petitioner against the appropriation. Massachusetts State Archives, legislative
documents, Acts 1877, ch. 222.
54Massachusetts General Court, Committee on Federal Relations, Hearing, 5,7.
55
'Massachusetts General Court, Committee on Federal Relations, Hearing, 9.
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precedent for historic preservation as a new category of public spending.56 The
legislature voted $10,000 to be paid only when the remainder of the money was raised
from other sources. 57 The Old South Association continued for years arranging
festivities and exhibitions, slowly paying down its mortgage.
The preservation of the Old South had to overcome not only practical difficulties, but
philosophical ones as well. When Bostonians set out to save it, they had little coherent
idea of what to do with it. In general, it was to be an historic monument, like the
Bunker Hill column, but unlike a column or a statue the meetinghouse was an
accessible and usable structure, now without an assigned use. At the first mass meeting
in 1876, Wendell Phillips suggested it be made into a "mechanics' exchange," in
recognition of the role of the working men of Boston in the revolution. Reverend
William H. H. Murray said "I would, had I my wish, make this building a Westminster
Abbey," complete with busts of American patriots. A group of Boston antiquarians
began preparations for an historical museum which they hoped would occupy the
building, although nothing immediately came from the effort.58
Instead, fundraising itself became the building's use. Twenty-five cents gained
admission to view a rotating exhibit of revolutionary relics, described for the New York
Graphic by one British visitor:
Ancient tongs, pokers, cradles, bed-quilts, andirons, stew-pans, old hats, old
shoes, old breeches which bled and 'fit into' the Revolution. Pewter plate General
Washington once ate from. Verified by inscription on plate. ... A wasp's nest. One
of Lady Washington's old shoes. Buttons off Washington's coat never sewed on
by Lady Washington. ... Silk banner inscribed 'The Hero of Tippecanoe.' No
explanations. Boston children leaving with impression that this relic of the Harrison
campaign of 1845 [sic] was carried during the revolution. ... Nut crackers of the
times which tried men's souls. 59
The Old South had become a "side show," complained the Boston Globe. "There is still
room, however, for a fat lady."6 In time its uses came to be more noticeably
56
'Massachusetts General Court, Committee on Federal Relations, Hearing, 43.
57Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1878, Resolves ch. 26.
58Burdett, History, 95-96; Boston Globe, August 22, 1876: 5.
59Quoted in Boston Evening Transcript, January 28, 1880: 4.
60Boston Globe, June 21, 1878: 4.
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educational, with the beginning in 1883 of an historical lecture series later endowed by
Mary Hemenway.61
The Old South effort set precedents for how to achieve environmental permanence.
During the several years of the preservation campaign, Bostonians explored every
avenue for saving the building, from the institutional custodianship on which they had
implicitly relied, to action by the state, city, and existing historical organizations, and
finally ad hoc private effort. Because of the Hancock house, they were already skeptical
of the efficacy of public action for preserving landmarks, and the Old South campaign
reinforced that skepticism. For the next generation or so of preservation in New
England, the Old South set a precedent of privately organized, privately funded effort
directed toward a single immediate end.
The greatest significance of the Old South campaign was that, despite overwhelming
odds, it worked. The building occupied some of the most valuable real estate in
America; its owners were hostile to its continued existence; demolition had actually
begun before the preservation effort started. Yet it was saved. Here was a case, given
tremendous nationwide attention, where for one part of the urban environment change
was not the answer. Permanence was, and a community took action to achieve it.
Americans looked around themselves with new eyes: if the Old South could be saved,
anything could.
One of the first significant by-products of the Old South's preservation was to alter
the context for debate about the future of the nearby Old State House. Most Bostonians
agreed that the Old South was the more important of the two buildings. As demolition
of the Old South began, one scheme called for commemorating it by re-erecting its
clock in a tower "on the site of the Old State House," according to the Globe, "when
that crumbling structure shall have been removed." 62 But once the Old South was out
of danger, the Evening Transcript noted that the Old State House "does not require
61Edwin D. Mead, The Old South Historical Work (Boston, 1887); Old South Association, The Old
South Association in Boston. List of Officers, members, Committees (Boston, 1912), 17-24.
62Boston Globe, June 13, 1876: 4.
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redemption from other hands, but is already the property of the people, and therefore
can easily be preserved."63 The issues involved in the two cases were very different.
The claims against the Old State House were not financial, but functional; it stood in the
middle of what its detractors thought should be an unobstructed wide street. In
addition, while the Old South had been maintained more or less faithfully by its
proprietors, the Old State House had been abused by commercial tenants throughout
most of the nineteenth century (fig. 5.3.), and thus it raised curatorial issues of material
integrity and restoration.
In a city where the prefix 'old' had plenty of work to do, the Old State House was old
indeed. Its exterior walls dated from 1712; the rest of the building was rebuilt after a
fire in 1747. It was the seat of government in Massachusetts until 1798, when that
function was transferred to the new state house on Beacon Hill designed by Charles
Bulfinch. For some years it deteriorated in commercial tenancy, leading up to the 1826
proposal that it be removed; instead, it was renovated for use as a city hall from 1830 to
1841, after which it was again crammed with as many as fifty tenants.64 The Old State
House in its heyday had been an imposing presence at the head of present-day State
Street, appropriately ostentatious for the representatives of empire in one of its most
prosperous colonies. By the early 1870s, a contemporary observer reported that
its external and internal appearance has been so changed that it would be a mistake
to allow sentimental considerations to delay its demolition, for the climax of
incongruity was capped when after every vestige of its original internal
arrangements had yielded to the encroachments of business, a French roof was put
on the sturdy old Britisher. James Otis himself, in a Parisian bonnet and chignon,
could hardly have been more of a surprise to his companions than the old State
House in its new attire. When a historic memorial is so altered that its identity is
lost, the lover of the past is repelled by the attempt to combine essentially
inharmonious characteristics, and would prefer demolition to disfigurement. 65
In 1876 the building's leases expired, and the Board of Aldermen ominously referred
the question of their renewal not to the Committee on Public Buildings, but to the
63Boston Evening Transcript, June 1, 1881: 4.
64Chase, 'Old State House,' 31-49; Elizabeth Reed Amadon, Old State House. Historical Report
(Boston, 1970).
65Boston Globe, May 28, 1872: 4.
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Committee on Streets.66 Alderman John T. Clark, who had presided at the Old South
preservation meeting on June 14,67 voted less than two weeks later in favor of
demolishing the Old State House. "[I]f the Old South stood in the way of a necessary
improvement of the public street," according to a newspaper account of his comments,
"he should be in favor of its removal."6s A resident of Chicago, feeling its acute
shortage of structures more than five years old, suggested buying the building and re-
: THE OLD STATE HOUSE
fig. 5.3. 'The Old State House: As It Is.' An 1876 drawing made as part of the
preservation effort. Signs cover much of the building's exterior, a mansard roof has
been added to increase rentable space. At left, a portico added in 1830 projects into
traffic. At right is the Sears Building, a recently-built office block.
66Boston Globe, February 22, 1876: 2.
67Boston Globe, June 15, 1876: 2. Clark's arguments in favor of preserving the Old South were
clearly meant to distinguish the two cases: "It has never been prostituted to the use of traffic or gain
only once in its history, and then in an emergency such as was never before known in the history of
the city, and which we trust we shall never again know, nor has it been used except for the purpose of
sacred worshiIts retention will not interfere with public improvements, as there is room enough to
move it back when the time comes for the widening of the street."
68Boston Globe, June 27, 1876: 8.
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erect it there.69 Out of some sense of historical considerations, but mainly for financial
reasons, the city government decided merely to remove a portico which projected most
seriously into the traffic, and renew the tenants' leases for five years.
Those five years encompassed the whole public phase of the Old South campaign,
and by the time they had passed there was little chance of the newly preservation-
conscious city letting this other conspicuous landmark fall. City Registrar and
Commissioner of Public Records William H. Whitmore had worked on the Old South
effort, and decided to devote himself next to saving the Old State House. In 1876, he
had requested that his department be moved to it, but the request was ignored.70 In
1879, as an indirect offshoot of earlier efforts to organize an historical museum in the
Old South, Whitmore helped organize the Boston Antiquarian Club, later renamed the
Bostonian Society. 71 Its first president, Samuel M. Quincy, said that its purposes were
"to aid the historian in his work, and in preserving intact the monuments of past times";
it quickly resolved to fight for the Old State House. 72 Whitmore, meanwhile, won
election to presidency of the Common Council, and in 1880 he persuaded his fellow
councillors that the Old State House should be added to Faneuil Hall and the Common
as an inviolable property of the municipality. The Board of Aldermen did not concur,
so this request did not come before the legislature,73 but opposition had more to do
with avoiding state interference than with any remaining desire to get rid of the
building.
At the end of the new leases in 1881 Whitmore sought to eject the tenants in order to
use the building for municipal offices. He secured an appropriation of $35,000 to
restore it, which he cheerfully admitted was his main goal. "I hope that in the course of
another ten or twenty years our successors will go beyond that," he said. "I hope the
time will come when public convenience will allow the removal of the public offices
69Curtis Guild, Sr., President's Address, Proceedings of the Bostonian Society at its Twenty-third
Annual Meeting, January 12, 1904 (Boston, 1904), 7.
70Boston Globe, June 16, 1876: 2.
7 1The earlier 'Historical Commission' lapsed into inactivity; most of the same people, including
Whitmore, were involved three years later in organizing the Antiquarian Club; Boston Globe, August
22, 1876: 5; Boston Evening Transcript, June 19, 1879: 1.
72Boston Evening Transcript, January 14, 1880: 1; February 11, 1880: 1.
73Boston Evening Transcript, January 16, 1880: 2; January 20, 1880: 3.
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from the building .... When that time comes I feel sure that the greatly enlarged city of
Boston will thank us for having preserved the opportunity for it to establish a city
museum."74
Downtown real estate interests sought to reverse this decision so that the building
could be removed as a traffic improvement. Their cause, a long shot to begin with, was
entirely lost when the largest landowners in the area, including Joshua M. Sears whose
Sears Building was across the street, publicly sided with the preservationists. But
Whitmore's plan was more vulnerable to criticism on economic grounds, especially
after a bank offered to restore the building at its own expense and pay the city more rent
than it had been receiving. The Board of Aldermen and even Whitmore's own Common
Council reversed themselves to favor this private-sector form of preservation. At least
one newspaper endorsed it precisely because it was private. "There is nothing about the
appointments of a first-class banking house," wrote the Globe, "that could in any way
offend the most fastidious sense, and this cannot be said of some of the city
departments which it is proposed to locate there." 75 Whitmore denounced the proposal,
claiming that the bank's plans were tantamount to destroying the building. Whitmore
eventually secured a compromise in which the building's lower floors would still be
leased, but the city would restore the exterior and the upper-story assembly halls "as
memorial halls, to be always accessible to the public." 76 The Bostonian Society was
granted possession as custodian of these rooms.
Restoration of the Old State House, carried out by city architect George A. Clough
working under Whitmore's direction, aimed to bring the building's exterior and interior
"as nearly as possible to their appearance when used by the Legislature."77 This was
exactly the brand of restoration to an earlier period that Ruskin opposed as a "lie," and
Bostonians made similar objections. "[S]o far as the interior is concerned we cannot
make it a relic," said one Common Council member, "We can only make an imitation.
74Boston Evening Transcript, June 10, 1881: 2.
75Boston Globe, June 19, 1881, quoted in Boston Evening Transcript, June 21, 1881: 2.
76Boston Evening Transcript, June 24, 1881: 3; June 18, 1881: 4.
77Boston Evening Transcript, June 24, 1881: 3. Before beginning work, Clough in a letter to
Whitmore referred to "the restoring of the outside walls to conform with its original outline and
appearance as shown by your sketches" (Boston Evening Transcript, June 24, 1881: 2).
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It will be a spurious relic.'os When the project was completed in 1882, Whitmore's
committee report reinforced this view when it said that "the antiquarian part" of the
work, on the second floor, "has cost considerable money, but there every part of the
finish had to be constructed afresh." 79 The restoration became the subject of bitter
debate for years after it was completed. A recent preservation report on the building
concludes that by Whitmore and Clough's work, "the entire interior of the building was
restored faithfully - back to the 1830 reconstruction" for a city hall, which they
mistakenly identified as its original form.so
Both the Old South and the Old State House were saved for their historical
associations rather than their architectural qualities; they were monuments rather than
landmarks. Each presented awkward conceptual problems of just what its use was to
be. They were exceptions from the utilitarian calculus by which the culture of change
still prevailed in the business center around them, even if it was losing its hold in some
residential neighborhoods. The Ruskinian premium on visible antiquity was not an
important motivation for saving these buildings; neither of them was valued for its
contribution to the visible cityscape. Another contemporary preservation cause,
however, had everything to do with the appearance of the city, through protection not
of historical monuments, but of the city's old public landscapes, its burial grounds and
especially its Common.
78Boston Evening Transcript, May 27, 1881: 2.
79Boston City Council, Re-dedication of the Old State House, Boston, July 11, 1882, 5th ed.
(Boston, 1889), 158.
80Amadon, Old State House, 10; George Henry Moore, Prytaneum bostoniense. Examination of Mr.
William H. Whitmore's Old State House Memorial and reply to his appendix N, 2d ed. (Boston,
1887); William Henry Whitmore, The Old State House defended from unfounded attacks upon its
integrity. Being a reply to Dr. G. H. Moore's second paper.... (Boston, 1886).
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The urban landscape
The Common was a truly permanent feature of Boston, more permanent than any
structure or street or other public space. Actually getting rid of the Common was
unthinkable, yet in the late nineteenth century, Bostonians found an increasing need to
defend it. The threats came from differing definitions of what the Common was, the
essence which was to be presumed permanent.
The Common's presumption of permanence dates from a 1640 town meeting vote
that "there shall be no land granted either for houseplot or garden to any person out of
the open ground or common field."81 When the 1822 city charter denied the municipal
government power to sell or lease the Common, contemporary legal opinion held that it
was merely recognizing a status which already existed because of this vote and two
centuries of dedication to public use.82 But what public uses?
In the seventeenth century, the Common was a common pasture for cows and sheep,
and sometimes a site for executions and for burials. In the eighteenth century militias
drilled and revivalists preached there, as the cows looked on. From 1768 to 1776, the
British troops who occupied Boston mainly occupied the Common. The first of many
committees "for the preservation of the Common" was appointed by the town selectmen
in 1769 because of the troops' wear and tear on the pasturage; as hostilities grew
imminent the damage was multiplied when they threw up earthen fortifications. The
townspeople in the early eighteenth century had inaugurated a more urban use of the
Common by planting a 'mall' along Tremont Street, a double row of trees where "every
afternoon, after drinking tea, the gentlemen and ladies walk," according to an English
visitor.83 The occupying troops cut these trees for firewood, but Bostonians planted
new ones, including some set out by John Hancock opposite his Beacon Street house,
81Boston City Council, Committee on Common and Public Grounds. Evidence taken at the hearing...
on the petition of the Mass. Charitable Mechanics Association, for leave to erect a building on Boston
Common (City doc. 26, 1877), 38.
82J. Mason and Franklin Dexter, Legal opinion ... on the title of Boston Common (Boston, 1843).
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so that by the 1830s each perimeter street had its own mall. A guide published in 1821
included a table by which proto-joggers could calculate their speed "by the time taken to
pass the long Mall" on Tremont Street.84 As paths and trees began to invade the
Common's interior, they conflicted with earlier uses; the militia were confined to an
ever-smaller treeless plain, and in 1836, "dangerous accidents having occurred to
promenaders," the anachronistic cows were banished altogether.85 By the 1860s,
baseball games had largely superseded the militia in the remaining open tracts. The
Common held open-air meetings, fireworks, festivals of every sort, and from 1863 to
1882 even a 'deer park' - a sort of petting zoo. 86 It was, in other words, a thoroughly
miscellaneous urban public ground shaped in the years before American cities self-
consciously built parks.
The parks movement complicated Bostonians' understanding of their Common. It
provided a coherent definition of urban open space, but its definition excluded many of
the Common's past functions. The presumed permanence of park landscapes conflicted
with the Common's tradition of continuing adaptability. For more than two centuries it
had been an open-ended community resource. It was space available for the new game
of baseball, but it was also space available for exhibits of industrial products in the
early nineteenth century and for army recruiting centers during the Civil War. If the
Common's essence was its common-ness, then such uses were no less appropriate than
promenading. The Common was set aside, the editors of the Globe said in 1877, to be
employed "for public uses. To hold that these employments are to consist in walking,
playing and breathing upon it would be to greatly restrict its benefit."87 But if the
Common's permanent essence was as open space, as the parks movement now defined
it, then its uses should indeed be restricted to "walking, playing, and breathing."
83Joseph Bennett, 1740, quoted in M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Boston Common: Scenesfrom Four
Centuries (Boston, 1921), 26; 34, 38.
"John G. Hales, Survey of Boston and Its Vicinity (1821), quoted in Howe, Boston Common, 57;
39-42.
85Boston Globe, May 13, 1873: 8.
86Howe, Boston Common, 57.
87Boston Globe, February 13, 1877: 4; Boston City Council, Hearing on the Charitable Mechanics
building, 72; Howe, Boston Common, 62-63.
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As the city grew in size and density, the inherent conflict between the Common's
roles as open space and as available space grew in intensity. More new uses arose
which could not be accommodated elsewhere. In 1863 the city council considered but
rejected moving the John Hancock house there, noting that "there are prejudices,
perhaps well grounded, against erections of any description on the Common."88
Temporary structures were a more difficult issue. The promoters of a 'Peace Jubilee'
after the Civil War sought and received permission to erect a temporary 'Coliseum' on
the Common, but their project drew such vehement protests that they elected to build on
the Back Bay instead. After the Fire, there was even opposition to the City Council's
offer of space on the malls to accommodate businesses while they rebuilt, and no
merchants took advantage of it.89
These conflicts reached a crisis in 1877, in a proposal for a temporary exhibition hall
for the triennial industrial exhibition of the Charitable Mechanic Association, a
venerable fraternal organization which had promoted Massachusetts industry since the
eighteenth century. The mechanics' exhibitions had outgrown their traditional sites in
Faneuil Hall and Quincy Market; the example of the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition,
together with the desire to spur the economy at the depths of a depression, led to an
ambitious scheme to erect a 600-foot long crystal palace on the Common's playing
fields. "It was for such purposes that the Common was kept," said Edward Everett
Hale, a staunch defender of Boston traditions. "... I do not see the distinction between
putting a canvas tent on it for a week, and showing azalias under it, and making a tent
of iron and glass, and keeping it up a month." 90
The mechanics' proposal was squarely within the tradition of treating the Common as
available space. As the association's representative explained it, "[w]e simply want to
have the use, for a short period, of a small portion of a large tract of unused land."91
To serve the city as it was meant to, explained another member, the exhibition hall
88Boston City Council, Preservation of the Hancock House, 11.
89Howe, Boston Common, 67; Boston Globe, November 12, 1872: 4; November 14, 1872: 4;
November 15, 1872: 8.
90Boston City Council, Hearing on the Charitable Mechanics building, 15.
91Charles W. Slack in Boston City Council, Hearing on the Charitable Mechanics building, 65.
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needed to be located in a convenient and central place, and "[tihis is altogether the most
central place of any that I know of."92
The project's opponents, led by William H. Whitmore, numbered many people who
were active in the Old South preservation campaign. They invoked that effort in part out
of exhilaration at its recent success, momentum which they hoped to borrow for this
new cause, but also because they thought of the two issues as kindred. Like the Old
South, one said, the Common was a place of "old and sacred memories."93
Early in March the Common Council rejected the association's proposal, on the
motion of Uriel H. Crocker, the park advocate and Old South antagonist. The
mechanics, like the Peace Jubilee before them, found space at the Back Bay frontier.
The Common's defenders had petitioned the legislature, for good measure, and two
months later this effort too bore fruit in 'An Act for the Preservation of Public
Commons and Parks.' The act provided that no building greater than 600 square feet
could be erected in any public common or park in Massachusetts without the
legislature's permission, and thus converted this specific threat in Boston to a general
statewide affirmation of the permanence of parks.94 The Common's essence, it was
decided, was as open space, and no further serious attempts were made to place
substantial buildings there.
A more utilitarian threat to the Common had recently emerged, however, and was not
to go away so easily. Increasing concentration of business downtown and the need to
move tens of thousands of people in and out of it every day put a strain on
transportation facilities, more acute in Boston than in other cities because its streets
were narrow and access constricted by arms of the harbor, Beacon Hill, and the
Common. Many people whose daily paths were blocked by the Common thought that if
it was available space for community needs, there was no more pressing need than
access. The Common's irregular shape obstructed what would otherwise be the longest
92Boston City Council, Hearing on the Charitable Mechanics building, 16-17.
93Boston City Council, Hearing on the Charitable Mechanics building, 40. See also 41, 42, 57.
94Boston Globe, March 9, 1877: 4; Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1877, Acts ch. 223.
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straight street in Boston, connecting the city's most populous neighborhoods and
suburbs with the heart of downtown from Columbus Avenue to Tremont Street. The
extension of Columbus Avenue across the Common remained a vague threat never
seriously attempted, however, and a more modest corner cutting was easily defeated in
1872.95
Streetcars from all these southwesterly directions instead ran around the perimeter of
the Common to come together on its Tremont Street side. There they formed
'blockades,' or traffic jams, exacerbated by the uncoordinated operation of competing
companies on the same tracks. Many Bostonians who opposed streets across the
Common thought widening Tremont Street reasonable, and perhaps even prudent to
forestall more radical solutions. "Nobody's morning or evening walk would be much
curtailed," wrote one; "nobody's enjoyment of the grounds at all diminished."96 But
when the city council in 1874 held hearings on the idea, they found intense opposition.
Some Bostonians even insisted that any widening should come from the other, built-up
side of the street; others made early proposals for placing the streetcars underground in
a subway. "We are almost prepared to declare," the Globe editors wrote hysterically,
"that any man who should propose a diversion of any portion of the Common from the
uses to which it has been set apart should do it with a rope around his neck and a
committee of citizens at the other end!"9 7 The proposal effectively died when that year's
council election returned a majority pledged to defeat the scheme.
The following year the Common's defenders consolidated their victory in two ways,
one big and one small. The big measure was structural reform to raise the threshold for
change. "What we want," said the Globe during the Tremont Street battle, "is an
insurmountable safeguard that no committee, present or future, and no organization or
body of men can get over, giving us assurance that these grounds can never be thus
desecrated."9 8 They got it in an 1875 act of the legislature providing that neither streets
nor street railways could not be placed in any Massachusetts commons or parks more
95Boston Globe, April 10, 1872: 8.
96
'R.L.S.' letter, Boston Globe, May 28, 1874: 2.
97Boston Globe, May 23, 1874: 4; November 17, 1874: 2; 'Nauticus' letter, January 16, 1874: 5.
98Editorial, Boston Globe, May 27, 1874: 4; italics original.
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than twenty years old except by approval of city's voters.99 The idea of putting
streetcars underground in a subway had entered the discussion sufficiently that it too
was proscribed. Years later the structural impediments to change on the Common,
which already included city charter provisions, legislative acts, and the vague doctrines
of long-term public dedication, would be reinforced by yet another important safeguard:
in 1908 George F. Parkman left five million dollars to the city as an open space
endowment, contingent that "the Boston Common shall never be diverted from its
present use as a public park for the benefit and enjoyment of its citizens." 100
The small consolidation of the 1874 victory involved the physical form of the
boundary between Tremont Street and the Common. The old fence there was removed
during the hearings on street widening, and while some of the Common's friends had
favored this new openness, under the circumstances it made the Common seem less
defined and more vulnerable, as if the streetcar tracks might some night creep onto the
mall. The newly preservationist city council proposed resolving the problem with a
massive granite curb, but was persuaded instead to use a system of cast-iron fencing
which would use existing the existing post-holes and thus avoid trenching across the
roots of trees on the Tremont and Boylston malls.101 The initiator of this careful
measure was Uriel H. Crocker's brother and law partner, George G. Crocker, a young
former state legislator who had taken up the fight to preserve the Old South after his
brother had left, and who years later would become important to the fate of the
Common in bigger ways than how it was fenced.
A decade later streetcar blockades had become serious enough to prompt an attempt to
overcome the legal impediments to solving them on the Common. In 1887 the West
End Street Railway petitioned the legislature to authorize tunnelling under Beacon Hill
and elsewhere, or as an alternative, to permit on the Tremont and Boylston street malls
of the Common what we would today call a 'transit mall.' Horsecars would join
pedestrians there, separated from any other traffic, on tracks "to be laid as an
99Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1875, Acts ch. 163.
10 0Firey, Land Use in Central Boston, 145.
10 1Boston Globe, May 26, 1875: 8.
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experiment only - not to become permanent unless it shall be voted by the citizens of
Boston at the next city election." 102
The West End did not pursue either the tunnel schemes or the transit mall, and instead
alleviated congestion by consolidating Boston's entire streetcar network under a single
ownership, rationalizing operations so that blockades became once again a rarity. But
by the early 1890s increasing traffic made it clear not only that this had been a
temporary solution but also that merely widening Tremont, Boylston, and other streets,
as difficult as that would be to accomplish, would not be enough. The growing length
of suburban commutes pointed toward the more radical solution of supplementing
streetcars with some form of rapid transit. Boston suburbanites familiar with New York
or Chicago thought enviously of sailing along above the streets at twenty or thirty miles
an hour on those cities' elevated railroads. But elevateds would not work well in
Boston's narrow and crooked streets. Some suburban residents proposed solving these
problems with an elevated approach to downtown located altogether out of streets,
running instead across the Common or above the Tremont Street mall. They told the
legislature's rapid transit committee, reported the Evening Transcript, that "the
sentiment which was formerly attached to the Common had to a great extent died."1 3
They discovered, however, that affection for the Common was alive and well.
Protests rained on the legislature from as far away as Virginia, and once again women
took a particularly active preservationist role. Mayor Nathan Matthews proposed a
compromise in which the elevated would be constructed above Tremont Street, which
would then have to be widened at the expense of the mall. The West End company,
already viewed with the distrust naturally accorded to monopolies, intensified the
protests by proposing an alternative in which several subways would be trenched
across the Common to meet at a subterranean switching yard for which four acres
would be excavated. The legislature sought to avoid the issue entirely, seizing instead
on a proposed 'Alley Route' in which a new street, just wide enough to hold the
elevated railroad, would be carved from the backs of building lots half a block east of
102Petition quoted in Boston Evening Transcript, March 25, 1887: 5.
103Boston Evening Transcript, February 1, 1893: 1, quoted in Charles W. Cheape, Moving the
Masses: Urban Public Transit in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, 1880-1912 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1980), 134; see also 120, 124.
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Tremont Street. Cutting a slot through the most valuable real estate in the city,
however, would be astonishingly expensive. Mainly for this reason, it was opposed by
Mayor Matthews, the good-government Citizens' Association, and others, and was
defeated at a city referendum in November, 1893.104
The Citizens' Association instead backed an alternate proposal by which streetcars
would be routed into a more modest subway skirting the Common along Boylston and
Tremont Streets, and after the defeat of the elevated the city turned to building this
subway, the first in the nation to be completed.105 The comparative ease of excavating
under parkland, together with growing awareness of potential business disruption
while streets were dug up, led the city transit commission to draw its plans for the
subway not under Tremont and Boylston Streets themselves but under the adjacent
malls of the Common, with the attendant loss of hundreds of trees. Citizens'
Association organizer George B. Upham, later credited as "the father of the
subway,"106 understood that it would inevitably run under the malls, but felt that it
would "prove a safeguard to the Common as it would prevent a demand for a larger
portion of it."107 Many of Upham's followers, however, had not understood the
proposal's compromise nature. "We have been fooled and bamboozled," wrote one.
"We thought by a subway under Tremont [Street] we were to save the Common, but
we are really to have a worse injury to it than to have tracks on the mall under the
trees." 108 Others pointed out that the decision was a purely economic one, to avoid the
expense of excavating and relocating utilities in the street. "[W]e are constantly paying
enormous sums," wrote 'M.P.L.' to the Boston Advertiser, "for acquiring bits of
104Cheape, Moving the Masses, 135-136; Nathan Matthews to Horace G. Allen, March 14, 1893,
Nathan Matthews papers 4:237, Littauer Library, Harvard; Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1893,
Acts ch. 481.
105Since the existing streetcar system would still continue in operation alongside any elevated
railroads, the problem of surface congestion was to some extent independent of the question of rapid
transit, and the same legislature which approved the alley elevated also authorized a subway;
Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1893, Acts ch. 478.
106Sylvester Baxter letter, Boston Evening Transcript, September 24, 1898: 17. Upham later served as
the first president of the Boston Common Society; Boston Globe, April 17, 1900: 6.
107Boston Evening Transcript, December 18, 1893: 8.
108Boston Daily Advertiser, April 1, 1895: 8.
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nature which if not purchased just then will be destroyed. Does not Boston Common
come under this head?" 109
Most of the Common's defenders no longer insisted that it was inviolable; they
simply did not want it to look bad. They were particularly concerned about the loss of
trees, and an astonishing amount of testimony and debate in the legislature concerned
the likely fate of individual trees under various proposed subway alignments. In May of
1895 several hundred friends of the Common signed a petition to the legislature as
notable for what it omitted as for what it asked. They requested that no permanent
subway structures be located above ground on the Common, and that all stations and
other subterranean structures be located at least twelve feet from the surface, where they
would have comparatively little effect on tree roots. In return, they were willing to
remove restrictions on how far beneath the Common the subway would extend, leaving
that to the transit commisioners. They did not ask that construction proceed by
tunnelling, in which the surface of the ground is not disturbed, rather than by the more
economical cut-and-cover, even though the distinction was well understood, and true
tunnelling was clearly what they wanted. They were evidently willing to settle for the
long-term prospect of mature trees replacing those lost, and willing to trust the
commissioners to do the right thing. "Almost everybody," wrote the staunchly
preservationist editors of the Evening Transcript, "believes the commission to be
thoroughly imbued with Boston notions as to the indispensible duty of preserving all
the best features of the Common." 110
The transit commission's five members were well chosen to inspire confidence in
their sensitivity to the Common. Among them was Charles H. Dalton, a former
chairman of the parks commission, and Thomas J. Gargan, a former legislator and city
councilman who had fought actively against the Charitable Mechanics' building. The
commission elected as its chair George G. Crocker, who had worked so hard twenty
years earlier preventing damage to the Common's tree roots by a curbstone. Crocker
led the commission on a path of preservationist sensitivity wedded with pragmatism,
109Boston Daily Advertiser, April 1, 1895: 8( probably Mary P. Lanza, who signed the May 11, 1895
petition in the Evening Transcript).
110Boston Evening Transcript, May 13, 1895: 4.
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fig. 5.4. Subway excavations under the Tremont Street mall of the Common, 1896.
The Bulfinch State House dome and the Park Street Church spire are visible on the'
skyline.
foregoing the religious concern for the Common which he himself had once shared, but
on the other hand showing a sincere concern for its treatment and appearance. The
commissioners worked with George B. Upham and others to devise means of
protecting the Common's trees. 111 When it became clear that the Boylston street
excavations would disturb a previously discontinued burial ground, the commissioners
put the matter in the hands of Dr. Samuel A. Green, an official of the Historical Society
and former mayor, and arranged for both a respectful re-interment of the remains and
1 1 Boston Transit Commission, First Annual Report (Boston,1895), 30: the commissioners
acknowledged to Henry Lee, Thomas L. Livermore, Charles S. Sargent, and George B. Upham, "for
assistance in devising means for reducing, so far as possible, the destruction of trees on the common,
and for advice as to the best treatment of those trees which stand so near the subway lines as to be
possibly affected by the work."
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an historical investigation of the site.112 They engaged landscape architects Olmsted,
Olmsted, and Eliot in order to use the occasion of the subway excavations for a
restoration of the entire Common, hoping to "permanently add to the beauty and
salubrity of the Common," in the commissioners' words, and to provide Bostonians
"some compensations for the sacrifices they have made in having the subway built
under the Boylston and Tremont street malls." By most accounts they succeeded. 113
Several years later, George B. Upham formed the Boston Common Society to lobby
for its continuing care, and Crocker, Dalton, and Gargan all worked as members of its
executive committee. 114
Boston's Common was initially valued, like the Old South and the Old State House,
as the site of historic events. Arthur Pickering, defending it in 1877, mixed up places
with people as mutually equivalent reference points in history: "There was a time when
there were names that would cause the blood of every true Bostonian to thrill. Those
names were George Washington, Adams, Hancock, Otis, Faneuil Hall, the Old South,
and last, but not least, Boston Common."1 15 On this mental map of history, the
Common was not merely a single point, but a whole symbolic landscape where every
hill and every tree had its own meaning. Even as late as the 1890s, many Boston men
could remember playing as boys amidst the still recognizable earthworks thrown up by
British troops there. 116
Debate about the Common gradually came to revolve around its role not as a symbol
but a visible piece of the urban environment. In the 1870s, as preservations deprecated
the Old South's architecture, the Globe similarly dismissed the Common's appearance.
"Nobody affects to believe that this precious spot of historic ground has high
112Boston Transit Commission, First Annual Report, 17. See also App. C, D, E. See also Second
Annual Report (Boston, 1896), 7 & pl. C, D, E.
113Boston Transit Commission, First Annual Report, 19; editorial, Boston Evening Transcript,
August 11, 1896: 4.
114Boston Globe, April 17, 1900: 6.
115Boston City Council, Hearing on the Charitable Mechanics building, 40.
116Howe, Boston Common, 39-40. The visible traces were evidently obliterated in the 1830s.
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pretensions as a city park."l 17 But during the coming decades, Frederick Law Olmsted
oversaw the creation of a citywide system of public parks, and in this 'emerald
necklace' the Common was the heirloom jewel. Newly created parks were infused with
some of Boston's traditional reverence for the Common, and the Common itself was
absorbed into the ethos of the parks movement. Its visual qualities became foremost.
During construction of the subway, public opposition centered on the visual issues of
whether it would damage trees or erect inharmonious structures on the Common, rather
than on the symbolic issue of disturbing an historic burial ground.
The shift from preserving historic monuments to preserving visual environments
could be seen most sharply defined in the evolution of Boston's treatment of burial
grounds. This was governed at first by the symbolism of ancestors, which could be
antithetical to environmental permanence when it was served by removing remains and
monuments to Mount Auburn cemetery. By the end of the century, however, they were
treated as little urban parks, all the more satisfying because their old stones, like the old
trees Olmsted sought in parks, gave a sense of temporal depth.
From monument to landmark: Beacon Hill I
The ahistorical brand of preservationism which emerged around issues of open space
in the city quickly came into play toward buildings, too. People began to treat them not
as monuments but as landmarks, defining their significance less by historical than by
visual importance. The building which served as fulcrum for this shift was the
Massachusetts State House on Beacon Hill, designed by Charles Bulfinch and
completed in 1798, the building which superseded the Old State House and later won
Bulfinch the commission for the capitol at Washington. The 1808 Park Street Church
just down the block extended this trend even further, since its significance was almost
entirely visual rather than historical.
117Boston Globe, June 24, 1875: 4.
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The Bulfinch State House was the subject of the first major preservation controversy
in the country in which architectural history was more important than political, military,
or religious history. It was the first one in which architects took a leading role. It also
revealed - in part because of the architectural orientation of its defenders - latent
conflicts between preservation and some of the kinds of permanence which people
sought. It did not pit preservation against utility, but rather one kind of permanence
against another.
The last time Massachusetts had focused its attention on enlarging its capitol was
immediately after the Civil War, and immediately after the demise of the Hancock
house. Between 1864 and 1867, at least five legislative committees considered the
problem, the final one commissioning architects Alexander Estey and Gridley J. F.
Bryant (who had designed an earlier extension behind the building) to prepare three
alternate schemes: 'Plan No. 1' would meet the state government's "most pressing
wants" by extending short wings from each end of the Bulfinch building, which would
remain intact; 118 'Plan No. 2' added to these wings an expansion of the House
chamber by extending the front 25 feet forward. The Bulfinch facade would be
reconstructed there "as far as it could be done with consistency," making, as Bryant
explained, "only such changes ... as the additional importance and character of the
building seemed to require..."1 19 'Plan No. 3' called for demolishing the Bulfinch
building to construct a new state house on the same site.
From this textbook triumvirate of preservation, replication, and demolition, the
legislators chose preservation, but they did so for purely financial reasons. While even
Bryant's minimal Plan No. 1 was estimated at $375,000, the legislature instead
appropriated $170,000 for an economy scheme of interior rearrangement by which they
hoped "the necessities of the government will be met for a series of years, ... until the
118Massachusetts Executive Department, Report of Commissioners on the Subject of Remodelling or
Rebuilding the State House (1867 Senate doc. 60), 3.
119Architects' description, in Mass. Executive Dept., Report on Remodelling or Rebuilding, 28-29.
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people shall demand and authorize the erection of a new building." 120 As they
anticipated, their short-term approach kept the state house usable for only a decade or
SO.121
When the question next came up in the mid 1880s, many circumstances had changed.
The government had grown, squeezing many departments out of the state house to
scattered rented spaces, an arrangement which not only bled the Treasury but defeated
some of the efficiency expected of a modern bureaucracy. The state tried consolidating
offices as much as possible in the immediate vicinity of the capitol, but the character of
the old neighborhood limited them to buying and renting what one suburban newspaper
called "disused tenements." 122 Neither these buildings, nor any modest changes to the
existing state house, could possibly be adequate to the growing apparatus of
government. The economy had changed, too. Instead of a burden of Civil War debt and
postwar inflation, Massachusetts enjoyed a prosperity which encouraged greater
architectural ambitions.
But one more changed circumstance complicated these ambitions: success in saving
the Old South and Old State House. These successes made newly poignant the memory
of the Hancock House, which began to achieve mythic status as the preservation
movement's martyr, a sort of nineteenth-century equivalent of New York's
Pennsylvania Station.123 Expanding facilities next door at the state house would not be
so simple as demanding "a new building." But if the eighteenth-century capitol
remained, how could it accommodate a twentieth-century government?
Various schemes were revived for adding wings to the Bulfinch building, but any
such plan had problems. Creating enough space this way was architecturally difficult,
and would require radical rearrangement of the existing interior. It meant clearing the
most densely occupied and expensive of the adjacent blocks. It was also perceived as a
1201867 House doc. 449, quoted in James M. Stone, The Improvements of the State House. The
Investigation Thereof Investigated and Misrepresentations Exposed (Boston, 1868), 8.
121See Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1878, Resolves ch. 43.
122Salem Public, reprinted in Sillars, The State House, 32; Governor Oliver Ames described the
arrangement as "not only expensive but inconvenient." Governor's Address (Senate doc. 1, 1888), 24.
123E.g., Boston Evening Transcript, November 27, 1886: "...the State House is not entirely safe in
the hands of a people who could let the old Hancock House go."
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grave threat to the old landmark, in part because land acquisition for wings would be
identical to that for a wholly new structure, but also because of what such extensions, if
actually constructed, would do to the building's proportions. Governor Oliver Ames,
who in his private life was an important architectural patron of H. H. Richardson,
explained that wings would "give us an unshapely and inartistic structure in place of
one that is symmetrical and in good taste." 124
The Bulfinch building's appearance might be enhanced, on the other hand, by new
state offices in separate buildings designed specifically to give it a deferential setting.
One legislator proposed a "handsome colonial building, subordinate in appearance to
the State House." 125 Detached buildings could not entirely solve the inconvenience of
scattered offices, however, and the arrangement would do nothing for the cramped
legislative chamber itself. In addition, the most eligible sites for such buildings were the
same as any wings would occupy, making this plan equally costly.
There were many reasons, therefore, for looking north, behind the building.
Construction there would have the smallest visual impact, and it would occupy the least
expensive adjacent land. Behind the state house was Mount Vernon Street, the elite
spine of Beacon Hill, although immediately across the street the houses were small and
unprepossessing. Closing this street was the only way the building could extend
rearward "in one solid mass," but it would involve heavy damages unless the plan
created some satisfactory new approach to Beacon Hill.126
A tempting but problematic solution beckoned from beyond the little houses on
Mount Vernon Street: the vacant full-block 'Reservoir lot,' which the City of Boston
owned, wanted to sell, and was holding off the market impatiently while the state
deliberated how to expand its capitol. But the reservoir lot shared either the difficulties
of closing Mount Vernon Street, or else the inconvenience of a detached office building
124(Senate doc. 6, 1887), 2; Boston Evening Transcript, November 27, 1886.
125Commercial Bulletin, April 30, 1887 (reprinted in Sillars, The State House, 27), writing of Rep.
Justin Perry of Natick. The bill Mr. Perry actually submitted a month later made no mention of
'colonial' style, but called for "a plain, three-story building." 1887 House bill 520, 2.
126Governor Oliver Ames, (Senate doc. 6, 1887), 2.
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- until the state began exploring the possibility of bridging the street to make the new
building an 'annex' to the existing state house. 127
Not everyone had become a preservationist. Many still felt that a proper capitol was a
new capitol, on Beacon Hill or elsewhere, and that finances - the only legitimate
argument against this solution - no longer prevented it. The whole question was first
formally raised by an 1885 petition "that the Commonwealth procure a new State
House in some other location," so that the Bulfich building could be re-used as a new
Suffolk County courthouse. 12 Among the "other locations" mentioned were the Back
Bay, Parker Hill (the same eminence to which the city had removed its Beacon Hill
reservoir), and the city of Worcester.129 People who wanted a new capitol elsewhere
provoked a debate over permanence and sacredness of site, like the earlier ones about
migrating churches, but even they usually assumed permanence for the old structure.
For all the nervousness about threats to the building, few people were willing to
advocate destroying it, and accounts announcing a danger of "having the work of
Charles Bulfinch removed or remodelled" were making a rhetorical warning about
remodelling as much as a real warning about removal. 130
The legislature in 1886 approved the concept of enlarging the state house, but only
after amending the measure to require "that the present state house, and particularly the
southern front thereof, be substantially preserved."131 Over the next two years
Governor Ames and the legislature's state house committee worked out a plan to
accomplish this, and in 1888 the state took the Reservoir lot to extend the state house
northward. The Governor announced a competition to design a 'State House Annex,'
the instructions for which stipulated that "the architectural design is to be in harmony
with the present building," and required drawings "showing method of connecting
127 Boston City Council, Majority and Minority Reports of Joint Special Committee on Sale of
Reservoir Lot (City doc. 96, 1887), 7.
128House Journal, 1885, 176.
129Boston Evening Transcript, March 10, 1888, reprinted in Sillars, The State House, 26.
130American Architect and Building News, June 26, 1886: 301.
13 1Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1886, Resolves ch. 87; House Journal, 1886, 739. See also
account of the act's passage, by Dr. William A. Rust, then member of the House, in Massachusetts
General Court, Committee on the State House, Hearings Mar. 16, 17, 18, 1896, concerning the
Bulfinch Front, typescript, Massachusetts State Library Special Collections, 1:2-4.
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proposed building with State House." 132 Charles Brigham's winning design made the
connection by two bridges across Mount Vernon Street, but it was modified before
adoption so that the annex itself spanned the street, fusing with the Bulfinch building in
a single mass. 133 This change would loom important later, but attracted little attention at
the time. Three State House Construction Commissioners were appointed to build it.134
The commissioners were not sympathetic to the Bulfinch building, an attitude which
became especially clear a few years later when their new building stood nearly complete
beside it. They hesitated to begin dismantling the old wall to connect the two, they said,
because "once inside of it, it would be difficult to know where to stop." 135
Commissioners and builders reacted to the reality of a new and luxurious building next
to an aged and comparatively plain one; legislators faced all their old discomforts plus
the new ones of life on a construction site, compounded by the contrast with spacious
quarters they could see rising.
In 1893 the commissioners blandly revived the question
whether the whole State House should not be made new. When the extension
already authorized is completed, practically nothing of the old part will be left .... It
is some hundred years old. Its outer walls and wooden finish will not be in keeping
with what, while called an extension, will really be five-sixths of the whole
building. The dome is of wood, subject to the impairment of age, and should be of
iron. It is hardly possible that many years will pass before, in any event, this old
132Massachusetts, Governor and Council, State House Annex (Boston, 1888), [1]. The competition
was advertised November 28, 1888, with a deadline of January 20, 1889. It provoked a nationwide
protest among architects, because of its short duration, inadequate prizes, failure to provide for expert
evaluation of the entries and failure to promise the commission to the winner (American Architect and
Building News, Dec. 15, 1888: 273; Dec. 22, 1888: 285; Jan. 19, 1889: 31). Most major architects
refused to participate - nor could they effectively, given the time frame. The winner, Charles Brigham,
was already intimately familiar with the building from making measured drawings for the state
(American Architect and Building News, Feb. 9, 1889: 61).
133The modified plan is explained by the architect in 1889 House doc. no. 334 (April 10, 1889), 3.
The process by which it was modified is recalled by Brigham in Massachusetts General Court, Hearings
concerning the Bulfinch Front, 2:39-40. Albert W. Cobb attributes the modified bridge to Carl Fehmer,
letter, Boston Evening Transcript, February 14, 1895: 6.
134Former Governor John D. Long, chairman; William Endicott, Jr.; and Benjamin D. Whitcomb.
Subsequent members were Charles Everett Clark and George W. Johnson.
135Massachusetts State House Construction Commissioners, Seventh Annual Report, 1895 (Senate
doc. 3, 1896), 7.
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and most conspicuous part, facing Beacon Street and the Common, will be made
new and of equal quality with the rest.136
Bostonians assumed they had won preservation of the Bulfinch state house, but in
fact the battle had not yet been fought. Now it was precipitated by the paradoxical
conflict between permanence and preservation revealed in this remarkable passage
above. The ideal of permanence had triumphed so far that builders, at least, sought a
hermetic permanence of materials not "subject to the impairment of age." "The
Commissioners have endeavored to bear in mind," they said, "that they are
constructing, not for a day or a hundred years, and that such should be the durability of
material and solidity of construction, as to insure a building that will stand for
centuries." 137 They could not find this perfection in old buildings.
Those who would get rid of the Bulfinch State House invoked both the lines of
argument favoring change, the first of which equated 'old' with 'corrupt.' The building
was so universally an object of affection that no one tried to claim it was morally or
even stylistically reprobate, but argued instead that it was 'corrupt' in the literal sense of
the word: it "consisted mainly of a wooden dome, badly rotted," said the American
Architect, "and covered with a tin roof, which, as it ... would fall down from decay
before long any way, might be dispensed with .... "138
136Massachusetts State House Construction Commissioners, Fourth Annual Report, 1892 (House
doc. 6, 1893), 8. The commissioners' proposal not surprisingly brought charges of disingenuousness.
"The move for the destruction of the State House has been a covert one....", said Arthur Rotch.
"Following the diplomatic tactics of those in charge, the great 'Annex' has crept up in the rear under
cover of the old building, and now suddenly asserts itself, and from behind it stabs to death...." (Save
the State House: The Memorial of a Century of Freedom [Boston, 1894], 28). Alden Sampson
speculated that this "plot" was conceived as a way of building a whole new capitol piecemeal to avoid
confronting demands that it be moved elsewhere in the state. (letter in Boston Evening Transcript,
publ., State House Reconstruction [Boston, 1894]). Even the American Architect thought that "if it
had been known that the public was not to be cajoled into giving up the old building," Massachusetts
would have picked a different design (American Architect and Building News, March 10, 1894: 109).
Arthur T. Lyman suggested a different sort of ulterior motive. With restoration estimated at $375,000,
and new construction at $1,250,000, he quoted "[a] friend from the corrupt city of Philadelphia" who
thought that the way to save the building was to raise the restoration price to $2,000,000. (letter,
Boston Evening Transcript, April 22, 1896: 6.)
137Massachusetts State House Construction Commissioners, Sixth Annual Report, 1894 (Senate doc.
3, 1895), 15. The American Architect and Building News referred to the annex as "the permanent part"
of the state house; Dec. 4, 1886: 261.
138American Architect and Building News, January 14, 1893: 17.
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The physical condition of the building would appear to be a factual question, but
somehow this seemed impossible to answer. Even after an independent commission of
experts investigated it in 1895, legislators were left to choose between wildly different
opinions.139 Architect William D. Preston described it as a structure of "good old
handmade bricks, made honestly in the old times, hard and red and laid in mortar, and
the mortar was solid and hard; .... Those great walls four feet thick, made honestly,
would certainly ... carry an eight story building without any strengthening ...."140 But
Charles Brigham called one of those same walls "the most decrepid [sic] piece of brick
construction that you could very well find." 141
Both sides agreed that parts of the building - in particular the dome - had deteriorated,
and their disagreement is best understood as a philosophical question: was a hundred
years' inevitable aging to be accepted as normal, a healthy subject for restoration, or
was it to be seen instead with the disgust connoted by descriptions of decay and
decrepitude? Viewed as a practical matter, the building's rehabilitation presented no
insurmountable difficulties, "so that if the building is to be destroyed," said Clement K.
Fay, attorney for the Boston Society of Architects, "it will not be because it cannot be
saved, but for some other reason." 142
The second argument for change - faith in material progress and improvement -
provided that other reason for those who wanted to take down Bulfinch's state house,
and gave rise to its own conflict between preservation and permanence. If
environmental permanence was a desideratum, should it be permanence of what was
there now, or of what was about to be built? A still-vital faith in progress led to the
answer that there ought to be one last wave of change, to an environment made to be
worthy of permanence. This question was increasingly troubling as preservationist
attention turned to visual and architectural significance and to ever-larger pieces of the
139Appointed March 14, 1895: Charles A. Cummings (President of the Boston Society of Architects),
David H. Andrews, E. Noyes Whitcomb; their report, presented April 13, is reprinted in American
Architect and Building News, April 27, 1895: 39-40.
140Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 1: 21. See also Walter H.
Wentworth, a Boston, mason and builder: "I never saw a better-built wall" (1:32).
14 1Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 2: 36.
142Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 2: 25.
180
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
environment. The City Beautiful movement (discussed below in chapter 6) arose at this
time as an effort to create a large-scale urban environment visually worthy of the
permanence which was by then considered possible. A triumph of the search for
permanence need not be a triumph for preservation.
Worthiness was a central issue in this era when most American states built new
capitols intended as their respective emblems. This capitol especially, serving a rich and
cultured commonwealth from its pride of place on Beacon Hill, the social and
topographic pinnacle of the city, should be its architectural pinnacle as well. 143 Could
Bulfinch's "good old handmade bricks" bear this tremendous symbolic weight?
This question made the state house, more than any other preservation controversy so
far, a design issue, and a potentially troubling one for the architecture profession.
Charles Francis Adams thought it "a curious and somewhat saddening fact" that
the best educated architectural taste the country can command has been at work for
the last half-century ... and the Old State House on Beacon Hill still remains
infinitely the most dignified and most imposing, the most characteristic, the most
perfectly designed and agreeable architectural effort we can boast.144
Did architects really want to agree that their profession's best work had been done in a
previous century? The evolution of architectural taste had reached a particular point
where it was possible to ask this question seriously. Architects and their patrons were
increasingly rejecting eclecticism and searching for academically-correct roots.
Bulfinch's simple Georgian lines were just the antidote for Victorian excess, and
Charles A. Cummings, the head of the Boston Society of Architects, denounced as
"false progress" the prospect of replacing them with what one newspaper feared would
be "some architectural phantasy of the newest new school." 145 For more than a decade,
143Construction commission chairman John D. Long, letter in Boston Evening Transcript, February
2, 1894: 5. It "might, with such opportunities for effect as the lot afforded, have been made one of the
most splendid buildings in the world" (American Architect and Building News, Feb. 10, 1894: 61).
144Speech re Chicago Columbian Exposition, at November, 1893, Massachusetts Historical Society
meeting, reprinted in Save the State House, 30. Three years later a crowd in Faneuil Hall applauded
Mayor Josiah Quincy when he said, "I do not feel like trusting the architects of today to improve upon
the work of Bulfinch." Boston Evening Transcript, April 21, 1896: 1.
145Save the State House, 15; Worcester Spy, reprinted in Sillars, The State House, 32. An 1895
appeal by non-architects asked, "At this time of reawakening interest in a noble and severe civic
architecture, symbolized by the new Public Library, what more fitting celebration of the centenary of
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the Colonial Revival had been taking hold in New England and was beginning to
spread elsewhere, and its practitioners grew increasingly rigorous in their adherence to
its canon. This led to preservation arguments based not merely on architectural quality
but on significance to architectural history, as when one defender explained that
Bulfinch's building was "the prototype of nearly all the legislative buildings which have
been erected in this country since .... a type which is quite unique to this country." 146
Architects led the fight to save the Bulfinch state house, a first for the profession in
this country. They had been conspicuously silent about both the Old State House and
the Old South Church, the replacement for which was designed by Charles A.
Cummings, now among the most active and vehement of the Bulfinch building's
defenders. "[Wihere was his well-developed 'historical sentiment' at that time?" asked
one skeptic. 147 If architects had earlier identified their interests with those of clients
who commissioned new buildings, now their sympathies clearly lay with Bulfinch as
their predecessor, and the emerging profession of restoration architecture demonstrated
that preservation, too, could pay.
In 1894, the Boston Society of Architects set up a State House Committee which
promoted the building's preservation in two ways. First, it answered doubts about the
building's condition and proposed practical methods to preserve it. One member of the
committee seized for their cause the mantle of progress by claiming that the state
house's preservation had only recently become feasible, because "principles of
construction have undergone such revolutionary changes, that what would have been
impossible twenty five or fifty years ago is now made comparatively a simple problem
Bulfinch's State House...than to hand down to another century unmoved, this landmark of a century
preceding our own?" Boston Evening Transcript, February 9, 1895: 9.
146Edward Robinson, Secretary of the Boston Art Commission, in Massachusetts General Court,
Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 1: 45.
147Albert W. Cobb, in Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 2: 12.
Cobb himself proposed in 1895 a "design for preserving and extending the front of the Massachusetts
Stae House," but the legislature, rather than hiring him to carry out his plan, created the expert
commission on which Cummings sat as the sole architect, which may explain Cobb's vehemence.
When Cummings later served as consulting architect for the actual restoration, he refused to accept any
compensation. American Architect and Building News, July 11, 1896: 10.
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of the use of steel construction." 148 Second, the architects educated the public, and the
legislators, about the quality of the building's design and its place in the history of
American architecture.
This involvement by architects, and this focus of public attention on architecture, was
part of a more general trend toward seeing preservation questions in terms of visual
issues, such as affection for views of the state house and its dome. Such concerns were
not heard so much during the controversies over the Old South Church and Old State
House, which were treated as historic memorials; the visual emphasis had its precedent
instead in defense of the Common.
Ironically, this visual focus worked against the Bulfinch building, leading to the
strangest and most significant episode of the story, an officially-endorsed plan to
replace the Bulfinch state house with a replica - eventually a larger-than-life replica, as
Bryant had proposed twenty-five years earlier. The commissioners, acknowledging the
building's architectural significance, "recognized of course that no change would ever
be permitted in the now historic and always admirable" design, but their version of
permanence did not encompass - it scornfully dismissed - the materials in which the
design was realized. 149 As commissioner William Endicott, Jr., asked:
Will a proper appreciation of Mr. Bulfinch require that the building should be
carried forward in pine wood and lathe [sic] and plaster finish until it shall burn
down? Is it not a truer loyalty to put the idea of Mr. Bulfinch into enduring
materials and pass it down the centuries? 150
At a hearing before the legislature's State House committee, Endicott explained that the
commissioners' plan would "preserve the structure in new material."
To this Mr. Fay remarked, "I fail to see how you can preserve the building by
substituting a new structure."
"We desire to preserve the idea," answered Mr. Endicott. 15 1
148Clement K. Fay, in Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 3: 17.
The committee consisted of Fay, Prof. Warren, William R. Ware (1: 14-15).
149State House Construction Commissioners, Fourth Annual Report, 1892, 8.
150Letter, Boston Evening Transcript, February 2, 1894: 5.
151Boston Evening Transcript, February 26, 1894: 1. An opponent quoted the commissioners: "'We
would raze the building,' they said, 'in order to preserve it, in order to preserve the idea of which it is
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Did Charles Bulfinch produce an "idea" or a particular tangible object? Was his state
house a sort of Platonic ideal, a soul which might be reincarnated in a new body? A
puzzled commissioner Endicott attempted his own analysis of these questions. "The
devotion of the architects to Mr. Bulfinch," he wrote, "simmered down, seems to be
one of two considerations: it must be either the dimensions and form of the wall or the
bricks themselves." He thought he had a solution; he wondered if architects would
favor
a new structure, as proposed by the commissioners, of the same outlines and
dimensions as the present one, provided the bricks of the present building shall all
be used in interior brickwork of the new. It would seem that this should satisfy
them in both respects. 152
It did not satisfy them, but Endicott had hit upon a fundamental dichotomy between a
visual concern for preserving "form," and an archaeological or art-historical interest in
preserving "the bricks themselves." Representative John E. Tuttle, a Boston real estate
broker who had worked to protect the Common, saw only a visual issue, and thus
favored the commissioners' plan. "I consider it a great tribute to the Bulfinch style of
architecture that we should attempt at this day, a hundred years later, to ... reproduce
it."1 53 Testifying before Tuttle, President Francis A. Walker of M.I.T. expressed the
opposite view in terms perhaps directed at Endicott, a trustee (and soon president) of
the Museum of Fine Arts: "Anybody can make a copy" he said, but "it takes a master
to make an original."Is4
This new awareness of the city as a visual experience also led to the project of
honoring the state house by clearing two blocks east of it to extend its park setting and
further open views of it (discussed further in chapter 6 below). Far from enhancing the
building, however, the demolitions carried out in 1894 gave new impetus to the idea of
the material embodiment"' (Alden Sampson letter in Boston Evening Transcript, State House
Reconstruction).
152Letter, Boston Evening Transcript, February 17, 1894: 12.
153Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 3: 33.
154Save the State House, 24. Even this to some people understated the value of the building:
"Bulfinch was great because he built the State House, and not the State House great because Bulfinch
built it" (Alden Sampson letter in Boston Evening Transcript, State House Reconstruction).
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replacing it. "[WIhen the buildings on the east side were cleared away," wrote the
American Architect,
and people had a chance to see the east front, it was at once plain that things had,
behind the high fence, arrived at a very dubious stage. Taken as it stands, the east
front seems to suggest nothing so much as that it was the designer's original
intention to do away absolutely with the old building and to repeat at the south end
the treatment employed at the north. Doubtless this may not have been the
architect's real intention, for it could hardly have been known at the time the design
was prepared that a park was to be made on the east side which would expose that
part, instead of leaving it to the seclusion of a narrow street.155
The painstakingly created views revealed "a building five hundred feet long with a
dome at one end"; "a tender too large for the woodburning locomotive that was trying
to pull it up hill"; an enormous tail for a "little dog" (fig. 5.5.).156 The construction
commissioners, recognizing the absurdity of this arrangement, decided to get a bigger
dog.
fig. 5.5. The 'Bulfinch front' and the completed state house annex. Photograph 1903.
The commissioners' 1893 report had recommended that "the front should be rebuilt,
preserving its present proportions", but after the unfortunate proportions of the whole
became apparent, their bill before the next legislature added that the reproduction should
155American Architect and Building News, March 10, 1894: 109.
156Fay, in Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 1: 9; American
Architect and Building News, March 10, 1894: 109.
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be made "with the proper increase of width and height." 157 "Bulfinch originally
intended a wider front," explained Long, "and there is some reason to believe that he
contemplated with it a higher dome accompanied by a colonnade...." The
commissioners, he said, had no intention "of recommending any other change than the
conservative one above suggested."15 8
Although the commissioners' plan made it through the legislature's State House
Committee, five of its eleven members dissented, including its chairman. Their
minority report acknowledged that "the present State House is in a condition where
thorough and systematic repair and renovation are necessary." But, they said, "the way
to preserve the State House is to preserve it." Only this promise had allowed the project
to go ahead. "The annex was built to preserve the State House and to harmonize with it.
We are told, now, that the State House must be destroyed and rebuilt so that it may
ha[r]monize with the annex." The commissioners proposed "to preserve the 'idea' of
the State House by destroying the State House itself." The minority offered instead a
bill providing for "so thorough a repairing and fireproofing of the present structure that
the question of its preservation will be permanently solved." 159
[T]he State House can thus be put into a condition almost unexampled among
historic buildings for safety and solidity and we desire to repeat that this is the only
kind of preservation that is worthy of the name. Reproduction of colonial
architecture never can retain the quaintness and beauty of the original. If the State
House is once destroyed it is destroyed forever, and putting up a new building of
stone and iron does not put it back again.160
157State House Construction Commissioners, Fourth Annual Report, 1892, 8; 1894 Senate bill 182.
Compare with 1893 Senate bill 318 - essentially the same language, without the clause allowing
dimensions to be increased.
158Letter, Boston Evening Transcript, February 2, 1894: 5. See Arthur T. Lyman letter, Boston
Evening Transcript, April 22, 1896: 6: "Even if we had Bulfinch's original plans, it would be absurd to
reproduce them when the building that we have is the building that he erected."
159Massachusetts General Court, Committee on the State House, Views of a Minority ... on the
Preservation of the State House (Senate doc. 189, 1894), 2-3. The minority included Joseph F.
Bartlett, E. G. Frothingham, of the Senate; Royal Robbins (chairman of the committee), F. H.
Bradford, Henry A. Whitney, of the House
160Massachusetts General Court, Views of a Minority, 3.
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Finally, they disagreed that building a new front would improve the appearance of the
complex as a whole, and argued that even on these grounds preserving the original was
preferable, since
it will serve to emphasize the fact that the State House and annex are in reality two
buildings, the former having been specially preserved for the people, and the union
of the two will not be subject to the strict criticism to which one modern building
would be exposed. 161
The committee's minority report, with its discussion of the proper relationship between
new and old building fabric, showed the sophistication of public discourse resulting
from Boston's two full decades of successful preservation efforts.
If the State House was to be preserved, the scale of the project would raise daunting
details of restoration, and thorough public discussion extended even to these details. As
Alden Sampson said of the Bulfinch building, "its very faults are not without
interest." 162 For example, the facade's columns, modelled on ancient Greek
construction of stone, had been executed instead in wood - each one turned from a
single tree trunk. Would not Bulfinch's intentions be best respected by making them of
stone, as he presumably would have done had it been available? So argued architect and
preservation advocate William G. Preston, 163 echoing Viollet-le-Duc's philosophy of
restoration to "a condition of completeness which could never have existed at any given
time."164 Counter-arguments followed the Ruskinian 'anti-scrape' philosophy which
favored not restoration but preservation as found. Even if Bulfinch would have
preferred stone, which preservationists were by no means willing to concede, "[h]e got
161Massachusetts General Court, Views of a Minority, 4. The committee was adopting a position
earlier taken by the BSA. see William G. Preston letter, Boston Evening Transcript, February 7, 1894:
8.
162Alden Sampson letter in Boston Evening Transcript, State House Reconstruction.
163Letter, Boston Evening Transcript, February 7, 1894: 8.
164Eugene Emmanuel Violet-le-Duc (1875), quoted in Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 23.
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the value out of wood," said H. C. Wheelwright. "The things that he did have a value
that nothing we do in the more complicated days of the present can equal." 165
The Bulfinch state house preservation campaign also brought a redefinition of what,
for Massachusetts, would be considered 'historic.' The term had previously applied
almost exclusively to the state's heroic period, the Revolution. "There is nothing
particularly historic about our present State House," editorialized the Herald, "Most of
the great events in our local history took place before it was built." 166 Some of the
building's defenders nonetheless tried reaching back to the Revolution to find its
associations there; Samuel Adams and Paul Revere, they pointed out, laid its
cornerstone. Now history leapt forward, as the building's significance was found in the
comparatively recent Civil War and the administration of "the great war Governor,"
John A. Andrews. 167 "We cannot know how precious everything connected with that
War" will be, said Edward Robinson, secretary of the Boston Art Commission, "two
hundred years from now." 168 The time horizon of historic significance now
encompassed living memory in Massachusetts, as it long had in the southern states,
even if historic sensibilities in both places were still heroic and primarily martial. 169
Some preservationists even tried to broaden these sensibilities to a more continuous
view of history. The Old State House had seen only fifty years in the life of the colony-,
165Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 1: 42.
166Boston Herald, April 8, 18%: 6. Winslow Warren, Vice President of the Massachusetts Historical
Society, in a letter to John D. Long, referred to the building's preservation as "destroying the effect of
the new for the sake of the not very old." The building had "more an imaginary than a real antiquity,"
he said. "I confess that with an anxious antiquarian spirit I have endeavored to understand what are the
associations connected with the present state house front. It was built by Mr. Bulfinch about 100 years
ago. Well, what of it!"
167Charles A. Cummings wanted to "put it as nearly as possible in the condition it was in when
Governor Andrews was here"; Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front,
1: 10. See also Roe, The Old Representatives' Hall, 42; Alden Sampson letter in Boston Evening
Transcript, State House Reconstruction.
168Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 1: 44.
169"We are told," said Alfred Seelye Roe, "that because the years after the revolution to those of the
rebellion were days of peace, there could little interest attach to these walls;" Roe, The Old
Representatives' Hall, 52.
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but this one, pointed out Henry Lee, "witnessed the first hundred years of the history
of the State. It is all the history there is." 170
Finally, this building raised in yet another way the question of use. As at the Old
State House, there were plenty of potential uses, but what was the purpose of
preserving it, and what use would accomplish it? Former Governor John D. Long,
chairman of the construction commission, was not unwilling to accept preservation
itself as a legitimate use for a building. He was one of the incorporators of the Old
South Association in 1877, and was instrumental in guiding that controversial
incorporation through the legislature; he remained one of the association's directors
even as he was trying to tear down the Bulfinch State House. 171 The Old South was a
monument, and nothing else; for Long this took it out of any utilitarian calculus. Long
had difficulty seeing the State House in the same way, as when Fay, for the Boston
Society of Architects, pictured it becoming
not an office or administration building full of busy offices, but rather a show
building, an historical relic, .... not ... to be used as a beehive of industry, but as
an impressive entrance to a building that may be put up behind it or on each side. 172
"The whole nutshell lies just here," replied Long. "We had supposed that the scope of
our duty was to regard this as a building, the main purpose of which was utility as a
State House." If this was the purpose, he said, "it is a great deal better to tear it
down .... "173
Each year the State House Committee agreed with Long, and each year the full
legislature granted the building a reprieve. By 1896, with the annex awaiting
connection and the old building more or less damaged by the work behind it, some
action was becoming imperative. After a series of public hearings dominated by
preservationists, the State House Committee nonetheless voted again 6 to 5 in favor of
170Henry Lee, 'The Value of Sentiment,' reprinted from American Architect and Building News,
March 9, 1895: 5.
171fBoston Globe, April 26, 1877: 2; Old South Association, List of Officers.
172Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 1: 11.
173Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 2: 26-27.
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demolition and reconstruction, bringing this story to its brief and intense crisis. The
Bulfinch State House became both a nationwide cause and a statewide political fight.
State Representative Alfred Seelye Roe of Worcester addressed mass meetings at
Faneuil Hall and the Old South meetinghouse, trying to establish a rhetorical
equivalence among the three monuments. The building's opponents in the legislature
complained, to Roe's evident glee, about organized campaigns by which their
constituents were bombarding them with letters and petitions. 174
The campaign extended beyond Massachusetts' borders to include agitation around
the country, especially in Chicago, where it rivalled that in Boston itself. Chicagoans
proposed buying the building and re-erecting it in Illinois. Their earlier threats to move
the Old State House there had seemed mere braggadoccio, but looked more serious
now because in the meantime, Chicagoans had scoured the country for historic
buildings they could bring to the 1893 World's Columbian Exposition, including an
unsuccessful attempt to secure Hawthorne's birthplace from nearby Salem. Their
efforts served as a stimulus to preservation in the east in the same way that American
raids on European historical patrimony catalyzed preservation there. 175
Preservationists won in the full legislature in the last days of the session, when it
approved a bill submitted by Roe, providing for preservation of the state house and
ensuring the necessary sensitivity to artifact by taking the restoration out of the
commissioners' hands. It would be supervised instead by Governor Roger Wolcott,
together with the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, "friends" 176 of
the Bulfmch building, and calculated to outrank the eminent commissioners. The
victory was consolidated when these three selected as architects Charles A. Cummings,
174Boston Morning Journal, March 27, 1896: 10; American Architect and Building News, Apr. 25,
1896: 33; Boston Evening Transcript, May 13, 1896: 7; Boston Morning Journal, April 16, 1896: 1;
Massachusetts General Court, Centennial of the Bulfinch State House. Exercises before the
Massachusetts Legislature, January 11, 1898 (Boston, 1898), 30.
175Roe in Massachusetts General Court, Centennial, 19-20; see also James Michael Lindgren, 'The
Gospel of Preservation in Virginia and New England: Historic Preservation and the Regeneration of
Traditionalism' (Ph.D. diss., College of William and Mary, 1984), 92.
176George P. Lawrence of North Adams and George v. L. Meyer of Boston. Meyer was an investment
banker whose sister Helen Meyer was later an important supporter of the Society for the Preservation
of New Enbgland Antiquities (Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 260); "The placing of the work in
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Robert D. Andrews, and Arthur G. Everett, each of whom had been active in the
preservation campaign. 177
Work was finished in time for the centennial of the building's original opening,
"fresh from the hand of the rehabilitator, old yet new," 178 said Alfred Seelye Roe at its
re-dedication. "The results surround us. Esto perpetua."179
The Bulfinch State House brought together two strains of preservation, one
concerned with historical significance and the other with broader visual, functional, and
sentimental significance. The first had saved two important buildings, and the second
had prevented encroachments on traditional public spaces. At the state house,
preservation was more about architecture than history, and it was about architecture
evaluated not so much in an academic framework as for its contribution to the visual
structure of the city. Across the short side of the Common, next to the Granary burial
ground, was Park Street Church, subject of a controversy which flared and then fizzled
during two years beginning late in 1902, following close upon the Bulfinch State
House campaign and further extending the directions it set. At the state house, the focus
on architecture was always balanced by confidence that the building was also of the
greatest historical and symbolic significance, a monument in every sense of the word.
Park Street Church, on the other hand, was still more recent (1809), and of what even
its defenders admitted was limited historical value, but it was a familiar and beautiful
building at the most prominent corner in the city.180 It was a landmark, not a
monument. Park Street Church produced the best articulation yet of an aesthetic basis
for preservation, and of a philosophical kinship between preservation and the parks
movement.
the care of its friends was wholly intentional," said A. S. Roe in Massachusetts General Court,
Centennial, 27; 1896 Senate bill 253 (as amended Senate bill 259).
177Massachusetts General Court, Centennial, 28.
178Massachusetts General Court, Centennial, 25.
179Massachusetts General Court, Centennial, 17.
1800n the Park Street spire in general, see American Architect and Building News, Oct. 31, 1896: 33.
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The Park Street Church debate was prefigured in different ways by two episodes,
each of which was resolved before it could become a real controversy. The first
happened twenty years earlier, when Back Bay residents in 1881 campaigned to
preserve the new Brattle Square Church on Commonwealth Avenue, or at least its
spire, as the defunct congregation's assets were liquidated. When an auction of the
property was announced, J. Montgomery Sears led other Back Bay residents in
organizing to save the H. H. Richardson building, then just nine years old. They did
not want to see, in the Evening Transcript's words, "our most magnificent avenue ...
bereft of its most conspicuous ornament." 181 The appeal quickly brought pledges of
$30,000, but the organizers expected the building to sell for $150,000, and so they
abandoned the effort. Sears attended the auction out of curiosity, and when bidding ran
only half the anticipated sum, he stepped in and bought the property himself for
$81,000, taking it with "a vague idea of utilizing it as a public hall or music hall, or in
some other way preserving it." 182 He offered it at cost to any religious body, or at a
slight advance to anyone else who would take it subject to the condition that at least the
tower be preserved. Lest potential allies think he had made the building's preservation
his own private philanthropy, he threatened five weeks after he bought it to demolish
the whole thing if a purchaser did not come forward within two months, and two
months after this deadline passed he advertised for removal of the building as salvage.
George B. Chase, a member of the Old South Preservation Committee, organized a
campaign to save the tower alone, calculating that selling off the rest of the lot would
leave at most $30,000 to be raised. Chase had obtained pledges of more than $20,000,
and assurances that the city would fit up and maintain the steeple as a clock tower,
when Sears found a buyer, the First Baptist Church, willing to put the whole building
back into use and thus end the question.183 This six months of sporadic effort was
significant for what it reveals about contemporary attitudes toward preservation. Just
18 1Editorial, Boston Evening Transcript, June 16, 1881: 4.
182Editorial, Boston Evening Transcript, May 11, 1881: 4; May 7, 1881: 2; May 10, 1881: 1.
183Boston Evening Transcript, October 11, 1881: 4; June 16, 1881: 4; advertisement cited in letter to
the editor, Boston Evening Transcript, October 11, 1881: 5; [George B. Chase], 'Brattle St. Church
Tower' MS subscription book, T. Chase papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. The pledges ranged
from $250 to $5,000; as the Springfield Republican wrote: "The appeal is rather to the wealthy than
the sentimental citizen" (quoted in George B. Chase letter to the editor, Boston Daily Advertiser, July
29, 1881, clipping in subscription book).
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after the Old South and the Old State House campaigns, some people drew from those
efforts the general lesson that they need not accept change in any valued part of the
environment, whether or not it had already achieved the semblance of permanence
through longevity. The Brattle Church tower took its value not from history, but from
its place in a larger scheme of urban design.
The second episode involved St. Paul's Episcopal Church, immediately preceding the
Park Street Church controversy and starting as a closely analogous question. Just a few
steps away from Park Street, St. Paul's faced the Common on Tremont Street, a granite
and sandstone Greek Temple built in 1819 to the designs of Bulfinch's disciple
Alexander Parris. In 1901 a real estate syndicate, after negotiating with the
congregation's treasurer, offered $1.5 million for the church property. The proprietors,
uneasy about removing the last Episcopal church from the center of Boston, declined
this princely sum. The following year a new offer matched that amount and added a
$5,000 individual bonus for each of the 41 proprietors who would vote in favor of the
sale. Such blatant bribery evidently offended Brahmin pride; this time the vote against
selling was "practically unanimous." 184
Later in 1902, a different syndicate headed by developer John Phillip Reynolds, Jr.,
approached the 'prudential committee' which managed the worldly business of Park
Street Church across the street. Although its lot was only half the size of St. Paul's,
they offered $1,250,000 for it. Park Street was an evangelical congregation, born in the
religious revival of 1808. and so its site had come to be called 'Brimstone corner.' Over
the past generation attendance had fallen off and in 1895, with chronic annual deficits,
the church society altered the building to rent out part of its ground floor as stores. Two
years later, while the congregation was drifting without a minister and its debt
increasing, the society renewed the store's leases with a new clause "in case of the sale
of the Church," for the first time acknowledging this possibility. 185 The deacons
brought back a previous pastor, Dr. John L. Withrow, and then determined in 1898
184Boston Evening Transcript, April 1, 1902: 12; William Shand Tucci, Built in Boston: City and
Suburb, 1800-1950 (Boston, 1978), 13; Boston Sunday Journal, February 17, 1901: 1, 2; American
Architect and Building News, Mar. 2, 1901: 66.
185Quoted in H. Crosby Englizian, Brimstone Corner: Park Street Church, Boston (Chicago, 1968),
202.
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that "the church should be kept in its present edifice."186 A few years later, with their
finances unimproved and the church's mortgage coming due, they were not so sure.
The developers' offer, said Withrow, was "the Lord's doing."187
Moving to the comfortable Back Bay and taking refuge in an endowment might be
seen as a departure from the idea of an evangelical church; some members of the society
wondered whether it wanted to make such a change in its mission. Framing the
question in this way tilted the answer toward preservation, but the practical
businessmen who served the church as officers and deacons saw it differently. The
society's property already constituted an enormous endowment which could both pay
for a new church and support substantial missionary work; the question was whether to
devote it to religious purposes or keep it locked up in architecture. "Are we right in
allowing so vast a sum to lie hid in a napkin," asked Withrow, "when the income of it
would do so much?"188
Withrow's allegorical "napkin," however, was a landmark which its admirers said
was "seen by more people to-day than any other building in the city."189 The corner
had always been visible, but its prominence increased markedly with the 1898 opening
of Park Street station in the Common across from the church, the most important stop
on the new subway. More than thirty thousand people a day, who in the past might
have stepped off a streetcar anywhere along Tremont Street, now emerged blinking in
the daylight to the sight of Peter Banner's graceful steeple. "The site is the most
conspicuous in the whole city," according to the developers' agent, "and there can be
no more advantageous position for a retail establishment."190 While the corner's new
place on mental maps of Boston made the site more valuable as commercial real estate,
186Subcommittee of the Prudential Committee, quoted in Englizian, Brimstone Corner, 202.
187Springfield Republican, December 17, 1902, quoted in Committee for the Preservation of Park
Street Church, The Preservation of Park Street Church, Boston (Boston, 1903), 52. The mortgage was
due July 15, 1903 (23).
188Quoted in Englizian, Brimstone Corner, 205.
189Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 5.
190Henry Whitmore, in Boston Evening Transcript, December 15, 1902; Firey, Land Use in Central
Boston, 163.
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it also made the church's preservation seem more important. The subway in large part
made the issue.
Withrow announced the syndicate's offer before Sunday services on December 7,
1902. The deacons set two meetings, the following Thursday and Saturday, for the
pew-owners and then the society as a whole to vote on the sale. Withrow's flock
followed him, and joined in a unanimous vote of confirmation to affirm the
congregation's harmony in its decision. Ten days after the sale was first publicly
proposed, the signed agreement was recorded in the registry of deeds. 191
The sale quickly aroused opposition, and attorney Prescott F. Hall invited individuals
to contact him about organizing to preserve the building. Dr. L. Vernon Briggs asked
those interested in the cause to meet at his Beacon Street home on January 14, 1903, to
coordinate "the different efforts now being put forth by many persons." 192. Briggs
announced that $100,000 had been pledged already toward an effort to save the church;
it was later made public that this came from two individuals offering $50,000 each. 193
The Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church was organized at that
meeting, its membership entirely unconnected with the congregation,194 and it soon
announced pledges of $200,000 and then $300,000.195
"The interest in Park Street Church", explained the committee's first circular,
is not due to great antiquity or wealth of historic associations, like the Old South
Church, .... The chief interest lies in the fact that the church is an impressive
architectural monument, situated at a strategic point in the landscape of the city and
191Boston Herald, December 8, 1902: 12; December 14, 1902: 7; December 18, 1902: 8.
192Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 31; Prescott F. Hall letter,
Boston Evening Transcript, December 31, 1902 (quoted p. 51).
193Boston Evening Transcript, January 15, 1903; Boston Globe, April 2, 1903 (quoted in Committee
for the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 32, 64).
194Englizian, Brimstone Corner, 205. The three pew-owners who later led the internal opposition, Dr.
Fred T. Lewis, William K. Porter, and B. Frank Silsby, did not join this committee (Boston Globe,
July 1, 1903, quoted in Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 72).
195Boston Evening Transcript, February 27, 1903: 1; Boston Herald, March 7, 1903: 9. The increase
from two to three hundred thousand in a week, and the casualness with which these round figures were
offered, suggest that they be treated with a certain skepticism.
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constituting a beautiful and time-honored feature of Boston, indissolubly bound up
with the very thought of Boston in every mind.196
Like the Bulfinch state house, Park Street Church was valued as a work of architecture,
"the finest of the few Wren [style] spires left in America." 197 While the Boston Society
of Architects did not take action as an organization, individual architects were again
prominent in the preservation effort. 198
The building was valued not only for the details of its design, but even more for its
particular combination of architecture and location. "It is essential that a monumental
public building of some kind stand on the site of Park Street Church", wrote the
Preservation Committee; the church "already stands there, and it will cost less to retain
it than to build another monument in its place."199 "If some one thinks that his
instinctive protest is wholly on account of the edifice, and not partly against the
desecration of the site," said one letter to the editor,
let him ask himself if his feeling for the church would be the same if it were
situated, let us say, on the corner of Washington and Boylston Streets. Or, to put it
another way, would not his regret be much less keen if he could be assured that the
church would be replaced by some noble work of art or by a beautiful building
devoted to public enlightenment? 200
According to the building's defenders, Columbus Avenue, the main artery of the South
End, had been laid out to create a vista terminating at Park Street Church, one of the
only intentional vistas in Boston.201
Preservationists' concern was fueled by the church's proximity to other landmarks
which had been successfully defended over the past generation. As the preservation
committee conceived it, much more than this single building was at stake. The
accomplishments of those who had preserved the Bulfmich State House, the Granary
196Prescott F. Hall, 'Circular of the Preservation Committee,' February 7, 1903, in Committee for
the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 35.
197Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 10.
198Boston Evening Transcript, February 27, 1903: 1.
199Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 4, 6.
200
'M.N.O.' letter to the editor, Boston Evening Transcript, January 31, 1903, quoted in Committee
for the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 60.
201
"Vistas," Boston Herald (n.d.), quoted in Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church,
Preservation, 56.
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burial ground, and the Common would all be tarnished, possibly even reversed, by the
demise of Park Street Church. The church was "the beginning of the noble approach to
the State House," an effect which would be "ruined," said architect John L. Faxon, if
the church were replaced by a tall structure.202 The Granary burial ground, according
to preservation committee organizer Prescott F. Hall, could become "merely a well or
backyard for office buildings."203 Most important, the church shared in and perhaps
contributed to the sanctity of the Common. "A monument on this corner constitutes a
part of the beauty of the Common", wrote the Preservation Committee. "If you do not
have a monumental building on this corner, you weaken the hold on the Common, and
make it easier for the projected extension of Columbus Avenue and Commonwealth
Avenue across the Common." The committee tried, through these arguments, to
increase still further the spatial scale of the building's significance. "It stands at the head
of the Common, and as such, it also stands at the head of our city park system."204
Park Street Church was associated with the park system not merely by proximity;
these preservationists argued the fundamental philosophical kinship of the parks and
preservation movements. Joseph Lee, one of the committee's founders and a nationally
prominent recreation reformer, wrote of Park Street Church:
We are spending, and rightly spending, through our City and Metropolitan Park
commissions millions of dollars for the sake of preserving or creating beautiful
scenery in suburban and out-of-town sections. But the real beauty of a city - the
beauty by which it must live in the hearts of its citizens - is not rural but civic
beauty; not the beauty of the scenery by which it is surrounded, but the beauty and
appropriateness of its own public and business structures and of the civic centres of
which they form a part; not the beauty of the woods and fields that you can visit
when you leave the city behind, but that which is found in the city itself, in the
place where its citizens live and do their work, where its business and social life are
carried on. 205
202
'M.N.O.' letter to the editor, Boston Evening Transcript, January 31, 1903, quoted in Committee
for the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 60; Boston Evening Transcript, February 27,
1903: 1.
203Prescott F. Hall letter, Boston Evening Transcript, December 31, 1902, quoted in Committee for
the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 50.
204Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 5-6.
205Letter, Boston Evening Transcript, January 5, 1903: 8; for bio, see Elisabeth M. Herlihy, ed., Fifty
Years of Boston (Boston, 1932), 771.
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Prescott F. Hall said that "[tihere is as much reason for the preservation of a unique
building like Park Street Church as there is for preserving notable natural features in the
State,"26 and drew the conclusion that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ought to
do both.
These people looked to the government not merely because of the philosophical
rationale of the park analogy, but also for pragmatic reasons. The $300,000 total
pledged was more than had been collected by any preservation effort in the nation since
the Old South,207 yet it was only a fraction of what Park Street Church cost. Unless
some individual of enormous wealth took an interest in the building, only the
government had the money to save it. Only the government could forcibly intervene
once the agreement of sale was signed, though Reynolds' syndicate was cooperative
enough that such force seemed unnecessary. The state was spending millions and using
its sovereign powers for projects which appeared related - a park system, construction
and restoration a block away at the State House, and limiting building heights around it
on Beacon Hill (see chapter 6). The committee almost immediately resolved to attempt a
legislative solution. Offering its pledges as the nucleus of the purchase price, it sought
state acquisition of the building either as an addition to the Metropolitan Park system or
for conversion to state offices. 208
A significant feature of this campaign was its strong, clear commitment to adaptive re-
use of the building. It was not meant as an historic shrine. The preservation committee
decided early that they were interested solely in the church's exterior, and were willing
to sacrifice the interior to save it. While the committee would have liked to see the
building used for assemblies - "an uptown Faneuil Hall" - they also explicitly advocated
and worked out the real estate arithmetic of cutting the interior into stores and
offices. 209
206Boston Evening Transcript, February 27, 1903: 1.
207Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 146.
2081903 House bill 712; Boston Evening Transcript, February 27, 1903: 1.
209Edwin D. Mead and Prescott Hall testimony at legislative hearing, Boston Evening Transcript,
February 27, 1903: 1.
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Despite a complete absence of opposition to preservation at the legislative hearings on
February 27, it immediately became clear that the state would not commit the resources
to save Park Street Church; from the beginning this option had been pursued as a long
shot.210 It was also becoming clear by this time, at least to the real estate and finance
people on the preservation committee, that tight money markets were making the
development, too, unlikely. 211 Early in March the preservationists met at the Parker
House to plan a practical new approach adjusted to these changed circumstances.
The first new approach was an offer of a $350,000 endowment for the Park Street
Church society on condition that it remain in its building. This strategy recognized that
the largest available sum which could be applied to preserving the church was the
expenditure the congregation could avoid if it did not have to buy a site and construct a
new building. The endowment offer was, in effect, an effort to separate issues for the
society's members - allowing them to decide whether they wanted to move, separately
from whether they wanted an endowment. A member of the congregation said at the
legislative hearings that the society "does not need all the money and it may be shamed
into turning part of it back towards saving the church."212 But just as at the Old South,
it was difficult for a religious body to decide that architectural preservation was a
legitimate explicit use of its resources. Once they thought about moving, the proceeds
of the sale became a tangible expectation for which many more spiritual objects
competed. Sentimental considerations indeed led many congregations to preserve old
buildings which could have been translated into endowments for other purposes, but
they most often did this by avoiding framing the question explicitly.
The Park Street society replied to this offer that it would accept such a condition only
for an endowment of $600,000 or more. That the church responded at all was a tacit
210Boston Herald, March 7, 1903, quoting Winslow Warren at Parker House meeting; Springfield
Republican, February 10, 1903, quoted in Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church,
Preservation, 32. On March 9, three days after the Parker House meeting, the legislature received a
negative report on the Park Street church bill from the Committee on the State House, which had held
the hearing. House Journal, 1903, 542.
2 11Boston Herald, April 2, 1903: 10.
212Boston Evening Transcript, February 27, 1903: 1; Firey, Land Use in Central Boston, quoting
Boston Sunday Journal, March 15, 1903.
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acknowledgement that the sale would not be consummated. Their answer embodied the
same spirit of rationality in which the offer was made. They could net $600,000 by
moving; in effect, they insisted on the full value of their asset and refused to donate any
substantial portion of it to this extraneous cause. To the public at large, however, it
appeared that they were being greedy, even that they were holding the building for
ransom.
A second proposed preservation strategy was purchase by a 'Civic Memorial
Corporation,' to convert more of the building to income-producing uses and lease most
of it back to the church. This corporation was conceived in the tenement reform
tradition of investment philanthropy; unlike housing schemes, the promoters of which
felt an ideological need to offer competitive five-, six-, and even seven-percent
dividends, this one proposed a two-percent return, emphasizing philanthropy rather
than investment with its two-percent return. This plan too would tap the society's
assets, in the form of rents, interior space to be converted, and even direct reinvestment
by the society in the Memorial Corporation's bonds. Individual church members also
indicated some interest in making such an investment, at least half of which would in
effect be donated.213
Then on April 1, 1903, the developers' option officially lapsed; the syndicate missed
its first scheduled payment and backed out of the deal. The church's leaders said
nothing to indicate that it was not still on the market, but newspapers announced that
the building was saved, and contributed to a perception that the congregation would
now cooperate in preserving it. During the next two months, the Civic Memorial
Association presumably pursued and failed in negotiations with the church; the deacons
called a meeting for June 30, 1903, at which the congregation, amid hard feelings,
voted to seek another buyer for the property. 214
2 13Boston Globe, April 2, 1903, quoted in Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church,
Preservation, 66; Eugenie Ladner Birch and Deborah S. Gardner, 'The Seven-Percent Solution, A
Review of Philanthropic Housing, 1870-1910,' Journal of Urban History, v. 7, no. 4 (August, 1981):
403-38.
214Boston Herald, April 2, 1903; also Boston Globe, July 1, 1903, Boston Morning Journal, July 1,
1903, both quoted in Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 71-74.
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By the following spring the prudential committee had sifted the options to two,
neither of them as financially attractive as the aborted sale had been. One was a
proposal by the Boston Herald that the church build a five-story headquarters for the
newspaper, which it would rent for $52,000 a year on a 20-year lease. The other, a less
radical version of the Preservation Committee's plans, called for further modifications
to make more of the ground floor rentable while keeping the church in place upstairs.
The prudential committee recommended accepting the Herald proposal and building a
new church elsewhere.215
Preservationists began a new kind of lobbying campaign, aimed not at any public
body but at the church members themselves, the group best able to save the building
and presumably having the greatest feelings of affection for it. The lobbying proceeded
along several lines. Preservationists cited financial analyses showing that renovation of
the existing building would produce more income than new construction. As with the
endowment offer, this helped to separate issues for the society; if financial security and
preservation of the building were not mutually exclusive, then a decision to destroy it
required a more compelling rationale. The preservationists brought into question the
financial wisdom of accepting the Herald's proposal, in particular. A newspaper plant
was a specialized property which would be obsolete at the end of the lease, they said,
leaving the church without an income. Finally, they aimed to tap the congregation's
sentiments to save the building: reverence for the building itself and the congregation's
own history in it, and also the same sort of prickly pride which had saved St. Paul's.
The Herald, not treating the matter as a purely business proposition, had already begun
claiming that the popular press was an appropriate successor to the evangelical pulpit.
"Shall the church assent to this humiliation?" asked the preservationists. 216
The congregation supported its deacons' recommendation, endorsing the Herald deal
by by a 68 to 59 vote, but this was a big change from the earlier sale's near-unanimous
support, and indicated the effectiveness of the preservationists' arguments. Their
215Englizian, Brimstone Corner, 205-06.
216 Quoted in Englizian, Brimstone Corner, 207.
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lobbying continued, and two weeks later, at the pew-owners' meeting to take final
action, the deacons withdrew the proposal without putting it to a vote.217
Dr. Withrow, unlike Rev. Manning at the Old South, chose to interpret the interest of
the congregation and the community as a hopeful sign for the church's religious future;
at the beginning of 1905 he urged the society to find him a young, dynamic associate
who could work to make the church prosper again at its old location. He may have
heeded the Boston Journal, which asked, "if Park Street Church cannot make a success
on 'Brimstone Corner,' which has been advertised all over the country, where in the
city can it make a success?" 218 For a church committed by its evangelical creed to
reaching out for new believers, the most conspicuous corner in the city was perhaps the
place to be after all. By the end of the year the congregation found its dynamic new
minister in Dr. Arcturus Z. Conrad, and Park Street Church continued to fulminate at
Brimstone Corner.
Conrad quickly seized on the preservation committee as a potential ally. He appealed
to these citizens, strangers to his congregation, to help him keep the church at its
traditional location. He asked $10,000 for painting and restoring the building. Conrad
acknowledged that he was not in a position to guarantee that the church would remain,
but promised personally that if it moved despite their aid, the money would be returned.
Within a few weeks he had his $10,000.219
By the building's 1909 centennial, six years after the deacons turned down $350,000
and insisted that $600,000 was the price for remaining in the old church, they were
plaintively appealing to lift a debt of $35,000 and seeking to raise an endowment of
$100,000, which they would accept, they said, "on the condition of the continuance of
worship at the present location." They did not raise the money for many years.220
217Englizian, Brimstone Corner, 207.
218Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church, Preservation, 74, quoting Boston Journal,
July 1, 1903. Englizian (Brimstone Corner, 209) says it is not in that issue of the Journal.
219Englizian, Brimstone Corner, 211. Other than painting, all the money was spent on the building's
interior.
220Rev. A[rcturus] Z. Conrad, ed., Commemorative Exercises at the One Hundredth Anniversary of the
Organization of Park Street Church, February 26 -March 3, 1909 (Boston, 1909), 27; Englizian,
Brimstone Corner, 219.
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Conrad, who succeeded Withrow to the pulpit, neutralized any implied threat of
removal by treating the church as if it were his associate minister: "The building itself is
eloquent ... Our Church building works with us and for us .... This temple is religion
in brick and mortar. ... a sentinel of God on this conspicuous corner of Boston
Common ... it preaches." 22 1
Park Street Church was in a way the culmination of nineteenth-century preservation
as a movement to resist change in the urban environment. The significance of
preservatinists' work for it is not easy to gauge, because unlike the Old South
Preservation Committee, its defenders did not ever have to constitute themselves as a
permanent entity or produce concrete results. Their aims were achieved indirectly, and
mostly out of the public eye, so it is impossible even to say for certain to what extent
they resulted from the committee's work. Yet they synthesized significant directions in
which the preservation movement was heading, directions it would again take later in
the twentieth century.
The effort continued and made fully explicit the concern shown at the Bulfinch State
House for architecture and urban views, rather than historic events. It embraced a more
explicit and radical idea of adaptive re-use than had yet been articulated, resulting
distinctly from the campaign's urban viewpoint: preservationists were concerned only
about the church's exterior. It continued the role of architects, both as advocates and as
experts, and even added real estate people in the same role, a position they would not
often take at this scale for decades to come. It began to place preservation in a
constellation of progressive concerns about the urban environment, ranging from the
long-established parks movement to the emerging city planning movement. Finally, it
urged government action at a large scale. To equate architectural preservation with
landscape preservation - the kind being accomplished through the parks movement -
implied an ambitious agenda which preservationists would not in fact take up until John
D. Rockefeller, Jr., in 1926 began financing restoration of colonial Williamsburg.
Both the values and many of the tactical approaches of the Bulfinch State House and
Park Street Church preservationists are familiar in the field today. However, the
22 1Conrad, Commemorative Exercises, 161-62.
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movement in Boston, and to a lesser extent in the rest of the country, was soon to head
in a different direction which would take it away from these values and methods for
several decades.
The institutionalization of the preservation movement
After the turn of the century, preservation changed from a set of ad hoc actions to an
institutionalized movement. In the process both its aims and its methods were
fundamentally transformed.
When the American Architect in 1886 first wrote about the threat to the Bulfinch
State House, its editors assumed that Boston already had institutions to look after
preservation; "we trust", they said, "that the Massachusetts Historical Society, the
Bostonian Society, and the Boston Society of Architects will" rally to the building's
defense.222 The unprecedented role ultimately taken by the architects' society in that
campaign was all the more remarkable because the other two groups, though well
represented by individual activists, did not consider the issue an appropriate one for
institutional action.
The Massachusetts Historical Society, like its counterparts in other states, saw itself
as a scholarly clearinghouse, a library, and above all a unique repository for
manuscripts - and for artifacts much smaller than buildings. It ordinarily remained aloof
from politics, even the politics of preservation. The society's priority of protecting its
collections and making them accessible to scholars gave it little direct use for historic
structures; it had shied away from the Old South Church, and in 1898 it moved
altogether out of the center of Boston, to a new fireproof headquarters on the
Fenway. 223
222American Architect and Building News, June 26, 1886: 301.
223see Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 114-15. The Massachusetts Historical Society was typical; like
others, it needed a fireproof headquarters for its manuscript collections.
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The Bostonian Society was chartered in 1881 "for the purpose of promoting the study
of the history of Boston, and for the preservation of its antiquities."224 Its predecessor,
the Boston Antiquarian Club, set a preservationist course for itself immediately upon
formation when it led the fight to save the Old State House; it incorporated specifically
to create a legally responsible institution as custodian and occupant for the building.
After this, however, it subsided into a less activist role, defining the 'antiquities' it
would save mainly as documents, views, and historic bric-a-brac, and its members
returned to the old antiquarian habit of lamenting the passing of landmarks as they fell,
and reminiscing about them afterwards.225 The Old State House itself may have played
a role in this tactical retreat: preserving this one important building turned out to be a
continuing and substantial job. With the building's condition dependent on the good
will of the city and the state, the group may have thought it diplomatic to steer clear of
other controversies.
The Bostonian Society limited its intervention in the environment to the placing of
tablets marking historic sites, such as the location of the Boston Massacre. When the
owners tore down the building on which this tablet was mounted, the Society
complaisantly and without comment stored it to remount on a new structure. The
afternoon before the Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church was
organized, the Bostonian Society held its annual meeting. President Curtis Guild called
attention to the Park Street Church issue, not with a plea for preservation, nor any
mention of the next day's meeting, but with a call for more memorial tablets.226
A growing number of organizations shared this territory on the periphery of
preservation. Increasing preoccupation with pedigree led to the multiplication of
patriotic and genealogical societies. The national Daughters of the American Revolution
224Proceedings of the Bostonian Society (1903): [74].
225John Ritchie, a neighbor of the Bulfinch State House who would later join the preservation
committee to save it, said at the 1887 hearings that he was "astounded that the Bostonian Society ...
did not appear to enter their plea ..." Boston Evening Transcript, March 24, 1887: 1.
226Proceedings of the Bostonian Society (1914), 23; (1903), 6. Of the Park Street committee's 18
members, the only officer or former officer of the Bostonian Society was William H. Lincoln,
president of the Chamber of Commerce.
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was organized in 1890, with preservation as part of its agenda; its Massachusetts
chapters quickly found an outlet in the Bulfinch State House campaign.227
Elsewhere in New England, local historical societies and other groups, spurred by the
1876 Centennial and the Old South Preservation Committee's success, set out with
increasing frequency to save old buildings in their towns. Most of these were selected
for their historic associations, either with illustrious ancestors or with campaigns of the
American Revolution. Lexington, Massachusetts, eventually preserved a collection of
buildings connected with the battle there; the town even conceived the project as part of
its park system.228 In Ipswich, the historical society in 1898 bought the seventeenth-
century Whipple house as its headquarters, not for any historic occupant or events
which occurred there, but simply as an artifact inherently interesting on account of its
age, "a link that binds us to the remote Past" and its "manner of living," said the
society's president.229 Such concern with material culture was a growing trend
eventually embodied in the Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities.
This trend came to Boston proper in 1905 as a movement to save the Paul Revere
house. Revere's conspicuous place in the revolutionary pantheon gave the house
conventional historic value, but it was also the oldest remaining structure in the city,
dating from sometime between 1676 and 1681. It stood on North Square, fashionable
in Revere's day but at the heart of what had since become the Italian North End. Tall
brick buildings loomed over it on all sides, and the house itself had been raised one
story, subdivided, and converted to a grocery store, tenements, and a cigar factory (fig.
5.6.). Generations of antiquarians and tourists had made the pilgrimage through this
strange and threatening district where they endured "the vile odors of garlic and
onions"230 to gaze at the greatly altered structure which sported a commemorative
227 Lewis Barrington, Historic Restorations of the Daughters of the American Revolution (New York,
1941), preface; Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 131-32.
228Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 109-111.
229Reverend Thomas Franklin Waters, quoted in Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 113.
230 Samuel Adams Drake, Our Colonial Homes (1893), quoted in Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,'
233.
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plaque and a "variety of signs with Italian names, strangely out of harmony with the
memories of its earlier history." 231
The house was surely destined for eventual replacement by a larger tenement
building, although it is not clear how immediate this threat ever became. It was
effectively saved around 1903, when it came onto the market and was bought for
$12,000 by John Phillips Reynolds, Jr., the real estate developer then trying to tear
down Park Street Church, who was coincidentally a descendant of Paul Revere. He
AA
fig. 5.6. Paul Revere House, 1895, before restoration. "[N]eighborhood
ydungsters," notes archivist Philip Bergen, "greet the photographer with a timeless
gesture." 232
231Boston Globe, April 11, 1905, in North Square/ Paul Revere scrapbook, SPNEA.
232Philip Bergen, Old Boston in Early Photographs, 1850-1918 (New York, 1990), 25.
.- 0
207
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
and several other prominent men in April 1905 organized the Paul Revere Memorial
Association, to raise money to reimburse himself for the purchase, restore the house,
and open it "for some historical, educational, or patriotic purpose." Without publicly
divulging Reynolds' ownership, their solicitations warned that the structure "is in
danger of destruction, and prompt steps are necessary in order to preserve it."2 3 By
the early part of 1907 they had raised enough to take title and begin restoring the
building.
The Revere house restoration was unlike any other Boston had seen. The Old South
Church, Faneuil Hall, and the two state houses were major public buildings, their
exteriors and at least potentially their interiors a part of most Bostonians' experience.
Their design and the technology of their construction were familiar, and the changes
they had undergone were comparatively well documented, so appropriate treatments for
them were matters of widespread amateur debate. The Revere house, on the other hand,
was outside the daily ambit of its preservers, and had undergone radical and unrecorded
changes. As it was agreed in principle that the building, contrary to Ruskinian precepts,
ought to be returned "to its original condition," its treatment became not a subject for
public discussion but instead a matter for expert investigation, an essentially private
question.234 It was not architecture but archaeology. The work was undertaken by
restoration architect Joseph Everett Chandler, whose interest was almost entirely in the
original seventeenth-century construction, rather than the period of Revere's tenure a
century later, with the result that, as one historian has written, "Paul Revere, were he to
return to North Square, would not recognize it as the house in which he long lived."235
To satisfy the project's patriotic sponsors, the second floor interior was restored to an
approximation of its late eighteenth-century appearance. It opened to the public on April
18, 1908, the 133d anniversary of Revere's midnight ride.236
233Printed circular letter (1905); 'Paul Revere's House Saved,' unidentified clipping [1907], both in
North Square/ Paul Revere scrapbook, SPNEA.
234WSA letter, Boston Post, June 16, 1905, in North Square/ Paul Revere scrapbook, SPNEA.
235Walter Muir Whitehill, foreward , in Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 13; JEC letter to Walter
Gilman Page, Mar. 2, 1907, in North Square/ Paul Revere scrapbook, SPNEA.
236William Sumner Appleton, 'Destruction and Preservation of Old Buildings in New England,' Art &
Archaeology 8 (1919): 144; invitation, in North Square/ Paul Revere scrapbook, SPNEA.
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The Paul Revere Memorial Association's greatest contribution to preservation, as it
turned out, was not restoring this particular house, but rather helping to awaken to his
life's work the association's secretary, William Sumner Appleton, Jr., who would
found the Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities and become the
country's first full-time preservationist.
In 1905 Appleton was a 31-year-old Brahmin without portfolio, trying to figure out
what to do with his life.237 His Beacon Hill pedigree was impeccable. His grandfather
Nathan Appleton moved to Boston from New Hampshire at the end of the eighteenth
century, later joined in founding Lowell and propelled the family into the highest
stratum of Boston wealth. The next generation used this wealth to devote themselves to
culture and philanthropy; Nathan's sons were directors of the Boston Athenaeum and
the new Museum of Fine Arts; his daughter Fanny brought culture to the family more
intimately by marrying Henry Wadsworth Longfellow.
Sumner Appleton himself (so called to distinguish him from his father, William
Sumner Appleton, Senior) grew up at 39 Beacon Street, a mansion built for his
grandfather in 1816, facing the Common two blocks from the state house. He believed
the house designed by Bulfinch, although it has since been identified as Alexander
Parris' first Boston commission.238 In 1886, when Appleton was twelve, as apartment
houses rose nearby and legislators debated tearing down the state house, his father sold
the Beacon Street house and moved the family. If Appleton's background gave him this
small taste of urban change, it also gave him a more than average introduction to
Boston's search for permanence. During his childhood on Beacon Street, his father
joined in founding the Bostonian Society and the American Historical Association. His
uncle Nathan Appleton had spoken for preserving the Old South Church. His older
cousin and good friend, Alice Longfellow (the poet's daughter, "grave Alice") served
237William Sumner Appleton, Jr.'s background is best described in Katherine H. Rich's 'Beacon,' Old-
Time New England 66 (1976): 42-60. Other information here comes from Lindgren, 'Gospel of
Preservation,' 227-47; Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 237-39, and 'William Sumner Appleton, 1874-
1947,' Old-Time New England 38, no. 4 (April, 1948): 71-72.
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the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association as vice-regent for Massachusetts. One of his
uncles nearly bought the Hancock house for his home, and did in fact salvage its
staircase; Appleton must have been conscious even as a child of the building's site
down the street from 39 Beacon.239
Appleton enrolled at Harvard, and studied with Charles Eliot Norton, the Ruskin
disciple who had recently written his Scribner's article bemoaning the lack of old
houses in America.24 After he graduated, he set out with a tutor on a grand tour of
Europe. When he returned he set up in business as a real estate broker, a vocation he
pursued in a desultory manner for three years until this career was cut short by what he
described as a "nervous breakdown."24 1 Appleton's father died in 1903, leaving his
inheritance in a trust which would provide a comfortable if not lavish income for the
rest of his life, without allowing him to touch the principal. Appleton then spent several
years in a more-or-less aimless existence. He tried managing the family farm. He toyed
with becoming a mining engineer in the west. He catalogued his father's coin
collection. He lived at his club and spent his time in a vapid whirl of Sunday social calls
and dinners with relatives.
Appleton came to the Paul Revere house effort through involvement with the
Massachusetts Sons of the Revolution, and his considerable work for the Memorial
Association - as its secretary, he took on most of its organizational chores, and was
credited by one newspaper as the "architect" of the campaign242 - seems to have been
motivated by the house's patriotic associations, together with his own need to occupy
time. He had shown no particular interest in architecture or old buildings, but this
quickly changed. He enrolled in an architecture course at Harvard, bought a camera,
and began touring and photographing the towns of eastern Massachusetts, paying
238Pamela Fox, 'Nathan Appleton's Beacon Street Houses,' Old-Time New England 70 (1980): 111-
23.
239Proceedings of the Bostonian Society (1907): 47.Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 51,238, n.
37.
240Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 230; Norton, 'Lack of Old Homes.'
241Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 232.
242Unidentified clipping, in North Square/ Paul Revere scrapbook, SPNEA.
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special attention to their oldest structures. He joined the directors of the Bostonian
Society, and met with the Governor and the Mayor as a member of a committee to
protect the Old State House from damage by the subway. He drew and publicized park
and planning schemes. On a tour of Europe in 1909 he took note of preservation and
restoration efforts there.
When Appleton returned, he continued this interest by attempting, as state vice
president of the Sons of the Revolution, to intercede in the impending alteration of
Lexington's Jonathan Harrington house, the owner of which found it ill-suited for
modern living. Harrington, shot in the battle on April 19, 1775, had made it back
across the Common to die on his own doorstep at his wife's feet, in one of the
Revolution's more romantic vignettes. "This story had always made a strong appeal to
me," Appleton recalled later, "and it seemed as though a house having such
associations should be safeguarded against all alterations."243 While Appleton's
interest, like earlier preservation efforts, stemmed from patriotic associations, the threat
which so incensed him was an architectural one - not demolition but renovation. He
was frustrated to find himself powerless to protect the house in any way. "From that
moment on my life's work seemed to be cut out for me..." 244 He was "ripe" for such a
discovery, says a recent biographer:
Sumner Appleton was thiry-six years old, midway in life. He had felt like a failure.
He had no occupation, no wife, no child. What he did have was a trust fund which
freed his energies. He had some real estate experience, a little formal coursework in
architecture, in public speaking, in publication. He had been in society on the hill
which spread out to include Harvard - his acquaintance stretched through a vast and
well-placed family into an erudite, if occasionally precious, world.245
Appleton put all this background to work as he set out on his mission with a
thoroughness and vigor which had not marked his life thus far. During the winter he
prepared a charter for a 'Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities'
243Harvard College, 25th Anniversary Report of the Class of 1896 (1921), quoted in Rich, 'Beacon,'
56; SPNEA Bulletin 1 (1910): 4.
244Harvard College, 25th Anniversary Report of the Class of 1896, (1921), 14 ff., quoted in Rich,
'Beacon,' 56.
245Rich, 'Beacon,' 57-58.
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(SPNEA)* and rounded up a board of directors "selected more for the connections of
its members than for their antiquarian knowledge".2 He enlisted Charles Knowles
Bolton, librarian of the Boston Athenaeum, as president, and chose for himself the
position of 'Corresponding Secretary.' In March of 1910 he appeared alone before a
committee of the legislature where he had "fixed it up with Senator Rockwood" that the
organization's as-yet-hypothetical properties should be made tax-exempt.247 In April,
eighteen incorporators held the new society's first meeting, and in May Appleton
publicly launched the group's membership-building phase by publishing the first issue
of its Bulletin.
The first Bulletin was a manifesto which showed that Appleton's recent years had
not been entirely idle, but had produced a well thought out preservation program of
unprecedented ambition. On its cover appeared a photograph of the John Hancock
house. "Built 1737 by Thomas Hancock. Destroyed 1863," said the terse caption. "The
fate of this house has become a classic in the annals of vandalism." The next two pages
presented more encouraging illustrations: four houses preserved in towns around
Boston, including the Whipple house in Ipswich. "Our New England antiquities are
fast disappearing," began the text,
because no society has made their preservation its exclusive object. That is the
reason for the formation of this Society.
Historical, ancestral, patriotic, and similar societies have been frequently
organized, of whose work that of preservation is only a part. ... Only rarely does
one of them save some old building, probably to be its headquarters, and when this
is accomplished other local landmarks are likely to be neglected.24
Appleton reflected on his own experience with the Paul Revere house, and other
similar ad hoc efforts. "This is splendid as far as it goes, but since the mechanism is
* Appleton himself admitted he had coined an unfortunate mouthful, and his successors are not offended
if it is pronounced 'spi-NEE-uh'.
246Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 151, quoting letter to Hosmer from Orcutt.
247Quoted in Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 242.
248SPNEA Bulletin 1 (1910): 4.
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elaborate it is seldom used, and it is wasteful because without much more elaboration it
can be used to cover the whole field."2 49
The whole field, to Appleton, meant all six New England states. Nowhere in the
United States had preservationists attempted such a regional organization. The closest
prototype was the Association for the Preservation of Virginia Antiquities, which
Appleton had joined in 1907 and on which he modelled the society's name, but he was
not interested in copying APVA's decentralized structure of local chapters. Even more
than the Bostonian Society, the APVA valued commemoration over preservation,
approving for the 1907 Jamestown Tercentenary a fanciful reconstruction of the
settlement's church, built of bricks taken from two genuine Colonial buildings which
were demolished expressly for the purpose. 2-50 Two other statewide organizations
nominally concerned with historic preservation were the Massachusetts Trustees of
Reservations and the American Scenic and Historic Preservation Society, but both of
them concentrated on natural areas; American Scenic, despite its name and ambition,
was in practice a New York state rather than a national organization.251
What Appleton had in mind was a sort of institutional deus ex machina:
The situation requires aggressive action by a large and strong society, which shall
cover the whole field and act instantly wherever needed to lead in the preservation
of noteworthy buildings and historic sites. That is exactly what this Society has
been formed to do.252
He went on to enumerate the sorts of "noteworthy buildings and historic sites" he had
in mind: "blockhouses and garrison houses, of which but few are left; the oldest
settlers' houses"; "Georgian" houses and "town houses"; battlefields and taverns. "We
may also include Indian names, old trails, roadside watering places and other objects of
note." Conspicuously absent from the list were public buildings of any sort, including
churches. Nowhere did Appleton mention the Old South Church, Faneuil Hall, or
249SPNEA Bulletin 1 (1910): 4.
250'The project was initiated and carried out by the Colonial Dames; Lindgren, 'Gospel of
Preservation,' 103-04. In 1922-23, again at the Dames' instigation, the APVA cannibalized the 1622
ruins of the Jamestown mill to construct a memorial shrine (181-82, note 81). For Appleton on the
APVA, see Lindgren, 130-3 1.
25 1Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 94.
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either state house. The only Boston antiquities he discussed were the Hancock and
Revere houses and the Old Feather Store, three buildings of domestic scale. The
society's program was aimed only at such modest structures. "It is proposed to
preserve the most interesting of these buildings by obtaining control of them through
gift, purchase, or otherwise, and then to restore them, and finally to let them to tenants
under wise restrictions...." 253
At the end of a year the society had grown to more than 300 members in 20 states,
with local officers in all six New England states, and a treasury of more than $3,000 -
but as yet no antiquities. Three months later, SPNEA bought the 1670 Usley house in
Newbury, Massachusetts, which "put the Society immediately in the long hoped for
position of having actually done something," 254 a position which Appleton knew was
necessary for sustaining interest and continuing to build membership. By the end of the
society's second year, it owned two houses and was undertaking a fund drive with
which it would soon buy a third.255
SPNEA had already established patterns of operation it would follow, with only
tactical adjustments, for decades to come. Appleton discussed them in his second
annual report as he reviewed the year's ten "completed transactions."2 56 In addition to
the two houses purchased - one of them as a rental investment, and the other subject to
a life occupancy which substantially reduced its price - he listed one house promised to
the Society as a gift, two for which other groups were found as agents of preservation,
three which found their way into sympathetic private ownership, and one which was
dismantled for later re-erection. In only one case had the Society's efforts utterly failed.
What it seems to show is this: the mere existence of this Society is a safeguard for
all our finest old houses. When one such is in danger of destruction the possibility
252SPNEA Bulletin 1 (1910): 5.
253SPNEA Bulletin 1 (1910): 6.
254SPNEA Bulletin 3 (1912): 14.
255The second house was the 1808 Fowler house in Danversport, bought subject to life occupancy by
its owners; the third was the 1657 Cooper-Austin house in Cambridge.
256SPNEA Bulletin 3 (1912): 18.
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of our intervening seems to occur more and more frequently to those whom ties of
residence or family bind to the old building.257
The society would never be able to acquire all the properties which came to its
attention each year, and Appleton tried to maximiz its effectiveness by husbanding
resources of both money and energy. He sought local groups to undertake preservation
campaigns, organizing new ones where necessary, in order to leave SPNEA as a
purchaser of last resort. Even then, the society used its funds only as a catalyst for
raising money from townspeople or descendants of a building's occupants. It would
soon begin making small grants in aid to other groups' preservation efforts, and
increasingly assisted them not with money but by lending SPNEA's well-developed
regional fundraising abilities.
SPNEA's third acquisition was the 1657 Cooper-Austin house in Cambridge, but
otherwise the society was not especially active in the immediate Boston area for several
years. For both the Shirley-Eustis mansion in Roxbury and the Cary house in Chelsea,
it spawned separate societies which undertook fundraising on their own. An ad hoc
committee including the late Edward Everett Hale had saved the 1773 West Roxbury
meeting house and in 1912 sought to turn it over to SPNEA, but the society refused to
accept it unless its mortgage were paid and repairs completed. The building was razed
the following year.258
Appleton's main Boston venture was the search for a building that could serve as the
society's headquarters, which was located first in a shared rented office and then in two
rooms of the New England Historic Genealogical Society. In 1913 he tried to find a
donor who would present SPNEA with the Parker-Inches-Emery house at 40 Beacon
Street, the twin of his boyhood home. The house instead became, with Appleton's
grudging approval, the headquarters of the Women's City Club, and he continued his
search for "a suitable building somewhere on Beacon Hill."2 9 In 1916 he found it, just
off the hill on Cambridge Street, where the society with the assistance of 15 wealthy
257SPNEA Bulletin 3 (1912): 20.
258SPNEA Bulletin 3 (1912): 19; 6 (1915): 13.
259SPNEA Bulletin 6 (1915): 22; 4 (1913): 2-8; 6 (1915): 13.
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donors bought Bulfinch's first Harrison Gray Otis house of 1795. With this single
purchase half the organization's assets were suddenly in Boston real estate.
The Otis house was SPNEA's fifth acquisition. Ten years after it was founded, and
despite an intervening war and recession, the society owned seven properties in three
states, and when Appleton died in 1947 it owned fifty-one. 260
William Sumner Appleton may be justly celebrated for his contributions to both
preservation and preservationism. As for preservation, he saved a lot of buildings -
probably more than anyone else in the country before John D. Rockefeller, Jr.'s
patronage of Colonial Williamsburg. He developed methods which became a model for
much of what preservationists did during the next fifty years (about which more
below). Even more fundamental, however, was his contribution to preservationism -
the philosophy of preservation. Appleton made systematic an activity which had been
entirely ad hoc.
Preservation is inherently reactive. It seeks to protect buildings and sites from a
variety of human and natural threats, and so its tactics must respond to the
circumstances of each case. Throughout the nineteenth century, not only the activity but
the objects of preservation were decided by reaction, whether to a threat, as at the Old
South, or an opportunity, as in Reynolds' purchase of the Paul Revere house. The
objects fit for preservation were simply those buildings or places which aroused
movements in their defense. The list was compiled empirically: Park Street Church was
worth fighting for, but if St. Paul's congregation had decided to sell, would Bostonians
have fought for that one instead? Were they both worthy of preservation?
SPNEA like earlier ad hoc efforts necessarily responded to immediate threats, but
from the very beginning it did so within an intellectual framework postulating a
comprehensive and consistent standard of value. Appleton meant to substitute system
260Old-Time New England 11 (1920): 6; Old-Time New England 38 (1948): 77.
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for sentiment. Architect Thomas A. Fox offered an early glimpse of this idea at the
1896 hearings on the Bulfinch state house:
I do not think that the laity in the United States quite understand what constitutes a
historical monument. The phrase "historical monument" means a building which is
a creditable piece of architecture, which represents [a] certain period of architecture,
and which has been made valuable by historical associations.261
Appleton's system was more flexible; a building might be worthy of preservation for
history, architecture, or even age alone. Appleton viewed the built environment as an
expression of material culture, and assigned value mainly according to an art-historical
or archaeological approach. He saw buildings not as unique landmarks but as
exemplars of types. Each could be ranked relative to others of the same kind according
to its adherence to type, or the significance of its departures, and the result further
calibrated according to the importance of the type itself and the rarity of surviving
examples.262 He valued buildings which could be read as 'documents,' displaying
either a cross-section of material culture at a particular time or a longitudinal view of its
evolution through time. He did not ignore historical significance - places as loci for
events unrelated to the evolution of material culture - but in his descriptions of buildings
these associational values usually supplemented their inherent value as artifacts.
A systematic approach to value in the environment meant that worthy objects for
preservation could be identified before they were threatened. Appleton's first Bulletin
began such a process with its list of building types. He soon referred to at least a
hypothetical list of particular buildings: "There are in New England several score of
houses of supreme interest historically, architecturally, or both, the future of which is
wholly problematic."263 These systematic priorities were meant to govern preservation
activity; he closed an article on one building saved in Salem with a list of other
candidates which was "the minimum at which Salem should aim."264 SPNEA's first
purchase, ironically, would not have been on Appleton's inventory if he had actually
compiled one. He had inspected the house and reported that it "lacked sufficient historic
261Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch Front, 1: 39.
262See, e.g., SPNEA Bulletin 2 (1911): 4.
263SPNEA Bulletin 3 (1912): 20.
264SPNEA Bulletin 7 (1916): 14.
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association and architectural merit to justify the Trustees in making a purchase," but an
offer of substantial financial assistance, together with the Trustees' impatience to "make
a beginning with some house"265 led the ever-pragmatic Appleton to relax his
standards. Even such compromises he soon reduced to a system:
it must be our policy to pick out the very best houses of each type as the ones for
the preservation of which we are to work. Various factors will appear to modify
this rule slightly. The very best may be in no danger today, whereas the second best
may be doomed unless instantly protected; or perhaps the third best may be offered
on such exceptionally good terms as to make it wise to postpone the others for the
moment. Such circumstances will not alter the rule; they will be merely the
exceptions to prove iL266
He was often delivering the bittersweet verdict that "these are so good that they warrant
local effort to save them, but they are not of sufficient importance to interest our
Society." 267
Preservationists before then had not addressed the abstract question of defining
everything in the environment worth saving. Extrapolating from the variety of their
efforts - for the Park Street Church and Brattle Church tower, the trees and malls of the
Common - by implication they would have selected much more of it than Appleton, and
done so without such internal consistency. This variegated list would have included
more failures than Appleton was willing to accept. He rejected such an ad hoc approach
because it was "wasteful," not only of organizational effort but of buildings themselves;
the movement's fragmented efforts saved too little of what was most worthwhile. He
was impatient with local historical societies, which spent their efforts on whichever
house happened to be threatened at the moment, and then, overwhelmed, neglected
other more worthwhile structures. 268
The logical extension of systematic preservation was an actual inventory of
worthwhile buildings. Architectural historians within the national A.I.A. agitated
during the 'teens and 'twenties for such inventories, preferably in conjunction with a
265SPNEA Bulletin 3 (1912): 13.
266SPNEA Bulletin 7 (1916): 14.
267SPNEA Bulletin 5 (1914): 7.
268SPNEA Bulletin 1 (1910): 4. For a specific case, in Greenfield, Massachusetts, see SPNEA
Bulletin 9 (1918): 27-28.
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program of graphic recording. In 1914, SPNEA began cooperating with the Boston
Society of Architects in listing houses to be measured and drawn by volunteers.
Appleton was ambivalent, however, about making public the inventory he carried in his
head, since he conceived it mainly as a list of potential acquisitions, and found that
divulging his priorities could make negotiations difficult. When the national inventory
was finally realized in the 1930s as the Historic American Buildings Survey, Appleton
was able quickly to provide lists of eligible structures throughout New England, though
he did so reluctantly. 269
Appleton's systematic standards, while steering preservation effort away from some
directions, significantly broadened it in others. Turning from heroic and patriotic
traditions to the study of material culture gave a much more inclusive view of history.
While his aristocratic background sometimes made him an elitist in dealings with his
contemporaries, he was staunchly egalitarian toward generations which were safely
dead. When SPNEA acquired a house built in 1651 to house some of Cromwell's
Scottish prisoners of war sent to work the Saugus iron furnaces, he tried to interest
potential donors in the history of the common people. "True, the memorial is not one
connected with glorious victory," he wrote, "but neither is it to be looked on as one
connected solely with defeat. It should become a memorial to the humble beginnings of
many Scotchmen ..."270 Perhaps not surprisingly, this chord did not prove resonant.
Preservationists' purview was also broadened by the change from a visual to an
archaeological orientation. This produced strange results in the case of Boston's 1679
Province House, the colonial governors' residence, gutted in a nineteenth-century fire
and its ruins converted into first a minstrel hall and then a theater. Preservationists had
long counted the Province House as one of Boston's losses, usually listing it right after
the Hancock house. But Appleton the archaeologist took a new interest in its
fragmentary remains.
To many it may come as a complete surprise to know that any part of the old
Province House, used by the Provincial Governors of Massachusetts, is still in
existence. What is left in place is the entire front or southeast wall minus the porch
269Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 205-08; SPNEA Bulletin 5 (1914): 23; Lindgren, 'Gospel of
Preservation,' 284-86; Hosmer, Preservation Comes of Age, 1:173-74.
SPNEA Bulletin 9 (1918): 22.
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and steps; practically the entire northeast end wall with its enormous stepped and
arched exterior chimney; and a portion, perhaps as much as half, of the southeast
wall. 271
When the site was to be cleared for a new office building in the 1920s, he tried
unsuccessfully to have the chimney incorporated into one of the building's rear walls;
he had to settle for photographing and recording the remains during demolition.272
Appleton's inclusive vision indirectly refocused preservationist attention on periods
even earlier than the Bay Colony's heroic 1770s.273 While he probably would have
liked to save every seventeenth-century house in New England, Appleton knew that
there were far too many eighteenth-century structures for a 'Colonial' date to
automatically guarantee preservation. He referred to one 1774 house as "not very old,"
and the 1755 extension of another as "containing absolutely nothing of interest."274 But
he also helped move forward the chronological threshold of buildings which could be
considered eligible for preservation. The society's second acquisition was a house built
in 1809, and he found it "gratifying" when a local historical society for the first time
preserved a house in the comparatively recent Greek Revival style.275 In 1920 he
examined an 1854 building near Boston which he thought "would make an ideal period
house for the display of mid-Victorian black walnut," but he concluded that "the present
is probably fifty years too early for anything of the kind ...."276
System in setting priorities for buildings naturally extended to system in setting value
on different parts of each building's fabric; and it was here that Appleton's
archaeological proclivities became most apparent. When he was criticized for restoring
27 1SPNEA Bulletin 6 (1915): 8.
272 0ld-Time New England 11 (1920): 178; 13 (1923): 191; see Old-Time New England 62 (1972),
no. 4, special Province House issue.
2731n contrast to the period of interest - 1607 to 1861 - set out explicitly in APVA's 1889 charter,
Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 171.
274SPNEA Bulletin 5 (1914): 5; Old-Time New England 12 (1921): 178.
2750ld-Time New England 12 (1921): 182.
27601d-Time New England 11 (1920): 173-75. SPNEA accepted a 1904 house in 1921, but it was the
building's furnishings rather than the structure itself which was deemed historic. The acceptance had
little to do with any system of preservationist value; the house came with a $20,000 endowment; Old-
Time New England 12 (1921): 163.
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to the Otis house a porch which, though accurate, looked too small even to him, he
responded that
"It would have been very easy to have designed a larger and more imposing porch
which would have given the house more distinction, but, after all, what is the object
of a restoration? ... To ignore the evidence and make what may be more beautiful
... [would be] telling an archaeological falsehood.' 277
Except where recent alterations were entirely inappropriate, he felt that buildings should
display the visible record of change over time. He cautioned the Lexington Historical
Society against bringing the Buckman Tavern back to a static historical moment: "The
19th of April, 1775 is the tavern's historic day but a great part of the interior finish is
more recent, and the house is emphatically one to be preserved about as found, in order
to show the evolution of various periods and styles." 278
He promoted "the Society's thoroughly conservative rule that what is left today can be
changed tomorrow, whereas what is removed today can perhaps never be put back."279
In this he was in agreement with the 'anti-scrape' gospel of England's Society for the
Protection of Ancient Buildings; "the spirit of the work of the two societies is almost
identical", he said.280 He boasted privately that "I am ... the most conservative restorer
of the entire lot and a building is in the safest hands when I have charge of it."281 His
conservatism extended beyond materials themselves to the information embodied in
buildings; to the extent possible he made his interventions evident and therefore
reversible, and he experimented with methods of marking replacement parts, without
which restored buildings would lose "any documentary value."282
Systematic preservation as practiced by SPNEA worked to reverse preservationists'
earlier trend toward increasingly general concern with the city. Such a reversal was to
some extent inherent in any consistent systematic approach to assigning value in the
environment, because it replaced subjective reactions which came from experiencing the
277 Old-Time New England 11 (1920): 166.
278Old-Time New England 11 (1920): 176.
279 Old-Time New England 11 (1920): 167.
280SPNEA Bulletin 5 (1914): 19.
281Letter to Murray Corse, May 16, 1919, quoted in Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 285.
282SPNEA Bulletin 9 ( 1918): 34; Old-Time New England 11 (1920): 168.
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city as a topographic whole. But Appleton's particular approach refocused attention
even more sharply.
Appleton saw buildings not as parts of the environment, but as objects complete in
themselves; his view of material culture did not encompass the city itself as an artifact.
When he thought about any scale other than that of buildings, it was usually the smaller
scale of furnishings and structural components, not the larger scale of sites and
relationships among buildings. Sites were background; he sought additional land
around many SPNEA properties so that each could exist as an island apart from the
town around it.283 The scale of Appleton's concerns became further evident in his
attitudes toward moving buildings. While he urged preservation in situ whenever
possible, he did not argue like Joseph Chandler that every old building "is connected
with the history of the neighborhood and should remain where it is,"284 nor was he
concerned with the archaeological value of the site. He simply wanted to avoid the
damage done to buildings in transit, especially the destruction of original chimney
cores. The seventeenth-century Becket house in Salem, located "near coal wharves and
tenement houses," had already lost its chimney, so he felt "its removal to a more
suitable neighborhood is unquestionably a gain for all concerned."285 Similarly, he did
not see graveyards as parts of the urban landscape, nor did he view them sentimentally:
he described ancestral remains as "a thin layer of slime" with "a few metal buttons."
With his concern for material culture, it was the gravestones which were of "permanent
value," which he thought could best be protected by moving them into a museum.286
SPNEA's region-wide scope further undermined any concern with the urban
environment. The society, said one trustee, could not "successfully be a neighborhood
concern."287 If Appleton had been inclined to preserve larger pieces of the city, this
283Campaign for Cooper-Austin corner lot, SPNEA Bulletin 3 (1913): 18; Fowler house lots "forever
safeguard the setting" of the house, SPNEA Bulletin 5 (1914): 4; a list of properties of which "each
should have a little more land," SPNEA Bulletin 7 (1916): 11; Cambridge Street shops purchased in
front of Otis house, SPNEA Bulletin 9 (1919): 4-5.
284Joseph Chandler to Appleton, Oct. 8, 1917, quoted in Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 326.
285SPNEA Bulletin 7 (1916): 13.
286Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 398.
287Banker Henry W. Erving to Bolton, April 3, 1916, quoted in Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,'
287.
222
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
geographical range would have been impossible. Acquiring buildings one by one was
relatively simple compared with the expense of acquiring groups of buildings or the
complexity of dealing with planning issues.
Appleton judged buildings in Boston by the same standards as those in towns
throughout New England: intrinsic archaeological interest, independent of their
contribution to the townscape. Only Beacon Hill was an exception, where Appleton's
own subjective attachment to the place was reinforced by finding enough buildings of
value to begin viewing them as an ensemble. In his campaign for the Parker-Inches-
Emery house, he argued that "the integrity of this house is absolutely essential to the
preservation of the stately old-time appearance of Beacon Street as we know it. The
best portion of the street is from No. 39 [where he lived as a boy] to No. 45."288 Even
so, he listed the building's interior as the most important reason for saving it. Also on
Beacon Hill, in an 1914-1917 expansion of the Bulfinch state house (see chapter 6),
SPNEA got more involved than anywhere else in an issue involving a major public
building, and involving treatment of a site.289
In general, Appleton was willing to give up on much of the urban environment.
James Lindgren, in a recent study of SPNEA, attributes this to his reluctance to offend
the business interests which he hoped would support the society.2% From Appleton's
perspective, with private purchases or gifts as his only tools for preservation, he was
simply facing reality. After the Province House was gone he wrote:
It may well be asked how the destruction of such a house could be tolerated and
why was its preservation not taken in hand and carried through to success.
Where is no question but that the saving of what was left would have been
undertaken except for the prohibitive cost involved. The house stood on some of
the most valuable land in Boston, the entire lot, including much that could have
been dispensed with, being assessed for $1,800,000 and worth considerably more.
The building was doomed from the moment the contract for the new building was
signed. 29 1
288SPNEA Bulletin 4 (1913): 2-3.
289SPNEA Bulletin 6 (1915): 16-17.
2%Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 313.
291William Sumer Appleton, 'The Province House, 1922,' Old-Time New England 62 (1972): 91.
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But Appleton also sincerely believed, as he advised people throughout his career, that
"nothing can be done unless someone will appear to do it. Given such a person
everything can be done."292 He could have chosen the Old South instead of the
Hancock house as his urban object lesson, so his abandonment of antiquities in the city
must be seen at least in part as a deliberate choice.
This choice reflects a cultural cleavage in early twentieth-century America which
produced a rift in preservationist ranks, brought about by growing numbers of
'medievalists,' who valued the most primitive rather than the most accomplished
architecture. They found medieval virtue in the simple structures of the early colonial
period; they equated with Renaissance artificiality the later Georgian and federalist
classical buildings which most urban preservationists valued.293 Medievalists were one
group of what T. J. Jackson Lears calls 'antimodernists.' Through the Arts and Crafts
movement, Gothic Revival architecture, and preservation of folk culture and vernacular
building, they reversed the earlier dictum and now declared that what was new was
corrupt.294
Appleton's sympathies lay with the medievalists. SPNEA members who did not
share his priorities thought the society concentrated too much of its resources on what
one called "those little houses in the country."295 Even SPNEA's second acquisition,
the 1809 Fowler house, shared the severe simplicity of earlier buildings, and Appleton
acknowledged opposition from members who "are apt to be disappointed that it is not
ornate."296 Appleton was most interested in structures like the Old Bakery in Salem,
which he described as "almost brutal in its simplicity .... The whole work is essentially
medieval, and the decorative motives are of Gothic extraction." 297 As he elaborated on
the theme in private correspondence regarding another building, "to my mind the 17th
292SPNEA Bulletin 7 (1916): 17.
293Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 231, 265-66.
294T. J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American
Culture, 1880-1920 (New York, 198 1).The Arts and Crafts movement was represented in Boston by
the Boston Society of Arts & Crafts, founded in 1897 with Appleton's teacher C. E. Norton as its first
president; Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 355.
295Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 265.
296Appleton to David Bonner, Jr., Aug. 1, 1919, quoted Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 260.
297SPNEA Bulletin 2 (1911): 14-15.
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century is the more strictly New England type, or I might say Anglo-Saxon type. The
other [Georgian] is after all but an importation from the Latin countries, bringing with it
the flavor of Greek and Roman civilization, with which our ancestral lines are not
particularly connected."298 Appleton's catholic tastes, however, together with his
usually adroit organizational politics, allowed him to steer a middle course which kept
both medievalists and classicists within the fold.
It was this comprehensiveness which made SPNEA the single institutional
embodiment of New England preservationism. The chairman of the American Institute
of Architects' Preservation Committee, surveying architects' preservation efforts
nationwide in 1915, reported that
In New England, where many buildings of historic and architectural interest exist,
there seem to be no Chapter committees intrusted with this subject. It is claimed that
the necessity is met by the existence of the Society for the Preservation of New
England Antiquities.299
By subsuming earlier urbanistic concerns enough to keep their proponents from
breaking out into separate institutions, SPNEA thus also limited their expression.
As the field of preservation grew more active in the 'teens and 'twenties, it was ripe
for organizing ideas, and Appleton's had particular force because of his unique national
position. Not only did he run the largest, most ambitious, and most rigorous
preservation organization of the time, but in the Bulletin he published (and until 1920
edited and almost singlehandedly wrote) the only American periodical devoted
exclusively to the subject. An indefatigable correspondent, he advised countless
individuals and groups all over the country, making SPNEA a national clearinghouse
for preservation information, and helping to provide a philosophical frame of reference
for activists who were often otherwise isolated from one another. They sought his
advice because SPNEA's methods worked.
298Appleton to Murray Corse, March 16, 1918, quoted in Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 250.
299Proceedings of the 49th convention, AIA, (1915), quoted in Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 252.
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Appleton's contributions to preservation's methods, like those to its philosophy,
were to make them systematic, effectively professionalizing the field. Appleton himself
remained literally an amateur, never drawing a salary, but this paradoxically contributed
to his professionalization. Appleton's trust fund figured decisively in SPNEA's tactical
success, serving as a substantial de facto endowment from the inception of the society.
It gave him the luxury and the responsibility of planning for the long term, thinking
through not only his philosophy of preservation, but also how he should go about it,
knowing that his full-time status was secure.
Systematic priorities brought increased reliance on experts able to evaluate them.
SPNEA was aided by, and itself assisted, the emergence of restoration architecture as a
distinct profession, following principles that had more to do with archaeology than with
design. The society was a continuing source of commissions for established
practitioners such as Joseph E. Chandler of Boston and Norman M. Isham of
Providence, as well as for newer entrants to the field. Even more important, it served as
a sort of continuing, informal professional seminar. "Practically every architectural
scholar in New England," says Charles Hosmer, "toured with Appleton at some
time." 300 He insisted on a rigorous regimen of investigation and recording in the
restoration process, laying the basis of a cumulative body of professional knowledge.
He made SPNEA an essential institution for the profession, acting as depository for a
massive archive of the documentation necessary to support comparative study.
Appleton also elaborated the preservation movement's techniques of private
intervention. He was innovative in his means of getting control of properties, seeking
and receiving gifts and bequests, buying houses subject to life occupancy, and
financing restoration of property in return for reversion of title on the owners' deaths.
He originated the now-familiar 'revolving fund,' in effect an organized approach to
crisis response. The Helen F. Kimball Emergency Fund was established in 1912,
$1500 on hand which could be used quickly without approval by the trustees, but
which had to be paid back in full before the fund could be tapped again. This allowed
300Hosmer, Preservation Comes of Age, 1:141.
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Appleton to raise money both for the particular building he was saving, as well as for
the fund itself as a tool for meeting the next crisis.301
Appleton's most significant contribution to preservation technique was to recognize
preservation as a continuing rather than a finite action. A choice of phrase is revealing:
when a federalist mansion in Providence was bought by an individual intent on saving
it, Appleton wrote, "We may well hope that preservation of this splendid example of
New England town architecture may be continued" [emphasis added].302 The recurrent
nature of the threats faced by buildings was a lesson which preservationists had been
learning, over and over, since Mt. Vernon. In Boston, the Old South, the Old State
House, and the Bulfinch State House each had to be defended more than once.
Continuing preservation required financial endurance. "The most disheartening
realization that emerges from a study of the economic side of the American preservation
movement," says Hosmer, "is the fact that the majority of people who saved old houses
did not understand that the word 'preservation' really meant maintenance of these
structures throughout the years that followed." 303 Appleton noted that "[tihe financial
weakness of the holding organization" for the Shirley-Eustis mansion "had for a long
time endangered the permanence" of the preservation effort.304 The West Roxbury -
Meetinghouse, 'saved' by its preservation committee, was eventually destroyed after
SPNEA refused to accept it without its mortgage lifted. Appleton was even prepared to
decline properties offered to the society unmortgaged but without endowments. "The
safety of some houses might be jeopardized by this policy, but the security of the
Society as a whole would be much increased."305
The security of the society was central to Appleton's vision of preservation. He was
deeply skeptical of any scheme other than ownership by some institutional guardian,
preferably SPNEA. He was almost insulting in his dismissal of preservation by
individuals, no matter who:
301SPNEA Bulletin 3 (1913): 11; Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 293.
302Old-Time New England 12 (1921): 176.
303Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 292.
3040ld-Time New England 11 (1920): 30.
305SPNEA Bulletin 4 (1913): 28.
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The two president's [sic] houses in Quincy, although now occupied respectively by
the Quincy Historical Society and the Adams Chapter, D. R., cannot with certainty
be counted among buildings permanently preserved, since they are still in the hands
of the Adams family, and the most casual knowledge of the fate of old buildings
shows the uncertainty of such private tenure.306
It was "essential" that historic buildings "be placed in the hands of permanent
corporations rather than in those of individuals."307
William Sumner Appleton transformed the preservation movement to one which was
better organized and more effective, but with more restricted aims than before. He
honed a single existing tool for preservation: ownership by a private group, usually
through purchase. It was the most thorough solution where it could be used, but it
could not be used often. As we shall see in the next chapter, Appleton did not
contribute to strategies for transcending the limitations of this system, partly because of
his strong bias toward private rather than governmental action, and partially because he
worked the system so well. Having devised a strategy, he spent the rest of his life
occupied with tactics. Appleton institutionalized preservation by creating "an enormous
operation," says Charles Hosmer, "that maintained many important buildings in a form
of historical cold storage. The number of houses lost in New England was remarkably
small between 1910 and 1947."308
Preservation was institutionalized in a broader way; it was built into the process of
decisionmaking about the built environment. Preservation began to be assumed,
although not always in the methodical way Appleton advocated. George G. Crocker as
head of the Boston Transit Commission ran what was potentially among the city's most
powerful engines of environmental change, but he ran it according to his own
preservationist views consistent with his earlier efforts on behalf of the Old South and
the Common. Appleton and Crocker were to come into conflict when the Transit
Commission sought to expand a subway station in the basement of the Old State
306Appleton, 'Destruction and Preservation,' 155.
307Appleton, 'Destruction and Preservation,' 168-69.
308Hosmer, Preservation Comes of Age, 1:178.
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House, but this time, significantly, no one suggested that the Old State House should
be torn down.309
Another example of preservation's widespread acceptance is the Custom House
Tower, proposed by architect Robert S. Peabody in 1909 and constructed from 1911 to
1915. It was criticized for the impracticality and expense of its design, but very little of
the criticism questioned the extraordinary basic premise of preserving Ammi Young's
1837 Greek Revival custom house by putting all the new offices in a slender tower
perched atop it, rather than clearing the site. Similarly, other buildings simply did not
become preservation controversies. In addition to the St. Paul's congregation's
decision to stay in their old church, the trustees of the Boston Athenaeum made the
more difficult determination that their 1849 building could be made fireproof enough
for their irreplaceable collections by renovations, which were carried out in 1913-14.
Preservationists from the earliest days of the movement had argued that historic
buildings were an economic benefit to their communities, and by the turn of the century
the argument was well accepted by businesspeople. The Providence Board of Trade
published a laudatory article on SPNEA in May of 1914, and later that year noted that
"Boston, by playing up its historic attractions for several generations, has vastly
profited in a commercial way ...." The Boston Chamber of Commerce agreed:
"Preservation ... pays as an investment." 310
Because preservation by private purchase operated through the market, it did not
fundamentally challenge real estate interests. Many real estate developers could see the
appeal of the buildings they were destroying, and they saw no contradiction in
participating in the preservation movement at the same time.The most conspicuous
example was John Phillips Reynolds, Jr., who was buying the Paul Revere house even
as he tried to tear down Park Street Church. For another example, Alexander S. Porter
was president of the Boston Real Estate Exchange, and put together the syndicate
which replaced the Tremont House hotel in 1894, and the one which would have razed
St. Paul's Church, yet he took a sympathetic interest even in the buildings he tore
309Proceedings of the Bostonian Society (1903): 6.
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down, amassing an important collection of antiquarian photographs.311 He led in
organizing the Committee to Preserve Park Street Church, and joined SPNEA shortly
after it was founded. Porter evidently felt that tearing down St. Paul's would have been
a reasonable way to make a profit, and preserving Park Street Church across the street a
reasonable way to spend it; market-based preservation allowed each individual to decide
for himself where the line should be drawn against change. Other developers were
happy to cooperate with SPNEA in recording structures or offering them to be moved,
secure in the knowledge that their fundamental right to clear sites went
unquestioned. 312
Preservation in Boston went through three distinct generations, from an historical to a
visual to an archaeological sensibility, corresponding with and anticipating its phases in
the rest of the country. First, it saved monuments such as the Old South and the Old
State House, places sanctified by their associations with historic events and valuable to
the present for their ability to evoke them. Second, it saved landmarks such as the
Common and the Bulfinch State House, important for their visual or architectural role
in the urban landscape. Finally, it saved artifacts such as SPNEA's old houses,
structures significant for what they revealed about the material culture of the past. These
sensibilities did not supplant but added to one another, each of them contributing a new
way of looking at what earlier efforts had accomplished, and redefining what still
needed to be done. A fourth generation on the national scene was 'area preservation,'
looking beyond individual buildings and sites to keeping whole districts intact. Boston
began this phase like the others precociously, but as we will see in the next chapter, it
eventually gave up its position of national leadership.
310Providence Magazine, December, 1914, 807; May, 1914, 374-77; Current Affairs, March 3, 1924,
in SPNEA clipping file.
311Boston Herald, April 28, 1894: 1; Boston Sunday Journal, February 17, 1901: 1; SPNEA Bulletin
7 (1916): 46.
3 12E.g. Moses Williams offered the Sun Tavern to SPNEA in 1912; when Appleton declined it for
lack of a site to move it to, Williams cooperated in allowing Norman Isham to make measured
drawings as the building was taken down (Sun Taven file, SPNEA).
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The first two generations of preservation responded primarily to threats of physical
change, but by the early twentieth century social change seemed more overwhelming.
Just as deed restrictions, first developed to control physical form, were increasingly put
to use making social geography durable, so preservation increasingly became part of a
matrix of class and ethnic definition. This shift can be seen for example in a change of
the intended audience for patriotic education, from 'us' to 'them.' The first generation
of preservationists expected the Old South and the Old State House to help convey
shared values to the next generation of what they still thought of as an essentially
homogeneous population. By the early twentieth century, the second editor of
SPNEA's bulletin, George F. Dow, would describe part of preservation's mission as
"informing foreigners and less enlightened natives as to American traditions and
values." 313
The earliest preservation controversies were largely among upper-class Anglo-
Saxons. They did not disagree about patriotic and historical significance, which both
sides typically acknowledged, but about whether it should have any operational weight
against the practical forces which drove change in the environment. By the twentieth
century, conflicts were often between Brahmins and other groups. As the Irish and
newer immigrants became economically and politically ascendant, white Anglo-Saxon
Protestants awakened to a group identity of which they had not been so acutely aware,
and they asserted it through the formation of genealogical and patriotic societies.
SPNEA was part of this organizational constellation, and at one point stretched its
definition of 'antiquities' to take up the issue of "persons changing their family names,
... for the purpose of assuming an old New England name of long and good
standing." 314 Brahmins' loss of power in Boston to an Irish-dominated political
machine resulted in their gradual disengagement from the public life of the city during
the twentieth century. Many turned their minds instead to more satisfactory bygone
days, and to the still comfortably Anglo-Saxon countryside, their residences and
preservation attention increasingly following. Thus while SPNEA's emphasis was the
immediate product of Appleton's own interest, its popularity and success - and the fact
313Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 331.
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that no competing organization emerged to complement its deficiencies - resulted from
its conformity with its constituency's narrower concentration on its own, more personal
past.
This new concern with a smaller scale of building changed the nature of preservation
conflicts: instead of confronting governments or quasi-public institutions,
preservationists found themselves dealing with individual property owners; in the
oldest, often run-down parts of Boston and smaller towns, those individuals were
increasingly likely to be Italians, Jews, Poles, or other eastern Europeans. William
Sumner Appleton often faced "the difficulties involved in trying to do business with a
foreigner, whom fortune had made for the moment the custodian of a really interesting
New England antiquity", 315 and he was by both background and inclination
unprepared for the task. At the Saugus house, he told a correspondent, "Our neighbors
are callabrian Italians who are not famous for their good behavior." 316 Appleton's
approach to managing properties in ethnic neighborhoods, says Lindgren, "bordered
upon a siege mentality," but he had to deal with real vandalism, and saw one
seventeenth-century house purchased by a family association only to be destroyed by
arson.317 Whatever his attitudes, his actions can be explained by sincere concern for
physical protection of SPNEA's properties. Other preservationists worried about less
tangible threats. Mary Desha, one of the founders of the national D.A.R., called upon
that organization in 1898 to keep historic buildings from "passing into the hands of
improper people."318 The chairman of the Committee to Preserve the Park Street
Church was one of the founders of the Immigration Restriction League. 319
The link between preservation and nativism, however, should not be overdrawn. A
resurgence of xenophobia was part of America's cultural mainstream at the turn of the
314SPNEA Bulletin 6 (1915): 17. See also Boston Herald, January 11, 1915, in SPNEA clipping
file.
31501d-Time New England 12 (1921): 177; Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 286.
316Appleton to Millar, May 6, 1916, quoted in Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 298.
3 17Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 299; Old-Time New England 12 (1921): 180.
3 18Quoted in Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 133.
319Prescott F. Hall.; Who Was Who in America 1, 507.
232
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
century; it did not produce the preservation movement but merely tugged at it with its
current. Indeed, when SPNEA is considered in the context of the other traditionalist
groups in its institutional family, its significance is that it was so steadfastly about
buildings and objects, making very little concession to patriotic cant. Curtis Guild, Jr.,
Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts and President of the Paul Revere Memorial
Association, tried to temper nativist excess when he reminded donors that "Paul
Revere, like the children who now play around his venerable home, was himself the
son of an immigrant." The house could help teach those children American ways, but it
could teach Americanists, too, "as a reminder to the Commonwealth of the services
rendered by new citizens and by their children." 320 Appleton could work with non-
WASP institutions when that would help preserve a building.321 Most importantly, the
preservation movement's broadening of interest to include the ordinary life of earlier
generations, even if it was conceived by some adherents as an affirmation of Anglo-
Saxon precedence, defined a powerfully inclusive subject matter which, as
preservationists' chronological frontier moved forward through the nineteenth century,
would embrace the very groups it had earlier excluded, and allow later preservationists
to take an interest in workaday parts of the environment their predecessors sought to
escape.
Saving the Old South Church was Boston's greatest contribution to American
preservation. It was the first time Americans challenged the culture of change head-on
and won. Mount Vernon, by contrast, was a movement not to protect a structure from
imminent destruction but to create a shrine, and its significance lay in the selection of a
genuine relic building as an appropriate monument. But at the Old South,
preservationists faced the American condition at its most virulent in the congregation's
steadfast preference for new rather than old, combined with the tremendous practical
pressures for change in the form of the site's land value. The success of the private
effort to save the Old South, coming after the failure of both state and city governments
320Curtis Guild to PRMA, November 29, 1907, North Square/ Paul Revere scrapbook, SPNEA.
32 1E.g., the Roman Catholic church, Old-Time New England 11 (1920): 35; the Cercle Social
Franco-American of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, Old-Time New England 13 (1922): 94; the First African
Methodist Episcopal Church Society of Boston, Old-Time New England 11 (1920): 170-71.
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to save the Hancock house, set a precedent of privatism which defined the New
England preservation movement for generations, most significantly for William Sumner
Appleton, who brought this precedent to its fullest realization but could not transcend it.
The Common and the two state houses, as major public spaces and buildings, were
necessarily saved by public action. Park Street Church was private property, and its
would-be preservers sought government financial intervention in recognition that the
costs of urban landmarks were simply too great to regularly preserve them by private
subscription. But Park Street Church, like St. Paul's, was eventually saved not by the
state but by the action of its congregation, further reinforcing the precedent of
privatism.
William Sumner Appleton was committed to private action and therefore turned away
from urban landmarks and launched preservationism firmly toward curatorship of
material culture. New Englanders for a generation had been sponsoring archaeological
exploration and preservation in the west; now in effect the movement came home.
While Appleton developed new tools for private preservation, he did not take up the
existing ones for public action. When he wanted a government to do something, he
"fixed it up" quietly if he could; he did not organize SPNEA for the sort of serious
lobbying carried out, for example, by the D.A.R.
These trends did not represent a general abandonment of the ideal of permanence in
the larger urban environment, but rather a new division of labor as new institutions and
professions took shape. Some of the concerns of permanence coalesced as a
professionalized preservation movement; others became part of the newly-recognized
field of city planning, which was pursued by a new generation of architects and
landscape architects sensitized to historic buildings and spaces. The shift of
preservationist attention from the public environment to private, domestic environments
was in part a mark of success; the most important public landmarks were secured, and
preservation had indeed become enough of an assumption that planners would exercise
at least minimal regard for landmarks. Appleton's systematic approach was essential to
the development of modern preservation. Consistency and comprehensiveness were
needed for bureaucratic administration, which is more or less what Appleton was
doing, and for legal intervention, which he was not, but which others would soon try.
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CHAPTER SIX:
Public action
Before the 1890s, attempts to achieve environmental permanence were for the most
part private actions. Deed restrictions were a branch of private land law, imposed by
one owner in an agreement with another. Preservation operated mainly through private
purchase of threatened landmarks.
While all levels of government participated in these efforts in various ways, their
involvement did not change this essentially private medium. Units of government
generally acted not through their sovereign powers but in a narrow capacity as
landowners. Municipalities were leaders in imposing deed restrictions, but they did so
in the same way as any other subdivider. Cities, states, and the federal government
preserved buildings which they already happened to own. Preservationists claimed that
the city of Boston, in its administration of the Common, was not a private owner at all
but a special sort of trustee, and they tried to extend this concept to historic public
buildings, but their arguments were rhetorical and ethical rather than legal. They were
really talking about what kind of private owner the government should be: one which
would seek material gain and would thus provoke change, or one which would
sympathetically protect its own heritage, as many individuals and certain enlightened
religious congregations were doing.
In rare instances cities, states, and even the federal government bought buildings or
sites specifically to preserve them. This did not happen in Massachusetts until 1913,
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when the town of Lexington purchased the Buckman Tavern. 1 There was long
precedent for such action, starting with the purchase of the Hasbrouck House by the
State of New York in 1850, but half a century later this governmental role remained
embryonic. 2 In each case it resulted from the same sort of expediency which led
Bostonians to ask city and state help to save the Hancock House, the Old South, and
Park Street Church. Government was seldom called upon to do anything which private
groups could not in theory undertake. It provided funds or served as a permanent
custodian; it did not (with very few exceptions) use uniquely governmental powers of
coercion such as eminent domain3 or police-power regulation. No government body
anywhere in the country took on preservation in any systematic way comparable to
SPNEA's private program.
Neither preservation nor deed restrictions challenged the institutions of private
property and private control of urban development. Saving landmarks by purchase -
whether private or public - operated through the market, and thus real estate developers
could be preservationists too without feeling any contradiction. Preservation exempted
a few places from developers' rules, but it otherwise followed those rules; it did not
change them. Deed restrictions also exempted parts of the environment from the rules
of urban change, much larger parts than preservation did, but the exemption was
likewise no threat because it was made by real estate developers voluntarily and in
response to demands of the market.
By the 1890s, experiences in both preservation and development were leading people
to recognize inherent limitations in stabilizing the physical city through the private
1Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 111. Even in this case, like the Park Street Church proposal to the
legislature, the catalyst was a private campaign which raised a substantial fraction of the purchase price.
2Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 36.
3The legislative act by which the Old South Association was authorized to alter its deal with the
church society was technically a delegation of eminent domain power (see chapter 5). Among the
earliest major examples of eminent domain used for preservation was the federal government's
acquisition of the battlefield at Gettysburg, in part through eminent domain; Hosmer, Presence of the
Past, 164.
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market and private institutions. The limitations they faced arose from a variety of issues
but ultimately led them to similar solutions.
Preservation's basic limitation was a lack of available resources. Private subscription
and purchase accomplished more in eastern Massachusetts than anywhere else in the
country, yet it was clearly inadequate in urban areas even for preservationists' most
limited goals. The Committee for the Preservation of Park Street Church, despite its
effectiveness at soliciting pledges, had to turn to the legislature if it was to save the
building by purchasing it. William Sumner Appleton was unwilling to seek government
purchase, so his goals in city centers had to be very modest. John D. Rockefeller, Jr.,
and Henry Ford each spent over $25 million on preservation at Williamsburg and
Greenfield Village, Michigan, respectively,4 and Appleton tried unsuccessfully to
interest one of them or their financial peers in creating an endowmeni for preservation
acquisitions elsewhere. Without a fund of such magnitude, private preservation would
inevitably remain fragmentary.
Even more important, preservationists' increasingly ambitious concern with whole
urban compositions such as the State House, the Common, and the churches and
houses around them, brought their attention to a scale at which purchase was almost
irrelevant; neither Rockefeller nor the Commonwealth of Massachusetts could buy
Boston. While Appleton was willing to retreat from the city, many of the people who
worked to protect the State House and Park Street Church remained interested in this
large scale. Their interest gave preservationism a kinship with the city planning
movement, and an interest in turning to public powers rather than private organizations.
Finally, incentives for public action were reinforced as the preservation movement
expanded in a smaller-scale but equally ambitious way with the advent of what is now
called 'area preservation,' the restoration of whole neighborhoods. This brand of
preservation brought the movement's concerns into close correspondence with the
issues of neighborhood stability which were addressed through deed restrictions.
Beacon Hill was among the first areas in the country to be touched by neighborhood
restoration; no sharp line divided the concerns of its residents from those of people
4Hosmer, Preservation Comes of Age, 1:75.
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grappling with inadequate deed restrictions in the newer Back Bay. Both areas faced
similar problems: conversion of houses to multifamily or non-residential use, and new
construction of large apartment and business buildings.
Deed restrictions' usefulness over long periods was limited by their lack of flexibility.
Their authors had consistently failed to foresee the emergence of new problems, such
as apartment houses, garages, or tall rather than short buildings. As circumstances
changed, courts interpreted restrictions unpredictably, and the necessity of going to
court for an interpretation in each case was itself a fundamental drawback. Flexibility
could be built in by creating permanent associations to administer restrictions, but such
groups brought their own cumbersome mechanics and social tensions, particularly from
the point of view of big developers, or 'community builders,' who typically held parts
of their large-scale projects for years after the first lots had been sold, aid themselves
had to deal with these community organizations. From a developer's perspective, long-
term deed restrictions were a marketing tool; if continued policing of land-use conflicts
could be handled by the public sector, it would serve just as well and save a lot of
trouble.5
These were the problems in new subdivisions, where restrictions worked best.
Elsewhere, their limitations were even more serious. In older residential plats,
restrictions often had become obsolete, or had lain inactive long enough to be of
uncertain validity. The expiration of time-limited covenants brought residents an
unwelcome awareness of their neighborhoods' new vulnerability; a transition period of
changes in ownership and occupancy often began in advance of the expiration date.6
Since land in an established neighborhood often increased in value when its restrictions
expired, even resident owners might have an incentive to celebrate their passing. Where
a consensus did favor continuing the restricted status quo, owners still could
accomplish little unless they acted in unison. If a restriction against, for example,
apartment houses did not apply to every lot on a block, it merely conferred a monopoly
premium on the owners of unrestricted lots. This was an incentive for owners to hold
5Ascher, 'Art of Administering Deed Restrictions,' 373-77; Weiss, Community Builders, 85-86, 91;
see E. H. Bouton, developer of Roland Park, discussion of Nichols, 'Financial Effect of Good
Planning,' 112-13.
6Weiss, 'Berkeley,' 16.
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out from renewing restrictions, and in areas originally subdivided without them, the
need for unanimity made them nearly impossible to initiate afterwards. 7 The only
widespread exception was the twentieth-century practice of imposing racially restrictive
covenants through 'protective associations' in already-developed areas. 8 Achieving the
necessary unanimity for post-hoc restrictions took the level of paranoia which attended
racial issues, a motivation which no merely environmental concern was likely to match.
Public actions to supplement deed restrictions
Deed restrictions, over a long period of practice, had demonstrated the desirability of
controlling the use of private property, but they also demonstrated that private controls
by themselves were not enough.
In some places the first substantial legislative intervention in land use regulation was
de facto elimination of the unanimity requirement for post hoc restrictions, through
'frontage consent ordinances.' This technique was developed further in Chicago than
anywhere else in the country; by 1893, ordinances there prohibited locating on
residential streets any commercial stables, gas houses, varnish works, saloons, or
carousels without the approval of the owners of a majority of the frontage on the
block.9 In Massachusetts, a similar law passed in 1881 allowed a veto of saloon
licenses by abuttors; in 1887 the legislature extended the veto to all owners within 25
feet of the premises. 10 This method was used in many American cities, usually to
regulate subjects which were already discretionary under the law, such as liquor
7There are scattered examples of voluntary imposition of restrictions after land passed into many hands:
Rancho Santa Fe, near San Diego, where owners of more than 3500 acres converted 10-year restrictions
to permanent ones (Charles H. Cheney, 'Building for Permanency,' 43); Cohasset, Mass., 1937, a
voluntary 50-year restriction to residential use around the Common (Lewis Barrington, Historic
Restorations, no. 17); another in Cleveland (Thomas W. Larwood, Jr. discussion of Nichols, 'Financial
Effect of Good Planning,' 107).
8See chapter 4, note 40.
9King, Law and Land Use in Chicago, 231, 253-58.
10Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1881, Acts ch. 255, §2; 1887, Acts ch. 323.
239
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
licenses or transit franchises. Where frontage consents appeared, they represented an
evolutionary link between deed restrictions and modern zoning.
The first Massachusetts legislative action specifically remedying deed restrictions'
substantive deficiencies - as opposed to technical shortcomings which made their
duration unclear - was an 1893 law enabling cities and towns to establish building lines
along public streets. These setbacks could include as much as 25 feet of the front of a
lot, and the act drew from familiar deed restriction language to provide that "no
structure shall thereafter be erected, placed or maintained between such building line"
and the street. Like streets themselves, the lines would be laid out as an exercise of
eminent domain. The bill was submitted by Boston's Board of Street Commissioners,
and at the request of a Brookline representative the mechanism was made available, at
local option, to the rest of the state.11
Alderman Charles W. Hallstram of the South End explained the motive for the act:
Where it affects my constituents most seriously is that up on Columbus avenue,
which is a very fine avenue, most of the estates are under certain restrictions as to
the building line, but there are three or four lots there on which there are no
restrictions and the parties are beginning to build out, thereby annoying the abutters
and disfiguring the avenue. 12
If the offending construction continued, he said, "it will cost the City of Boston a great
deal more money than it will at present to abate these nuisances." One way or another,
Hallstram assumed, this was a subject for municipal attention.
The building line act had the potential to address problems both of the city's
established districts and of newly developing areas. In older areas where restrictions
were expiring, it offered a way of making permanent one of their most basic provisions
without requiring that owners act unanimously. In new sections, it could give
municipal sanction to the setbacks established in deed restrictions (thus neatly avoiding
any potential damage award), and provide an enforcement mechanism less cumbersome
than private lawsuits.
11Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1893, Acts ch. 462; 1893 House bill 506 (February 7); 1893
House bill 230 (January 31).
12Proceedings of the City Council of Boston (1893): 594, Board of Aldermen, August 28, 1893.
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During the two and a half years after the act's passage, the Boston street
commissioners received only three petitions for building lines, and all three reacted to
threats of change in established neighborhoods. The first was from Alderman
Hallstram's constituents on Columbus Avenue, where residents complained that "[t]he
restrictions are running out," and the avenue "fast becoming a business street." 13 These
petitioners were reacting to one tall building which had already been built; on nearby
Warren Street residents asked for a building line to block "a new building that is about
to be erected on a lot of land where the restrictions have recently expired." 14 Both
Columbus Avenue and Warren Street residents tried to use the new procedure as a
response to the beginnings of commercial encroachment, but in both cases the owners
of unrestricted estates made it clear that they would expect to receive substantial
compensation, and the commissioners therefore declined to act. 15 The first petition they
granted was to reinforce the existing building line on aristocratic Beacon Street, where
public hearings showed no opposition, and thus no need for compensation. 16 While the
legislature had given the commissioners the power to override opponents, it created no
new source of funds to make practical the exercise of this power, which probably
explains why so few neighborhoods bothered asking them to use it. The procedure's
usefulness in newly developing areas was recognized by an 1894 act requiring that it be
used to establish building lines in the as-yet-undeveloped parts of the Back Bay; the
extension of Boylston Street was immediately laid out this way. 17 The building line act
13George W. Pope and Horace G. Allen in Board of Street Commissioners 23:223 (December 7,
1893).
14John K. Berry in Board of Street Commissioners 24:274 (December 20, 1894); John Carleton in
Board of Street Commissioners 23:224 (December 7, 1893).
15Similarly, in Chicago in 1912 the city council considered ways of preventing business encroachment
onto residential streets, and concluded that the best available mechanism was municipally-established
building lines (King, Law and Land Use in Chicago, 334).
16Board of Street Commissioners 24 (1894): 253, 272, 278-79, 287, 301-04. The building line in
Beacon Street's deed restrictions had been upheld and enforced in 1886 in Payson v. Burnham, 141
Mass. 547; residents may have wished to avoid the trouble of private lawsuits to enforce it in the
future.
17Board of Street Commissioners, Annual Report, 1895. In the next twenty years, Boston imposed
municipal building lines in only three more places, all of them streets in the new Back Bay. Brookline,
where building was more active, used it enough to have a policy, explained by Philip S. Parker,
chairman of the town's Board of Selectmen: "We put a building line on streets which may be widened
or where property owners give security against damages. We also put building lines on all new streets
accepted" (Boston Evening Transcript, May 26, 1915: 14). No matter how drastic the case, the town
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set a legal and conceptual precedent for public intervention to address neighborhood
land-use issues left unanswered by private planning, but it did not immediately change
the ordinary way of doing business.
A separate strain of public actions relied not on eminent domain but on the police
power (discussed in chapter 3), to address different kinds of deficiencies in restrictions.
These public health and housing reforms, and nuisance-law control of conflicting urban
land uses, flowered in Massachusetts by 1870.18 The building line act responded to
expiring restrictions; police power measures addressed problems that were beyond
control by deed restrictions, either because they involved conflicts across the
boundaries of subdivisions, or because they were not yet anticipated when the
restrictions were written. The clearest example of such unanticipated contrasts was
automobile garages, unknown before about 1900 and ubiquitous after about 1910.
While courts struggled with adapting restrictions on stables to this new functional
equivalent, the Massachusetts legislature in 1913 created a second legal tool of control
by empowering Boston's Board of Street Commissioners to regulate garage locations.
After a public hearing on each application, the commissioners were to weigh the
balance between "requirements of public convenience" and the "general character of the
neighborhood." 19 The following year the legislature raised the threshold for change by
deleting consideration of public convenience.20 This procedure relied on the police
power and was analogous to a special exception under modem zoning law; no
compensation was involved because property ownership was not deemed to include
any inherent right to build garages.
A change even more disruptive than building-line encroachments was the construction
of tall new buildings, the common threat which could destroy the visual ensemble
around the state house, could replace the old houses awaiting renovation on Beacon
would not impose a line unless property owners posted a bond to indemnify the town. (Boston Evening
Transcript, May 31, 1915: 3).
18See Cousineau, 'Tenement Reform in Boston,' 600, re the Tenement House Act (Massachusetts
Acts & Resolves, 1868, Acts ch. 281); see also Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1869, Acts ch. 369,
'An act concerning the erection of stables in the city of Boston.'
19Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1913, Acts ch. 577.
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Hill, and could mar the design of South End avenues and the Back Bay district. Neither
deed restrictions nor private preservation efforts held any answer to this threat, so
people concerned about these places began to look to public actions, in particular to
legislation restricting allowable building heights. Massachusetts had passed the first
such height limit in the country in 1891, limiting new buildings in all the state's cities to
a maximum height of 125 feet, or about eleven stories.21 Height restrictions were one
of the police power regulations which served as a precedent for modern American land
use and urban design regulation through zoning.
Building height regulation in the United States indirectly grew out of a Boston
preservation controversy, at the Bulfinch State House. When the state was arranging its
acquisition of the reservoir lot in the 1880s, the city's negotiator was William H.
Whitmore, who had fought for and carried out the Old State House restoration;
Whitmore suggested that the state ought to limit heights on Beacon Hill to keep new
buildings from "dwarfing the [Bulfinch] state house." 22 At this time no American city
had yet limited building heights; only a few cities on the European continent had done
so, all except Paris within recent years. Only one small German city, three years earlier,
had limited heights within a particular district as Whitmore was proposing.23 The
editors of the American Architect reported Whitmore's "amusing suggestion" with a
vigorous defense of private property rights:
we doubt if even the beauty of the Massachusetts State House is worth preserving
at the expense of the rights of citizens. ... [Ilts dignity cannot be enhanced by
assaults upon the property of its neighbors, or by compulsory humiliation inflicted
upon estates near by.24
20Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1914, Acts ch. 119.
2 1Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1891, Acts ch. 355; the restriction exempted "steeples, domes,
towers, or cupolas erected for strictly ornamental purposes."
22American Architect and Building News, March 26, 1887: 145.
23Altona, outside Hamburg; Heights of Buildings Commission, Report ... to the Committee on the
Height, Size and Arrangement of Buildings of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment of the City of
New York (New York, 1913), 94-95.
24American Architect and Building News, March 26, 1887: 145.
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Whitmore's suggestion bore no fruit at the time, but three years later increasingly tall
buildings downtown led the city council to ask the legislature for a citywide building
height limit to address problems of congestion, shadows, and especially fire safety,
which Boston took very seriously. After the Great Fire of 1872, height restrictions had
been proposed as a safety measure. On Thanksgiving day, 1887, alarm box 52 once
again brought news of a major fire, which destroyed the Ames Building, a modem and
supposedly fire-resistant warehouse. After a new Ames Building, an office block on
another site, rose to 190 feet in 1889, the first building height restriction in the United
States made its way into law with little opposition. "The style came to us from the new
prairie cities of the West, as an imported novelty devised by speculative and
enterprising people; who being without traditions, are given to the wildest
experiments," wrote the editors of the Transcript. "We are a parent colony, and are
looked to to furnish a conservative example."25
The citywide height limit embodied no preservationist intent, but if anything the
opposite: some of its advocates hoped that prohibiting skyscrapers would help spread
modem fireproof construction over a larger area, eliminating old 'firetraps.' But in
restricting building heights Boston had created a versatile and powerful new tool,
which soon looked handy for other purposes. Its recent use downtown made it
naturally come to the minds of proponents of environmental permanence - eventually
around the Bulfinch State House where it started, but first in the Back Bay.
Developer W. H. H. Newman brought the issue of height restrictions from
downtown to this more sensitive location in 1895 with construction of Haddon Hall at
the corner of Commonwealth Avenue and Berkeley Street.26 Haddon Hall was an
apartment house whose nine generous stories brought it exactly to the 125-foot limit,
but this height looked bigger among Back Bay rowhouses than it had downtown (fig.
6.1.). Thirty-five years of public development and regulation of private construction
25Boston Evening Transcript, February 21, 1896: 12; see Michael Holleran and Robert M. Fogelson,
"'The Sacred Skyline": Boston's Opposition to the Skyscraper, 1891-1928.' Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Center for Real Estate Development Working Paper #9, 1987.
26Boston Real Estate Record and Building News, July 28, 1894.
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had finally produced the large-scale Beaux-Arts cityscape it was intended to, and
Haddon Hall did not fit in, especially if it was to be the first example of a new pattern
of development. Bostonians were disturbed at the prospect of seeing this urban
ensemble lost so quickly, after waiting so long to see it completed.
fig. 6.1.Haddon Hall, 1895, J. Pickering Putnam, architect.
The residents of one block banded together to buy a lot at the Public Garden entrance
to Commonwealth Avenue, where another tall apartment house was threatened, but this
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answer clearly could not work everywhere.27 Nor did private regulation have any tools
for this; the Back Bay deed restrictions had not anticipated tall buildings, and could do
nothing retroactively. Deeds there specified a minimum height - 3 stories - aimed at
preventing temporary structures and helping to achieve the even comice line so
important to the Beaux-Arts aesthetic. When the restrictions were written in 1857, there
was no apparent need to specify a maximum. The Hotel Pelham was built that year on
Boylston at the corner of Tremont Street, probably the nation's first 'French flats' or
apartment house, and at seven stories it was a tall building, but the commissioners
evidently did not foresee that such structures would spread to the new land. Starting in
the 1870s, they did indeed spread, especially in the Back Bay. As Douglas Shand Tucci
says in his architectural history of Boston,
the great height of most early apartment houses (which derived, of course, from the
profit motive as well as from the increasing demand for suites) was a problem more
easily solved on the inside than the outside, where such buildings seriously marred
the established scale of town house streetscapes.... Ironically, if only the French
flat fashion had caught on in Boston twenty years earlier, Commonwealth Avenue
might have been a Parisian boulevard indeed; but by the time apartments were
fashionable the low four-story town house had established a scale unsuitable to
blocks of flats.28
Before Haddon Hall, their unsuitability of scale was never quite so apparent. The
most common apartment-house heights were six or seven stories; most of them
occupied two or more houselots, and these squat masses were architecturally treated not
unlike very big rowhouses or groups of rowhouses. Haddon Hall was a bit taller29 and
quite a bit narrower than most, so that its proportions accentuated the vertical, and its
architect, J. Pickering Putnam, designed the facade to emphasize identical floors
stacked one atop another, starkly different from the houses around it.
Haddon Hall's neighbors mobilized to prevent any more such "monstrosities" from
invading the district. 30 It is tempting, a century after Haddon Hall, to look for social
rather than visual causes for such visceral rhetoric, but it is difficult to support such an
27Boston Evening Transcript, March 31, 1896: 7.
28Tucci, Built in Boston, 106.
29See 'Boston's Tallest Skyscrapers,' Boston Sunday Globe, January 14, 1894: 27, which lists and
illustrates Boston's 29 tallest structures (down to 103 feet); there are no apartment houses on the list.
30
'Vox Populi' letter to the editor, Boston Evening Transcript, January 22, 1896: 6.
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interpretation. According to Tucci, the luxurious nineteenth century apartment, while it
ran against the prevailing evolution from rowhouse to detached suburban villa, "early
achieved social parity with the town house, to which it was comparable and in some
respects superior."31 Apartments allowed successions of reception rooms on one floor,
vital for the era's elaborate entertaining and physically impossible in a rowhouse. The
argument that apartment life was somehow immoral held little force among the Boston
elite, with its francophilic acceptance of Parisian arrangements. Widespread ownership
of large second houses in the suburbs or by the shore invoked the London duality of
town and country, insulating apartments from any objections from the growing
domestic ideology of hearth. Back Bay apartment society was fully as elite as the
residents of townhouses, not only financially but socially.
The height restriction campaign was carried out under the auspices-of the Twentieth
Century Club, a two-year-old organization which spanned the whole range of
progressive causes, and which later served as a base for the Committee for the
Preservation of Park Street Church.32 In an effort led by George B. Upham, whose
efforts to protect the Common had made him "the father of the subway," club members
submitted to the 1896 legislature a bill to lower the height limit to 80 feet outside of a
"high building district," where it would remain 125 feet. Building heights would be
reduced in Beacon Hill, the Back Bay, and the rest of the city except downtown and the
adjacent waterfront. Property owners would receive no compensation; like the original
125-foot limit, this new restriction was to be imposed under the police power.33
The rationale for the original height limit placed it squarely within the police power. It
was a fire safety measure, it reduced shading and congestion of the streets, and it
applied equally to any building on any street in any city in Massachusetts. Publicly-
imposed building lines, on the other hand, might vary from one street to the next, and
31Tucci, Built in Boston, 106.
32Boston Evening Transcript, February July 1896: 4. Ironically, J. Pickering Putnam, the architect of
Haddon Hall, had been one of the club's founders and remained a member. Officially, the club was
neutral on this as on all issues, and merely "extended the facilities of its rooms and of its machinery of
publicity to any of its members who were fighting any sort of campaign." Twentieth Century Club, A
Survey of Twenty Years (Boston, 1914), 9.
331896 House bill 522.
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curtailed private property rights for reasons less readily linked to health or safety, so
they used eminent domain powers (even though in practice cities avoided paying
compensation for them). The police power too could make spatial distinctions within a
city, for example the fire limits within which wooden buildings were prohibited. Was it
equally reasonable to reduce allowable building heights in the Back Bay while
continuing to permit 125-foot buildings downtown? The editors of the American
Architect thought so; unlike the Beacon Hill proposal a decade earlier, they saw city-
wide districting as a distinction between apartment houses and office buildings for valid
reasons of public health:
[C]ontagious diseases do not occur in office-buildings; they are vacated and aired
during sixteen hours out of every twenty-four, and they are usually of solid, non-
absorbent materials, scantily furnished, and well cared for. With apartment-houses
the case is entirely different. The rooms are constantly occupied; they are filled,
usually to near suffocation, with furniture ready to be saturated with disease-germs;
they are, comparatively, poorly built, with innumerable crevices, to put the air of
the different rooms in communication; and they have, as a rule, no ventilation
worthy of the name. Commonly, the perfume from the cigar of the lodger in the
sixth story, passing up through the pipe-sleeves in the floors, mingles with that of
the cigarette of the occupant of the seventh story, while both together ascend freely
to the eighth; and so on; the upper stories accumulating a combination of nearly all
the different flavors of the house. Where the aroma of tobacco and coffee can pass,
the infection of diphtheria and scarlet-fever can pass also...34
The real estate community in general supported the existing height restriction for its
stabilizing effect on downtown land values and rents, but it was divided about this new
proposal. Most real estate people did not object in principle to some further protection
for residential areas; they did find fault with the particulars of Upham's plan. The
Boston Real Estate Exchange, representing the largest and most established owners and
brokers of both downtown and residential property, met to discuss the bill the day after
the House passed it. Alexander S. Porter, who had recently stepped down as president
of the exchange, thought the bill's new limits on tall buildings "would go a great deal
further than was desired or necessary, and would prevent their erection along the
waterfronts of South and East Boston and Charlestown, where there was a legitimate
demand for high mercantile structures. The Back Bay was the portion of the city it was
34American Architect and Building News, February 1, 1896: 49.
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desired to preserve as it is."35 To this the exchange members had no objection, and
they decided to draw their own bill to protect the Back Bay while recognizing that
"there were circumstances under which a high building might be erected without injury
to the city."36
Senator Charles F. Sprague of Boston, a young lawyer active in efforts to protect the
Common, had introduced his own bill with a more modest and specific response to
Haddon Hall. He treated it not as a citywide health or safety issue, but as a local failure
of deed restrictions. His bill gave local Park Commissions the power to establish
building lines on lots which faced parks or parkways (Commonwealth Avenue had
been absorbed into the city parks system in 1894), and provided that where they did,
"the extreme height to which buildings may be erected ... shall be seventy feet, or such
other height as the city council of a city or the inhabitants of a town may from time to
time determine." 37 Like the 1893 building line act this relied on eminent domain;
owners of height-restricted property would be eligible for compensation.
Both Sprague's eminent domain bill and Upham's police power bill made their way
through the legislature to a final vote in the Senate on the same day, April 21, 1896.
The Senate passed the parks and parkways bill but at Sprague's motion tabled the city-
wide districting bill; Upham and the Real Estate Exchange were now working together
on an improved version. Sprague introduced it for them two weeks later, not as an
amendment but as a new bill, so that the earlier version could still be enacted if the
modifications were to fail. The Senate suspended its filing deadline and quickly passed
the bill, but on May 14 the House Rules Committee refused to waive the deadline and
thus killed it. The next day the secretary of the exchange - Frederic H. Viaux, a realtor
who had once sued for a commission on the preservation of Old South meeting-house -
wrote Sprague that his parks and parkways act made further action unnecessary and
asked that Upham's bill be "quietly dropped."38 Sprague, not yet aware of the House
action and under the impression that the communication came from the exchange and
35Boston Herald, April 17, 1896: 5.
36Frederick H. Viaux, in Boston Herald, April 17, 1896: 5.
37Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1896, Acts ch. 313.
38Quoted in Upham letter, Boston Evening Transcript, June 20, 1896: 15; Senate Journal, 1896, 788
(May 7); House Journal, 1896, 1040 (May 14).
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Upham working together, did as requested. Upham said he was "left under the
impression that I had been 'buncoed' by the Real Estate Exchange." 39 Through this
idiosyncratic process, Massachusetts chose to pursue height districting of cities through
eminent domain rather than the police power. The deed restriction analogy won.40
The Parks Commission promptly imposed a 70-foot limit on Commonwealth
Avenue. This was the only place they applied the act; like the city's imposition of
building lines, its use of this potentially systematic tool was still reactive. No one
sought damages for these height restrictions.41 Back Bay owners generally agreed that
this was a reasonable limitation which unfortunately had been omitted from their deed
restrictions, but their unanimity may have had a more prosaic explanation. Haddon Hall
opened in the midst of a depression and at first paid no dividends, and owners would
have had a hard time demonstrating damages from losing the right to duplicate an
unprofitable building.42 They also may have been confused. There was no precedent
for eminent domain taking of air rights, but plenty of precedent for deed restrictions.
Restrictions on Commonwealth Avenue originated with the state, and it would have
been easy for owners to think of the new limit as a welcome addition to their deed
covenants, without inquiring too closely into how such an addition was possible.
39Boston Evening Transcript, June 20, 1896: 15; Senate Journal, 1896, 875 (May 19).
40The next year Upham returned with a police power bill modified to meet many of the exchange's
objections (1897 House bill 287); it included a larger area within the high building district, and
included a variance procedure modelled on a proposed New York City height law, by which tall
buildings could be erected outside the high building district if they were approved by the Mayor, the
park commissioners, and the board of health after a public hearing. The legislature's Committee on
Metropolitan Affairs reported a version which applied only to Beacon Hill and the Back Bay (1897
House bill 970). The Senate amended it to reduce heights in the whole city - even downtown - to 80
feet, but then failed to pass the bill (Senate Journal, 1897, 596). The following year Upham made one
more try (1898 House bill 763). The Senate again eliminated the district provision so that the bill
would lower heights throughout the city - this time to 100 feet (1898 Senate bill 205) - and once again
failed to pass it (Senate Journal, 1898, 538).
41The limit was imposed August 3, 1896. Commission on Height of Buildings in the City of Boston,
Final Report (City doc. 133, 1905), 14-15; Heights of Buildings Commission (New York), Report,
141. No one appeared, either in favor or opposed, at the Park Commissioners' hearing on the
restrictions (Boston Evening Transcript, July 20, 1896: 1); a claim of damages at this hearing would
normally be the first step in seeking compensation under eminent domain.
42Robert Treat Paine v. Commonwealth, transcript of hearings, 1902-1903, MS Massachusetts State
Library Special Collections.
250
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
Classifying this act as a parks measure was not merely a subterfuge to accomplish
Boston's first differentiation of height by districts; it initiated a stream of legislation
which controlled land and buildings around parks more stringently than the rest of the
city. Haddon Hall's offensiveness had come at least in part from Commonwealth
Avenue's sanctity as a link in the 'emerald necklace' system of parks. The city had
about completed the emerald necklace, and was just setting out to create an even more
ambitious metropolitan park system. Bostonians would not tolerate seeing this
enormous investment undone by selfish and inappropriate private development that
took its value from the parks while ruining their appearance. New parkways being laid
out during these years established elaborate restrictions on lots bordering them,
addressing everything from where laundry could be dried to the costs and heights of
different kinds of buildings.43
Even these detailed restrictions neglected to regulate the most parasitic of private
developments, billboards. The Boston Parks Commissioners for several years after
1896 campaigned to expand their powers over adjacent lands to include control over
signs. In 1903 they finally received the power to make rules relating to "the displaying
of advertisements, and to the height and character of fences,"44 after the legislature
requested from Massachusetts Attorney General Herbert Parker an opinion as to
whether such rules would entitle owners to compensation. Parker replied with an early
endorsement of aesthetic regulation under the police power. "Noises and odors have
always been treated as nuisances," he wrote. "There is no legal reason why an offence
to the eyes should have a different standing from an offence to the other organs." Nor
did he see any problem with singling out particular locales for stricter regulation. If the
city could spend millions of dollars creating parks, then the public welfare could require
special controls "to preserve the effect for which the public money was spent."45
430n the Riverway, for example, the Board of Park Commissioners stipulated in 1889 deeds that "No
building...shall exceed five stories in height above the basement or cellar, nor shall exceed sixty feet in
height from the mean grade of the edgestone or sidewalk in front to the ceiling of the extreme upper
story, excepting churches or chapels...". Quoted in Flynn v. Caplan, 234 Mass. 516 (1920), at 517.
"Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1903, Acts ch. 331.
451902 House doc. 1305, 3, 5. Parker was articulating an argument which the American City Beautiful
movement had recently imported from English anti-billboard activists. The New World branch of the
campaign was the American Park and Outdoor Art Association, founded in 1897 and headquartered in
Boston; see William H. Wilson, 'The Billboard. Bane of the City Beautiful,' Journal of Urban History
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Parks, which had been conceived as a way of making certain pleasing kinds of
landscape permanently available to city-dwellers, now required a whole range of new
public powers to ensure that their effects would in fact be permanent.
Ensuring permanence of urban design effects was even more complicated, and
concern for the long-term surroundings of parks was mirrored at this time by concern
for the long-term appearance of the city itself, a concem which also turned attention to
height restrictions.
The main urban design thinking of the 1890s and the years after the turn of the
century was the City Beautiful movement. At its heart, the City Beautiful was about
making an environment worthy of permanence. It grew out of a generation of concern
with environmental stability; as people began to realize that constant change was not the
inevitable fate of all urban fabric, then the design of those portions which would not
change became a more serious matter. We have seen an example of this discussion in
the question of whether the old Bulfinch State House should be preserved, or a new,
more worthy replica should be built for the ages.
In answering what a worthy city would look like, the City Beautiful movement was
an outgrowth of the Beaux-Arts principles which governed the Back Bay's plan. They
called for an architectural treatment for the whole city, or the largest possible pieces of
it; not merely buildings but groups of buildings, whole streets and districts should be
consciously designed as harmonious wholes. City Beautiful planning was baroque
planning; instead of the infinite adaptability of the grid, the form of the city would
embody a symmetry and focus which was inherently permanent, and would be used to
express the city's enduring civic and cultural structure. City Beautiful planning was
strongly identified with the neo-classical style, which seemed so permanent both in the
solidity of its construction and in the timeless simplicity of its design principles. Both
12 (1987): 397. Parker's confidence was premature. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
overturned the law in 1905 (Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 74 N.E. 601, cited in Wilson,
414), making this just an opening skirmish in a decades-long national fight to control billboards.
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City Beautiful planning and neo-classical architecture were popularized by the 'White
City' of the World Columbian exposition at Chicago in 1893, but both had nationally-
important prototypes in Boston which helped create the public receptivity for the White
City's aesthetic.
The Back Bay as a whole was one such prototype; admiration of Commonwealth
Avenue, at its center, was increasingly accompanied by praise for Copley Square, at its
southern edge. When Trinity Church, the new Old South, and the Second Church
relocated to Copley Square and the new Museum of Fine Arts located there, all in the
1870s, the square began to emerge as Boston's new institutional focus, an early,
spontaneously-originated prototype for the civic centers which the City Beautiful
movement later advocated as planned components for other cities. Various proposals
sought to reinforce this role by locating a monumental public building on the square's
remaining privately-owned side, perhaps a new city hall, perhaps a new Music Hall so
that "there would be surrounding the square and upon its four sides more or less
beautiful buildings, symbolizing religion, art, literature and music."46 Copley Square
began as a grouping of separate buildings each individually designed to endure. Copley
Square's buildings, reflecting the period in which they were made, exhibited the
greatest variety and exuberance of styles rather than the City Beautiful's ideal of unity,
but the monumental neo-classicism which would characterize City Beautiful design
made its national debut there in C. F. McKim's Boston Public Library, designed in
1888 and completed in 1895.47 By this time the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Harvard Medical School, and the Museum of Natural History were also located within
a block or so.
The library was as ambitious in its programs as in its architecture, and thus
consolidated Copley Square as the cultural heart of the city in a way no other institution
could have done. "Copley Square is at present, and is always likely to remain the
intellectual and artistic centre of Boston, so far as this can be topographically
460tis K. Newell letter, Boston Evening Transcript, January 29, 1898: 15; D. Webster King letter,
Boston Evening Transcript, January 27, 1898: 6.
47See William H. Jordy, 'The Beaux-Arts Renaissance: Charles McKim's Boston Punlic Library,' in
Progressive and Academic Ideals at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, v. 3 of American Buildings and
Their Architects (New York, 1976), ch. 7.
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expressed," said the American Architect in 1893.48 Bostonians became newly and
keenly aware of this place as an emblem of their city at the same time that the City
Beautiful was giving them a new standard for evaluating such places. Americans
returned from Chicago's White City with critical eyes for their hometowns, and a new
awareness of the possibilities of whole ensembles of buildings as architectural
compositions. The library spatially redefined Copley Square's composition with a new
emphasis on discipline and horizontal lines. The Boston Society of Architects sought to
give the library an appropriate setting by sponsoring a design competition for the square
itself, thus far a neglected collection of leftover triangles suspended among the trolley
wires of intersecting roadways.49
With the exception of the Museum of Fine Arts, each of the institutions facing the
square had been forced out of downtown during the past generation, and was thus
deeply sensitive to issues of neighborhood change. They intended to make their new
locations permanent, to fight change rather than submit to it this time, an attitude
evidenced not only in the enormous investments they made in their respective
buildings, but also in the activist posture they took toward protecting their new setting.
The Old South Church, for example, bought several adjacent lots and resold them with
deed restrictions limiting building height to four stories.50
This sensitivity was soon challenged by 'Westminster Chambers,' Boston's next tall
apartment building, which began construction in August 1897 at the southeast corner of
Copley Square. Restriction of heights on Commonwealth Avenue the previous year
meant that any new tall apartment buildings would have to be located elsewhere, and
Copley Square, long an apartment district, was perhaps the next-most-desirable
address. Westminster Chambers was planned as a ten-story building to rise 120 feet
directly across the street from Trinity Church and the Museum of Fine Arts. Like
Haddon Hall, Westminster Chambers did not fit; one critic invoked the square's
symbolism of art, religion, and education to condemn this addition "representing
48American Architect and Building News, Mar. 4, 1893: 129.
49American Architect and Building News, Mar. 4, 1893: 129.
50J. H. Benton, Jr., Argument ... for Legislation to Limit the Height of Buildings on and Near Copley
Square (Boston, 1898), 32.
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Wealth, and looking down upon all the others."51 The challenge was addressed more
quickly here than on Commonwealth Avenue, thanks to momentum from that victory
together with Copley Square's visual and symbolic prominence and the existing
organizational framework of its institutions. Their rapid response made this the first
height restriction effort to be directed at a building while it was still under construction,
and gave the Westminster Chambers fight a bitterness reminiscent of the Old South.
Westminster Chambers took on lasting significance as the first case to bring height
restrictions before a state supreme court, and ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The case both extended the precedent for restricting building heights through eminent
domain, and established that such restrictions could involve real, substantial damages.
Public outcry against Westminster Chambers arose as soon as people learned how tall
it was to be. An ad hoc committee of opponents began organizing in mid-October,
headed by Frederick 0. Prince, president of the library trustees and former mayor. Just
as height restrictions on Commonwealth Avenue were meant to protect the city's
investment in parks, on Copley Square these people sought to protect an enormous
public and quasi-public investment both in cultural facilities and in urban design. The
Boston Society of Architects offered the opinion that 80 feet was the tallest that
buildings could rise before they would destroy the square's proportions.52 As the
citizens' committee asked, "[s]hall all that has been done to make [Boston's] chief
square beautiful go for nothing?" 53
Could Copley Square be protected through the existing Parks and Parkways Act? The
act's applicability was at best debatable, because the square had not been formally
dedicated as a park, and in any case the parks commissioners had not designated a
building line there. However, the building line mechanism was not well understood; the
lay public and many lawyers thought the act by itself had restricted heights around all
parks, and even the parks commissioners seemed confused as to whether they had
established lines applying only to Commonwealth Avenue or to parks throughout the
city. The city council and parks commission could have cleared up all these questions
51George E. MacNeill, in Boston Evening Transcript, April 3, 1901: 6.
52Cited in David Alan Levy, 'The Sacred Skyline: The Conflict over Height Restrictions for Copley
Square' (M.C.P. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1985), 35.
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by taking new action to invoke the act, but this course was unattractive for several
reasons. City officials knew that interfering with a building after its construction had
begun would expose the city to liability for heavy damages; the project's opponents, on
the other hand, believed that the restrictions were already in effect, and did not want to
initiate any action which would call them into question. This combination of fiscal
constraints and legal ambiguities led the citizens' committee to seek fresh legislation.
Only after new Copley Square height restrictions were before the legislature did the
parks commissioners, on January 29, 1898, warn Westminster Chambers' owners that
their property was subject to a 70 foot limit.m Two months later the city filed suit to
enforce this limit, but as the city law office quickly accepted a verbal assurance that the
developers would not build above 70 feet before the legislature took final action, the
suit seems to have been intended less to limit the building's height than to limit the
city's potential liability.
The Westminster syndicate gave an early indication of just how much this liability
might be when, as construction began, they offered to reduce the project's height by
two or three stories for the price of $75,000 per floor.55 This proposal, which
opponents ridiculed as a "purchase of imaginary lines in the sky," 56 may have been the
first attempt to set a value on air rights established through public regulation,57 but it
was taken at the time as mere impertinence. Confusion over the Parks and Parkways
53Quoted in Levy, 'Sacred Skyline,' 30.
54Boston Evening Transcript, January 24, 1898: 4; Edmund A. Whitman, Change of Limitation in
Height of Buildings in Copley Square: Address ... Opening the Case for the Remonstrants Against the
Bills for the Change in the Limitation (Boston, 1903), 9.
55Letter to "a prominent member of Trinity Church," September 23, 1897, cited in Samuel J. Elder,
Limitation of Height of Buildings bear Copley Square: Argument ... on behaf of the Museum of Fine
Arts and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Boston, 1898), 10-11. In the same letter, the
syndicate offered to construct the building with only seven stories and sell it for $1,085,000, and
claimed that it would yield an 8 to 10 % return at that price. Since the price named represented an
$85,000 construction profit for the syndicate on its already-inflated $1 million capitalization, and
apartments were then expected to yield around 6% (Boston Evening Transcript, September 20, 1898:
5), the project's opponents used this offer to argue that a height restriction would in fact entail no
damages (Benton, Argument, 35-36.)
56Elder, Limitation of Height of Buildings, 11.
57As Justice David J. Brewer later put it for the U.S. Supreme Court, "there may be novel questions in
respect to the measure of damage, the value of the property that is taken." Williams v. Parker, 188
U.S. 491 (1903), at 504.
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Act led to an impression that the Westminster syndicate was flouting the law from the
beginning, and the syndicate's own actions contributed to the resulting atmosphere of
confrontation. Westminster Chambers' walls would block light from M.I.T.'s
engineering studios next door, the developers offered to face that side of their building
with light-reflecting bricks, but sought concessions from the institute for doing so. 58
Henry B. Williams, who headed the syndicate, was Boston's third-largest landowner,
and some of his opponents remembered him in a similarly provocative role fifteen years
earlier. On one of his three hotels, the Kensington, he built projecting windows in
violation of Back Bay deed restrictions, and then twice fought all the way to the state
supreme court before he was finally forced to remove them.59 To many Bostonians the
Westminster syndicate in Copley Square looked like Mammon-worshipping barbarians
at the inner sanctum of the civic temple; debate started out polarized and stayed that
way.
When legislators convened in January, the Westminster's opponents presented nearly
3,000 signatures from all over Massachusetts asking them to prevent what one of their
lawyers called "this new Haddon Hall."60 By then the building's foundations were in
the ground and its steel was beginning to rise. The Boston Public Library led the effort,
represented by Col. J. H. Benton, Jr., a library trustee who legislators more often saw
as a railroad corporation lawyer. Benton was assisted by Samuel J. Elder, representing
M.I.T. and the Museum of Fine Arts. These conservative men spoke for much of the
city's establishment. The petition's signers owned an aggregate of $100 million worth
of property, according to Benton, thus as Elder pointed out, "no body of men in this
community has more personal interest to safeguard the rights of property than have
these petitioners." 61
Yet these solid citizens asked for height restrictions under the police power, without
compensation, and among the petitioners was Charles F. Sprague, who had been
58J. M. Crafts (president of M.I.T.), letter to the editor of the Boston Evening Transcript, in
Massachusetts General Court, Committee on Cities, Schedules to Accompany Petition for Legislation
to Protect Copley Square in the City of Boston (Boston, 1898), schedule H.
59Levy, 'Sacred Skyline,' 46; Attorney General v. Williams, 140 Mass. 329 (1885).
W0lder, Limitation of Height of Buildings, 11.
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responsible for sending Boston's height restrictions off in the direction of eminent
domain.62 Their bill would impose an 80 foot height limit on all property within 500
feet of Copley Square.63 The bill's opponents mostly raised questions of fairness.
"Many owners of the property threatened by this measure are in the fullest sympathy
with the spirit of preserving and adding to the beauty of Copley Square," wrote D.
Webster King, who had considered his own tall apartment house on the north side of
the square, "but feel that they should not be immolated on the altars of sentiment or
aesthetic beauty on account of their ownership of estates within five hundred feet of that
square."6 A group of these owners protested the bill, but said they would have no
objection if its 80-foot limit were applied to the whole city. The Westminster Chambers
owners engaged as their representative former state attorney general Albert E.
Pillsbury, who argued that if the property were to be restricted at all, it would have to
be under eminent domain with provision for compensation. The petitioners agreed to
the insertion of a compensation clause, not to protect property rights on the restricted
lots but to protect the act itself from being voided if found unconstitutional. Benton
argued for a hybrid act which would provide for compensation only if it were judged
invalid as an exercise of the police power. "In short," he said, "all the petitioners ask is
that you shall leave this question of the right to damages, where it belongs, with the
Courts." 65
The legislature disagreed, and on May 23 gave final passage to Copley Square height
restrictions which unambiguously offered compensation both for the restrictions in the
abstract and for changes to the one building in the area "the construction whereof was
61Elder, Limitation of Height of Buildings, 3; Benton, Argument, 10. Boston's total real estate
valuation in 1898 was $870 million (Municipal Register [City doc. 37, 1916], 260).
62Benton, Argument, 11.
631898 House bill 114. Another petition defined its area with an exact boundary, within which it
sought a 70-foot limit (1898 House bill 291). George Upham for one last time submitted his city-wide
height district bill (1898 House bill 763), with Copley Square and all the rest of the Back Bay in the
80-foot district.
"Letter to the editor, Boston Evening Transcript, January 27, 1898: 6; Levy, 'Sacred Skyline,' 47
(King's ownership of the corner of Dartmouth and Boylston); Benton, Argument, 8 (plans for a tall
apartment house there).
65Benton, Argument, 30. Benton insisted that the Parks and Parkways Act itself was a police power
measure (28); Elder, Limitation of Height of Buildings, 12.
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begun but not completed." 66 The act applied only to buildings immediately fronting on
the square, and set limits of 90 feet on its south and west sides, including Westminster
Chambers, and 100 feet on the north side. At the developers' request the act specifically
exempted Copley Square from the Parks and Parkways Act and its 70-foot
restriction. 67 This was a more-or-less necessary corollary of the new limits, but it
meant that the earlier act's applicability would never be decided, and allowed opponents
to go on believing that the building had been illegal from its inception. The new act
allowed above the limits "such steeples, towers, domes, sculptured ornaments and
chimneys as the board of park commissioners of said city may approve."68 Although
the restrictions were imposed by the state, damages were to be paid by the city of
Boston.
On the day the act passed, seven stories of Westminster Chambers' steel framework
stood completed, with three more stories sitting on the ground awaiting assembly (see
fig. 6.2a.). The developers had their architect prepare drawings of various alternatives
for the building's completion (including a nine-story version which could not possibly
have complied with the limit), and met with mayor Josiah Quincy and city officials to
consider their options. It was possible to build an eighth story and roof within 90 feet,
but not the eighth story and roof which had already been fabricated, nor would the
lower building have room for an elaborate terra-cotta frieze and cornice which had been
produced to cap it. This was, in effect, the city's problem, as the act made it
responsible for "the actual cost or expense of any re-arrangement of the design or
construction" of the building.69 The mayor resented this legislative raid on municipal
coffers and later challenged its constitutionality, but meanwhile he sought to minimize
the 're-arrangements' for which the city might have to pay. The city's lawyers believed
they had considerable latitude in interpreting the act, since enforcement of Boston's
building laws had recently been put in the hands of the city rather than the state, and
66Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1898, Acts ch. 452, § 3.
67Whitman, Change of Limitation, 10.
68Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1898, Acts ch. 452, § 1; Similar exceptions had been inserted into
the Parks and Parkways Act by an emendment the previous year (Massachusetts Acts & Resolves,
1897, Acts ch. 379).
69Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1898, Acts ch. 452, 3; Whitman, Change of Limitation, 10.
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they agreed to a compromise.70 The building's eight stories would be built up to the 90
foot limit, where its frieze and cornice would begin, with the roof behind them, rising
to 96 feet under a permit from the parks commission as "sculptured ornaments." The
park commissioners at first declined to follow this script, instead sending the
developers' plans back with a sketch suggesting how the building might be finished
within the limit, at seven stories rather than eight. The developers, relying on their
arrangement with the city, continued construction.
If all concerned were seeking a reasonable compromise, there was probably no better
one available. But few people other than the mayor were interested in compromise.
Many of Copley Square's defenders were disturbed even by the prospect of a 90-foot
building there - the first witness at the hearings had suggested a limit of 45 feet.71 The
syndicate had tried to get the bill's limit amended to 96 feet, and the legislature refused.
The city thus appeared to be conniving with the developers in a clear violation of the
law, an impression which deepened in the coming months. Though Boston's municipal
government during this period was a model of probity compared with the corruption in
many other big cities, the growth of machine politics and patronage led people to
interpret its actions in the worst light and led the legislature in Massachusetts as
elsewhere to circumscribe municipal prerogatives at every turn, a pattern which the
Copley Square height restrictions clearly fit. As soon as the developers' intentions were
rumored the art museum's trustees pressed Massachusetts Attorney General Hosea M.
Knowlton to sue. The city forestalled this action by filing its own suit, and then let
prosecution lapse while the contractors rushed to complete the building. At this point
the attorney general, concluding that enforcement by the city was no enforcement at all,
authorized the museum to bring suit in his name. The parks commissioners, under new
pressure from the city administration, retroactively approved the frieze and cornice on
October 31, 1898. A year later, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice Marcus
P. Knowlton* handed down the decision in Attorney General v. Williams:
Westminster Chambers was six feet too tall.
70Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1894, Acts ch. 257.
71Henry L. Higginson, Boston Herald, February 1, 1898, cited in Levy, 'Sacred Skyline,' 34.
* only a distant relation of Attorney General Knowlton. See entries in Conrad Reno, Memoirs of the
Judiciary and the Bar of New England for the Nineteenth Century (Boston, 1901) 2:114, 124.
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The most important result of this decision was to establish the constitutionality of
height restrictions. "The right to make such regulations is too well established to be
questioned," claimed Justice Knowlton. 72 In fact, this was the first time any state
supreme court had ever considered the question. The right was "established" only by
eight years of unchallenged operation in Boston, and by more recent regulations in
Chicago (1893) and Washington, D.C. (1894), neither of them tested yet in the courts.
The decisions cited in Attorney General v. Williams all involved more limited powers,
concerning particular types of building or types of construction.
The Westminster case itself now moved back to the legislature, where it was re-cast
as a campaign for relief of the city and "preservation" of the building's terra-cotta top.
"Lawful or unlawful," wrote two of the syndicate's partners, "it is not in the public
interest to pull down the frieze and cornice, which is the only effect of this suit, and
leave the building, as it will then be left, an object of public reproach and an injury to
every building in Copley square."73 The partners repeatedly stated their intention not to
mend the appearance of the building in any way if they were forced to remove the terra
cotta work. "[D]o you suppose," asked Pillsbury, that the owners
will spend another $50,000, in addition to all they have lost, to put back the
ornaments upon that building, to please the very people who have pulled them off?
Never. It is not in human nature to do it. If these fanatics pull off the top of the
building, they shall take the responsibility and the consequences. 74
The legislators of 1900 at first rejected the developers' appeal, but then reconsidered
and reversed their vote a day later, a conversion which the Boston Herald insinuated
was a product of outright bribery.75 Governor W. Murray Crane vetoed the act. "In my
opinion the vital point involved is not the appearance of the building," he said, "but it is
72Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476 (1899), at 478.
73Woodbury & Leighton letter to the editor, Boston Evening Transcript, March 22, 1900: 10.
74Albert E. Pillsbury, The Truth about Westminster Chambers (Boston, 1901), 11.
75See Massachusetts General Court, House of Representatives, Statements made by Members speaking
to Questions of Personal Privilege in the House of Representatives on Tuesday, May 29, 1900,
concerning Newspaper Criticisms of their Votes... (1900 House doc. 1385)
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rather whether the law may be violated only to be excused or condoned."76 The
Westminster owners returned to the legislature in 1901, 1902, and 1903, and two
successive mayors of Boston and a large portion of the city's real estate community
argued on their behalf that the case had become silly and vindictive. The 'Copley
Square Protective Committee' opposed them each year, invoking Crane's veto by
arguing that Westminster Chambers was "not a question of Aesthetics, but of Law and
Order." 77 Williams' Hotel Kensington, according to attorney Edmund A. Whitman,
"was a monument to Massachusetts law, and the Westminster Chambers will be
another."78 Whatever legislators thought of the merits of the case, it was hard for them
to find any political benefits in what their constituents would see as the rescue of a
rogue real estate syndicate and its accessory before the fact, the city of Boston.
It was mainly the city which needed relief, because it was the city which would have
to pay. Under the act the city would pay the cost of changing from a ten- to an eight-
story building during construction; it would pay the additional costs which would have
been saved if the building had been designed from the beginning to be eight stories tall.
It would pay the developers for the two floors worth of rent they lost, and on top of all
this it would pay the enormous cost of lowering the roof of an occupied residential
building. "[I]f the city authorities have blundered in their interpretation of the law," said
Williams, "why should they not be the sufferers?" 79 Even before the decision, the
syndicate had filed suit for damages, but the municipal administration claimed that the
act was unconstitutional and the city therefore exempt from liability. The prospect of
being caught without anyone responsible for compensation must have been an
important motivation in the owners' continuing search for legislative relief. Williams
returned to the state supreme court arguing that they should not be made to take any
action until some source of compensation was guaranteed. In March, 1901, the court
rebuffed him and ordered the building cut down to 90 feet. This was the decision he
761900 Senate doc. 234: "I am unable to give my sanction to a measure inclined to relieve citizens of
the Commonwealth from the consequences of deliberate disregard of the provisions of a statute of the
General Court."
77Future U.S. Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis argued for the committee that "[t]his is a case
where the majesty of the law must be maintained for the sake of its influence upon the community"
(Boston Evening Transcript, April 3, 1901: 1).
78Boston Evening Transcript, April 4, 1901: 5.
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appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court, which in February, 1903, upheld it and sent it
back for the Massachusetts courts to work out the details of compliance and
compensation.80
An owner of property on the north side of the square, Mollie R. Cole, had sued for
compensation even before Williams did. The Superior Court's opinion in Cole v. City
set a short-lived precedent strongly favorable to this use of eminent domain. A jury
decided that Cole was not entitled to any compensation; the height restriction if anything
increased the value of her mid-block lot by preventing tall buildings overshadowing
it.81 This precedent was reduced in scope, however, before the Westminster Chambers
damages finally came to trial; corner lots were less subject to overshadowing, and their
owners won compensation, including $17,000 - more than the original price of the land
- for D. Webster King, who was not immolated on the altar of aesthetics after all.82
After the initial state supreme court decision in Attorney General v. Williams, the
Museum of Fine Arts withdrew from the case, because its trustees had decided to
abandon Copley Square. 83 This was no doubt Westminster Chambers' most far-
reaching effect on its neighborhood. Although, in the trustees' words, they had
"regarded the location on Copley Square as an ideal one and likely to remain the
permanent home of the Museum," within months of Westminster Chambers'
completion, and even as they were prosecuting its owners, they set up a committee to
consider relocating.84 The museum was the only one of the square's institutions which
had not moved before, and apparently had not developed a corporate instinct to stand its
ground. But it acted with a view to prospective permanence, buying the following year
79Boston Evening Transcript, March 14, 1901: 5.
80 Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491.
8 1Cole v. Boston, 181 Mass. 374 (1902). The case was filed September 6, 1898, just three and a half
months after the restrictions went into effect.
82Whitman, Change of Limitation, 15-16.
83Whitman, Change of Limitation, 13.
84Trustees of the Museum of Fine Arts, Twenty-fourth Annual Report,for the Year Ending December
31, 1899 (Boston, 1900), 7-8. The possibility was publicly discussed already during 1898 (American
Architect and Building News, November 5, 1898: 41; November 19, 1898: 57; November 26, 1898:
69); the trustees were nervous about not only Westminster Chambers but also the impending removal
of a nearby fire station in order to construct a new Back Bay railroad station.
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twelve acres on the Fenway which the museum's trustees found "sufficient for its
needs for centuries to come."as
The museum's relocation was to be financed by selling its Copley Square property.
Before the trustees announced their intention of leaving, they secured from the city the
release of a restriction on the original grant of the property that limited its use to
"promotion of the Fine Arts." 86 When city council members learned of the museum's
plans, they made an abortive attempt to rescind their release.87 Though the museum
remained in its old building for several years, Copley Square's magic as a civic center
was finished. The trustees signed an agreement of sale with a group of real estate
developers in time for Westminster Chambers' final appeal to the legislature in 1903.
That year the Westminster owners put their relief petition in the form of a bill to raise
the height limit to a uniform 100 feet all around the square, arguing that the museum's
departure would remove the logic for lower heights on its south side. Business and real
estate people predicted that Copley Square would become a new downtown and
therefore needed tall business buildings; the museum's purchasers agreed.88 The
museum's departure, however, worked in another way against relaxing the restriction.
The trustees had allowed a three-year statutory limit to lapse without seeking
compensation for the height restriction on their own property and had sold it subject to
the 90-foot limit. An increase in that limit would be a valuable gift from the legislature,
and it seemed inappropriate to bestow such a gift upon a development syndicate instead
of the museum, especially if the developers had cynically anticipated the increase all
along.
The legislature let the restrictions stand, and in August, 1903, contractors began the
work of lowering the roof of Westminster Chambers. As the owners had warned all
along, they made no effort to finish the truncated building (fig. 6.2b.). The city of
85Museum of Fine Arts, Twenty-fourth Annual Report, 8. The museum's president was William
Endicott, Jr., who as a state house commissioner had advocated rebuilding the Bulfinch front in
"enduring materials."
86Museum of Fine Arts, Twenty-fourth Annual Report, 9.87Woodbury & Leighton letter, Boston Evening Transcript, March 22, 1900: 10.
88Boston Herald, March 1, 1903: 10. See also, even before Copley Square restrictions, 'Boston's Fifth
Avenue,' an advertisement in the Boston Evening Transcript, December 8, 1897: 6; 'Boylston Street as
it Was and Is,' Boston Evening Transcript, December 9, 1897: 10.
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Boston eventually paid them almost $350,000 in damages.89 Ironically, the site is now
occupied by the John Hancock Tower (1975), the tallest building in Boston, exactly
700 feet taller than this predecessor which the city paid so much to shorten.
fig. 6.2a and 6.2b. Westminster Chambers before and after removal of its cornice.
Trinity Church is at left, the Museum of Fine Arts at right.
89Elisabeth M. Herlihy letter, n.d., in Loeb Library VF, Harvard. The total damages under Acts 1898,
ch. 452, including those paid to other owners, were $396,079.72.
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During the 1890s, Bostonians figured out that government actions could control
change in the urban environment in ways that private deed restrictions could not. They
could respond to new problems without having to anticipate every possibility in
advance, and without requiring the unanimous consent of property owners. But by the
end of the decade, this discovery was still more important in the abstract than for any
specific accomplishments it had produced. Citizen activists and their allies in the
legislature had found or created new powers which allowed the government to
intervene where the city's physical stability was threatened, but they had not yet learned
to use these powers well enough for them to have any widespread effects; they had not
yet changed the existing pattern of private development regulation. Public powers of
enormous potential were being used in the same ad hoc ways which had been
appropriate for more limited private responses, and they produced correspondingly
limited results.
Public action in the Back Bay succeeded in its specific aim of preventing more
Haddon Halls on Commonwealth Avenue. It even succeeded reasonably well in the
larger aims of protecting the overall Back Bay streetscape, though in fact it only
established height restrictions on one street and building setback lines on two. Its real
success may have occurred by reinforcing residents' sense of control over their
neighborhood, a sense which had worn thin with the necessity for extreme measures
such as buying lots where tall buildings were threatened. Back Bay residents expressed
that sense of control emphatically on Copley Square, where they initiated public action
that succeeded in its specific and extraordinary aim of determining, against a property
owner's will, exactly how high his building could stand. It was not so successful there,
however, in its larger goal of ensuring the permanence of Copley Square's architectural
composition or its symbolic place in the structure of the city.
In the Back Bay, these tools for public action were used to stabilize the physical
environment in a relatively new neighborhood. This was normally the role of deed
restrictions, which publicly-imposed height restrictions supplemented and extended.
Before this tool had been available long enough for its success to be evaluated, it was
put to use in another place, for somewhat different ends. While the Copley Square
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restrictions were new, before protracted controversy there strained the consensus which
had produced them, the technique spread to yet another area experiencing a similar
invasion of out-of-scale buildings; height restrictions came to Beacon Hill, where they
had first been discussed. On Beacon Hill, they were an extension not of deed
restrictions but of a preservation effort.
Public actions suDlement preservation: Beacon Hill II
In October of 1900, Charles R. Ashbee, a representative of Great Britain's National
Trust for Places of Historic Interest and Natural Beauty, began touring the United
States in an effort to organize an American counterpart to the Trust. In his lectures he
described preservation as one in a family of reform movements which touched the
urban environment, including park and city beautiful groups, settlement houses, good
government organizations, and even the nascent functionalist movement in
architecture.9 He found receptive audiences in fourteen states throughout the east and
midwest, and refined his appeal in discussions with scores of existing organizations.
As Ashbee spoke at the turn of the century, his expansive vision of preservation was
shared by most of his audience. It was this broad concern with permanence of the
whole urban environment which motivated Bostonians working to save the Common
and Park Street Church.
These ambitious ideas of preservation implied making use of government powers in
several ways, each of which would be explored during the next generation. First, the
concern for landmarks' visual relation to each other and to their surroundings suggested
public controls to prevent inappropriate development around them. When
preservationists turned their attention to whole neighborhoods, then such controls
might address inappropriate development throughout those neighborhoods, just as
height restrictions were doing in the Back Bay. Second, concern for the settings of
9C. R. Ashbee, A Report ... to the Council of the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest and
Natural Beauty, on his visit to the United States in the Council's Behalf (London, 1901), 7, 11.
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landmarks might be carried even further by actively re-arranging their surroundings.
Such intervention was inspired by the City Beautiful design philosophy, which
demanded landmarks to mark its symmetries and organize its vistas, and sought in
these landmarks the sort of civic significance that was often attributed to existing
historic buildings. Here was a marriage between preservation and urban design, just as
Ashbee suggested, and the City Beautiful brought as its dowry the full range of
government powers to which urban designers turned to realize their often grandiose
projects. Finally, government powers (of either eminent domain or, much later, the
police power) might be used directly to assert public control over privately-held
landmarks where they were threatened through the greed or intransigence of their
owners.
Private preservation in most cities were not as effective as in Boston. Of the patriotic
societies which then dominated such efforts, Ashbee reported after his trip that the
"narrowness" of their vision meant that "with one or two noteworthy exceptions, their
energies are often at present frittered away in doing comparatively trifling things." 91
What sorts of broader actions would the proposed 'American Council' take? Ashbee's
first example was to "help the architects in their fight" for height restrictions, an answer
he repeated time after time in various cities.92
The preservation movement did move off at first in the directions Ashbee sketched for
it, although New England preservationists under William Sumner Appleton would soon
define their mission more narrowly. The movement's first essay in making use of
uniquely governmental powers was a campaign with which Ashbee was familiar and no
doubt had in mind as he wrote: a drive to secure the setting of the Bulfinch state house
by restricting the heights of buildings around it on Beacon Hill. Later, preservationists
would consider other forms of public action, charting new territory which the
movement would continue exploring for the rest of the twentieth century; first they took
a legal tool which was handy thanks to the efforts in the Back Bay, and extended its use
to another place where it had a clearly preservationist rationale.
9 1Ashbee, Report ... on his visit to the United States, 5.
92Ashbee, Report ... on his visit to the United States, 7.
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By the beginning of 1899, the Bulfinch State House was saved, its restoration
completed under the direction of the committee appointed by Governor Roger Wolcott.
People throughout Massachusetts had rushed to defend the building, and this
widespread interest now took on a momentum of its own, travelling along a channel
already marked by the Back Bay building height controversies. Governor Wolcott in
his 1899 address to the legislature called for Beacon Hill height restrictions to give the
state house similar "protection." 93 Height restrictions, thus far enacted to preserve the
visual character of a neighborhood, and to make permanent the settings of some
comparatively new buildings in it, were now invoked as an explicit corollary of
preserving a particular historic structure. The logic of using them there sheds light on
why the building was valued and preserved: as an icon important not merely for itself,
but in its visual relationship with the rest of the city.
The icon was not so much the whole state house as its dome. "The state house dome
is the hub of the solar system," said Oliver Wendell Holmes, and by a synechdocic
representation of the whole by a part, Boston became known as "The Hub." "As the
crowning and most conspicuous edifice of this city," wrote the 1867 State House
Commissioners,
its dome has always been the most noticeable feature of Boston in any distant view
of this metropolis. Its happy adaptation to the position which it occupies, and its
highly impressive outline, in such just and harmonious proportion to the mass of
roofs around it, have made it through many years the familiar and recognized land-
mark of the city. Its overshadowing presence has always conferred an unmistakable
character upon Boston and constituted a marked and peculiarly striking feature,
towards which the eye of every son of Massachusetts, in approaching her capitol
[sic], turns always, with instant recognition. 94
Unfortunately for the harmonious proportion of distant views, neither the dome, the
state house, nor the hill on which it stood was especially tall (see fig. 6.3.). Engravings
almost always exaggerated its size, but an examination of contemporary photographs
shows that its 'instant recognition' had more to do with familiarity than visual
93Boston Morning Journal, January 5, 1899.
94Massachusetts Executive Department, Report on Remodelling or Rebuilding the State House, 7.
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dominance. "With the great extension of the city, however, within the past few years,"
the commissioners pointed out in 1867, "and the erection of other and loftier structures
in its neighborhood, the dome now hardly maintains its relative importance as to height
and mass, in comparison with the rest of the city, which it possessed at the time of its
erection."95
Their answer was a taller dome: 268 feet tall, in Bryant and Estey's design for a new
building, compared with Bulfinch's 120 feet.96 If the Bulfinch building were to be kept
instead, they would at least raise the existing dome by inserting a colonnade under it,
and they believed this so "indispensable" that they included it even in their Plan No. 1,
the budget alternative which addressed only "the most pressing wants"97 of the
building. When the legislature took a more parsimonious view, it sought to achieve the
same visual prominence instead by painting the dome gold, and then in 1874 by
covering it with gold leaf.98
By the 1880s, an increase in preservationist sentiment suggested that the problem of
the relationship between the dome and its surroundings should be treated not by
changing the dome, but by controlling change in the surroundings. This relationship
remained, beyond bare preservation of the Bulfinch building, the central problem of the
state house. The "most imminent danger" to the state house, wrote the Transcript in
1886, was
being dwarfed by high adjacent buildings on either side on Beacon Street. Already
the great hotel on the corner of Joy street hides the State House dome from the Back
Bay section, and should elevated structures also be erected on the corner of
Hancock avenue and upon the lot bordered by Mt. Vernon, Beacon and Bowdoin
streets, ... the historical landmark would have lost its chief claim for
preservation.99
95Massachusetts Executive Department, Report on Remodelling or Rebuilding the State House, 7.
96Architects' description, in Massachusetts Executive Department, Report on Remodelling or
Rebuilding the State House, 30; Parker v. Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199 (1901), at 202.
97Massachusetts Executive Department, Report on Remodelling or Rebuilding the State House, 7, 3.
98Tucci, Built in Boston, 147. The legislature pursued this approach further in 1898 when it had the
dome outlined in lights at night (Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1898, Acts ch. 395).
99Boston Evening Transcript, November 27, 1886.
270
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
In this pre-height restriction year, the Transcript endorsed a proposal that the state
buy up these critical blocks, to build a low government office building on the
downtown side, and simply to hold the buildings on the other side so that "the land
could not be built upon in a manner to injure the appearance or outlook of the State
House." 100 Indeed, the legislative committee which first recommended expanding the
building contemplated purchasing land "either for use or protective control." 101
Governor Ames' plan for the capitol, announced in January 1887, included acquisition
of all the property facing the state house grounds east and west, "to protect the State
House from the danger of injury to its present outlook and appearance by the erection
of lofty structures...." 102
Shortly thereafter, former city council president William H. Whitmore made his
suggestion that the state might accomplish this same end by a law restricting the height
of buildings. The Boston Journal endorsed the recommendation because its editors
feared that this purpose would otherwise result in overly-ambitious schemes of land
acquisition.103 Such land acquisition might be alarming for purely fiscal reasons, but it
also troubled preservationists such as Whitmore because it could be the first step in
solving the height problem by replacing the Bulfinch state house with a bigger one.
Thus four years before height restrictions were enacted anywhere in the country, and
eight months before the Thanksgiving Day fire brought attention to them for reasons of
public safety, they had already entered public discourse with a preservationist rationale.
During the decade between this proposal and Governor Wolcott's 1899 speech, the
Bulfinch state house had been saved without the use of building height restrictions, and
Boston had adopted them in other places, by various means, for various ends.
100Boston Evening Transcript, November 27, 1886.
101Report of Committee on Finance, 1886 House doc. 457, 2.
1021887 Senate doc. 6, 1.
103Boston Journal, March 28, 1887, in Sillars, The State House, 34.
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fig. 6.3. Beacon Hill in 1899; vertical dimension exaggerated by 2:1. A block from
the state house dome, to the left, is the Hotel Tudor. A block to the right the Hotel
Bellevue is under construction. At far right is the 190-foot Ames Building, tallest in
Boston; shading shows the heights allowable under the 125-foot limit it inspired.
The issue arose again in 1899 because of two new tall buildings under construction
on Beacon Street, the Hotel Bellevue and the Women's Club. The governor's call for
height restrictions that year followed logically from the decision to preserve and restore
the state house. The state's efforts to make permanent the Bulfinch capitol would be
incomplete, even pointless, if they did not also secure the view of its dome upon the
hill. As on Commonwealth Avenue and Copley Square, height restrictions would
protect a public investment and a civic icon. The fight to save the state house from
decay and from the legislature now became a fight to save it from its changing
neighborhood, and the same people fought both. They included Governor Roger
Wolcott, former senator Alfred Seelye Roe, and the many chapters of the D.A.R.
which helped make the earlier campaign a statewide one, and started this one off the
same way with a massive petition drive. 104
George B. Upham, who had tried for the previous three years to get the legislature to
lower heights in residential districts, represented the petitioners for Beacon Hill height
restrictions. The old solution to the problem of tall buildings around the state house was
to buy the neighboring property, but now there appeared to be several less expensive
alternatives. Upham still believed, as Benton had argued at Copley Square, that a height
district could be imposed at no cost under the police power. Even under eminent
domain it seemed possible that a restriction might cost little or nothing - the
Westminster damages were still years in the future, and only Mollie Cole's ultimately
104American Architect and Building News, Feb. 11, 1899: 41; Massachusetts State Archives,
legislative documents, 1899 Acts, ch. 457.
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fruitless pursuit of compensation had come before a court. Upham's bill provided for
compensation, but did not use ordinary eminent domain language, and evidently was
intended like Benton's Copley Square bill to provide payment only if it were thrown
out as an exercise of the police power. Louis Brandeis, among others, assured
legislators that no compensation would be necessary.10 5
fig. 6.4. George B. Upham's proposal, limiting buildings within 1000 feet of the
Bulfinch state house to the height of its main cornice. Topography makes the limit most
stringent nearest the state house.
Though the bill's legal rationale was murky, its design intent was clear. All buildings
within a thousand feet of the state house would be limited to the height of "the main
cornice of the Bulfinch front of the state house" (fig. 6.4.).106 This language made
explicit the bill's essentially aesthetic purpose of maintaining the dome's visibility; its
proponents made no attempt to cloak it in traditional police power concerns of health
and safety. At the same time, the bill avoided the pitfall of arbitrariness which had thus
far worked against height districting under the police power. A thousand feet from the
state house in almost every direction, the ground falls away to more than 125 feet
beneath the cornice, so buildings there could be built to the existing limit, which simply
would no longer follow the topography up Beacon Hill. Buildings would conform to
an absolute height limit rather than one relative to the ground; no tall building could
look down on its neighbors across a legislated boundary. This new flat ceiling as first
written would have reduced allowable heights on several valuable downtown blocks,
but Upham quickly retreated from this direction.
105Boston Morning Journal, March 18, 1899: 5.
1061899 House bill 681, §1.
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Many members of the Women's Club petitioned for the restriction, but the Women's
Club House corporation retained former attorney general Pillsbury, Westminster
Chambers' lawyer, to oppose the bill. Pillsbury argued that the bill's aesthetic purpose
made it unconstitutional whether or not it claimed to be an exercise of the police power.
"Powers of eminent domain can be extended only to public uses," he said. "To prevent
interference with a view of the State House is not a public use." 107
The Hotel Bellevue syndicate opposed the bill through its trustee, William Minot, a
lawyer who controlled more Boston real estate than any other individual, and whose
widely-reproduced testimony had a greater effect than Pillsbury's on the course of the
legislation. Minot was a staunch supporter of height restrictions in general. As a
member of Boston's building code commission in 1892, he was responsible for
making the limit more stringent on narrow streets, and more recently his support had
been influential in passing the Copley Square restrictions. Now he explained why he
thought the Beacon Hill proposal was a bad idea.
Copley Square, said Minot, was "unique ... [I]t has been mistaken for a precedent,
and as a precedent it is certainly dangerous." He drew a distinction between the design
intent of the Copley Square restrictions and those proposed for Beacon Hill. The goal at
Copley Square "was to preserve the whole of it, to be seen upon the spot;"108
regulation of private buildings was essential because they were part of the composition.
On Beacon Hill no such composition existed; the whole was being made subordinate to
one part of one building, for the aesthetically ill-defined aim of maintaining its visibility
from all directions, some of which in fact had good views and some of which were
already obstructed. This difference in design intent could be expressed as a public
policy question in quantitative terms: at Copley Square the property benefitted was
worth ten times as much as the property restricted; on Beacon Hill the ratio was
reversed.
William Minot was sympathetic with the goal of protecting and enhancing the
Bulfinch state house, but he felt the bill's sponsors were using it as an "excuse."
107Boston Morning Journal, April 4, 1899: 5; Boston Evening Globe, March 17, 1899: 4.
108Boston Evening Globe, March 30, 1899: 6.
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"[These petitioners, as represented by Mr. Upham, are not interested in the
preservation of the state house; they are only interested in the restriction of the height of
buildings."109 Ironically, Minot advocated Upham's original, now-abandoned
approach, of a general lowering of the height limit in all the city's residential areas; he
even thought, returning to the private medium of deed restrictions, that "in large
sections of the city it might be accomplished by obtaining the actual consent of every
owner." 110
Most of Minot's testimony was an attempt to clear up what he saw as confusion or
irresponsibility in discussing eminent domain and air rights. But Minot's own
arguments revealed some of these same confusions, and show how slippery these
issues were for proponents and opponents alike. "There seems to be a vague sort of
feeling," he said, "that in taking away the right to build to the height allowed by law is
not really sequestration of property, but simply the enforcement of a rule which will not
entitle the owners to damages." 111 "[W]hat is to be taken does not seem like a real
thing," he said, offering a not entirely accurate parallel to make it sound more real:
the hotel Tudor, on the corner of Beacon and Joy [streets], is an eyesore, which has
caused universal complaint. It obscures a view of the state house. If it were
proposed to remove the upper stories of the hotel Tudor for the purpose of giving a
view of the dome, you would not do it. You would be destroying actual property
for a purely aesthetic purpose, and you would think it wasteful. 112
As Minot continued, however, it appeared that he himself was not entirely convinced of
air rights' reality. He recommended that the legislature protect the state house by taking
abutting land outright, so that the state "will obtain an actual asset for its money."
The Committee on Cities sent the bill to the legislature with a negative
recommendation. Rather than letting the project die, Representative William Schofield
of Malden substituted on the House floor a more limited restriction which applied only
to the two blocks immediately west of the state house. Unlike the original proposal with
its cornice-line datum, the new version specified a 70-foot height measured at each
109Boston Evening Globe, March 30, 1899: 6.
110Boston Evening Globe, March 30, 1899: 6.
111Boston Evening Globe, March 30, 1899: 6.
112Boston Evening Globe, March 30, 1899: 6.
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property (fig. 6.5.). Perhaps this change was intended for ease of administration, but it
could also make a police power rationale more plausible; the compensation clause
remained ambivalent. Schofield intimated that no compensation would be required
because the affected owners were "practically all in favor" of the limit. 113 The two
blocks did not include either of the buildings under construction which had raised the
issue, so the state in any case spared itself the ordeal to which it had subjected the city
at Westminster Chambers.114
A competing idea of public action to 'protect' the state house, rather than regulation,
was taking and clearing buildings from around it. In Paris, Baron von Haussmann had
called this "ddgagement" - disengaging historic monuments from the urban fabric to
make them more visible and thus more monumental. He practised it in the 1850s and
'60s as he cleared the blocks around Notre Dame, eliminating the context for which the
building had been designed and which made it awesome, in order to make it a
freestanding structure visible from across the Seine, looking more diminutive as an
object, but serving as a landmark within a greater area.115
Americans practised major urban clearance and reconstruction, especially for new
thoroughfares, as early as Haussmann did, but his aesthetic approach came to America
later, in the European baggage of the City Beautiful movement. The symmetrical public
spaces which the City Beautiful sought to create might be ordered around existing
historic landmarks, in part by clearing away less important old buildings around them.
This provided an answer to the more general question raised by these structures'
preservation, of how they should be treated. Thus the Boston Real Estate Record and
Building News in 1893, the year of the Columbian exposition, advocated schemes to
create new squares around the Old State House, the Old South, and Christ Church (the
Old North). These landmarks would be rendered all the more visible when the new
squares were linked by a network of new streets and street widenings, including a new
113Boston Evening Globe, May 18, 1899: 2.
114Including the Hotel Bellevue, which was under construction to 39 feet above the Bulfinch cornice.
American Architect and Building News, March 25, 1899: 89.
11501sen, City as a Work of Art, 306.
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approach to the Bulfinch State House which would open a vista by tearing down Park
Street Church.116 Twenty years later, SPNEA pursued a similar aesthetic in a more
modest way as it tried to buy and clear lots around all its urban properties.
The treatment of Beacon Hill around the state house supports historian Jon Peterson's
assertion that the City Beautiful movement took its impetus less from design
professionals than as a grass-roots impulse for civic adornment. 117 Politicians began a
program of acquiring and clearing property around the state house while its extension
was under construction early in the 1890s, although the architect of the annex neither
initiated nor favored this treatment. 118 The state house construction commissioners let
clearance lapse after 1894, when criticism of the newly-visible annex coincided with a
demand for accomodations in the remaining old buildings by the growing bureaucracy,
which could not be accommodated even in the greatly enlarged state house. In 1899,
with both the addition and the Bulfinch restoration completed, the legislature's state
house committee tried to resolve the treatment of the capitol's surroundings. It
approved bills for clearing all the remaining state-owned buildings east of the state
house (see fig. 5.5.), and for buying and clearing the block to the west so that the open
space would be symmetrical around the Bulfinch front, thus emphasizing the original
building rather than the new annex.
Compared with such demolition schemes, building height restrictions were
unsatisfyingly passive; they did not appeal to the legislature's men of action. Limiting
building height would at best keep Beacon Hill as it was. Clearing, these people
believed, would improve it; they were still looking for material progress. They also
realized that height restrictions would offer little for them to show their constituents
what the state had spent money on. Clearing, on the other hand, was dramatic. To
appreciate it required no refined aesthetic sensibilities. Representative Richard Cullinane
of Lawrence, for example, brought a simple perspective to the issue: the legislators had
116Boston Real Estate Record and Building News, November 18, 1893: 4; November 4, 1893: 4.
117Jon A. Peterson, 'The City Beautiful Movement: Lost Origins and Forgotten Meanings,' Journal
of Urban History 2 (1976): 415-34.
118Governor Ames' 1887 plan to acquire blocks east and west assumed "the buildings to be removed at
such time as shall seem to be for the best interests of the Commonwealth." (1887 Senate doc. 6, 2);
Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1892, Acts ch. 404; 1893, ch. 450; 1894, ch. 532; 1895, House bill
427; Charles Brigham testimony, in Boston Evening Transcript, February 10, 1896: 8.
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commissioned two war monuments which were nearly finished; now they realized there
was no place to put them, so he favored demolishing more of Beacon Hill. 119
The state house's longtime friends thought this idea at best misguided. Alfred Seelye
Roe did not want to further expose the "homeliness" of the state house annex. 120 The
State House Preservation Committee unanimously opposed the idea. "The low
buildings now owned by the State," said member William W. Vaughan (who was also
busy fighting Westminster Chambers), "form a most valuable screen - to separate the
State House from the buildings beyond which would dwarf it."121 Clearing them
without imposing height restrictions would be an invitation for the construction of tall
apartment buildings around any newly-created open space. All of these people favored
height restrictions instead.
In addition to aesthetic motives, a pragmatic reason for taking land around the state
house was the commonwealth's need for more office space. The only contiguous land
was the block west of the state house, and people who felt comfortable with the idea of
building an extension attached to the Bulfinch building argued that the land should be
acquired before it came to be occupied by expensive new structures. A new state house
preservation controversy was brewing over whether such an addition was appropriate;
buying the adjacent blocks seemed likely to tilt the decision in favor of the wings.
Schofield's height restriction bill offered something to both sides in this incipient
controversy, and allowed them to defer the main issue. It protected the Bulfinch front; it
also prevented expensive new buildings which could complicate future expansion of the
state house, while deferring the cost of actually acquiring property until such time, if
ever, as the state was ready to use it. It created a land bank in which the land remained
in private hands.
The legislature in 1899 adopted Schofield's bill as a compromise response to
demands for a state house park and for Beacon Hill height limits. Because his
restrictions applied to only one side of the state house, they left unsatisfied not only the
reformers like Upham with ambitions for protecting large areas of the city, but even
119Boston Morning Journal, May 19, 1899: 5.
120Boston Morning Journal, May 19, 1899: 5.
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those preservationists concerned only about buildings directly fronting the state house.
They continued -pressing their case and were rewarded in 1901 with an extension of the
height restriction, in an even more narrowly-drawn area. As part of the final scheme for
laying out the park east of the state house - the blocks which had been bought early in
the 1890s - the legislature imposed a 100-foot height limit on the blocks fronting this
park. The restriction did not apply to the whole of the property, however, but only to
the front forty-two feet of each lot. Thus this act sought to preserve not distant views of
the dome, but the appearance of the state house and its park as seen on the spot. The
provision may also have been a cynical attempt to minimize compensation, since
owners could claim damages on only half of their property, but were unlikely to build
above the limit on the other half. This act also made a final refinement in the drafting of
height restrictions under eminent domain, providing that any damages were to be offset
against benefits to property owners arising from the whole state house and park
project. 122
fig. 6.5. The Beacon Hill height restrictions as adopted. Adjacent to the state house,
on the left, is the 70-foot limit of 1899. To the right, across the new park, is the 100-
foot limit of 1901, applying only to the front of each lot. Distant views of the dome
remain in jeopardy.
The Bulfinch state house remained for years a prolific generator of preservation
controversies. Their source lay in the conflict between the permanence ascribed to the
121Boston Morning Journal, April 13, 1899: 4.
122Justice Marcus Knowlton, who had to sort all this out in 1906 in American Unitarian Association
v. Commonwealth, 193 Mass. 470, suggested that the limit might have been the first American height
zoning under the police power (at 477). The 1901 Act provided compensation for owners on Beacon and
Park Streets (4), but not those on Bowdoin Street (§3); the provision offsetting benefits against
damages, coveraing all these areas including Bowdoin Street, was not enacted until 1902 (ch. 543).
Knowlton used the idea of a police-power district to avoid the otherwise inescapable conclusion that the
1901 act was an error in legislative draftsmanship.
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building as icon and as artifact, and the changing and growing functions it served. Even
while the annex was under construction, further extensions had been widely discussed.
"The State Government is constantly expanding," said Clement K. Fay in 1894, urging
the commonwealth to "treat the matter heroically" by expanding still further north with
an annex to the annex. 123
Instead, a growing sensitivity to environmental symbolism strengthened the impulse
to make Bulfinch's dome the focus of some larger urban composition. The legislature's
state house committee in 1899 published an elaborate rendering of the Bulfinch state
house with symmetrical flanking wings along the Common, "which would be possible"
on the expanded state house park.124 Some such scheme came to seem increasingly
logical. Few people liked the annex well enough to want any more of it. Wings, if
treated at the heroic scale which government accommodations would soon require,
could hide the annex and restore the sense of Bulfmch's facade as the front, rather than
one end, of the building.125
When this scheme was finally realized between 1914 and 1917, under the supervision
of architects Robert D. Andrews and R. Clipston Sturgis, it gave rise to yet another
echo of the Bulfinch front controversy. Members of the legislature overruled the
architects' recommendation, and specified that the wings be clad in white marble.
Preservationists worried that this would lead to plans for facing the Bulfinch front itself
with the same material. They acted through the Boston Art Commission and the new
Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities, which made a rare (and
unsuccessful) effort to influence public action. Significantly, the society's
uncharacteristic interest in a major public building was motivated by an issue of
artifactual integrity, rather than large-scale environmental aesthetics. SPNEA
abandoned the fight for reasons of similar philosophical purity, because in William
Sumner Appleton's words, "[t]he new wings are in no way antiquities in themselves,"
123Save the State House, 7, 6.
1241899 Senate doc. 385.
125Robert D. Andrews suggested at the 1896 hearings that the entire Bulfinch state house be treated as
one pavilion to be symmetrically matched, and he argued that it would be architecturally unfortunate to
expand the building with wings. Massachusetts General Court, Hearings concerning the Bulfinch
Front, 3: 42. Twenty years later, wings were erected under his supervision.
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and "[wihen a direct attack is made on the old work of Bulfinch there will be ample
time to rally to its support" 126 The wings indeed got faced with marble; Bulfinch's
bricks were not replaced but were painted white to match.
As part of the state house expansion project, the commonwealth took the two
mansions which had been built on the site of the Hancock house. When Sturgis and
Andrews in 1916 drew their plans for the newly enlarged grounds, they proposed that
the Hancock house be reconstructed. 127 Unlike the state house proposals of twenty
years earlier, this replica was not to be created at the price of destroying the original.
Since the house had been destroyed already, would it not be laudable to build it anew
on the site? The governor, who would occupy it as his official residence, endorsed the
plan. SPNEA took a keen interest in the treatment of the grounds as the Bulfinch
building's setting, but said little about the Hancock house scheme. 128 The preservation
movement had come full circle; this official acknowledgement of error must have been
gratifying, but it now collided with preservationists' own new standards of
archaeological truth. The Hancock house project eventually languished.
While height restrictions were being used as an urban design tool around the state
house to accompany its preservation, the hill's lower slopes were receiving a more
unusual kind of attention which suggested a different way of applying this tool to
preservation. Height restrictions were aiding a nascent movement - later called 'area
preservation' - which was ultimately of greater significance to historic preservation.
Area preservation grew out of the same concern for the large-scale environment which
initially motivated preservationists' exploration of government powers, and extended
this exploration even further.
126SPNEA Bulletin 6 (1915): 16-17.
127
'Plan A', described in Report of SPNEA Committee on State house grounds, May 3, 1916; see
also May 16, 1916 Sturgis to Appleton: this "more conservative plan" is Sturgis' favorite. Microfiche
correspondence archive, 'State House,' SPNEA.
128Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 277; SPNEA appointed a Committee on the State House Grounds,
composed of Henry Charles Dean, Joseph Everett Chandler, and Herbert Browne. See their report, May
3, 1916; Microfiche correspondence archive, 'State House,' SPNEA.
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The state house's immediate neighbors were among the most active proponents of
Beacon Hill height restrictions. Many of them made clear that, while they were
sincerely concerned about the dome's visibility, they were also happy to have found a
way of relieving pressures for replacement of existing old houses by large apartment
and office buildings. In later years the neighborhood would repeatedly organize to use
height restrictions for resisting change. 129
Before the advent of height restrictions, the state house had undermined the stability
of the Beacon Hill neighborhood. Long uncertainty over the direction and extent of its
expansion brought a feeling of tentativeness to the tenure of its neighbors, even those
well-to-do owner-occupants who could not be dislodged by more economic land uses.
While the Bulfmich building itself was early deemed worthy of preservation, and its
surroundings were of increasing concern so they would not detract from it, years
passed before there was broad agreement that anything else on Beacon Hill was in its
own right worth saving. By the 1880s the neighborhood was perceived as declining.
The buildings in it were "old and of but little value," said Governor Ames.130 The
Transcript thought that adopting a definite state house plan and settling the uncertainty
would ensure that "property all around must appreciate greatly, whether the hill shall
continue a residential locality or shall be given up to professional and business
purposes." 131 By the real estate orthodoxy of the time, even if Beacon Hill remained
residential, it would improve only by building anew, or reconstructing existing houses
so thoroughly as to amount to the same thing.
The turn of the century was Beacon Hill's low point, the culmination of at least
twenty years of decline, during which the neighborhood's frontier retreated before both
the state house and the growing downtown, and the Back Bay rose as an equally
fashionable and much larger district. The height restrictions imposed around the state
house in 1899 and 1902 came just at the beginning of Beacon Hill's aggressive
response to that decline. The restrictions looked like an end both to the invasion by tall
business and apartment buildings and by the expanding state house itself.
129Firey, Land Use in Central Boston, 129-132.
130Oliver Ames, Governor's Address (1888 Senate doc. 1), 24.
131Boston Evening Transcript, editorial, March 10, 1888, reprinted in Sillars, The State House, 26.
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Beacon Hill maintained at all times a core of aristocratic residences and residents.
Among them were generations of the Codman family, including real estate broker
William Coombs Codman, who led a 1909 suit against a subway extension beneath the
hill. While in that suit what he most deeply cared about preserving was the value of
commercial real estate behind Beacon Hill, 132 on the residential hill itself he found a
more substantial congruence between preservation and self-interest. Shortly after the
turn of the century, Codman began buying, restoring, and reselling old houses on
Beacon Hill. He induced many of his friends to move to the district, including architect
Frank A. Bourne, who came from the Back Bay and began a prolific practice serving
the growing influx of well-heeled Bostonians whose domestic ideal was a completely
up-to-date interior surrounded by a quaint exterior on an historic street.
These neighborhood improvers were not necessarily disciplined by Appleton's
principles of archaeological truth - their 'restorations' often brought nineteenth-century
buildings back to a colonial or even medieval past they had never seen. Yet their
attraction to the area was clearly its antiquity; material progress was an ideal only within
their walls. On the exterior, they like Appleton were practicing preservation by
purchase, solving the financial problems of this approach by taking it out of the realm
of philanthropy and into the market, where it could be accomplished by the aggregated
housing budgets of many people.
These improvers quickly extended their activities beyond the traditional aristocratic
south slope of Beacon Hill to its north slope and to the flats on the river side of Charles
Street, areas which had been occupied by the servants and stables of the hill's elite, and
by a long-established black neighborhood. The newcomers thought of themselves, in
writer Margaret Deland's words, as "redeeming" the area "to something like its old
desirability as a residence neighborhood."1 33 In fact, however, its erstwhile
desirability, like its colonial building details, was a modern invention; the area became
132Codman v. Crocker, 203 Mass. 146 (1909). See clippings and correspondence with the suit's co-
plaintiffs and supporters, W. C. Codman papers, SPNEA.
133[Margaret Deland], 'The regeneration of Beacon Hill: How Boston goes about civic improvement,'
Craftsman 16 (1909): 92.
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more fashionable and more quaint in the twentieth century than it had ever been in the
nineteenth.
The area's new and old residents achieved an uneasy alliance at the Charles Street
meeting house, occupied by the First African Methodist Episcopal Church, where
neighbors raised money for Frank Bourne to restore its exterior. In return the
congregation agreed to give SPNEA an option of first refusal in case the building was
ever to be sold, a safeguard which later became common practice in preservation
grants, but which seems to have been thought up specifically for this case.134 The
relationship between new and old residents was more often one of simple succession,
as in Deland's description of "a pair of tumbledown wooden tenements" occupied by
"twelve families, who were speedily induced to seek other accommodations." 135 These
improvers were troubled by few qualms about such displacement, which for Deland
seemed the whole point of the architectural exercise; it "brings a most desirable element
into a part of the city which badly needs such associations." 136 In 1922, the
neighborhood institutionalized its reasserted identity by organizing the Beacon Hill
Association, "to keep undesirable business and living conditions from affecting the hill
district."137
Similar neighborhood restoration, in cities throughout the United States and in
Europe as well, challenged the real estate doctrine of inevitable decline and conversion.
In 1915, Edward H. Clement, a former editor of the Transcript and one of the Park
Street Church preservationists, described the process as it worked in New York:
After the boardinghouse period, that the swell mansions of other days pass
through, when at last they are utterly run down and too drear and dirty even for
lodging houses, the taste of the artist converts them into something so desirable that
the tide of values in the whole neighborhood is often set running in the opposite
direction to that in which it has been setting for a generation or two. 138
134 Old-Time New England 11 (1920): 171.
135Deland, 'Regeneration of Beacon Hill,' 95.
136Deland, 'Regeneration of Beacon Hill,' 95.
137Boston Evening Transcript, December 6, 1922, quoted in Firey, Land Use in Central Boston, 111.
138Boston Evening Transcript, May 15, 1915: III/2.
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Even the businessmen of the Board of Trade in Providence recognized the rehabilitation
of "old favorite residential quarters" as a new "phenomenon of modern city
growth." 139
Preservationists' relationship with government, especially Boston's city government,
was ambivalent. Beacon Hill residents saw that their area preservation efforts required
reinforcement through government powers. Height restrictions kept apartment
buildings from overwhelming the neighborhood. The street commissioners' regulation
of building lines kept commercial uses on Beacon Street from becoming obtrusive. The
same commission's review of commercial garage locations was of particular interest
because Beacon Hill's boundaries were insecure where the 'revived' neighborhood met
its utilitarian surroundings. 140
While Beacon Hill residents relied on these municipal powers, well-to-do Bostonians
did not trust the ascendant immigrant political leadership, and they saw their mistrust
amply confirmed by the city's treatment of its environmental heritage. The mid-
nineteenth century rearrangement of headstones in the Granary and King's Chapel
burial grounds provoked fresh outrage generation after generation, and as old families
became more isolated from the city's political life, the action came to seem more
ominous. One twentieth-century Bostonian pointed out that "every corpse is probably
that of an Englishman or of the descendant of an Englishman; whereas, the custodians
are almost all of Irish descent. I leave the rest to your imagination." 141
At the apex of Brahmin demonology was James Michael Curley, mayor from 1914 to
1917, and then on and off again until 1949; he and his lieutenants, wrote SPNEA
President Charles Knowles Bolton in his journal, were "[s]urely ridiculous rulers of a
139
'Old Favorite Residential Quarters, Now Somewhat Down-at-the-Heel, Will Some Day Regain
Their Former Dignity./ A Phenomenon of Modern City Growth,' Providence Magazine, January, 1915:
17.
140See, e.g., the street commissioners' hearing on a garage proposed for Charles Street; Boston
Evening Transcript, February 23, 1915: 1.
141 Anonymous correspondent quoted in Firey, Land Use in Central Boston, 168.
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million people anywhere but in a democracy run mad." 142 Curley appointed as his
building commissioner Patrick O'Hearn, a tenement-builder who threatened to tear
down the colonial Shirley-Eustis mansion for building code violations; preservationists
appealed to the legislature, which specifically exempted it from the city's code.143
When Henry Statler hesitated to build a hotel in Boston in 1923, Curley tried to lure
him by having the city's height limit raised from 125 to 155 feet, and announced that if
this was not tall enough for a hotel he would return to the legislature to ask for 200 feet.
He later attempted to remove the special height restrictions on Commonwealth
Avenue. 144 Aristocratic Bostonians could not feel comfortable putting environmental
stability in the hands of government while the government was in hands like Curley's.
William Sumner Appleton starkly exemplified preservationist ambivalence toward
government. His attitude was both typical and influential. "Action by the nation or
states is in America peculiarly difficult of achievement," he wrote in 1918,
and for some reasons not to be desired. That part of the public capable of
appreciating a handsome building for the sake of its artistic merit, is small indeed,
and the chance of obtaining support from the public treasury is too negligible to
notice, except in the case of public buildings of historic interest, like Faneuil Hall in
Boston, and Independence Hall, Philadelphia. On the other hand, even if this were
not the case, our political system, with its almost total lack of responsibility, as well
as its widespread tendency to the spoils system, makes public action extremely
dangerous.145
On the whole, Appleton was faithful to these principles and eschewed the
participation of government agencies when he could avoid it, but he was too much a
142Bolton, "Note-book," February 23, 1914, quoted in Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 219.
143Massachusetts Special Acts & Resolves, 1915, Acts ch. 306; Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,'
273. O'Hearn was not being arbitrary; on the contrary he systematically enforced building and fire codes
for the first time in the city's history, causing the demolition of 654 substandard structures in his first
15 months in office. Boston Evening Transcript, May 12, 1915: 111/3.
144Boston Herald, March 9, 1923; May 6, 1924; December 26, 1930.
145Appleton, 'Destruction and Preservation,' 131-183, 179. When Appleton in 1936, under the
financial pressures of the Depression, relinquished one house to the National Park Service to become a
part of the National Historic Site in Salem, Massachusetts, he complained that "[tihe government, if it
runs true to its usual form, will want to receive the property without any conditions of any kind, which
will permit it at some time in the future to pull the house down and take it out for re-erection at a
World's Fair in Salem, Oregon, if the vote of Oregon senators should be needed to putting something
of the kind over, and it is exactly this sort of thing that our Society exists to prevent." Quoted in
Hosmer, Preservation Comes of Age 1:143.
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pragmatist not to at least look longingly at the tremendous resources available to
governments. A logical first step in exploring these resources was an attempt to
safeguard historic properties that the government already owned. Appleton was
fascinated by the log blockhouses which survived from frontier forts in Maine, some of
them abandoned and decaying but still in War Department ownership. In 1912 he wrote
to Smithsonian Institution Secretary Charles D. Walcott about them.146
The federal government had begun protecting prehistoric monuments on public lands
in the west under the Antiquities Act of 1906, which historian Ronald F. Lee calls "the
first national historic preservation policy for the United States"; 147 Appleton wondered
whether the same authority could permit it to do something similar with surplus
properties of historical interest in the east. The answer in fact was yes: the act allowed
the President to designate as "national monuments" any "historic landmarks, historic
and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are
situated on the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United
States...." 148 Despite its inclusive language, the act had been conceived and until then
had been used only for sites of archaeological or geological interest; all of them in the
west.149 Walcott was not encouraging, and ironically echoed Appleton's frequent bitter
pronouncement when he suggested that the blockhouses possessed "a local rather than
a National interest or importance."iso Appleton's concern was systematic preservation
of numerous small structures, the same domestic scale of almost all SPNEA's actions.
He continued his efforts by writing to the Secretary of the Interior, attempting to invoke
a national scope by pointing out that "[t]here must be many more such properties
scattered all over the country."151 Such a prospect of endless, piecemeal involvement
with local preservation concerns may not have been the best way to woo Washington
officials; Appleton did not accomplish anything and eventually returned to private
146Appleton to Charles D. Walcott, Dec. 2, 1912, Microfiche correspondence archive, 'Preservation
legislation,' SPNEA.
147Lee, Antiquities Act, 1.
14834 Stat. L. 225, §2, in Lee, Antiquities Act, 117.
149Lee, Antiquities Act, tables I-III, 94-96.
150C. D. Walcott to WSA, Dec. 5, 1912; Microfiche correspondence archive, 'Preservation
legislation,' SPNEA.
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methods to save the blockhouses. 152 The Antiquities Act was not used for any historic
- as opposed to prehistoric - landmark until 1924, and then it was applied with a view
to supreme national significance, though not necessarily great antiquity; among the first
was the Statue of Liberty. 153 The kind of small-scale local preservation of surplus
properties that Appleton had in mind was not put into practice by the federal
government until 1944.154
The strongest possible use of government powers for preservation would be to force
preservation over the will of private owners, as historic districts and landmark laws can
do today under the police power. Preservationists first explored the possibility of
accomplishing this through eminent domain. The idea cropped up several times as an ad
hoc response through frustration with intransigent owners: eminent domain powers
were in fact granted to the Old South Association, and were discussed as a threat
against the Park Street Church developers. When preservationists in 1912 suggested
that the federal government use condemnation to gain possession of Thomas
Jefferson's Virginia home, Monticello, William Sumner Appleton wrote to the idea's
author disapprovingly:
I am a strong believer in buying Jefferson's home for preservation, but as luck will
have it I am also an ardent Jeffersonian in my principles, and can't help feeling that
Jefferson would turn in his grave at the mere suggestion that the Federal
Government should buy his home by right of eminent domain. 155
Despite his mistrust of government, Appleton was serious enough about preservation
that five years later he too explored this avenue of action. He began to consider eminent
domain as an extension of the cultural patrimony laws by which European nations
guarded their tangible heritage against plunder by wealthy and acquisitive foreigners,
151Appleton to Secretary of the Interior, Dec. 9, 1912; Microfiche correspondence archive,
'Preservation legislation,' SPNEA.
152SPNEA Bulletin 6 (1915): 7.
153Lee, Antiquities Act, 94. The other four designated on October 15, 1924, were Fort Pulaski,
Georgia; Castle Pinckney, South Carolina; and Fort Matanzas and Castillo de San Marcos, both in
Florida. No national monument was created in New England until 1949 (Saint Croix, Maine).
154Stephen W. Jacobs, 'Architectural Preservation in the United States: the Government's Role,'
Curator 9 (1966): 313.
155Quoted in Hosmer, Presence of the Past, 167.
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often Americans. 156 Great Britain, for example, passed its first compulsory
preservation act (relying on eminent domain) in 1913, after Americans began
dismantling Tattershall castle in Lincolnshire. 157 Similarly, museums and collectors in
New York and other cities were buying and stripping interior panelling and other
architectural features from early houses in New England and the South, leading
Appleton to consider seeking some sort of cultural patrimony legislation. He saw the
removal of building parts, in effect, as raids by foreigners. This regional parochialism,
together with disgust for the lower-class and sometimes immigrant owners who
allowed their buildings to be broken up, blunted both Appleton's usual conservative
regard for property rights and his distaste for government action.
Appleton appeared to succeed spectacularly by incorporating eminent domain in the
first preservation amendment to a state constitution:
The preservation and maintenance of ancient landmarks and other property of
historical or antiquarian interest is a public use, and the commonwealth and the
cities and towns therein may, upon payment of just compensation, take such
property or any interest therein under such regulations as the general court may
prescribe.158
Appleton laid modesty aside as he reminisced about the amendment years later:
I thought it up as I was crossing the Common one day as the last Constitutional
Convention was in session here and finding the judiciary committee was in session,
appeared before it and presented my proposed amendment. They asked what
organizations and individuals would appear in addition. I said none; it was my own
idea and I was appearing alone. There was nobody in the room but the committee
and myself and they seemed very much amused. However, on talking the matter
over in committee it seemed to them a good proposition and they commended it to
the Convention. There it would have failed excepting that a member from Lexington
156Lindgren, 'Gospel of Preservation,' 339.
157Ancient Monuments Consolidation and Amendment Act (1913), 3 & 4 Geo. 5, ch. 32. Nicholas
Boulting, 'The law's delays: conservationist legislation in the British Isles,' in Jane Fawcett, ed., The
Future of the Past, Attitudes to Conservation, 1174-1974 (London, 1976), 19; Lowenthal, Foreign
Country, 394. See also Stephen W. Jacobs, 'Architectural Preservation in Europe: French and English
Contributions,' Curator 9 (1966): 196-215, 201.
158Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, amendments art. 51 (in Massachusetts
General Acts, 1919, Act 63). The same constitutional convention put forward, and the voters approved
at the same election, a similar amendment defining conservation of natural resources as a public use
(amendments art. 49); another permitting the regulation of advertising "on private property within
public view" (amendments art. 50); and one permitting land use zoning (amendments art. 60). Jacob H.
Morrison, Historic Preservation Law (Washington, 1965), 6.
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spoke so strongly in its favor that it went through. So far as I know the only article
in the Massachusetts Constitution to be put through by a single individual unless
John Adams shares such an honor with, Yours very truly.159
It became Amendment 51 to the Massachusetts constitution when voters approved it on
November 5, 1918, by more than 2 to 1 statewide, and more than 4 to 1 in Boston.160
"I am surprised that you can reach so many people," wrote one convention delegate to
Appleton.161
This great preservationist victory turned out to be hollow, at least in part because of
Appleton's political naivete which had so amused the convention delegates. Appleton
petitioned the next legislature for the enabling 'regulations' needed to make the
amendment operational, but he did not even bother testifying for them. "If the people
wanted the amendment," he wrote plaintively to the Judiciary Committee chairman as
his bill died there, "it seems to me that they are entitled to some act giving the
amendment force."1 62 After sporadic attempts to revive it, he did not return to the issue
again until the mid 1930s. It was not important to him. Both the constitutional
amendment and the legislation to make it usable were structural reforms. He could not
point to a single specific building which they would save, and their abstractness left
him almost apologetic. "It will doubtless take some years ... to determine just what may
or should be done under this amendment," he wrote, "but there can be no doubt but that
it will justify itself as time goes by."163 He gave the amendment only a short notice in
the SPNEA Bulletin, and of the attempt to secure follow-up legislation he made no
mention at all. Significantly, given Appleton's region-wide mindset, he made no
suggestion that New England's other five states ought to follow the example.
159Appleton to Mr. R. Peabody Bellows, December 6, 1935. Microfiche correspondence archive,
'Preservation legislation,' SPNEA.
160The vote is not easy to interpret, as all thirteen amendments on the ballot passed, most by similar
margins, and the high number of blank ballots indicates apathy toward all the referenda; the
preservation amendment won without an actual majority of all ballots cast in either the city or the state
(unidentified newspaper clipping, Microfiche correspondence archive, 'Preservation legislation,'
SPNEA).
161Henry M. Hutchings to Appleton, October 22, 1918, in Microfiche correspondence archive,
'Preservation legislation,' SPNEA.
162Appleton to Senator Cavanagh, May 2, 1919, 2; in Microfiche correspondence archive,
'Preservation legislation,' SPNEA; 1919 House bill 767.
290
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
Despite the august sound of a constitutional amendment for the protection of
antiquities, despite the momentous potential of turning to eminent domain as a tool for
historic preservation, the most far-reaching use of government powers for
environmental permanence turned out to be building height restrictions. But this
precedent was extended not by preservationists, but by a coalition of city planning
activists and real estate people interested in more general, widespread neighborhood
stability.
Problems with height restrictions and a solution in zoning
Height restriction by districts, as it was being practiced, turned out to have serious
problems. The process of solving those problems created a much more versatile and
potentially universal system for regulating development, which was directly and
quickly shaped into modem zoning.
When Haddon Hall forced consideration of how to regulate buildings in specific
locales, the Massachusetts legislature conservatively chose to act under eminent domain
rather than the police power. Under eminent domain the state respected vested rights in
property, by paying for them. But were 125-foot tall buildings, the statewide limit
enacted in 1891, a right or merely a maximum? Members of the Boston Real Estate
Exchange and the Twentieth Century Club believed in 1896 that 125 feet was a
maximum which might be further reduced according to local conditions. George B.
Upham and others, including future U.S. Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis,
continued advocating the police power as a basis for making building height
distinctions between different parts of the city. In 1899, when it became clear that the
legislature was unwilling to divide the city explicitly into districts, they tried imaginative
variations such as the Beacon Hill ceiling projected from the state house cornice.
163SPNEA Bulletin 10 (1919): 19; Appleton to President, Boston Society of Architects, December 2,
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Upham submitted another bill the same year which would set an 80-foot height limit
applying only to apartment buildings and hotels, and providing that the mayor after a
public hearing could issue exemptions "if satisfied that the location designated is fairly
within a business district as distinguished from a residential district." 164 Either of
these, if enacted and sustained by the courts, would open the door for citywide height
districting without compensation.165 If Upham and Brandeis were correct, the city and
state were paying for rights which did not exist.
The police power appealed to fiscal conservatism, as opposed to the ideological
conservatism of eminent domain. Legislators acknowledged this conflict by writing
height restrictions that were increasingly ambivalent about what compensation they
offered. The Commonwealth Avenue and Copley Square acts in 1896 and 1898 were
unambiguous - it was the city of Boston which would have to pay, and since it was
citizens of Boston who wanted the restrictions, that seemed fair to legislators who were
mostly from elsewhere. But on Beacon Hill the state would have to pay, and legislators
began to see the appeal of the police power. In drafting the 1899 Beacon Hill
restrictions they were non-committal about compensation; the state would pay only "[i]f
and in so far as this act ... may deprive any person of rights existing under the
constitution." 166 Since the courts would ultimately decide whether or not police power
districting was valid, why not leave the whole sticky issue to them?
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
however, would not allow the court to be drawn into "the difficulty of fixing a
1935; in Microfiche correspondence archive, 'Preservation legislation,' SPNEA.
1641899 House bill 668, §2. Mayor Quincy instead requested, and the Committee on Cities once again
reported, a bill lowering the citywide limit to 100 feet (1899 House bill 1137); once again it failed to
pass.
165The U.S. Congress passed a similar act that year regulating building heights in the District of
Columbia, specifying different limits for "business streets," which were those designated by the
Commissioners of the District of Columbia as being in predominantly business use, and for "residence
streets," which were all others. The act made no provision for compensation and was thus in effect the
first imposition of height districts in any American city under the police power. Congress was under
the impression that it was following Boston precedent (55th Congress, 3d session, House Report no.
1704, 2), and Bostonians do not appear to have known of the D.C. regulations. The act was not tested
in court. Heights of Buildings Commission (New York), Report, 150-51.
166Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1899, Acts ch. 457, §2.
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constitutional limit by feet and inches." He upheld the Beacon Hill restrictions in Parker
v. Commonwealth, on March 1, 1901, rejected any interpretation of the act's language
as "importing an exercise of the police power so far as the Legislature constitutionally
could go, and as saving a remedy for all damages beyond that limit." The act, he said,
"treats the limits of the police power as if they were a matter which might be left to this
court to fix in the first place without any preliminary exercise of legislative judgement."
But the police power by its nature balanced individuals' rights against their
responsibilities to others, a balance which Holmes insisted was to be politically
decided, not judicially discovered. "[W]hile we can gather that the Legislature was
willing to take anything without paying for it that this court should say that it could,"
wrote Holmes, it nowhere made the explicit judgement of public necessity which would
support an exercise of the police power, and the restriction was therefore a taking. 167
Until the legislature could decide for itself where lower height districts were reasonable
without compensation, it would have to go on paying for them.
Boston's earlier experience with height restrictions on Commonwealth Avenue,
where no owners asked for compensation, and on Copley Square, where Mollie Cole
asked but did not receive it, was giving way to a more sobering understanding that
damage awards would be widespread and substantial. The Westminster Chambers case
was making its way through the courts, while the mayor and the building's owners
repeatedly explained how expensive that pointless exercise would become for city
taxpayers. Damage awards elsewhere on Copley Square, together with Holmes's
decision on Beacon Hill, destroyed any hope that compensation would be limited to this
extreme case of cutting down a completed building. The right to build tall could be
valued - and was valuable - in the abstract. Restricting building heights through eminent
domain was proving prohibitively expensive.
In the evolution of American land use law, Boston's exploration of eminent domain
turned out to be a dead end. Although a false step, it may have been a necessary one. It
was motivated by the desire to treat different places within the city differently, which at
first appeared problematic under the police power. Once freed of this theoretical
167Parker v. Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199, at 204-05.
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constraint, and faced with the prospect of substantial payments for restrictions, it
encouraged actions which were very site-specific indeed. This specificity, together with
freedom from the police power's strict requirements of a health and safety basis,
allowed formulation of regulations from an explicit design viewpoint, without worrying
about undermining their validity. Eminent-domain restrictions thus allowed concrete
exploration of the potential of site-specific limits, without having to resolve for the
moment the difficult ideological questions of private property rights. This exploration
was a success; it showed that height districting was not the "special case" which
William Minot had thought at Copley Square, but a technique of potentially widespread
usefulness in controlling environmental change. At the same time, Boston's experience
showed that relying on eminent domain would make the tool too unwieldy to realize
that potential.
A combination of events at the end of 1902 and the beginning of 1903 pushed Boston
toward ending its experiment with eminent domain while pulling it toward police power
regulations. The push began on December 31, 1902, when hearings opened to set the
compensation for height restrictions on Beacon Hill. Substantially all the affected
owners filed for damages, so many that the Supreme Judicial Court appointed a special
commission to evaluate their claims. The first owner heard was Robert Treat Paine, one
of the original petitioners for the restriction. 168 Many of his neighbors had sought the
legislation and almost all were said to favor it, a circumstance which had seemed to
indicate that large compensation payments would not be necessary. Their damage
claims now appeared perhaps ungracious, but they followed from the logic of eminent
domain. Unlike on Commonwealth Avenue or even Copley Square, there was no
pretense on Beacon Hill that restrictions were for the owners' mutual benefit. For
almost twenty years various state house plans contemplated taking their property. Now
the state was taking part of it, and Paine's attorney suggested that the legislature acted
"with a view of so depreciating the value of that section" that it could later pick up the
land at bargain rates. 169 The owners sought an average of $100,000 each, an
168A map in Parker v. Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199, at 201 appears to show 59 parcels of land
affected; the Boston Evening Transcript (January 5, 1903: 6 reported "between fifty and sixty" claims.
See also Boston Evening Globe, March 17, 1899: 4.
169Paine v. Commonwealth, transcript of hearings, 5.
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astronomical total of $5 to 6 million, which wGeald dwarf the cost of the Copley Square
restrictions. The legislature passed a new kind of height restriction legislation,
authorizing the governor to issue bonds to cover the damages, "to such an amount as
may be necessary." 170
Three weeks before these hearings opened, the attractiveness of police power
regulations was increased when the governor named Marcus Knowlton the new Chief
Justice of Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court, to replace Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., who had been called to the Supreme Court in Washington. As an Associate Justice,
Knowlton had written the 1899 Attorney General v. Williams decision upholding
height restrictions in general, and the Copley Square act in particular, adding that "it
would be hard to say that this statute might not have been passed in the exercise of the
police power..." 171 Such gratuitous comment was in effect an invitation to the
legislature, deflating any claims that such a measure would be found unconstitutional.
Holmes's 1901 Parker v. Commonwealth decision, in which Knowlton joined, gave
legislators further guidance; while the geographical specificity of the Beacon Hill
restrictions "would present grave difficulties" under the police power, he discussed
other circumstances in which such regulations would be allowable. 172
Two months later, on February 23, 1903, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
Knowlton's Attorney General v. Williams decision, the first time building height
restrictions anywhere had come before the high court. The opinion was not a ringing
endorsement of Knowlton's every word: "We have not ... stopped to comment on the
suggestion made by the Supreme Court of the State," wrote Justice David J. Brewer,
"that this statute might be sustained as an exercise of the police power, or ... that it
could be enforced without any provision for compensation." 173 But the opinion
implied, by confining itself to narrow issues without examining Knowlton's sweeping
affirmation of height restrictions in general, that states would be allowed wide
discretion in settling these questions themselves. With Marcus Knowlton now Chief
170Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1903, Acts ch. 234.
17 1Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, at 478; Boston Herald, December 11, 1902: 7.
172Parker v. Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199, at 205; "...such a law is no less valid when passed to
satisfy the love of beauty than when passed to appease the fear of fire" (at 203-04).
173Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491, at 504.
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Justice of the highest court in Massachusetts, discretion there would likely be exercised
in favor of the police power.
That summer, Westminster Chambers' roof came down, slowly and expensively, a
process which clearly could not be repeated. At least five new structures had risen
above 100 feet in the Back Bay since Haddon Hall, maintaining a certain urgency about
the issue of tall buildings. 174 The Supreme Court's affirmation of Attorney General v.
Williams came down too late to initiate action in the 1903 legislature, but at the
beginning of the following year's session, a new height districting bill was submitted
with broad and distinguished sponsorship and the official support of the Boston
Common Council. 175
This new height bill would divide the city into two districts, but it did not delineate
them, and thus avoided the legislative wrangling that repeatedly tripped up Upham.
Instead, it would create a three member commission to carry out the delicate task of
drawing the boundaries, and gave the commissioners a rule by which they were to
proceed:
those parts of the city in which all or the greater part of the buildings situate therein
are at the time of determination used for business or commercial purposes shall be
included in the district or districts designated A, and those parts ... used for
residential or for other purposes not business or commercial shall be in the district
or districts designated B.176
In district A, the business district, buildings could still be built to 125 feet, but in
district B - most of the city - the allowable height would be reduced to 80 feet.
"The boundaries," said the bill, "... shall be determined for ten years," a period
which the committee on cities increased to fifteen years.177 Assigning a duration to the
boundaries, rather than to the restriction itself, implied that the 80-foot limit would
174Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 18.
1751904 House bill 507, submitted by petition of G. H. Richards and others; Boston City Council
Minutes, 1904, 113 (March 24). The minutes include a list of the bill's supporters.
176Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1904, Acts ch. 333, § 1.
1771904 House doc. 507; 1904 House doc. 1250.
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continue indefinitely, with only its geographical extent revised after fifteen years. The
act, however, made no provision for what was to happen then. As with deed
restrictions by this time, the initial development of a tool for ensuring permanence was
followed by a realization that the tool was more versatile if used not to freeze change
but to exert control over it. Consensus on a permanent shape for the city was difficult to
achieve, as Upham had learned; it was easier for people to agree on short-term controls.
The legislature passed the act, inserting a process by which owners might appeal the
initial determination of districts. Mayor Patrick A. Collins promptly appointed a
commission of three real estate experts to draw the boundaries, including former Mayor
Nathan Matthews, whose administration had submitted the original 125-foot bill in
1891, and who had advocated further height restrictions ever since. 178
The boundary they drew did not look at all like modem zoning maps with their
convoluted shapes weaving through the interiors of blocks and lots. Instead, the
commissioners pieced together from Boston's labyrinth of streets a comparatively
straight line across the peninsula, which for most of its length followed within two
blocks of Upham's original 1896 proposal. Along every foot of the boundary a
building restricted to 80 feet could end up overshadowed by a 125 foot neighbor, an
inequity and a potential challenge to the law, and the commissioners aimed to keep that
boundary to a minimum. They drew the line cautiously, aware that a court challenge
was inevitable, and determined to withstand it. They returned again and again to the
act's plain distinction between commercial and residential uses. Beacon Hill was
residential, so allowable heights there were lowered, greatly assisting neighborhood
preservation, and leaving the two blocks where the state was paying for a 70-foot limit
surrounded by blocks on which an 80-foot limit was imposed for free (fig. 6.6.). But
the commissioners did not make other preservationist adjustments; they did not attempt
to lower heights on the other side of the state house, nor on Park Street, where their
line ran right past Park Street Church during its hour of need without offering it any
178The other two members of the 'Commission on Height of Buildings in the City of Boston,' all
appointed June 7, 1904, were Henry Parkman and Joseph A. Conry.
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protection. Regulation according to aesthetic criteria was of uncertain constitutionality,
they said, so they ignored aesthetics. 179
B A
fig. 6.6. The height districts as they applied to Beacon Hill. The 80-foot limit of the B
district protected views of the state house dome from all sides on which that was
economically feasible; it also prevented further development of tall apartment buildings
throughout the residential side of Beacon Hill.
The language of the act gave the commission no guidance as to how big were the
'parts of the city' it should look at, except perhaps indirectly in the requirement that the
entire process of holding hearings and drawing the line should take no more than 30
days. The commissioners were concerned that all precedents for small districts included
provision for compensation, while police power districts such as fire limits involved
some "considerable part of a city," and so they resolved to avoid altogether small
districts. 180 They included the whole residential North End in the A district rather than
make an island of it. They refused to extend the A district in fingers radiating from the
city center along the major commercial thorofares, because "it seemed to us that the
Legislature could not have intended that we should create districts out of single streets
and thus permit the residential sections of the city to be covered like a gridiron by long
lines of 125-foot buildings." 181 The pressure for small districts came from Back Bay
landowners. While the commissioners noted business incursions there, they found the
Back Bay as a whole "distinctly residential in character according to the test prescribed
by the act... ."182 "We were pressed to avoid this conclusion," they reported,
179Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 17. See also Boston Evening
Transcript, editorial, December 6, 1904: 12.
180Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 17.
181Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 20.
182Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 19.
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by creating separate districts out of particular streets and their contiguous territory;
putting, for instance, into the District A a parallelogram consisting of Boylston
Street, and, say, 100 feet on either side, and doing the same thing for
Massachusetts avenue, Huntington Avenue, etc. This proposition was opposed by
owners of property immediately next to the proposed districts, and seemed to us
clearly beyond the scope of our duties as defined by the act.183
The Back Bay was both the place that made height restrictions important, and the
place that made them difficult, for Upham in the 1890s, and for Matthews and his
fellow commissioners in 1904. "When the best residence district is determined, the
main growth of the city is quite certain to follow it," wrote New York real estate expert
Richard M. Hurd in 1903 in his Principles of City Land Values, "as note the movement
of retail stores after the best residences ... on Boylston Street in Boston[.]" 184 The axis
of Boston's 'best residence district' extended through the Back Bay to Brookline and
then Newton, and Boylston Street, almost entirely residential in the late 1880s, had
become a commercial district advertised as "Boston's Fifth Avenue" ten years later.185
These were the years when civic and commercial uses fought for the soul of Copley
Square, with Westminster Chambers seen by one side as a trojan horse and by the other
as a sacrificial lamb. By the time the commissioners were drawing their boundary line,
the Herald found many businessmen who believed that "commercial Boston, in
spreading outward, would naturally seek Copley Square for its new center." 186
Ambitions for a new downtown in the Back Bay were even higher at the Park Square
complex of the Providence Railroad, redundant since South Station opened in 1900, a
large, centrally-located piece of land between Copley Square and downtown which
could be developed without immediate damage to the existing Back Bay streetscape.
The fact that its development lagged for years only increased the determination that the
results should be worth the wait.
183Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 20.
184Hurd, City Land Values, 81.
185Advertisement, Boston Evening Transcript, December 8, 1897: 6; December 9, 1897: 10.
186Boston Herald, March 1, 1903: 10.
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The commissioners heard no objections to their line from the South End or "the
suburban parts of the city." 187 From owners of commercial property in the Back Bay,
however,
the opposition ... was so strong and so much of it was directed against the whole
purpose of the act, that it was not always easy to distinguish between
considerations affecting our action under the act and considerations pointing to a
condemnation of the act itself.188
Within their conservative reading of the act, they saw no way to satisfy this opposition
through expedient shortcuts. Nor did they have any inclination to assist in the Back
Bay's transformation; they believed that the act's purpose was "to prevent the erection
of very high buildings in those parts of the city which, unlike the down-town section,
are not yet condemned by the number of high buildings already erected to the perpetual
toleration of this evil." 189 Based on the strict criterion of business use, and a slight
relaxation of their insistence on straight boundaries, they added a jog to put Park
Square and the beginning of Boylston Street in the A district. 190 They also suggested
that, as the next legislature "will undoubtedly be asked to amend the Act of 1904," that
it meet the protests by permitting buildings on wide streets in the B district to the
intermediate height of 100 feet.191
The Evening Transcript endorsed the 100-foot proposal, not because its editors liked
tall buildings, but because they thought it would remove any need for future revision of
the limits:
there is no reason why the rest of the city should not be protected for all time
against sky-scrapers on the Back Bay and in other residential districts. If the
character of those districts changes so that in time they become devoted to business
187Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 19.
188Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 21.
189Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 22.
190Order of December 3, 1904, in Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 9; see
map, Boston Herald, December 6, 1904: 12.
19 1Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 21. "[I]f it were not for ... the great
number of high buildings already erected in the downtown districts," they said, "we should recommend
a maximum limit for the entire city of 100 feet." (22)
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uses, the limit of 100 feet will permit the erection of buildings which are high
enough ... 192
The commissioners also urged that the district boundaries "should be permanent":
If the limits adopted are satisfactory, we see no reason for holding out any definite
expectation of a change. The Legislature has, and will continue to have without
express reservation, the power to modify the law, but the existence of a statute
expressly providing for modifications at stated periods can only have an unsettling
effect on real estate values. 193
The following year, as the commissioners predicted, scores of real estate owners
petitioned the legislature to repeal the act. More than three quarters of them owned
property in the Back Bay; more than half of them on Boylston Street and Huntington
Avenue alone, the two arteries which met at Copley Square and where owners had
every reason to believe that high buildings would be profitable some time in the near
future. Their opposition may have been increased indirectly by the damages already
paid under the several eminent-domain acts, which helped owners imagine the value of
the air above their roofs. The legislature did not repeal the act, but instead passed the
commission's recommended amendments - except for the one to make the restrictions
permanent - giving these Back Bay owners the right to build to 100 feet. 194
After the 1905 legislature left the A and B districts in force, they were promptly
challenged in court. The act included no procedure for appealing the boundaries beyond
the commission, so that the only basis for a court challenge was the constitutionality of
the act itself. Francis C. Welch, who owned a lot facing the Public Garden at the comer
of Arlington and Marlborough Streets, applied to build a 120-foot building there, and
when the city denied him a permit, he sued claiming that he had been unconstitutionally
denied equal protection under the laws and deprived of his property without
compensation. Marcus Knowlton, now Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the
192Boston Evening Transcript, December 6, 1904: 12.
193Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 23.
194Petitioners for the Repeal of Chapter 333 of the Acts of 1904; Massachusetts Acts and Resolves,
1905, Acts ch. 383. The act again delegated to a commission the details of where and under what
conditions such buildings would be permitted; the mayor appointed the same three commissioners.
Rather than drawing more boundaries, this time they formulated a rule: on any B-district street more
than 64 feet wide, buildings could rise to one and one quarter times the width of the street, to a
maximum of 100 feet on streets of 80 feet or wider. Order of July 21, 1905; Commission on Height of
Buildings (Boston), Final Report, 26.
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state's high court affirming the statutes and the commission's proceedings under
them.195 Welch appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
On May 17, 1909, Justice Peckham delivered the court's decision, which upheld
Knowlton's opinion so enthusiastically that it became an important spur to the
development of police power building districting - what came to be called 'zoning' - in
this country. The validity of police power measures is a matter of the fit between their
ends and means, and the reasonableness with which they balance private rights with the
public good, matters which heavily rely on the facts of each case. "This court is not
familiar with the actual facts," wrote Peckham,
but it may be that in this limited commercial area the high buildings are generally of
fireproof construction; that the fire engines are more numerous and much closer
together than in the residential portion, and that an unlimited supply of salt water
can be more readily introduced from the harbor into the pipes, and that few women
or children are found there in the daytime and very few people sleep there at night.
And there may in the residential part be more wooden buildings, the fire apparatus
may be more widely scattered and so situated that it would be more difficult to
obtain the necessary amount of water, as the residence quarters are more remote
from the water front, and that many women and children spend the day in that
section, and the opinion is not strained that an undiscovered fire at night might
cause great loss of life in a very high apartment house in that district. 196
Judging whether these things were true, and whether they merited discriminating
between different parts of the city, required an understanding of local conditions which
could be found in legislatures and state courts better than in Washington, Peckham
said, so that the high court would not interfere unless these local officials were "plainly
wrong." Boston's distinction between districts, far from being wrong, was
"reasonable, and is justified by the police power." Peckham concluded by allaying the
commissioners' fear of permitting any taint of aesthetics in their criteria: "That in
195Welch had not been among the petitioners for the act's repeal, suggesting the possibility that this
was a friendly suit designed to establish the act's validity. There is little in the record to support this
interpretation.Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364 (decision Jan. 1, 1907).
196Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909), at 107-108. Morrison, quoting this passage, says, "There is
no doubt that Welch v. Swasey established a judicial pattern of circumvention and evasion where
regulations based on aesthetic considerations were concerned" (Historic Preservation Law, 23).
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addition to these sufficient facts, considerations of an msthetic nature also entered into
the reasons for their passage, would not invalidate them." 197
Even before the Supreme Court decision, a new issue arose which would eventually
unravel the A/B line. A 1906 master plan by the Boston Transit Commission noted that
streetcar traffic "has practically reached its limit" on Boylston Street, "in which
direction the shopping district is extending," and recommended an immediate extension
of the subway under Boylston Street to Copley Square or farther. 198 The legislature
instead selected one of the long-range proposals in the plan, a 'Riverbank Subway'
which would have to be constructed as part of the Charles River Embankment park then
in the works. 199 The Boylston Street subway was to be constructed some time later,
but since it was parallel to and only five blocks away from the Riverbank subway, its
priority could not be high. Boylston Street merchants were not happy to be bypassed,
and by 1911 they convinced the legislature to reverse itself and order construction of
the Boylston Street line first.200 One member of the transit commission, Horace G.
Allen, dissented as he contemplated the uninterrupted run of 4000 feet from Copley
Square to the existing downtown station at Tremont Street. "I cannot believe," he said,
that the proposed subway route, with stations as indicated in the report, will satisfy
the Boylston street owners and merchants who have been most earnest in their
opposition to the Riverbank subway, as it is difficult to see what good such a
subway can do business interests on Boylston street between Clarendon and
Tremont Streets.201
Even before the line opened in 1914, the merchants imagined thousands of passengers
a day disappearing from in front of their doors, and they saw Allen's point. They
agitated for an intermediate station at Arlington Street. The transit commissioners
recommended stations 1500 feet apart in the business district, and this, insisted
197Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, at 106-108.
198Boston Transit Commission, Twelfth Annual Report, 1906: 46, 49.
199Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1907, Acts ch. 573; see Boston Transit Commission report to
the Committee on Metropolitan Affairs, in Boston Transit Commission, Thirteenth Annual Report,
1907: 8-10.
200Boston Transit Commission, Seventeenth Annual Report, 1911: 5-6; App. B, C.
201Boston Transit Commission, Seventeenth Annual Report, 1911: 36.
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property owners, was a business district.202 They could point to the building height
district to prove it: the proposed station was just inside the A district's Park Square jog.
"While it now appears an outpost," wrote the Evening Transcript, "on the first revision
of the boundaries there can be no question but what it will be far more central." 203 The
Elevated Railroad Company, which held the rapid transit franchise, opposed the new
station, and the legislature in 1914 narrowly rejected it.
The following year station proponents returned better organized, submitting petitions
totalling over 20,000 signatures, most of them from commuter suburbs. Mayor
Curley's administration supported the measure, no doubt moved in part by property
owners' threats to seek tax abatements if they could not get a station. With a view
perhaps to increasing rather than abating taxes, the mayor submitted to the legislature
his own bill, which would create a new Building Heights commission to redraw the B
district boundary even before its fifteen-year life was up.204 The station bill and the
district revision bill together were conceived as a clear public policy in favor of change
in Boston's urban form, reinforcing the city's recent extension of Arlington Street
across the Providence railroad lands in order to encourage expansion of the city's
commercial center beyond its narrow State Street and Washington Street confines. The
two measures were linked in the public mind, and they passed together.205
The original height districts were not to last through their fifteen-year term, and the
act called for the new ones to remain in effect for only ten years.206 Unlike the 1904
act, it specified no standards to define where the lines should be drawn, and so the new
202Boston Evening Transcript, February 10, 1915: 1. The Transit Commission had already announced,
with respect to an issue elsewhere, that its "aim should be to facilitate the extension of the business
district rather than its contraction." Report to the Legislature on Boylston Street Subway Terminal,
May 9, 1913; app. A in Boston Transit Commission, Nineteenth Annual Report, 1913: 52.
203Editorial, Boston Evening Transcript, February 8, 1915: 10.
204Boylston Street Owners' Association letter to Mayor Curley, in Boston Evening Transcript, March
24, 1915: 3; see earlier rumblings in testimony before legislative committee, Boston Evening
Transcript, February 10, 1915: 3; 1915 Senate doc. 177.
205Massachusetts Special Acts & Resolves, 1915, Acts ch. 297 (Arlington Street station);
Massachusetts Special Acts & Resolves, 1915, Acts ch. 333 (Building Heights. The members of the
commission, ex officio, were the chairman of the City Planning Board (Ralph Adams Cram), the city
building commissioner (Patrick O'Hearn), and the fire commissioner (John Grady).
206Massachusetts Special Acts & Resolves, 1915, Acts ch. 333. Once again, no mechanism for
revision was specified.
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height district hearings became not a factual investigation into Boston's geography, but
rather an unprecedented forum on permanence and change in urban form, and the idea
of a public policy deliberately addressing them.
Experience with deed restrictions provided a powerful analogy for understanding
controls on environmental change. The B district's inclusion of a specified duration
reinforced the analogy, and led people to express dismay at premature tampering with
an arrangement that appeared settled.207 Like deed restrictions, these publicly-imposed
regulations seemed to create vested interests in those who had built in reliance on them.
W. W. Vaughan, a developer who had campaigned against Westminster Chambers
explained that
you have had ten years of building under that restriction, the owners at the time they
built not knowing on the face of it that there were any signs of its being changed.
You will remember that the present law was supposed to be established for fifteen
years. ...
Property owners thought it was to run on indefinitely. We recognized the fact, of
course, that in fifty or even one hundred years the city would change, but we did
not realize that within ten years' time a law might be passed so that it would all be
thrown open again. 208
Vaughan, like many of the commission's witnesses, thought "[tihese laws ought to
be as nearly permanent as possible." 209 This principle was urged even by people who
opposed the restrictions, because they felt the real estate industry demanded certainty.
Isaac F. Woodbury, one of Westminster Chambers' developers, advocated eliminating
all height distinctions in the city, but agreed with his old adversary enough to oppose
piecemeal adjustments to the boundaries, saying, "my idea would be to leave the matter
as it is, but leave it there for good -- or else, change the whole business."2 10 John J.
Martin, former president of the Massachusetts Real Estate Exchange, explained that the
207See Commission on Height of Buildings in the City of Boston, Hearings (Boston, 1916),.98,
127.
208Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Hearings, 107.
209Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Hearings, 104.
210Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Hearings, 48.
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"present uncertainty in regard to district 'B', with the chances of the lines of the District
being changed from time to time, retards development." 211
With no statutory requirement that district boundaries reflect existing land uses, some
speakers projected land use trends into the future and asked the commissioners to draw
lines around their projections. "[T]he whole of the Back Bay," said Frederick 0.
Woodruff, a downtown developer and executive committee member of the
Massachusetts Real Estate Exchange, "has got within a few decades to be all business;
there will be no residences between Arlington street and Massachusetts avenue and the
water. That is coming, and it is only a question of time."212 Architect and developer
Clarence H. Blackall agreed: "Why, I believe that Commonwealth avenue is going to be
the retail street of this city some day."2 13 The commissioners paid attention to these
projections, when they thought they were accurate, and took into account "the general
and probable trend of business development" in setting the new boundaries.214
Witnesses' accounts of what would be were shaped by their feelings about what
ought to be, and some speakers urged the commissioners to go beyond passively
identifying trends to selecting among them. "I would like to see that Back Bay district
opened up," said Charles A. Ufford, who had long worked for a new downtown
around Park Square.215 The height district tool, invented and honed for preventing
change, was now being examined as a means of steering development, encouraging
particular changes which seemed desirable.
No matter how much developers hoped to promote change, they showed an almost
universal acceptance of the idea that some places should be exempt from it. On the first
day of testimony, Woodruff advocated eliminating the B district entirely, saying, "I tell
you that in real estate this idea of regulating business is a great mistake." But when
chairman Ralph Adams Cram asked if he would continue the restrictions around the
2 11Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Hearings, 31.
2 12Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Hearings, 171.
213Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Hearings, 143. See also 36, 51-52, 140, 171-72.
214Commission on Height of Buildings in the City of Boston, Report (City doc. 114, 1916), 4.
215Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Hearings, 155; see also 141, App., 155.
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State House, he anwered, "Yes, I would except that. I didn't think of that." 216
Everyone who admitted exceptions named Beacon Hill as one of them, but developers,
investors, and residents argued about the Back Bay, street by street. George F.
Washburn, president of the Massachusetts Real Estate Exchange, reported a poll of its
executive committee, which wanted the right to build tall "over every part of Boston,"
yet asked that the commission
protect Beacon Hill, where the sky line would be noticeable if there was an
irregularity of heights along there in the buildings. And from Newbury Street to the
water. That would leave Boylston street with the privilege of building to 125 feet
except where it passes through Copley Square, which under the law of course
would not be affected. ... That reserves the residential section which is held rather
sacred by Boston society.217
Even these people, whose counterparts fifty years earlier were the prophets and
engines of change, had thoroughly internalized the idea that the public policy was to
control environmental change, and that control would be exercised both to encourage
certain desirable developments, and also, at least in certain agreed-upon places, to
prevent change.
The building height commissioners announced their new boundaries November 2,
1916, more than doubling the area of the A district, bringing into it all of the South End
and wide swaths of South Boston and the waterfront. The Back Bay proper remained
in the B district, but they drew the boundary line down the middle of Boylston street,
allowing tall buildings around Park Square and in the vicinity of Copley Square, except
where the 1898 limits applied.218 After the library trustees and Trinity Church
complained, the commissioners put the maximum back to 80 feet in a small area around
Copley Square. 219
216Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Hearings, 15, 17.
217Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Hearings, 160.
2 18Commission on Height of Buildings (Boston), Report, 114.
2 19Letter to commission, November 27, 1916; quoted in Boston Herald, November 29, 1916. Boston
Herald, January 13, 1917; Commission on Height of Buildings in the City of Boston, Order...
Amending Boundaries (City doc. 45, 1917).
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While Bostonians were adjusting the controls they had invented twelve years earlier,
public regulation of change in the urban environment was evolving into its mature form
elsewhere. That form was comprehensive zoning, more-or-less as it is still practiced
today, and its advent was a direct result of Boston's development of height districting
under the police power.220
Elsewhere in the country, districting followed a separate line of development
regulating buildings' uses rather than their forms. As early as the 1880s, California
courts upheld ordinances regulating the location of potentially offensive land uses, not
as in Chicago through frontage consents, nor as in Boston through a permit process,
but by dividing cities into districts under the police power.221 In 1908, Los Angeles
made an important conceptual refinement to this technique by going beyond regulation
of specific proscribed uses to instead designate "residential districts" encompassing
most of the city's area, within which any non-residential uses would be allowed only
through a special "exception" process. Los Angeles' action came after the
Massachusetts high court upheld Boston's residential height districts in Welch v.
Swasey, but before the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case.
Planning activists in eastern cities were beginning during this period to think about
comprehensive systems of building regulations by district, which would bring together
height, use, and lot coverage rules. Housing reformers, for example, did not want
tenement laws based on slum conditions to determine the form of outlying
development. Such concerns were especially strong in New York City, which in 1898
annexed the vast and mostly undeveloped areas of Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten
Island; if Manhattan standards were applied to suburban areas within these new
boroughs, they would be essentially unregulated. These reformers discovered the
German model of building regulation known as the 'zone system,' in which concentric
220Massachusetts made an early attempt to generalize from Boston's innovation, a 1907 proposal
(House doc. 416) which would have given all the state's cities and towns the same right as Boston to
establish business and residential districts with different height limits. It failed in the legislature.
221Weiss, Community Builders, 81; W. L. Pollard, 'Outline of the Law of Zoning in the United
States,' The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 155, part 2 (1931): 19.
The first of these ordinances regulated hand laundries, as a means of segregating the Chinese
population, but the technique once upheld was applied to more legitimate land use concerns such as
livery stables, slaughter houses, and saloons.
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rings within each city were subject to different building height and area standards
permitting progressively less intense use of land with increasing distance from the city
center.222 One of the zone system's popularizers was Benjamin C. Marsh, executive
secretary of New York's private Committee on Congestion of Population, who together
with other members of the committee organized in 1909 the first National Conference
on City Planning.
The conference opened in Washington four days after the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld Welch v. Swasey. The first speaker after the welcoming remarks was Henry
Morganthau, a New York real estate operator and chairman of the Committee on
Congestion of Population, who devoted much of his talk to the possibilities of building
districts. He was apparently under the impression that Boston's 'residence' and
'business' districts were prescriptive rather than descriptive, and announced that "it has
been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that it is within the police
powers of a community to restrict the heights of buildings and confine the use of certain
parts of a city to residences and of other parts to business purposes."223 Other speakers
joined him in his call to bring the zone system to America.224
At the third national conference, two years later in Philadelphia, a Committee on
Legal and Administrative Methods presented the first pieces of a proposed uniform
code of city planning. Andrew Wright Crawford, Philadelphia's assistant city solicitor,
explained that the committee omitted provisions for zoning of building uses because
they could not yet find a consensus as to how it ought to work. "We do present an act,
however," he went on, "looking to the districting of cities, so far as the height of
buildings is concerned; an act that simply enables cities to follow the example of
Boston." 225
222Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., 'The Scope and Results of City Planning in Europe,' in City
Planning, Senate doc. 422, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 63-70; Toll, Zoned American, 123-25; Frank Backus
Williams, 'The German Zone Building Regulations,' in Heights of Buildings Commission (New
York), Report (New York, 1913), 94-119.
223Senate doc. 422, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 60. The U.S. Supreme Court in fact had not yet ruled on
such broad use categories. F. B. Williams, The Law of City Planning and Zoning (1922), 288.
224Senate doc. 422, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 69; 72.
225Senate doc. 422, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 240.
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Ernst Freund, foremost expert on the police power, and a German by birth, approved
of this height districting measure but thought it fortunate that the committee was not
trying to import the whole German zone system because, he said, "there is a
fundamental difference between American cities and German cities."226 As an example
he contrasted New York and Frankfurt, which in the past generation had grown by
similar proportions:
In Frankfurt the business district is now exactly where it was; no neighborhood, no
quarter of Frankfurt has changed its character - excepting of course the quarter that
has been added to the city. New York, as you all know, has profoundly changed.
Residence districts have first become business districts; and now they have become
factory districts. ... Therefore, the districting power in Germany means that it
simply registers conditions that are more or less permanent; in this country, it
would mean that the city would impose a character upon a neighborhood which that
neighborhood, in the course of time, would throw off.227
In the discussion following the sessions, conference participants rejected Freund's
conclusion, arguing instead that "in a country of rapid changes in the use of property
there was all the more need for control."228
Massachusetts was the first state to act in the spirit of this movement. The legislature
in 1912 established indirectly the possibility for zoning Massachusetts cities and towns
other than Boston, through an amendment to the fire code act which for forty years had
allowed cities to delineate fire limits and regulate construction within them. The
amendment added public health and morals to the permissible regulatory purposes, and
building heights and uses to the permissible regulations, making them in theory as
versatile as the German system. The suburb of Lexington tried to use the law to
effectively exclude all manufacturing from the town, but the Supreme Judicial Court
ruled that this exceeded even the broad authority granted under the act.2 If any other
municipalities took advantage of the 1912 statute, their actions were not publicized and
did not find their way into the courts; Massachusetts provided neither the legal nor the
226Senate doc. 422, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 245.
227Senate doc. 422, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 245.
228Senate doc. 422, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 258.
229Heights of Buildings Commission (New York), Report, 39; Massachusetts Acts & Resolves,
1912, Acts ch. 334; Kilgour v. Gratto, 224 Mass. 78 (1916).
310
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
practical precedent the zoning movement needed.230 Several states and cities across the
country passed versions of districting in 1913, including one which applied to New
York state's smaller cities, but all of these involved use regulations alone.231
The movement's national precedent came, much more conspicuously and with greater
deliberation, in New York City's formulation and adoption of a comprehensive zoning
ordinance. New York's zoning resulted in large part from an unusual quest for
environmental stability, a crusade by the Fifth Avenue Association to fix in place once
and for all the fashionable retail district. It had been migrating northward at the rate of
twenty blocks each generation, advancing by displacing the homes of the wealthy, and
being chased from behind by the garment industry, which sought proximity to its retail
customers. The association sought to thwart not commercialization but industrialization;
the high-class shopping district had itself become a valued and threatened icon. The
industry's looming loft buildings shaded sidewalks, and its immigrant workforce
crowded them, both of which disrupted what one association representative called the
"sensitive and delicate organism" of a luxury retail street.232 Merchants had already
begun the next uptown march, to the forties and fifties, but many feared that this was
only the beginning of another self-defeating cycle. Like the Back Bay's residents and
Copley Square's institutional directors, they resolved to stand their ground and fight,
and they found that their Boston predecessors had provided a weapon for them. The
Fifth Avenue Association lobbied hard for a height district there in which buildings
would be restricted to 125 feet, which merchants hoped would make further
construction of manufacturing lofts uneconomical.233
New Yorkers had struggled for decades with the need to regulate buildings which
rose much taller than those in Boston, creating development expectations that made
impractical a citywide ceiling like Boston's original 125-foot limit. The Supreme
Court's affirmation of the A and B districts in Welch v. Swasey offered wide latitude
230 For example, Lawrence Veiller, 'Protecting Residential Districts,' Proceedings of the Sixth
National Conference on City Planning, Toronto, May 25-27, 1914 (Boston, 1914), 92-111, makes no
mention of Massachusetts in an otherwise exhaustive survey.
231Heights of Buildings Commission (New York), Report, 38-42.
232Heights of Buildings Commission (New York), Report, 269; Toll, Zoned American, 93-116, 158-
59.
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in using the police power, and made a more complicated set of regulations seem
possible for the more complicated conditions in New York. In 1913 the city set up a
commission to consider regulating the "height, size, and arrangement" of buildings -
their uses were not yet part of the formula - by dividing the city into "zones."234 These
New York City commissioners took the unusual step of holding a public hearing in
Boston, and on the steamboat which brought them back home they discussed what they
had heard about that city's experience with height districts and concluded, as
commission vice chairman Lawson Purdy recalled, that this was indeed "the answer"
for New York.235 When they later decided that district regulations ought to encompass
not only buildings' forms but also their functions, they laid the groundwork for the first
American comprehensive zoning ordinance, which would dictate with great specificity
the height, use, shape, and siting of buildings throughout the city.236
The commission endorsed the proposed Fifth Avenue height limits, with the further
recommendation that the area also be put off limits to manufacturing uses, because
"[t]he preservation of that thoroughfare as a high-class shopping center is essential to
the business prosperity of the entire city."237 As Seymour Toll points out in his history
of New York's zoning, the Fifth Avenue Association was not quite the defender of
tradition that it made itself out to be.
The fact is that the drive to get law onto Fifth Avenue was really not a struggle to
preserve a tradition at all. ... The retailer and many of the landowners were only the
latest of Johnnies-come-lately. The struggle was actually about getting some kind of
public control under which an urban tradition - this one happened to be the elegant
shopping boulevard - might now begin with some assurance that it could
continue.238
After the commission presented its recommendations, debate in New York tipped
decisively in favor of zoning because of a single extraordinary structure then under
233Toll, Zoned American, 146.
234Heights of Buildings Commission (New York), Report, 1.
235Lawson Purdy, quoted in Toll, Zoned American, 167.
236Heights of Buildings Commission (New York), Report, 71-75.
237Heights of Buildings Commission (New York), Report, 72, 51-53.
238Toll, Zoned American, 159-60.
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construction. This was the new Equitable Building, the largest office building in the
world, filling an entire block of lower Broadway straight up from the sidewalk to the
height of 496 feet. Commercial tenants nearby, most of them on the short leases then
customary, fled its shadow after it was completed in 1915, and eventually the city had
to reduce real estate assessments for four blocks northward.239 This was an eloquent
demonstration of real estate's financial reliance on environmental stability, and a
powerful concrete argument for public regulation to achieve it. On July 25, 1916, New
York City enacted its zoning ordinance.2O
Zoning spread rapidly to other cities throughout the United States. It was generally
supported by the larger and more established developers, brokers, and investors in each
place, who increasingly valued stability of investment over potential speculative gain.
Zoning could promote stability at two different scales. First, at the small scale of
individual neighborhoods it protected individual lot owners from inharmonious
structures or uses nearby. Zoning was the culmination of the search for public controls
to make up for the shortcomings of private deed restrictions, stabilizing neighborhoods
by protecting them from encroachments. Duncan McDuffie, the largest developer in
northern California, advocated a zoning ordinance for his hometown of Berkeley
because it would "give property outside of restricted sections that protection now
enjoyed by a few districts alone and will prevent deterioration and assist in stabilizing
values." 241 McDuffie used deed restrictions in his own subdivisions, and zoning could
extend similar controls to adjacent land he did not own.242 The commission drawing
New York's zone boundaries was besieged by requests from homeowners who wanted
their property included in the most restrictive district so that it would remain protected
after deed covenants expired.243 George B. Ford, who headed the New York
239Paul Goldberger, The Skyscraper (New York, 1981), 13; Heights of Buildings Commission (New
York), Report, 64; Stephen Zoll, 'King Kong in New York,' Space & Society 18 (1982): 16.
2 Toll, Zoned American, 180.
24 1Quoted in Weiss, 'Berkeley,' 13; Toll, Zoned American, 196-97.
242Weiss, 'Berkeley,' 16.
243Edward M. Bassett, discussion of Veiller, 'Districting by Municipal Regulation,' 162.
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commission's staff, believed that "about two thirds of the whole city has been set aside
for all time for strictly residential use."2"
Second, at the scale of the entire city zoning could protect investment from decline
due to unpredictable shifts in urban structure. It would accomplish this by freezing the
character of districts, an imposition of will on the city w ch Freund felt could not work
in America, and for which his audience so yearned. This anti-speculative function of
zoning was in fact less evident in Boston, where conservative real estate trustees kept
much of the business development to a small downtown area, than in places with a
more speculative real estate tradition, such as New York and Los Angeles. The uptown
march which once symbolized progress to New Yorkers, especially those with any
interest in real estate, became a problem when significant numbers of people found
themselves losing money on it. Los Angeles' downtown real estate community used
zoning in an unsuccessful fight against the decentralization of business onto Wilshire
Boulevard.245
The year after New York passed its zoning ordinance, a Massachusetts constitutional
convention proposed what would become the first state constitutional amendment for
zoning. Before the New York ordinance, many reformers had assumed such
amendments would be necessary to put zoning into effect, and other states, including
New York, considered such action to resolve doubts about this expansion of the police
power. In view of Massachusetts courts' friendliness to the police power, an
amendment there was perhaps an excess of caution, but no court had yet affirmed the
1912 zoning statute, lawyers were skeptical that California precedents would carry
much weight in the east, and the convention already in session was a one-time
opportunity.24 Voters in 1918 passed the amendment by a nearly 2 to 1 margin
statewide and by an even larger margin in Boston, at the same election in which they
approved Appleton's preservation amendment and several other environmental
244Discussion of Veiller, 'Districting by Municipal Regulation,' 165.
245Robert M. Fogelson, The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles 1850-1930 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1967), 261-62. Duncan McDuffie argued for zoning in Berkeley to "protect the business districts of the
city against the competition created by scattering stores through residence districts" (quoted in Weiss,
'Berkeley,' 13).
24Toll, Zoned American, 173; Lawrence Veiller, 'Districting by Municipal Regulation,' 153.
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measures. The legislature took more interest in zoning than it did in Appleton's cause,
and in 1920 passed a zoning enabling act.247 During the next three and a half years, a
dozen Massachusetts cities and towns adopted zoning ordinances.24
Both Boston and Los Angeles, having pioneered early districting measures, were
slow to adopt comprehensive zoning, feeling less urgency than in cities where
development was completely unregulated. The Boston City Planning Board had been
asking for zoning since 1915, but did not begin to get it until 1922, when Mayor
Curley appointed resentatives of various consituencies to a zoning advisory
commission which was to work with the board in preparing a zoning ordinance. The
project was directed by Arthur C. Comey, working with consultant Edward M.
Bassett, the lawyer who had prepared New York's ordinance. The planning board
decided to submit Boston's zoning to the legislature because it was not clear, even with
the zoning enabling act, that a city ordinance could supersed the legislature's many
special enactments on building construction and heights for Boston. The city's bill
passed and took effect on June 5, 1924.249
There was a direct relationship between Boston's various districting regulations and
the explicitly preservationist causes which had first brought them into being, but the
relationship gradually grew weaker over the years. Preservationists supported the A
and B height districts. Of fifteen "distinguished gentlemen" cited in City Council debate
as backers of the 1904 measure, at least nine had been publicly involved in one or more
247Frederic H. Fay, 'The Planning of a City,' in Herlihy, ed., Fifty Years of Boston (Boston, 1932),
50; Massachusetts constitution, amendments, article 60: "The general court [the legislature] shall have
power to limit buildings according to their use or construction to specified districts of cities or towns."
The amendment's brevity proved problematic, as it made no provision for the legislature to delegate
this power to cities and towns. Action in the 1919 session was stymied by the attorney general's
insistence that such delegation would be unconstitutional (Opinions of the Attorney General 5 [1917-
20]: 362-65), but the Supreme Judicial Court contradicted him in an advisory opinion (Opinion of the
Justices, 234 Mass. 597 [1920]), so the measure was enacted the following year: Massachusetts Acts
and Resolves, 1920, Acts ch. 601, "An Act to authorize cities and towns to limit buildings according
to their use or construction to specified districts."
248Boston City Planning Board, 'Growth of the Zoning Movement,' January 15, 1924 (typescript at
Loeb Library, Harvard), 4.
249Boston City Planning Board, Zoning for Boston: A Survey and a Comprehensive Plan (Boston,
1924), 9-10; Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1924, Acts ch. 488.
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preservationist campaigns, including those to protect the Old South Church, the
Bulfinch State House, Park Street Church, the Paul Revere House, and the Common.
Of the 84 petitioners to repeal the districts the following year, only one had joined in
any of those causes, while four had remonstrated to the legislature against assisting the
Old South effort. Twenty years later, while the creation of Boston's zoning was in no
sense dominated by preservation activists, a representative of the the Beacon Hill
Association appeared before the legislature to support the bill.250
The relationship between zoning and preservation was acknowledged not only by
preservationists but by planners as well. While zoning in many cities benefitted
outlying areas of suburban character while providing little or no protection to old
residential areas near the city center, Boston's zoning did protect many close-in
neighborhoods, and did so with an explicitly preservationist rationale. "A direct benefit
of zoning," said the planning board as it explained the new zoning law, "which is
perhaps of more value in Boston than in any other city in the United States, will be the
protection and preservation of old historical buildings and sites," such as the "famous
Beacon Hill district."251
Neighborhood preservation efforts soon did their work through zoning. Significant
new development now required zone changes, and the Beacon Hill Association set up a
'Zoning Defence Committee' to fight them, led by restoration architect Frank A.
Bourne and realtor William Coombs Codman. They went beyond defense to initiate
zone changes which would reduce allowable density and, they hoped, prevent further
apartment construction on the hill.252 In the Back Bay, the future form of which was a
less settled issue, development proposals also became zoning controversies. Beacon
Hill activists joined Back Bay residents in fighting them, both to protect the hill's views
across the Public Garden and to help a neighborhood which they saw as being in the
same position as their own had been a generation earlier. They lost significant battles in
250Boston City Council Minutes, 1904, 113 (March 24); Boston City Planning Board, Zoning for
Boston, 29.
2 51Boston City Planning Board, Zoning for Boston, 34.
252Boston Herald, October 2, 1926; Beacon Hill Association, Zoning Defence Committee, The
Menace to Beacon Hill (Boston, 1927); Boston Herald, June 22, June 29, 1929; Boston Evening
Transcript, March 8, 1933; Boston Herald, April 7, 1933.
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the Back Bay, such as a zone change which allowed the 190-foot Ritz-Carlton Hotel on
Arlington Street, so that zoning came to seem a threat from which they needed defense,
as well as a means of defense from other threats.253
If zoning was about environmental stability, could it be written in a way which would
make it explicitly a tool for historic preservation? Historic district zoning was the
natural synthesis of all the branches of the search for environmental permanence,
combining development controls, which had evolved into zoning, and preservation
which had evolved toward area restoration. This synthesis appeared first not in Boston
but in southern cities.
Even as Boston was adopting its conventional zoning in 1924, New Orleans was
preparing an historic district preservation measure, although it was not enacted until
after a state constitutional amendment passed in 1936.254 Charleston, South Carolina,
enacted the first American historic district zoning ordinance in 1931. Within the
officially mapped 'Old and Historic Charleston' district, no exterior alterations could be
carried out until a Board of Architectural Review granted a 'certificate of
appropriateness.'255 Boston eventually became the first northern city to enact historic
district zoning, for Beacon Hill, but did not do so until 1955, two decades after these
southern pioneers and after a number of other southern cities had followed their
example.256
253
'Zoning, Autos, and Subways,' W. C. Codman letter to the editor, Boston Evening Transcript, n.d.
(clipping in W. C. Codman papers, SPNEA); Boston Herald, October 30, 1926.
254There is some confusion in the record about what New Orleans actually did in the mid-1920s. Jacob
H. Morrison, the nation's foremost authority on preservation law and a New Orleans resident, wrote
that the city passed an historic district ordinance in 1924 "[bjut it was never put into effect" (Historic
Preservation Law, 17, n. 11). Charles Hosmer in his first history of preservation wrote that New
Orleans architects in 1926 and 1927 worked on "the first effort to create a municipal historic
preservation law in the United States" (Presence of the Past, 205), but in the sequel to that work he
said they "evidently failed. There is no evidence that any ordinance actually came up for consideration at
this time." (Preservation Comes of Age 1:294). However, he cites "a weak law in New Orleans,"
extant in 1929, as the sole precedent for Charleston's historic district zoning (1:239).
255Hosmer, Preservation Comes of Age 1:240.
256Morrison, Historic Preservation Law, 12-14. The historic district campaign on Beacon Hill was led
by John Codman (Jacobs, 'Architectural Preservation in the United States,' 328), son and business
successor of William Coombs Codman ('Retires as Head of Firm of W. C. Codman & Sons,' October
1, 1932 clipping in W. C. Codman papers, SPNEA).
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Why did southern cities arrive first at this synthesis of preservation and zoning, when
both movements had been active so much longer in Boston? This paradox holds its
own explanation, for longer experience with these movements made northerners first of
all less likely to think it possible for zoning to encompass preservation, and second,
less likely to think it necessary or even desirable. Northern cities' practice of planning
and zoning had already produced a mobile corps of smart lawyers and sophisticated
consultants sensitive to legal nuances. They were concerned, especially before the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1924 upheld a zoning ordinance in Euclid v. Ambler, about dubious
regulations which might bring down their whole constitutional house of cards. They
thought of preservation as a special case of aesthetic control, and cited Welch v.
Swasey as authority that aesthetics alone would not support use of the police
power.257
Southerners were less aware of legal precedent and ordinary practice - Charleston
mayor Thomas P. Stoney cheerfully acknowledged himself "incompetent to judge how
a city should be zoned" - and their comparative inexperience left them free to
improvise.258 Charleston still had no zoning in 1929, as its citizens were becoming
concerned about business incursions into the city's historic Battery district. The
preservation impulse preceded organized city planning there, and citizens assumed that
planning and zoning must be available to gratify it. Mayor Stoney created a temporary
City Planning and Zoning Commission of city officials, charged with reviewing
applications for commercial construction. When the commission refused permission for
a proposed gas station in the old part of Charleston, the city was impelled to create a
legal framework that would legitimize an action already taken on its behalf. For years
afterwards, Charleston emphasized persuasion and compromise in order to keep its
historic district decisions out of court and instead, apparently assuming that any test
case was likely to overturn it.259
257Morrison, Historic Preservation Law, 21. The main branch of aesthetic control, around which most
litigation centered, was billboard regulation.
258Quoted in Hosmer, Preservation Comes of Age, 1:239.
259Hosmer, Preservation Comes of Age, 1:241.
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While experience with zoning made northerners less apt to think historic districts
possible, experience with preservation made Bostonians in particular less likely to think
them necessary. Hosmer attributes their origins in the south to the recognition that cities
there could not afford to save whole urban landscapes piecemeal. But Boston had
already done just that. It had saved its Common and Bulfinch State House, kept both
from being overwhelmed by skyscrapers, and held a large and moneyed enough elite
that all of fashionable Beacon Hill could be restored and even expanded. Surrounded
by such successes, Bostonians saw no need for radical measures, and the politics of a
northern city made municipal control over matters of architectural taste seem more
radical there than in the south.
If preservation's means came more easily in Boston, preservation seemed more
important as an end in southern cities. Not only did people look more longingly to the
past in the former Confederacy than elsewhere, but historic ambiance in the present
took on an economic importance there, through tourism, which it could not have in
big northern cities whose historic fabric was threatened by intensive development
which was clearly of great economic importance itself.
New England preservationists' most striking contrast with their southern counterparts
was their inability to grasp even the abstract desirability of historic zoning. When
Charleston was first considering how to protect the Battery district, preservationist
Samuel G. Stoney wrote to William Sumner Appleton for advice: "Has any attempt
been made in New England communities to regulate such affairs through municipal
government?" 261 "As I understand it you are not asking for any advice concerning the
preservation of any particular house," replied the puzzled Appleton in a long letter
which evidently meant to be helpful but nowhere touched upon Stoney's question. 262
Why did public regulation so elude Appleton's understanding? First of all, he was
blinded by a conservative aversion to the use of government powers, compounded by
mistrust of government personnel such as the legislators whose inaction left his
260Morrison, Historic Preservation Law, 39, 41-42.
261Stoney to Appleton, March 21, 1929, in Microfiche correspondence archive, SPNEA; Hosmer,
Preservation Comes of Age, 1:237.
262Appleton to Stoney, March 26, 1929, 2, Microfiche correspondence archive, SPNEA
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contitutional amendment inoperative. Appleton was even more conservative about
property rights than were the many property owners and investors who were embracing
public regulation, because his conservatism was defined by principle while theirs
stemmed from the more flexible calculus of self-interest. Appleton had no faith in any
preservation technique except ownership by an organized society, preferably his own.
He expressed skepticism about the idea of private restoration and resale, even though it
had been working in Boston for a generation and in Charleston for at least a decade.3
Second, and more important for the schism it opened between preservation and
planning, was Appleton's archaeological and art historical definition of the field. He
saw houses as antiques. He was more interested in small than in big things, a view that
by the 1920s helped uncouple preservation's tentative link with the parks movement,
which itself had changed emphasis to focus on playgrounds and active recreation rather
than saving landscapes. Appleton considered neighborhood restoration a local issue, a
distraction from his regional view. As professional preservationists gained the academic
perspective to evaluate individual historic structures more or less objectively, they lost
some of the resident amateur's ability to see them subjectively together, 'tout
ensemble,' as New Orleans preservationists put it. Appleton's consistency and
comprehensiveness were essential for developing the systematic preservationism that
would make historic districts permissible under the police power, but the motivation for
attempting them was the earlier subjective appreciation which had saved so much of the
center of Boston. These two branches of the preservation movement had separated and
not yet come back together.
A few Bostonians did make the arguments which would later form the basis for
landmark regulation. They had argued that Park Street Church, and the Old South
before it, belonged to the public. Their proprietors were in preservationist eyes trustees,
just as the city of Boston was in holding the Common for the people. Similarly, owners
of property on Commonwealth Avenue, in Copley Square, and around the Bulfinch
State House had responsibilities toward the urban ensemble from which their land took
much of its value. Preservationists articulated an ideal of private stewardship in which
263Appleton to Stoney, April 4, 1929, Microfiche correspondence archive, SPNEA.
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restrictions on each of these places would meet the police power test of reasonableness
because it was unreasonable to build for selfish gain at the expense of community
icons. Such views did not seem radical when they were first urged in the 1880s and
1890s; their most forceful proponents included a city council president, a mayor, a state
attorney general, a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, and some of the city's biggest
property owners. By the end of the first world war, these ideas were in the mainstream
of discussion about city planning, but they were no longer in the mainstream of
preservationism as it was being led by Appleton and peopled by genealogical and
patriotic zealots. The philosophy and personnel of the preservation movement had
undergone a shift which kept it from coalescing during this period around some
consensus for public action, even as action was becoming possible.
Preservationism grew increasingly irrelevant to Boston's urban landscape. Brahmins'
nineteenth-century involvement in civic affairs waned as the city government was
increasingly taken over by the kind of machine politics which had existed for decades in
other big cities. As the old aristocracy became less effective, it also became less
interested in the public environment, retreating to safely Anglo-Saxon suburbs or to
constricted orbits within the city. Preservationists continued defending the landmarks
they had already saved, but they took few new initiatives; their purview had continually
expanded from the 1870s to the 'teens, but now for a generation or so they paused and
consolidated.
By the early twentieth century, the search for permanence produced a rapidly
expanding set of tools for public control of environmental change. They were powerful
tools which completely reformed the way urban development worked. Their very
power left them to be explored, shaped, and expanded by people who, unlike Boston's
Brahmins, were still willing to wade into the public arena. Some were reformers
motivated by altruism, others such as the real estate industry were motivated by self-
interest; few were necessarily concerned with environmental permanence.
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Conclusion
By the 1920s, environmental change had come under control to a degree nearly
unimaginable in America fifty years before, and, equally surprising, this had been
accomplished largely by public rather than private methods.
The three strands of efforts to control environmental change began from a single
source, and they led to a single destination, though they followed different routes
getting there. Their origin was a widespread and largely undifferentiated rejection of the
culture of change in the urban environment. As Americans searched for an alternative
environmental culture, specific concerns elicited specific responses. To build for
permanency in new parts of the city, they invented the private planning mechanism of
deed restrictions. For valued places which seemed permanent but in fact had no
guarantees of survival, they formulated a range of preservationist tactics. As these
techniques were explored, their shortcomings led people to a third class of efforts:
public controls on environmental change. At first a bewildering variety of them, often
quite specific, resolved particular situations in particular places. Eventually they
matured into zoning, a single, systematic and nearly all-encompassing form of
regulation which asserted public control over most significant physical change in the
city.
Zoning absorbed both the rudimentary public height and use regulations which had
preceded it, and also much of the tradition of private planning through deed restrictions,
which lay behind the early public controls. As we have seen, most simple land use
controls were applied with complex ends in mind, such as the attempts to use front-
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yard setbacks to thwart conversion of residential avenues to shopping streets.
Comprehensive zoning addressed such issues more directly, and better matched their
complexity. Zoning itself grew more complicated as planners' understanding grew
more sophisticated, and as expectations rose about what it could accomplish. Deed
restrictions continued to be used for many purposes, but their main original aims were
answered by zoning, and at least a few observers thought at first that zoning would
render them entirely obsolete.
Zoning and city planning also absorbed much of the broad and eclectic preservation
movement which C. R. Ashbee had found on his visit to America at the turn of the
century, the ad hoc campaigns by which Bostonians had defended increasingly large
pieces of the city center, until they defined whole districts as historic fabric and took
steps to keep it in place. William Sumner Appleton and SPNEA, concerned not with
large-scale environments at all but with a limited and scattered set of ancient houses,
foreordained the split in which purist preservationists would fail to be integrated into
this movement which subsumed the other two branches of search for permanence.
They also helped accomplish the split, by driving people with those broader concerns
elsewhere: the preservationist movement as it was first becoming institutionalized did
so in a constricted manner, just as the city planning movement, also newly organizing,
was expanding the purview of its engineering and landscape architecture forebears to
encompass all aspects of the urban environment.
If zoning was the single culmination of these various campaigns, then historic district
regulation was an integral part of it. Charleston's naive view of zoning was a natural
view, as it was fundamentally about controlling change, and historic districts were the
places where such control was most essential. From this perspective, northern
preservationism heading off on its own was a departure from first principles, and the
nationwide spread of historic district zoning, which finally took place in the 1950s and
'60s, was not the innovation it has usually been seen as, but rather a belated family
reunion.
In the process of subjecting environmental change to conscious communal will, the
ideal of permanence which motivated people at first had lost much of its appeal, and
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had been replaced by the more modest and pragmatic ideals of stability and control. In
two generations, Americans in their cities had moved from celebration of change, first
to an ideal of permanence, and then to a reality of controlled change.
Permanence had been attractive because it was the opposite of change; once change
began to seem controllable, it ceased to be so frightening. By the 'teens, the
permanence of Boston's urban form seemed alarming rather than reassuring. When
Bostonians first set out to pursue this goal in the 1870s and '80s, the same
environmental changes which made people yearn for stability also provided evidence of
the city's vitality - the enormous Back Bay landmaking, the annexations which
multiplied the city's area. A generation later, however, Bostonians could read many
signs giving opposite indications. They were acutely aware of their cramped little
business district; they lacked a modern skyline because of their own building height
restrictions; surface congestion continually worsened around the sacrosanct Common,
where almost every street improvement scheme in fifty years had come to nothing; and
though the metropolitan area was still growing apace, it did so in suburban towns
which the city was utterly unable to annex. By the 'teens Boston's stability looked like
stagnation, and this made change, if properly channelled, look more attractive than
permanence.
The principal of permanence was largely abandoned by the 1920s. City planners
concerned themselves with controlling rather than preventing change. Modernist
architects promulgated a new incarnation of the idea that old is corrupt. Even most
preservationists agreed, when the 'old' in question was the late Victorian excess which
surrounded them and which had erased so much of what they revered, and so these
preservationists could accept radical change so long as it respected the few islands they
valued.
Within their own sphere, too, preservationists had moved beyond the simple notion
of permanence. Appleton indeed wanted his houses to last forever, but he understood
that permanence was not a status to which a building could simply be elevated; it was a
result which had to be accomplished. Appleton wanted permanence, so he worked for
control.
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Even if physical permanence were possible, shifting ideas could make it as
undesirable in preservation as in other physical aspects of the city. Preservationists
have become Ruskinians through the sobering experience of re-restoring earlier
restorations; the depredations of time have often been more kind to their physical
materials than to their scholarly basis. Whitmore's work on the Old State House had
been repudiated even in his lifetime, without detracting from his credit for defending it.
Restoration architects have come to embrace reversibility as a first principal governing
their actions; in effect preservationists value control over permanence.
The steps beyond permanence to control have been recognized by an increasingly
sophisticated movement, in James Marston Fitch's definition of preservation as
"curatorial management" of the environment, an ongoing activity rather than a discrete
act of salvation. Even if it were possible to freeze time at a particular moment, as some
early restorers set out to do, the result smelled of embalming and was hardly
satisfactory to people who had learned to appreciate the continuity of living historic
neighborhoods. In the urban environment, such an approach leads preservationists to
managing rather than blindly resisting change; this philosophy together with their ever-
expanding purview has once again removed the barriers between preservation and
planning. 1
Area restoration is the most far-reaching example of preservation as a process of
managing rather than resisting change. The idea that change could be good, could
return things to a desirable prior state, not only at the scale of a restored building but at
the larger urban scale, was tremendously powerful, and greatly expanded the fraction
of the environment with which preservationists might concern themselves. It was more
potent still in its effects on planning in general. Edward M. Bassett, reflecting in the
mid-1920s about New York's experience with zoning, noted that "No blighted districts
have begun in this city since the zoning was established, but on the contrary, some that
had begun have been redeemed."2 Real estate theory, lagging behing practice once
again as it had with deed restrictions, debated during the 1930s and 1940s whether it
1See Eugenie Birch and Douglas Roby, 'The Planner and the Preservationist: An Uneasy Alliance,'
Journal of the American Planning Assocation 50 (1984): 194.
2Edward M. Bassett, quoted in Toll, Zoned American, 193. Italics original.
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was really possible for neighborhoods to improve without being physically
reconstructed, whether all the ones that had been doing it for forty years were somehow
special cases to be disregarded.
Control of change does not necessarily lead to stability; in the mid-nineteenth century,
abuse of the limited controls then in existence was one of the irritants which led people
to question the culture of change. Human nature had not changed since then, and the
increased powers over the physical environment were explored by all kinds of people,
many with greed in their eyes and some with larceny in their hearts.3 Speculation
depends on anticipating change, and any expansion of controls on change offered
expanded speculative possibilities.
The simplest speculative subversion of zoning was 'overzoning,' the classification of
far more land in intense use categories than the market was likely to allocate for them,
so that a zoning ordinance served not as a limitation on development, but as boosterism
for opportunists.4 Marc Weiss, in The Rise of the Community Builders, chronicles Los
Angeles' adoption of zoning and the real estate industry's adaptive response in which
"the 'rabid speculator' who at first balked at zoning soon found it to be a very congenial
ally ... zoning became the ultimate promotional device, a form of government-
subsidized free advertising." 5 William B. Munroe, a contemporary expert on municipal
administration, observed that "the signs went up on vacant lots: 'Zoned for business,'
or 'Zoned for apartments,' with the definite implication that such action on the part of
the public authorities had resulted in giving the property a higher and more assured
value than it would otherwise have." 6
Other manipulations of zoning could also enrich speculators at the expense of
environmental stability. Zone changes, variances, and exceptions, intended as
3Toll, Zoned American, 207-210.
4Weiss, Community Builders, 96-105; Toll, Zoned American, 206-07.
5Weiss, Community Builders, 98-99. Quote refers to Huber Smutz, Los Angeles Zoning
Administrator (re 1921 zoning revision): "It was either a proposition of zoning the rabid speculator's
property for the purpose for which he was holding it or having no zoning at all and hence no protection
for residential districts."
6William B. Munroe, 'A Danger Spot in the Zoning Movement,' Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 155, part 2 (1931), 203.
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refinements of public control, could also become methods of achieving publicly-
enforced land-use monopolies. "Unlike deed restrictions," notes Weiss, zoning offered
additional opportunities for speculation because "zoning classifications and regulations
could easily be changed by a majority vote of the City Council. Real estate values could
therefore be manipulated by acquiring property with one zoning designation and having
it changed to another, or by selling property with the implied promise that its current
zoning designation could be changed."7 These practices pointed to one advantage of
deed restrictions over public controls - within the limits of their specific provisions and
durations, deed restrictions provided reliable if cumbersome protection, with
enforcement in the hands of the aggrieved neighbors. Zoning provided more flexible
control, but the flexibility was in the hands of municipal officials, who might or might
not respond to neighborhood concerns. Subdividers continued imposing restrictions,
both to control matters that were beyond the reach of the police power, such as
architectural style, minimum cost - and the race of occupants - and to provide long-term
buttressing of neighborhood character independent of municipal caprice.8
Planners campaigned against these perversions of zoning. Overzoning, they argued,
kept supply out of balance with demand -in the land market, thus contributing to rather
than relieving uncertainty in urban development. Many of zoning's original advocates
were unpleasantly surprised by the frequency and deviousness with which the
variance, exception, and zone change mechanisms were used. They had conceived
these as escape valves to be used for making infrequent adjustments in keeping with the
original spirit of districts, or for recognizing substantially changed conditions. Instead
they swiftly became the most frequently invoked portions of zoning ordinances, used
not to carry out but to undermine their original intentions.9
7Weiss, Community Builders, 99; Weiss, 'The Real Estate Industry and the Politics of Zoning in San
Francisco, 1914-1928,' Planning Perspectives 3 (1988); Toll, Zoned American, 207-210.
8See Lawrence Veiller, 'Districting by Municipal Regulation,' 156.
9Weiss, Community Builders, 102; Fogelson, Fragmented Metropolis, 255-57, 261-62. Boston's
experience was less disturbing. From the organization of the Board of Zoning Adjustment in 1924,
through the end of 1930, 64 petitions for zone changes were granted out of 219 applications (Fay, 'The
Planning of a City,' 52-53).
327
Holleran, 'Changeful Times'
But plannerly dismay at these phenomena missed the essential difference from old
ways: the context for speculation now was a public policy of control over
environmental change. By its very existence, zoning indicates a presumption in favor of
stability, continuity, and preservation. And, while public regulation might in practice be
ineffective in preventing change, since zoning supplemented rather than supplanted
deed restrictions, if it offered any protection at all it was protection in addition to the
private methods which remained available.
One conclusion we can easily reach about Americans' turn-of-the century search for
permanence in the urban environment is that it worked. Metropolitan Boston has
changed as much in the sixty years since 1930 as it did in the sixty years preceding.
Yet almost all of the icons which those Bostonians set out to save remain saved.
The center of the city has been remade almost completely, but it has been remade
around its landmarks, all of the ones identified by nineteenth-century preservationists,
and many more which have been added to the list. The Old South Church, the Old State
House, Faneuil Hall, Paul Revere's House - all remain, and now make up parts of the
Boston National Historical Park. The Bulfinch State House, Park Street and St. Paul's
churches, and the Athenaeum all stand in their familiar places, still put to their original
uses. The street numbers on the Granary and King's Chapel burial grounds remain
unused.
The structures and places newly built for permanence have mostly achieved it, by all
indications so far. At Copley Square, Richardson's Trinity Church faces McKim's
Public Library; each has surely achieved its intended immortality.
Neighborhoods built for permanence, and neighborhoods resolutely defended,
mostly retain their intended qualities after a century. In the 1870s there was no urban
residential district in the country of which that could be said. But today Beacon Hill
west of the state house remains almost exactly as it was, andthe apartments which first
provoked height restrictions there remain the tallest buildings on its Beacon Street
skyline. The Back Bay, too, is now an historic district, and most of the buildings
which survived the 1920s have lasted to the present. Olmsted's deed-restricted
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Brookline subdivisions, and many others of their type, remain among the most
attractive and prized residential locations in the Boston area, and the same story can be
found in cities around the United States, at Llewellyn Park outside New York, Roland
Park in Baltimore, and Shaker Heights outside Cleveland, where the century-long
restrictions are still in force. These neighborhoods, designed for permanence, have in
fact been the places where American city-dwellers stood their ground and most closely
achieved it.
The Common remains, as do fights about it. In the 1960s Bostonians again argued
over the sanctity of the space beneath it, as they decided to put a parking garage there;
in the 1980s they even replayed the subway imbroglios, as they expanded Park Street
station and fretted over its effect on the trees. Boston's Common, like New York's
Central Park, will remain fertile ground for controversy because each in its respective
city is the litmus test for commitment to environmental permanence; they are the screens
on which people project their images of stability.
The triumph over the culture of change has not been limited to conspicuous symbolic
locations, but has permeated the way we make and re-make cities. Even at the growing
edges of metropolitan areas, we seldom find anything quite like the wide-open frontier
of nineteenth-century suburbs, with their miles of paper streets outlining
neighborhoods which might become mansions, or tenements, or factories, or all three.
Instead, even where change is admitted to be inevitable, it is usually tightly confined by
as-of-right zoning, and where developers wish to depart from these marked channels
their neighbors look to government with every expectation that it will protect then from
unwanted surprises. For every exception to the pattern - Urban Renewal and its
modem-day Poletown equivalents, organized sell-outs in which neighborhoods use
their zoning to profit from land use conversion - there are many more examples of no-
growth opposition to all change, a contemporary quest for permanence. These modern
anti-development constituencies want to keep it the way it was, the same rallying cry as
a hundred years ago, but applied now to a far more encompassing environment than
any nineteenth-century obstructionist would ever have dared.
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We face the same issues of change, permanence, and control, and we debate them in
terms that were at least sketched out then. We fight many of the same battles, often with
weapons forged then. We have created some new ones of our own - police-power
regulations applied to individual historic landmarks; growth controls which in some
cases directly regulate not only the substance but the rate of change. But most of what
we do in regulating ordinary development today would have been understandable to
anyone familiar with the development world of the 1920s, while that world would have
been largely incomprehensible to a developer from fifty years earlier. Everything that
we have added since then has been refinement on a basic premise first agreed upon by
that generation: change in the urban environment is not an unalloyed good but rather a
necessary evil, and it is the public's right and responsibility to control it.
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